JUDGMENT K.C. Jagadeb Roy, J. - This batch of miscellaneous appeals are heard together as a common question of law has been raised in all the appeals. Before dealing with the cases, it is necessary to mention the facts leading to these miscellaneous appeals. 2. One Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla, a contractor, had entered into several contracts with the State of Orissa for execution of the work in connection with improvement of National High Ways under the N.H. Division, Baripada. According to the present appellant work was completed in 1965 and final bills were paid during 1966 to the Contractor in full and final settlement of works and accounts. After lapse of a long 9 years, contractor Agarwalla raised some disputes and requested the Chief Engineer, National High Way, Orissa for appointment of an Arbitrator to decide the same. Sri B.N. Das, the Superintending Engineer was appointed as an Arbitrator in the cases. Sri Das was, however, removed by the court and Sri G.S. Patnaik, the then Chairman of the Orissa Arbitration Tribunal was appointed as the Arbitrator. But Sri Patnaik declined to arbitrate and accordingly the trial court appointed Sri S.K. Das, the Member of the Arbitration Tribunal as the Arbitrator. Before this Arbitrator, claim statements were filed by the present respondent and objections were filed by the State. The Arbitrator after considering the claims and objections as well as the materials on record, passed the awards in dispute in favour of the respondent-contractor. The awards, were not speaking awards and no reasons were given by the Arbitrator in support of his awards. However, a specific finding was given by the Arbitrator that the claims were not barred by limitation. 3. Against those awards of the Arbitrator, objections were filed and after hearing the objections, the trial court had set aside the awards by its orders dated 2.4.83, 2.4.83, 2.4.83, 2.4.83, 22.3.83, 22.3.83, 24.3.83 & 4.3.83 in Title Suit Nos. 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122 and 123 of 1983 respectively. The present respondents Shanti Devi and others preferred appeals against those orders since Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla was dead by then. Those miscellaneous appeals preferred under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act') were heard together as a common question of law was raised therein and were disposed of by a common judgment date 23.12.87. 4. Those miscellaneous appeals preferred under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act') were heard together as a common question of law was raised therein and were disposed of by a common judgment date 23.12.87. 4. This Court in the aforesaid judgment dated 23.12.1987 held that when the appointment of the Arbitrator was under Section 8 of the Act, he had jurisdiction to decide the question of limitation. When the Arbitrator on the facts of the case decided that the claims are not barred by limitation, there was no scope for the trial court to enter into that question unless there was error of law apparent on the face of the record. When the Arbitrator had not given any reason, but had merely held that the claims are not barred by limitation, the trial court should not have read the mind of the Arbitrator and without any further materials on record from which a reasonable man could not have come to the aforesaid conclusion, the trial court was not justified to hold that the claims were barred by limitation and in conclusion the Hon'ble Single Judge passed the following orders : "In the result, the appeals are allowed and the objections raised by the respondent before the trial court under Section 30 of the Act stand rejected. The trial court shall now consider the question of making the award a rule of the court, While making the award a rule of the court, the question of grant of interest shall be taken into consideration by the trial court. Parties are directed to bear their own costs in all the appeals." 5. In the above paragraph, respondent refers to the State of Orissa who contested the case. After this common judgment was delivered on 23.12.1987, the cases went back to the trial court who took up the hearing of the suits and passed the final orders dated 3.1.89, 22.12.88, 22.12.88, 22.12.88, 22.12.88, 4.1.89, and 3.1.89 in Title Suits Nos. 117, 120, 121, 123, 122, 119, 118 and 116 of 1982 respectively making the awards rule of the court upon which the decrees were drawn subsequently. The trial court while making the awards rule of the court observed that the awards in favour of the plaintiff-contractor was upheld by the Hon'ble court in Misc. Appeals Nos. 117, 120, 121, 123, 122, 119, 118 and 116 of 1982 respectively making the awards rule of the court upon which the decrees were drawn subsequently. The trial court while making the awards rule of the court observed that the awards in favour of the plaintiff-contractor was upheld by the Hon'ble court in Misc. Appeals Nos. 223 to 230 of 1983, it did not find any ground to interfere with the award of interest made by the arbitrator in all those awards. 6. The present appeals namely Misc. Appeals Nos. 119 to 126 of 1989 are filed challenging the judgment and decree passed in Title Suits Nos. 117, 120, 121, 123, 122, 119, 118 and 116 of 1982 respectively. All the miscellaneous appeals, as the memo of appeal would show, are however filed under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. In these appeals, the State of Orissa challenges the judgment and decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Baripada in the title suits on the following grounds. "A - For that minimum reasons having been given by the Arbitrator, the Award in question is liable to be set aside; B - For that the Award in question should not have been made a rule of the court as the award itself is not a speaking one; C - For that in view of the provision of Interest Act (14 of 1978) the Award of Interest is bad; D - For that in absence of any contract, the Award of Interest is bad; E - For that the learned Sub-Judge omitted to take into consideration of the applicability of the provisions of Interest Act to the Arbitration proceedings; F - For that the Award, Judgment and Decree are otherwise bad and are liable to be set aside." 7. The present respondents namely the legal heirs of the original contractor M.P. Agarwalla who are substituted in his place on his death have raised the following points : (i) The miscellaneous appeals are not maintainable; (ii) The matter is already concluded as the awards have been made rule of the court under the direction of this court in Misc. Appeals Nos. 223 to 230 of 1983; (iii) The amount of interest awarded by the Arbitrator in all those 8 disputes were concluded and are not open for reconsideration and the direction of the Hon'ble Single Judge in Misc. Appeals Nos. Appeals Nos. 223 to 230 of 1983; (iii) The amount of interest awarded by the Arbitrator in all those 8 disputes were concluded and are not open for reconsideration and the direction of the Hon'ble Single Judge in Misc. Appeals Nos. 223 to 230 of 1983 relating to consideration of the question of grant of interest, did not refer to the interest passed by the Arbitrator but the interest then the court could grant on passing the decree under Section 29 of the Act. 8. It is worthwhile to make a reference to the objections raised by the State under Section 30 of the Act to the awards being made rule of the court as could be seen from the order of the Hon'ble Single Judge dated 23.12.87 in Misc. Appeals Nos. 223 to 230 of 1983 which are as follows : (i) Claims of the appellant were beyond the terms of the agreement; (ii) Dispute being unilateral reference to the Arbitrator was invalid; (iii) Unreasonable delay by the Arbitrator to give the award is a misconduct; (iv) There is no dispute since the final bills were accepted; (v) There was error of law apparent on the face of the awards on the question of limitation : (vi) Difference in the claims by the claimant before the various Arbitrators ought to have been a ground to reject the claims of the appellant; and (vii) Claim of the appellant are barred by limitation. 9. As already stated, the Hon'ble Single Judge in his judgment dated 23.12.87 in the aforesaid miscellaneous appeals had rejected those objections and the State of Orissa has not challenged the said order of this court. Because of this it is not open to the State of Orissa - the present appellant to raise the objection once again saying that the claims of the contractor were beyond the terms of agreement. The trial court in his impugned order referred to the interest already given in the awards but held that he had nothing to differ from the said awards in the matter of interest. The trial court in his impugned order referred to the interest already given in the awards but held that he had nothing to differ from the said awards in the matter of interest. When the trial court was reconsidering the awards in making them rules of the court, the State of Orissa did not raise an objection before the trial court that the award of interest was beyond the terms of the agreement or that interest was otherwise not available to be paid to the contractor under any law and when the said award had already been made rules of the court, and decrees have been drawn pursuant to that, no appeal lies against that decree under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act appeals are only provided against appellable orders enumerated in the Section. The memo of appeals filed by the State of Orissa in the present appeals i.e. Misc. Appeals Nos. 119 to 126 of 1989 shows that said appeals have been filed against the judgment and decree passed in the concerned suits. Appeal, if any, against the said decrees lies under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act which reads as follows : "17. x x x x x x. No appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with the award." 10. In the grounds taken in present appeals, none of the grounds allege that the decree had been passed in excess of the award or not in accordance with the award. Accordingly, these appeals, even if be treated under Section 17 of the Act, still have no merit on the facts of the case. The State, however, has raised a contention that the orders passed by the court making the awards rule of the court which are now referred to as the judgments in the suits in question, are orders refusing to set aside the awards and such could be challenged in appeal under Section 39 of the Act. Such contention of the State of Orissa is not acceptable as the State did not choose to prefer appeal under Section 39 of the Act challenging the order of the court making the award rule of the court but awaited till decrees were drawn. Such contention of the State of Orissa is not acceptable as the State did not choose to prefer appeal under Section 39 of the Act challenging the order of the court making the award rule of the court but awaited till decrees were drawn. Besides, the State has failed to say why the awards were liable to be set aside. The only challenge between the parties is the award of interest and there is no dispute before this Court regarding the principal amount. The State has not taken any specific ground before the trial court stating that the award of interest was not in terms of the contract or the award of interest by the Arbitrator was without any authority of law. When the State of Orissa failed to raise that objection before the trial court before the awards were made rule of the court and decrees are subsequently drawn, it cannot raise this point for the first time in these appeals. This being the case, the present appeals are not maintainable under Section 39 of the Act and are liable to be dismissed. 11. The State has further contended that this court while allowing the Misc. Appeals Nos. 223 to 230 of 1983 filed by the contractor by the order dated 23.12.1987, sent back the cases to the trial court asking it to consider the award for making them rule of the court and while doing so to consider the question of interest. According to the State, this Court by such direction meant that the principal amount given in the award would be made rule of the court, but the question of interest be kept open so as to be finally considered by the trial court. I do not agree with such contention of the State. The award is the decision of the Arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding and includes interest that is awarded by the Arbitrator. By the order dated 23.12.1987, this court had rejected all the objections made by the State under Section 30 of the Act before the trial court. Therefore, when the cases went back from this court to the trial court, there was no objection available upon which the trial court could have considered the legality or otherwise of the award and interest on the principal amount. Therefore, when the cases went back from this court to the trial court, there was no objection available upon which the trial court could have considered the legality or otherwise of the award and interest on the principal amount. It, therefore, follows that the direction regarding the consideration of interest given in the said order only referred to the interest payable by the court under Section 29 of the Act which the court could grant from the date of the decree. This is more so because the order dated 23.12.87 does not anywhere specifically mention that the interest already made a part of the award was to be considered afresh by the trial court. 12. The State has lastly raised a point that the trial court could not have made the awards rule of the court and signed the decree as the interest that is paid in the awards was contrary to law. The Arbitrator has no right in law to award pendente lite interest to the plaintiff and in support of his contention relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of (Executive Engineer, Irrigation, Galimala v. Abhadhuta Jena ( AIR 1988 SC 1520 )). In the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court had laid down the principles regarding the award of interest by an Arbitrator to whom a reference was made without intervention of the Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had proceeded on the basis that, in the notices of demand by the contractors, before the disputes were referred to arbitration, interest on the amount said to be payable was claimed. The statutory provisions in regard to the award of interest by a Court are contained in the Interest Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. In the Interest Act, 1978 the expression 'Court' is defined to include Tribunal and the Arbitrator. 13. Both the Interest Act of 1839 and the Interest Act of 1978 provide for award of interest by the court up to the date of institution of the proceeding. Since in the Interest Act, 1978, the word 'Court' included the Arbitrator, it follows, therefore, that an Arbitrator can pass an award of interest up to the date of institution of the proceeding before him, if the Interest Act of 1978 applied to the case. Neither Interest Act, 1839 nor the Interest Act, 1978 provide for the award of pendente lite interest. Neither Interest Act, 1839 nor the Interest Act, 1978 provide for the award of pendente lite interest. It is Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code which authorises the Courts to make orders for payment of interest pendente lite. Section 34, however, applies to arbitration in suits for the simple reason that where a matter is referred to arbitration in a suit, the Arbitrator will have all the powers, of the court in deciding the dispute. Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code as such does not apply to arbitrations as Arbitrators are not courts within the meaning of Section 34 of the C.P.C. Therefore, while reference was made to Arbitrator without intervention of the court, the Arbitrator did not get the jurisdiction to award pendente lite interest. If under the contract the contractors were entitled to the interest for the amount claimed by them, the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to grant interest for the period prior to the proceeding from the date, the amount was payable till the date of reference to him in the arbitration proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case referred to in AIR 1988 SC 1520 held thus : "... Seth Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India ( AIR 1955 SC 468 ), was a case of direct reference to arbitration without the intervention of a court. Neither the Interest Act, 1839 nor the Civil Procedure Code applied as an Arbitrator was not a court. Interest could, therefore, be awarded only if there was an agreement to pay interest or a usage of trade having the force of law or some other provision of the substantive law which entitled the plaintiff to receive interest". The case of Seth Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India was a case decided prior to the coming into force the Interest Act of 1978 and was one governed by the earlier Act of 1839. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held further in the said case as follows (at page SC 1528, AIR 1988) : "... While this is the position in cases which arose prior to the coming into force of the Interest Act, 1978, in cases arising after the coming into force of the Act, the position now is that though the award of pendente lite interest is still governed by the same principles, the award of interest prior to the suit is now governed by the Interest Act, 1978. Under the Interest Act, 1978, an Arbitrator is, by definition, a court and may now award interest in all the cases to which the Interest Act applies." 14. This point was not raised before the trial court before it was made rule of the court nor was raised before this court in previous miscellaneous appeals preferred under Section 39 of the Act. In the present case, as already stated that the award is a non-speaking award and while allowing interest, the arbitrator has stated nothing as to why interest was made. The State of Orissa has not adduced any evidence to show that the contractor was not entitled to any interest as per the agreement on the principal amount claimed. There is nothing on record to show the basis of the award of interest and the award being non-speaking, this court cannot read the mind of the arbitrator. When no specific and pointed objection has been raised by the State of Orissa before the trial court or before this court in appeals under Section 39 of the Act against the direction for payment of interest in the award by the arbitrator, the awards having been made the rule of the court and subsequently decrees having been drawn, this cannot be agitated again in these appeals. The aforesaid decision in Abhadhuta Jena's case which laid down the principles regarding the award of interest is of no consequence to the State of Orissa on the facts and circumstances of the case. 15. The last contention of the State of Orissa is that the awards being non-speaking, was liable to be rejected by the trial court. This objection had been raised incidentally before the Hon'ble single Judge of this court in the earlier batch of miscellaneous appeals referred to above and this court did not choose to quash the awards on that ground. On the other hand this court directed the trial court to consider making the awards the rule of the court. Now the law is well settled that non-speaking awards are not liable to be set aside or remitted on the ground of absence of reasons. Reference may be made to (Raipur Development Authority v. M/s. Chokhamal Contractors ( AIR 1990 SC 1426 )), in this connection. This contention, therefore, deserves no merit and is rejected. 16. Now the law is well settled that non-speaking awards are not liable to be set aside or remitted on the ground of absence of reasons. Reference may be made to (Raipur Development Authority v. M/s. Chokhamal Contractors ( AIR 1990 SC 1426 )), in this connection. This contention, therefore, deserves no merit and is rejected. 16. The respondents filed cross-objections under Order 41, Rule 22 of C.P.C. read with Section 39 of the Act, 1940 claiming higher interest on the principal amount awarded by the arbitrator. While the arbitrator had awarded 6% interest per annum on the principal amount, the respondents in their cross-objection had claimed 16% interest per annum on the said amount, but at the time of argument of the appeals, the respondents chose not to press those cross-objections and confined their argument to the miscellaneous appeals and challenged the maintainability of the same. The cross-objections are, therefore, rejected. 17. In the result, the miscellaneous appeals are devoid of any merit and are accordingly dismissed with costs to the respondents. Appeals dismissed. *-*-*-*-*