ORDER M.L. Bhat, J. - Judgment dated 5-8-85 passed by the Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad is challenged in this writ petition on number of grounds. 2. In order to understand the controversy raised in this writ petition it is necessary to state briefly the facts of the case. From the record it transpires that Likhi Ram, Atar Singh and Murari Lal were sons of Todal Mal. Likhi Ram and Ater Singh had no son. They have executed a registered will in favour of Murari Lal on 24-11-43. On the death of Likhi Ram on 19-2-53 there was a dispute between Murari Lal and Anandi Devi, widow of Likhi Ram about mutation. A compromise is said to have been arrived at before Panchayat Adalat in which it was agreed that name of Anandi Devi would remain in record till her life time. The said Anandi Devi seems to have executed a gift deed in favour of the petitioners on 22- 8-54. The petitioners are daughter's son of Anandi Devi. A case for mutation was filed. It was contested by the respondent Murari Lal before the Tahsildar. The Tahsildar vide his order dated 9-9-55 held that Anandi Devi has a right to lease the plots and ordered the names of the petitioners to be recorded as asamis. This order seems to have been maintained by the Additional Collector by his judgment dated 18-1-57. However, it was held by the Add. Collector that Anandi Devi had a life interest in the land in dispute and question of mutation would remain open after the death of Anandi Devi. This finding was not challenged by Anandi Devi but she seems to have remained contended by having a declaration in her favour about her life interest in the property. The said Anandi Devi died on 21-7-80. The plaintiff moved an application for mutation as the life estate of Anandi Devi had come to an end. He was however, directed by the Tahsildar to get his title declared by a regular suit. 3. Respondent Murari Lal filed a regular suit for declaration under section 229B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The suit was contested by the petitioner by filing a written statement. The preliminary objection about the maintainably of the suit was raised and the trial court framed two preliminary issues on 25-5-82 and 15-6-82. 3. Respondent Murari Lal filed a regular suit for declaration under section 229B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The suit was contested by the petitioner by filing a written statement. The preliminary objection about the maintainably of the suit was raised and the trial court framed two preliminary issues on 25-5-82 and 15-6-82. The first issue framed related to the maintainability of the suit in view of the change in the identity of the land covered by the suit, during the consolidation proceeding and the second issue related to the bar created by S. 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act about the maintainability of the suit. The trial decided these issues against the respondent - Murari Lal and in favour of the petitioners on 23-8-82. The First appeal filed by Murari Lal respondent was dismissed on 24-11-82. On a further appeal, Board of revenue after detail discussion directed retrial of the suit and decided the two issues framed-in the suit in favour of respondent - Murari Lal. The judgments passed by the Courts below dated 23-8-82 and 24-11-82 respectively were set aside. The trial Court was directed to frame remaining issues and allow the parties to adduce evidence and thereafter decide the suit on merits in accordance with law. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners states that the Board of Revenue's finding is erroneous because the suit of respondent No. 3 under section 229B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was not maintainable and the finding arrived at by the Courts below that the suit was not maintainable could not be disturbed by the Board of Revenue. 5. A Preliminary objection was raised by respondent Murari Lal about the maintainability of the writ petition. It is contended that the order of remand dated 5- 8-85 could not be challenged at this stage because it is only an interlocutory order. The said order is open to challenge after the trial court decides the suit. Elaborate arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective contentions. It may be said here that this case had come up for consideration of vacation of stay but the learned counsel for the parties agreed that they be heard on merits and the case be decided finally because pleadings of the parties were complete. It may be said here that this case had come up for consideration of vacation of stay but the learned counsel for the parties agreed that they be heard on merits and the case be decided finally because pleadings of the parties were complete. Therefore, at the joint request of learned counsel for the parties this case was heard on merits and is being decided finally. 6. Let me take up for discussion the correctness or otherwise of issue No. 2 which relates to the maintainability of the suit in view of the bar created by S. 49 of the Consolidation of Holding Act. It is the petitioner's contention that the suit was not maintainable because S. 49 would bar the suit and its cognizance by the trial court. The respondent's contention is that S. 49 would not-come into play in the way of the maintainability of the suit before the trial Court. This will bring us to the provisions of S. 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The said Section reads as under : - "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in an area, for which a notification has been issued or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no Civil or Revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matter for such a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act. Provided that nothing in the section shall preclude the Assistant Collector from initiating proceedings under S. 122B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 in respect of any land, possession over which has been delivered or deemed to be delivered to a Goan Sabha under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 7. We are not concerned with the proviso which is added to the said Section. We are not concerned with the proviso which is added to the said Section. From a careful reading of S. 49 of the Consolidation of Holding Act, it is revealed that no Civil or Revenue Court has jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding with respect of rights in any land about which adjudication has been made during the consolidation proceeding and in respect of which proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. It means that if any adjudication or declaration of right was made in respect of a land lying in an area for which notification was issued under the Consolidation of Holding Act or any right was agitated, which right arise during the consolidation proceeding or which right ought to have been decided during those proceedings with regard to the land for which notification was issued under the Consolidation of Holdings Act, the jurisdiction of Civil Court and Revenue Court in such matters is taken away. 8. Speaking conversely, it can be said that if a dispute was not capable of being decided or was not decided during the consolidation proceedings in respect of an area for which the notification under the Consolidation of Holding Act was issued, Civil or Revenue Courts' jurisdiction as the case may be, would not be taken away. For example if the cause of action in respect of an area for which notification was issued under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was not available to the tenure-holder or the asamis during the operation of the Consolidation proceedings and they acquire the cause of action after the conclusion of the consolidation proceedings, their rights to bring a suit for declaration would not be barred under S. 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The provisions of S. 49 are to be excluded in such a case for obvious reason. The reason being that during the consolidation proceedings there was no cause of action available to any asami of a holding, he could not agitate the dispute before authority under the Consolidation of Holdings Act, nor could any matter be brought before the consolidation authorities in respect of which an asami of a holding could not seek any relief. The reason being that during the consolidation proceedings there was no cause of action available to any asami of a holding, he could not agitate the dispute before authority under the Consolidation of Holdings Act, nor could any matter be brought before the consolidation authorities in respect of which an asami of a holding could not seek any relief. As to whether S. 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act would hit the suit filed by the respondent Murari Lal or not is to be tested on the facts unfolded in the case. 9. It is admitted case of the parties that on 18-1-57 Anandi Devi, widow of Likhi Ram was held to have life interest in the land in dispute and the question of mutation was left open. The said question was to be considered after the death of Anandi Devi. It is also admitted that Anandi Devi died on 21-7-80. During her life time respondent Murari Lal had no cause of action to ask the authorities to mutate the land in his favour. Thought the consolidation proceedings and after it was concluded Anandi Devi living. Therefore, respondent - Murari Lal could not file a suit before the Consolidation officer for which he had no cause of action during the life time of Anandi Devi. Such a suit was liable to be dismissed as premature. It is the death of Anandi Devi which gave cause of action to respondent Murari Lal to file the present suit. Anandi Devi's status in the mutation proceedings was not that of an absolute owner and question of the mutation was left open by the Additional Collector. Therefore respondent Murari Lal could file a suit after the death of Anandi Devi which suit is not barred by S. 49 of the Act. In the said suit it was not necessary for respondent Murari Lal to seek cancellation of gift deed executed by Anandi Devi in favour of the petitioner. The gift deed if inoperative as against the interest of respondent No. 3, could be declared so by the trial court and in that view of the matter no relief for its cancellation is needed. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on an authority Ramji Dixit v. Bhirgunath and others reported in, AIR 1968 SC 1058 : 1968 All LJ 1844. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on an authority Ramji Dixit v. Bhirgunath and others reported in, AIR 1968 SC 1058 : 1968 All LJ 1844. It was held by the Supreme Court that the interest of female Bhumidhar is absolute and not merely a life interest. If a female Bhumidhar the holding she becomes an absolute owner. The Supreme Court has observed as under in this authority at Page 848 (of ALJ) : "But there is, in our judgment, no discernible relation between the nature of the estate of a female holder and the restriction placed upon the power of testementary disposition or the special rules of devolution of the holding of a female bhumidhar on death, abandonment or surrender, or forfeiture resulting from marriage or remarriage. From the various provisions made in the act it is impossible to evolve any consistent or logical pattern, indicating that the Legislature intended by imposing the special rules of devolution of the interest of a female bhumidhar on death, marriage, abandoment or surrender, to make her tenure in the holding a mere life estate." 11. In para 13 of the judgment it was held that on careful review of the provisions of the Act the Court was unable to hold that it was intended by the legislature to enact by implication that the holding inherited by a female heir belonging to one of the classes of female heirein S. 171 is not held as a life-estate." 12. AIR 1968 SC 1058 : 1968 All 11844 (supra) was considered by the Supreme Court in AIR 1988 SC 2020 Amar Singh v. Asstt. Director of Consolidation. It was held that in Ramji Dixit's case on the death of the owner of the land Raj Kisore, the Lands devolved upon his wife Sanwari as a Hindu widow's estate and a dispute arose about her right of alienation. If a estate devolves on a Hindu widow as Hindu's widow estate and she was in possession of that estate on coming into force the Hindu Succession Act, she shall acquire certain right in the capacity of a Hindu widow. 13. Here we are concerned with the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. S. 171 prescribes a general order of succession. A bhumidhar with transferable right subject to certain provisions has a right to bequeath his holding by will. 13. Here we are concerned with the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. S. 171 prescribes a general order of succession. A bhumidhar with transferable right subject to certain provisions has a right to bequeath his holding by will. If there is no bequeath interest of male bhumidhar or asami in his holding it shall devolve in accordance with order of succession on given in S. 171. In the absence of male lineal descendant a widow's recognised to succeed the male bhumidhar and assami. 14. Under S. 172 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, after the death of the widow, the holding or the part shall devolve upon the nearest surviving heir (such heir being ascertained in accordance with provisions of S. 171) of the last male bhumidhar or asami. From the reading of S. 172 widow's estate, after her death would revert back to male surviving heir of the Bhumidhar. 15. Ramji Dixit's case reported in, AIR 1968 SC 1058 : 1968 All LJ 844 (supra) was against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1965 Allahabad 1(FB). The Supreme Court maintained the Full Bench judgment and a latest Supreme Court's decision of 1988 has explained the scope of the said judgment. Therefore it is not necessary to discuse the Full Bench authority of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1965 Allahabad 1 (FB) : 11964 All LJ 197). 16. In AIR 1985 SC 39 : 1984 All LJ 994, Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P., it was held that it an holding in a village was put into consolidation and settlement of land in such village is completed, settlement cannot be questioned by Suit before civil or revenue Court as it would be barred by S. 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. This authority has a different import. On going to the facts of that authority it would be revealed that the Consolidation authority had allotted the plot in question to the respondents of that case. The said allotment may have been erroneous. The question involved was once the allotment under 1953 Act became final, would a suit lie before the Civil or revenue Court with respect to rights in land or with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the 1953 Act ? The said allotment may have been erroneous. The question involved was once the allotment under 1953 Act became final, would a suit lie before the Civil or revenue Court with respect to rights in land or with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the 1953 Act ? It was held by the Supreme Court that such a suit was clearly barred by S. 49. In the present case no proceeding could be taken up by respondent - Murari Lal before the authority under Consolidation Act because he had no cause of action till the death of Anandi Devi which happened in 1980 when the Consolidation proceedings had come to an end. Therefore, this authority will be of no use to the petitioners. 17. In Smt. Bismilla v. Janeshwar Prasad and others reported in, AIR 1990 SC 540 : 1989 All LJ 1335 it was held that where the party in her suit prima facie proceeded on the premise that she could not ignore the sales but the sales require to be set aside before she would be entitled to possession and other consequential reliefs, the suit would not be barred under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which also created a bar against filing of a suit under certain conditions. 18. In Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed and another reported in, 1980 Revenue Decisions 300 : 1980 All LJ 902, the Supreme Court held that bar of S. 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act could not be attracted to a suit which was based on inheritance. It was abserved that at Page 905 (of All LJ) : - "It is well settled that unless there is an express provision barring a suit on the basis of title, the courts will not easily infer a bar of suit to establish the title of the parties." 19. The authority in Suba Singh v. Mahendra Singh and others reported in, AIR 1974 SC 1657 was relied upon by the Supreme Court. In the aforesaid authority, it was held that S. 49 which excludes jurisdiction of Civil Courts must be construed strictly. S. 49 bars civil suit in respect of matters arising out of consolidation proceedings and matters in regard to which a suit or application could be filed under the provisions of the Consolidation Act. In the aforesaid authority, it was held that S. 49 which excludes jurisdiction of Civil Courts must be construed strictly. S. 49 bars civil suit in respect of matters arising out of consolidation proceedings and matters in regard to which a suit or application could be filed under the provisions of the Consolidation Act. A question had arisen in that case whether `B' was heir of `A'. That question had arisen not during the consolidation proceedings but after their completion and hence the suit was held not to be barred under S. 49 of the Consolidation of Holding Act. In the present case also question of inheritance of Anandi Devi's estate had arisen after the death of Anandi Devi in 1980 when the consolidation proceedings had been completed, therefore, the bar of S. 49 would not be attracted in the present case. 20. The findings of the Board of Revenue on the question of applicability or otherwise of S. 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, are well founded, well reasoned and not open to challenge. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that the suit was barred by S. 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act is to be overruled. 21. It was next contended that during the consolidation proceedings the land in question and some other land was blended together and therefore, identity of the land which is subject matter of inheritence is completely lost. Therefore, no fresh proceeding could be brought against the petitioners in respect of the matter which has been settled by the Consolidation authorities and which has lost its identity. 22. This argument is fallacious. The fallacy lies in the fact that bar is created under S. 49 of the Act. If a matter does not arise out of S. 49 there can be no bar on the ground of property having lost its identity. In that case a person who acquired the right after the completion of the Consolidation proceedings would not be non-suited, merely because the land has lost its identity. The suit filed by respondent Murari Lal would not affect any holding which had come under the operation of the Consolidation of Holding Act. The life interest of Anandi Devi and any holding which is claimed by the petitioners now is to be decided without affecting the proceedings which have been completed under the provisions of Consolidation of Holdings Act. The suit filed by respondent Murari Lal would not affect any holding which had come under the operation of the Consolidation of Holding Act. The life interest of Anandi Devi and any holding which is claimed by the petitioners now is to be decided without affecting the proceedings which have been completed under the provisions of Consolidation of Holdings Act. The decision on issue No. 2 by the trial court therefore, was not correct and the Board of Revenue has rightly set aside the same. 23. The Board of Revenue has directed retrial of the suit after issues are framed which would arise in the case after persual of the pleadings of the parties. The trial court has to consider some important aspect of the matter such an effect of the gift deed executed by Anandi Devi in favour of the petitioners. What type of interest, Anandi Devi could pass on through the gift to the petitioners. If Anandi Devi herself had life interest as agreed between the parties in previous mutation proceeding. Whether she could pass absolute interest to the petitioners. What is the effect of the gift-deed on the rights of respondent - Murari Lal and is the gift - deed void or voidable ? The petitioners also claim adverse possession. Whether as a matter of fact there was an adverse possession over the property by the petitioners and what is its effect on the rights of respondent - Murari Lal. Whether the suit was barred under the Limitation Act so on so so forth. The courts below have decided the preliminary issues in favour of the petitioners by not applying correct law to the case and have fallen into great error and that error was corrected by the Board of Revenue. Therefore, no fault can be found with the impugned judgment of the Board of Revenue. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioners has very feebly relied on the provisions of Succession Act. The said provisions relate to devolution of the property of a legatee. Those provisions would have no application to the present case. 25. It was also contended that if it is held that Anandi Devi had life interest then Murari Lal must be deemed to have vested interest when the life interest came into being. The said provisions relate to devolution of the property of a legatee. Those provisions would have no application to the present case. 25. It was also contended that if it is held that Anandi Devi had life interest then Murari Lal must be deemed to have vested interest when the life interest came into being. By creation of life interest in favour of Anandi Devi, possession of the property alone would remain with Anandi Devi but the ownership of the property would vest in Murari Lal. Therefore, he was bound to agitate the matter during consolidation proceedings. This argument cannot be accepted for the simple reasons that no question of vested or contingent interest arises in this case. It was agreed in mutation proceedings that Anandi Devi would hold the property for life and question of mutation was left open. When Anandi Devi died. Revenue authorities were approached by the respondent who was asked to agitate the matter by way of a suit. During life time of Anandi Devi no suit could be brought. The suit of the property could be brought only by Murari Lal. Had Murari Lal predeceased Anandi Devi position would have materially altered. Therefore, the learned counsel's attempt to draw distinction between life interest and vested interest is only an acadamic question in this case. 26. I have considered the preliminary objection of the respondent about the maintainability of the writ petition also. Since I have held that order of remand does not suffer from any infirmity and there is no error apparent on the face of the record of the impugned judgment, therefore, there is no use to consider the preliminary objection about the maintainability of the writ petition. 27. As a result of the foregoing discussion, I hold that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed as there is no merits in the writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, in view of peculiar facts of the case, there will be no orders as to costs. Stay order dated 21-5-85 is vacated.