Judgment S.B.Sinha, J. 1. This Misc. Appeal arises out of an order dated 19-5-1990 passed by Shri H.P. Chakravarty, Subordinate Judge-I Chaibasa, in Title Suit No. 13 of 1988, whereby and whereunder he purported to have held that the objection filed by the appellant under Sec. 30 of the Arbitration Act is barred under the law of Limitation. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. The plaintiff, respondent filed a Misc. case being No. 72 of 1986 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Chaibasa. The disputes and difference between the parties were referred to arbitration to Shri Singheshwar Prasad by an order dated 19-3-1987. On 1-3-1988 the Arbitarator filed his award in a sealed cover which gave rise to registration of T.S. No. 13 of 1988. On receipt of the said award in sealed cover, the court directed that the same be kept in the safe custody the Sharistadar. On 2-3-1988 an application was filed by the respondent that the said sealed cover may be opened. On 7-3-1988, the order-sheet was shown to the Government pleader and counsel for the respondent. In view of the aforementioned application dated 2-3.1988, the sealed cover was opened on 14-3-1988 and thereafter the said suit was adjourned to 14-4-1988. The appellant filed its objection on 13-4-1988. By reason of the impugned order, the learned court below held that in view of Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the time for filing of an application under Sec. 30 of the Arbitration Act having expired, the objection filed by the appellant on 13-4-1988 could not be entertained on the ground that the month of March consisting of 31 days and thus the said objection was barred by limitation. 4. Mr. M.Y. Eqbal, the learned G.P.I. appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the learned court below committed serious error in holding that the objection filed on behalf of the appellants was barred under the Law of Limitation without taking into consideration the provisions of Article 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 . 5. Mr. S.K. Chattopadhaya, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents could not controvert this legal position. 5. Mr. S.K. Chattopadhaya, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents could not controvert this legal position. Learned Counsel, however, submitted that as notice of filing of award was given to the Government Pleader, on 7-3-1988 time shall began to run from that date and in that view of the matter the objection under Sec. 30 of the Arbitration Act having been filed on 13-4-1988, the same was clearly barred under the Law of Limitation. 6. Learned Counsel, in this connection, has relied upon State of Bihar and Ors. V/s. Liason and Contract and Anr. -- ; Chhabila Singh and Ors. V/s. Sumitra Devi and Ors. 1986 PLJR 199 and Indian Rayon Corporation V/s. Raunag and Co. -- . 7. Learned C.P.I., on the other hand, submitted that mere endorsement by the counsel cannot be said to a notice within the meaning of Sec. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act and in this connection he relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.D. Gupta V/s. Union of India -- . 8. From a perusal of the impugned order it is evidently clear that the learned court below held that the objection filed by the appellant was barred by law of Limitation only on the ground that the month of March consists of 31 days and as both the appellant and respondent had notice of filing of the award on 14-3-1988 in view of Article 119 of the Limitation Act, the said objection which was filed on 13-4-1988 was barred under the Law of Limitation. 9. Sec. 12(1) of the Limitation Act reads as follows: 12. (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. 10. From a perusal of the aforementioned provisions, it is clear that for the purpose of computation of period of limitation, 14-3-1988 should have been excluded and thus, evidently the objection filed under Sec. 30 of the Act on 13-4-1988 was not barred under the Law of Limitation. 11. The other question raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent namely, as to whether the period of limitation should have been computed from 7-3-1988 or not, evidently the same was not raised before the learned court below. 11. The other question raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent namely, as to whether the period of limitation should have been computed from 7-3-1988 or not, evidently the same was not raised before the learned court below. As noticed hereinbefore, by the terms of the order dated 1-3-1988, the learned court below directed that the sealed cover containing the award be kept in the safe custody of the Sharistedar. From a perusal of the order sheet dated 2-3-1988 it appears that on that date an application filed by the respondents to the effect that the sealed cover containing the award should be opened. Even a copy of the said application was not served on the counsel of the appellant. The court below, however, fixed 14-3-1988 for opening the sealed cover, which was shown to the counsel for the parties. 12. In the situation although the said order was shown to the counsel of the parties, the same does not amount to notice of filing of the award which was done on 14-3-1988. There cannot be any doubt that for the purpose of the notice of filing of the award, it is not necessary that such notice must be in any particular form. The notice to the counsel for the parties is also a valid notice and for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, even an oral notice would serve the purpose. 13. Reliance on the case of State of Bihar V/s. Liason and Contract and Anr. -- by Shri S.K. Chattopadhaya is misplaced, inasmuch as in that case the pleader of the concerned party had himself filed the award in question and as such it was held that filing of the award was within the knowledge of the parties and thus no separate notice in terms of Sec. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act was required to be issued. 14. In the case of Chhabila Singh and others (supra) a learned Single Judge of this Court merely held that the period of limitation starts running from the date of intimation whether such intimation was formal or infomal. There is no dispute with regard to the said proposition of law. 15. In the case of Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. V/s. Raunaq and Co. There is no dispute with regard to the said proposition of law. 15. In the case of Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. V/s. Raunaq and Co. Pvt. Ltd. -- , it was held that limitation under Article 119(1) of the Limitation Act starts from the date of service of notice and where the conduct of the parties reveals that it had already acknowledged filing of the award, the limitation commences from the said date. The Supreme Court in that case laid down the law in the following terms: The fact that the parties have notice of the filing of the award, is not enough. The notice must be served by the Court. We reiterate again that there must be (a) filing of the award in the proper Court; (b) service of the notice by the Court or its office to the parties concerned and (c) such notice need not necessarily be in writing. It is upon the date of service of such notice that the period of limitation begins and as at present under Clause (b) of Article 119 of the Act, the limitation expires on the expiry of the thirty days of the service of that notice for an application for setting aside of the award. The importance of the matter, which need be emphasised, is the service of the notice by the Court. It is not the method of the service that is important or relevant. 16. It is, therefore, clear that in terms of the aforementioned decision what is necessary is the service of notice upon the parties concerned by the Court. As indicated herein before on 7-3-1988 the parties were merely informed that the sealed cover containing the award would be opened on 14-3-1988 in presence of both the parties. Such an intimation passed by the court cannot be said to be a notice of filing of an award in terms of Sec. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act. 17. In the case of R.D. Gupta (supra), the Supreme Court held as follows: The last contention taken by the appellant was that the application made on behalf of the Union of India to set aside the award is barred by Limitation. As seen earlier, the award had been filed in Court on May 26, 1966, and a notice of the filing of the award was served on the Union of India in May 30, 1966. As seen earlier, the award had been filed in Court on May 26, 1966, and a notice of the filing of the award was served on the Union of India in May 30, 1966. The petition to set aside the award was made on June 27, 1966. Therefore, prima facie the petition was in time having been filed within thirty days from the date of service of the notice of filing of the award. But what is said or behalf of the appellant is that on the very day the award was filed into Court, the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner passed the following order; Arbitrator has filed the award along with the records of proceedings and his bill is amounting to Rs. 7,163 00. Issue notice on the parties fixing 14-7-1966. This order was shown to Mr. K.P. Changakacoti Government Advocate and his signatures obtained. This amounted to a service of a notice under Section 14(2) of the Act. Hence, the petition filed on June 27, 1966 must be held to be barred. It is true that notice under Sec. 14(2) of the Act, need not be in writing but we are unable to accept the contention that the information given to Mr. Changakakoti amounts to a notice to the Government under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act. All that Mr. Changakakoti was told was that a written notice of the filing of the award will be given to the Government though he had come to know that the award had be tiled into Court. Under the circumstances we are unable to hold that the information given to Mr. Changakekoti amounted to a notice under Sec. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act. 18. From the decision abovementioned it is clear that notice as such of filing of the award Was given to the parties by the Court. 19. In this view of the matter, the impugned order must be set aside. 20. Before parting with the judgment it may observed that from plaint reading of Sec. 14 of the Act it is evident that the arbitrary is required to file not only the award but also all the records forming part of the arbitration proceeding. The Court when it receives an award in sealed cover must open the same immediately itself without waiting for filing of an application in that regard by any of the parties to the suit. The Court when it receives an award in sealed cover must open the same immediately itself without waiting for filing of an application in that regard by any of the parties to the suit. Before a party can be said to have knowledge about filing of the award, he must know the nature of the award has been passed against. This is more required so in a case where the arbitrator does not serve a notice upon the parties to the arbitration proceeding about making of his award in terms of Sec. 14(1) of the Arbitration Act. 21. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the learned court below is directed to dispose of the case on merits expeditiously as the matter has been pending since long. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.