This case illustrates the proverbial thorny path of service. 2. This appeal by the defendant is directed against the judgment and decree dated 21.6.88 passed by the learned ADC (J) in Title Suit No. 4 of 1985 whereby the plaintiff's suit was decreed. 3. The respondent Shri H.K.L. Thanga instituted a suit in the Court of Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial) being Title Suit No. 4 of 1985 against the three defendants praying for declaration that the Resolution No. 6 dated 9.11.74 of the Champhai College Committee, and the resultant deduction of the plaintiff's pay for three days and resolution dated 24.4.1985 of the Governing Body in regard to the inter se seniority of the lecturers of the Champhai College are void and illegal and also for declaration that the plaintiff is senior to defendent Nos. 2 and 3. The learned Additional Deputy Commissioner (J) decreed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the defendant Nos. 1,2 and 3 filed three revision petitions separately, being revision petition Nos. 15 of 1990, 21 of 1990' and 22 of 1990 respectively. The two revision petitions namely, Nos. 15 of 1990 and 20 of 1990 filed by the defendent Nos. 1 and 3 respectively were dismissed by this Court on 15.11.90 and 4.1.91 respectively. The revision petition No. 21 of 1990 filed by the defendant No. 2 has been converted into one of an appeal vide order passed by this Court on 9.4.91. I am now concerned with this appeal only. 4. The plaintiff's case, in short, is that the plaintiff was appointed as a lecturer of Champhai College by the Managing Committee of that College on 3.8.71 and on the same day he joined his duty. The plaintiff was unauthorized absent for 18 days in the year 1974. The College Committee of that College, by their resolution No. 6 of 9.11.74, deducted his pay for three days in excess of 15 days which were admissible to him, presumably, as casual leave. The plaintiff came to know this deduction of his pay of three days when he received his pay. Although the plaintiff was the senior most lecturer of the College, his name was placed at the third place in the list of inter se seniority of the lecturers dated 24.4.85. The names of the defendant Nos. The plaintiff came to know this deduction of his pay of three days when he received his pay. Although the plaintiff was the senior most lecturer of the College, his name was placed at the third place in the list of inter se seniority of the lecturers dated 24.4.85. The names of the defendant Nos. 2 and 3, who were junior to him, were placed at serial Nos. 1 and 2 respectively in the said seniority list. The plaintiff's case goes further that the plaintiff was appointed as the Acting Principal of the College on the very day he joined as lecturer and his pay was fixed at Rs. 350/-. He was a post graduate degree holder at the time of his appointment. The pay of the defendant No. 3 was fixed at Rs. 300/- only at the time of his joining service as he was not a post graduate degree holder. The plaintiff's case also goes further that before the finalization of the said inter se seniority list, the plaintiff was not given adequate opportunity to show that he was senior to defendant Nos. 2 and 3. It is stated that the plaintiff did not avail of 18 days leave at all. Hence the suit. 5. The defendant No. 1 i.e. the Chairman of the Governing Body of Champahi College did not contest the suit by filing any written statement. The defendant Nos. 2 and 3 filed written statements contending inter alia that the Governing Board of Champhai College was competent to award penalty to any members of the teaching staffs of the College without assigning any reason thereof and that the decision of the Governing Body is final. It was also contended that the plaintiff had availed of unauthorised leave of 18 days in the year 1974 and that this matter was taken up seriously by the Governing Body in its meeting held on 9.11.74 and had passed the resolution No. 6 of 9.11.74 that 15 days of the said unauthorised leave were to be regularised as casual leave and for the remaining three days the plaintiffs three days pay was to be deducted as penalty from his salary. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff without any objection or complaint had accepted the said decision of the Governing Body and received his pay in the month of November, 1974 and that since the said deduction of three days pay in the beginning of 1974, the plaintiff had been sleeping over his right to protest till the institution of the present suit. It was also pleaded that the ground for placing the plaintiff junior to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 in the inter se seniority list dated 24.4.1985 was that the plaintiff had become junior to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 by three days due to the said deduction of three days pay as penalty. Hence, the suit merits dismissal. 6. After filing of the written statements, the two defendants also did not appear before the Court and, therefore, the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner (J) proceeded the suit exparte against all the defendants. 7. The learned Additional Deputy Commissioner (J) held that the deduction of three days pay from the salary of the plaintiff was illegal, arbitrary, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff. The said finding of the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner was based on the following grounds :- (i) The College Committee of Champhai College had no jurisdiction to pass the resolution No. 6 dated 9.11.74 for deduction of three days pay from the salary of the plaintiff as penalty inasmuch as the plaintiff was appointed by the Managing Committee of the Champhai College. (ii) No reasonable opportunity was given to the plaintiff to show cause or to explain the circumstances for his unauthorised three days absence and also why his three days pay should not be deducted from his salary. (iii) If the plaintiff was allowed to enjoy 15 days casual leave, the excess leave for three days had to be adjusted from his earned leave, if any, and in the absence of any such consideration on the part of the appointing authority, the resolution for deduction of three days pay was opposed to the principle of natural justice. (iv) The resolution of the College Committee could not be a substitute for an order and, therefore, deduction of three days pay was illegal in the eyes of law. 8. (iv) The resolution of the College Committee could not be a substitute for an order and, therefore, deduction of three days pay was illegal in the eyes of law. 8. Sri Sailo, learned counsel for the appellant, has vehemently urged that the learned ADC (J), committed an error of law in holding that (he resolution No. 6 of the College Committee of Champhai College regarding the deduction of three days pay from the salary of the plaintiff by way of penalty was illegal, void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff/respondent. Sri R.C. Thanga, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, capably and forcefully submitted that the said finding of the Court below is quite sound and legal. 9. In support of his above contention, Sri Sailo has submitted that the plaintiff, who attended the meeting of the College Committee in his capacity as a member, did not protest when and after the resolution No. 6 was passed and had drawn his pay for the month of November, 1974 (which was the relevant period) after the deduction of his three days pay and, therefore, the plaintiff has waived his right to assert or challenge the validity or otherwise of the said resolution No. 6. Therefore, in this case, the sole point for consideration is whether the plaintiff has waived his right to assert or challenge the validity or otherwise of the said resolution No. 6. 10. Before proceeding to the consideration of the points raised by the learned counsel of both the parties, during the course of their arguments, I consider it necessary to examine how to constitute "waiver" under the law. In order to constitute "waiver" there must be intentional relinquishment of a known right or the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing right. In this connection we may refer to the decision made in the case of Associated Hotel of India Ltd., appellant vs. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, respondent, AIR 1968 SC 933 . In the said case, it was tersely held that a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right and that there can be no "waiver" unless the person against whom the waiver is claimed had full knowledge of his rights and of facts enabling him to take effectual action for the enforcement of such rights. In the said case, it was tersely held that a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right and that there can be no "waiver" unless the person against whom the waiver is claimed had full knowledge of his rights and of facts enabling him to take effectual action for the enforcement of such rights. Therefore, before there can be any waiver, the person alleged to have waived must have had the complete and full knowledge of the rights said to have been waived. After all, waiver is an agreement to release or not to assert a right. Therefore, when waiver is pleaded, it should be shown by the parties pleading the same that there was an agreement between them that the person waiving the particular right should not press that right in future in consideration of some compromise from some other persons. 11. Keeping in view the above propositions of law regarding the constitution of the "waiver", I proceed to consider whether the plaintiff/respondent has waived his right to assert or challenge the validity or otherwise of the said resolution No. 6. In the case in hand, the defendants, in their written statements, have not pleaded that there was an agreement between the plaintiff and the College Commit­tee/Governing Body or between the plaintiff and the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 that the plaintiff should not press his right to challenge the validity or otherwise of the resolution No. 6 in future. Further, the defendants have not also taken any plea in their written statements that the plaintiff was quite aware that his three days pay was deducted from his salary by way of punishment or that the deduction of his three days pay will cause a break to his service. However, Sri Sailo, learned counsel for the appellant urges that though the defendants did not specifically plead the same in their written statements, the conduct of the plaintiff clearly shows that he had full knowledge that his three days pay was deducted from his pay by way of punishment by the said resolution No. 6 or that the deduction of three days pay will cause a break to his service and that he had a right to challenge the validity or otherwise of the said resolution No. 6. In support of his above contention, the learned counsel submits that the plaintiff had drawn his salary for the month of November, 1974 after deducting three days pay and that the plaintiff had been sleeping over his right to assert since the drawl of his pay for the month of November, 1974 till the passing of the resolution dated 24.8.85 fixing the inter se seniority of the lecturers of the Champhai College. The fact that the plaintiff had drawn his salary after deduction of three days pay will undoubtedly show that he was not allowed to enjoy his salary for three days for his unauthorised absence. But the allegation of the respondent is that the plaintiff was unauthorisedly absent for 18 days and that the plaintiff was allowed to enjoy 15 days leave. Hence, from the said deduction of three days pay, there can be no reasonably inference that the plaintiff had full knowledge that the deduction of three days pay from his salary was done by way of punishment or that it would cause a break to his service, undoubtedly, the agreement not to enforce a particular right may also be proved by conduct as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant. But the above conducts of the plaintiff are not sufficient enough to make an inference that the plaintiff had the full knowledge of his rights and the facts enabling him to take effectual action for the enforcement of such rights. In other words, there is no material to establish that the plaintiff had the full knowledge that he had the rights to challenge the validity or otherwise of the resolution No. 6 dated 9.11.74 (regarding the deduction of three days pay) before the passing of the resolution dated 24.4.85 of the Governing Body regarding the inter se seniority of the lecturers of the College. Hence, there is no question of relinquishing or abandoning of any known right by the plaintiff. 12. Further, a man who has vested interest and in whom the legal title lies, docs not., and cannot loss that title by mere laches or mere standing by or even saying that he has abandoned his right unless there is something more, namely inducting any party, by his words or conducts, to believe the truth of that statement and to act upon it to his detriment. It is supported by the decision made in Satmul chand and Co. v. Jawar Lal Milk Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 98 . Now, in the case in hand the plaintiff by virtue of his said initial appointment as the acting principal of the College was legally senior to the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and, therefore, his such legal title docs not and cannot loss by his mere laches or inaction. 13. And further, as stated above, the defendants did not categorically slate in their written statements that the plaintiff has waived his right to assert or challenge the validity or otherwise of the said resolution No. 6. Again, the defendants did not claim for any issue to be framed to cover their plea of the fact of waiver before the trial Court and, therefore, it can be taken that the defendants have waived that plea. After all, a plea not raised in the original Court, will be deemed to have been waived and cannot be raised in the appellant Court. In this connection, we may refer to the decision made in Prabhal Singh Nathu Bhai vs. Santilal Nagi Bhai, AIR 1982 Gujarat 136. In the said case, it was largely held that a plea which was not raised in the original Court will be deemed to have been waived and cannot be raised in the appellate Court. 14. For the reasons slated above, I do not find any substance in the above communion of the learned counsel for the appellant. 15. Further, as can be seen from Exis. 1 and 2 it was the Managing Committee who appointed the plaintiff as the lecturer and the Acting Principal of the College. However, the resolution No. 6 was passed by the College Commerce of Champhai College. There is nothing on the record to show that the College Committee which was not the appointing authority, had jurisdiction to pass any resolution for deduction of the pay of the plaintiff f by way of penalty for his unauthorized absence. it appears that the College Committee was oblivious of its jurisdictional rightly pointed out by the learned Addl. Deputy Commissioner (J), in the absence of any proper rule, the appointing authority is the compete authority to award such a penalty. it appears that the College Committee was oblivious of its jurisdictional rightly pointed out by the learned Addl. Deputy Commissioner (J), in the absence of any proper rule, the appointing authority is the compete authority to award such a penalty. Furthermore, in pursuance of the said resolution No. 6, no order for the deduction of three days pay from the salary of the plaintiff was passed by any competent authority. After all, a resolution cannot be a substitute for an order. That apart, admittedly, the College Commerce did not give any reasonable opportunely to the plaintiff to show cause or to explain as to why his three days pay should not be deducted from his salary by way of punishment. It is a well settled principle of law that reasonable opportunity to show cause or to explain must be given to the person against whom such an order is proposed to be passed. The learned Lower Court has cited some decisions made by the Apex Court in support of the above propositions of law. However, I do not propose to burden my judgment with those citations as the proposition of law is very well settled. The College Committee, as the record shows, did not give any notice regarding the passing of the resolution No. 6 to the plaintiff. The case of the defendants is that the plaintiff himself was present in the meeting in his capacity as a member when the resolution No. 6 was passed. But there is nothing on the record to show that the plaintiff was a member of the Committee or that he was present in the said meeting when the resolution No. 6 was passed. After all, giving of notice to the person against whom the order is to be extended is the rule of natural justice and non-giving is against the rule of natural justice. 16. For these reasons, I do not find any merit in this appeal and, therefore, the appeal is dismissed. The result is that the judgment and decree dated 21.6.88 passed by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner (J), Aizawl District is hereby affirmed. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their respective costs throughout.