TIBREWAL, J. -In all the above three Criminal Misc. Petitions, the petitioner has prayed to quash criminal proceedings pending in the court of Special Judge (Anti-corruption Cases) Jaipur on the ground of delay. As there is a common ground in all the petitions, they may be disposed of conveniently by a common order. (2). The old saying justice delayed is justice denied has now been given shape in the investigation and trial of criminal cases. After dynamic interpretation to Article 21 of the Constitution of India in Menaka Gandhis case (1) the judgment of the apex court of the country in Hussamara Khatoons case (2) has further expanded Article 21 in dispensation of criminal justice recognizing the right to speedy trial as a part and parcel of the fundamental right. The constitutional position is now well settled, the right to a speedy trial is one of the dimensions of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (3). However, the application of this doctrine is a vexed question. While a speedy trial is an implied ingredient of a fair trial, the converse is not necessarily true. A delayed trial is not necessarily an unfair trial. Therefore, several questions arise for consideration in this connection when the matter is judicially examined by a court of law, some of them are : — (i) How long is the delay and whether it is unreasonable? (ii) Was to delay inevthitable having regard to the nature of the case, the sparse availability of legal services and other relevant circumstances? (iii) Was any part of the delay caused by the wilfullness or the negligence of the prosecuting agency? (iv) Was the delay causes beyond the control of the prosecuting and defending agency? (v) If there any likelihood of the accused being prejudiced in his defence? (vi) Whether inordinate delay itself is sufficient to drop the criminal proceedings without any prejudice to the accused? (vii) Whether any outer delay can be spelt from the date of commission of the offence to be the period beyond which a criminal proceeding is not to be continued at all? (4). In order to find out the causes of delay and the effect of delay in the trial of the present cases it is necessary to examine the facts in nut-shell: (5). (4). In order to find out the causes of delay and the effect of delay in the trial of the present cases it is necessary to examine the facts in nut-shell: (5). The Secretary, Rajasthan Vigilance Commission, Jaipur (Rajasthan) made a complaint to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Anti Corruption Department, Jaipur with reference to a complaint made by the then Superintending Engineer, P.W.D. (B&R) Circle-III, Jaipur. In the said complaint, it was alleged that the then Executive Engineers, District Division, Jaipur, Sh. P.C. Tripathi and Sh. H.P. Kuchhar, in collaboration with the Asstt. Engineer Sh. L.D. Sapra and Overseer Sh. J.P. Gupta, had incurred an expenditure of Rs. 6,31,735.00 against the allotment of Rs. 3,00,000/- in breach of General Financial and Account Rules and that Sh. P.C. Tripathi has also made excess payment of Rs. 2,56,124.00 as compared to the actual work done by the contractors. Hence, a prayer was made for investigation in the matter as large amounts of Government money were involved and the allegations against the officers were serious. (6). The Superintending Engineer, P.W.D./ B&R, Circle-Ill, Jaipur had made another complaint to the Chief Engineer, P.W.D. Rajasthan, Jaipur vide his letter dated 3rd Oct., 1971 relating to over payments made in some cases by the then Executive Engineer Sh. H.P. Kuchhal, the details of which were also given. On this complaint, the Chief Engineer, P.W.D. (B&R) Rajasthan deputed Shri S. Adaviyappa, Additional Chief Engineer, P.W.D. Raj., Jaipur to conduct a quick and summary examination of all the allegations vide his office order No. H 5(B)/C-B/Ir. 106 dated 15.07.1972. (7). Four Checking Parties were also deputed by the Chief Engineer for cheking and re-measurement of the various works executed at different places. Party No. 1 was headed by Sh. B.L. Hawa, Asstt. Engineer, PWD (B&R) Planning, Sub-Division-II, Jaipur, Party No. 2 was headed by Sh. D.B. Chanchalani, Asstt. Engineer, PWD (B&R) MREC Division Jaipur, Party No. 3 was headed by Sh. V.P. Srivastava, Asstt. Engineer PWD (B&R) East Sub-Division, Jaipur and Party No. 4 was headed by Sh. H.C. Gupta, Asstt. Engineer, PWD (B&R) Sub-division, Jaipur. These parties submitted their respective reports to the Additional Chief Engineer Shri S. Adariyappa. The Additional Chief Engineer examined the matter and found that there were many irregularities in those cases. For the over-payments, Mr. V.P. Srivastava, Asstt. Engineer PWD (B&R) East Sub-Division, Jaipur and Party No. 4 was headed by Sh. H.C. Gupta, Asstt. Engineer, PWD (B&R) Sub-division, Jaipur. These parties submitted their respective reports to the Additional Chief Engineer Shri S. Adariyappa. The Additional Chief Engineer examined the matter and found that there were many irregularities in those cases. For the over-payments, Mr. Adaviyappa has observed as under in his letter dated 28.2.1973 to Chief Engineer :- "Most of the irregularities were committed during early part of the year 1971. As indicated in the report contained in the appendices, the measurements recorded by the Checking Parties may not represent correctly, the work might have been done by the Contractors and as such, the amounts of over-payments worked out may not truely represent the over-payment involved. However, the reports and statements do establish that there have been over-payments." (8). Presently, we are concerned with the cases involving the petitioner, who is the Secretary, Khania Shramik Sahakari Samiti. This Society was allotted the following works by the P.W.D. Department, Government of Rajasthan: — (a) Collection of Muranda on Sanganer-Malpura Road mile 10 and 11, vide Agreement No. 241 and work order No. 10485 of 8.3.71 for Rs. 15,120/-. (b) Supplying and spreading of Quarry Rubbish for berms on Moti Dungri Jagatpura Road vide Agreement No. 280 and work order No. 56263 Dt. 25.3.71 for Rs. 18,139/- (c) Spreading Quarry Rubbish at mile 6,7 and 8 on Sanganer-Sodala Road vide Agreement No. 277 and work order No. 9545-46 dated 24.3.71 for Rs. 19,836/-. (d) Collection of grit and stone for patches and repairs on different reaches on Sanganer Section vide Agreement No. 263 and work order No. 529-30 dated 24.3.71 for Rs. 19,963/- (e) Improvement of Road Berms on Bassi-Tunga Road mile 9,10 and 11 vide Agreement No. 262 and work order No. 437/38 dated 11.1.71 for Rs. 19,758/-. (9). After investigation, the Anti-corruption Department instituted five cases against the petitioner and the co-accused L.D. Sapra and R.P. Sharma in the Court of Special Judge, Anti-corruption Cases, Jaipur. Criminal case No. 33/79 relates to item No. (a), criminal case No. 37/79 relates to item No. (b), criminal case No. 38/79 relates to item No. (c), criminal case No. 43/79 relates to item No. (d) and criminal case No. 45/79 relates to item No. (e). (10). Criminal case No. 33/79 relates to item No. (a), criminal case No. 37/79 relates to item No. (b), criminal case No. 38/79 relates to item No. (c), criminal case No. 43/79 relates to item No. (d) and criminal case No. 45/79 relates to item No. (e). (10). Subsequently, the criminal cases No. 33/79, 37/79 and 38/79 were consolidated by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Cases, Jaipur vide his order dated 3.12.1986. Thereafter, the learned Special Judge framed charges against the petitioner and the co-accused vide his order dated Feb. 24,1990. The petitioner has been charged under sections 120B, 420/120B IPC, 477A/120B IPC, 471/120B IPC and 468/120B IPC. (11). Aggrieved against the aforesaid order framing charges, the present three petition under section 482 Cr. P.C. have been filed by the petitioner with a prayer to quash the criminal proceedings against him in all the above cases. (12). S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 760/90 relates to criminal cases Nos. 33/79,37/79 and 38/79 which were consolidated later on, while S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 325/90 relates to criminal case No. 43/79 and S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 762/90 relates to criminal case No. 45/79. (13). Salient points/features of the Inspection Reports, Police, Investigation and the trial are also necessary to be detailed out. (A) Inspection Reports (a) The works were executed in the month of March 19, 1971 or so, while the inspection/cheking of the material etc. by the Checking Parties, was made after one and half years in Sept. 1972; (b) Looking to the nature of the five works entrusted to the petitioner, it was difficult to assess after 18 months the actual quantity of the material placed/collected on the roads. There were every chances of the material being flown away or washed out due to heavy traffic, wind, blowing and rains; (c) to work out the shortages, the quantities consumed on the work was assessed as per theoritical calculations; (d) While assessing over-payments to the contractors, other factors were also taken into account e.g. that most of the stones or sand were supplied from a near place/quarry while payment was made for the supply from a long distance place and that the material was of inferior quality etc. (e) Sh. D.B. Chanchalani, Asstt. (e) Sh. D.B. Chanchalani, Asstt. Engineer, in his report (Appendix-2), with regard to item No.6 of the complaint pertaining supplying and spreading of Quarry rubbish on miles 1 to 4 on Moti Doongri Jagatpura Road (Agreement No. 280) has stated as under : — "As the work of spreading was done almost about 1 1/2 years ago, the Quarry rubbish has got compacted with the traffic moving over it. It is also possible that some quantity must have been washed away during rains and some must have been flown away due to wind and on account of traffic. It is, however, not possible to assess correctly what must have been actually collected and spreaded on the road berms." Similar notings were also made by Sh. Chanchalani in the Statement 2.A short reference of the same may be made: — "The correct assessment cannot be done as there are chances of flown away and washing-out due to traffic and rains as more than one year has been passed." "About two years and three months has been passed after the collection has been made, there are chances of theft of materially by villagers." (f) Sh. H.C. Gupta, Asstt. Engineer has also stated similarly in his report (Appendix-3) while dealing with item No.l Collection of Muranda on Sanganer-Malpura on Sanganer-Malpura Road mile 10 and 11 (agreement No. 241 of 1970-71) :- "It is difficult to assess at this stage what quantity must have been spread. It is also. not possible to accept whether any collection had been left in stacks and if any spreading was done on the berms." For collection and spreading of quarry rubbish, he has made the following remark in the measurement chart: — "Actual assessment of quantities in this work is not possible after one and half years of its completion." (g) Sh. S. Adaviyappa, Additional Chief Engineer has also admitted in his statement recorded under section 161 Cr. P.C. on 27.5.1976 that the exact measurements of the works done was not possible as the works were completed in the year 1971 while the meas urements were made in 1973. (B) Delay in Investigation: The case was registered at police station on 28.2.1973 and thereafter, the investigation proceeded at a snails pace. Even the statement of Addl. Chief Engineer Sh. S. Adaviyappa was recorded on 27.5.1976. (B) Delay in Investigation: The case was registered at police station on 28.2.1973 and thereafter, the investigation proceeded at a snails pace. Even the statement of Addl. Chief Engineer Sh. S. Adaviyappa was recorded on 27.5.1976. Statements of other witnesses were recorded thereafter in the years 1976 to 1978 even though the Checking Reports were already prepared in the year 1972. The charge-sheets have been filed on 21.12.1979. The investigation has, thus, consumed about seven years, for which the Investigating Agency has no explanation, less to say any reasonable explanation. (C) Delay in Trial: (i) The charge-sheets were filed on 21/12/1979, but it took about 11 years in framing the charges, which have been framed in Feb., 1990. In other words, till the charges were framed 19 years had already passed when the works were completed and 17 years have passed since the cases were registered against the petitioner. (ii) From the date of filing of the charge-sheets till the date when the charges have been framed, each case has been listed in the Court on eighty dates of hearings or so. A perusal of the various order-sheets in the concerned files will demonstrate that the responsibility for this delay can be easily fastened either on the prosecution or the Court. The cases have been adjourned at several occasions as the court could not take up them for one reason or the other. On 30.4.1982, the Court had directed the prosecution to produce the statements recorded u/s 161 Cr. P.C. of the witnesses Rajendra Jain, Badri Prasad, H.P. Kuchhar and P.C. Tripathi, who were cited as prosecution witnesses, but the same were not produced in the Court. The prosecution took as many as thirteen adjournments to comply with the order of the court. After taking 13 adjournments, on 19.9.1983, the APP informed the Court that the statement of those witnesses were not recorded by the Investigating Agency. In other words, the prosecution took 18 months to give this information. (iii) Then, on 4.7.1985, the Court had directed the prosecution toproduce certain documents in the court. A similar direction was again given on 29.10.1988. After taking 13 adjournments, on 19.9.1983, the APP informed the Court that the statement of those witnesses were not recorded by the Investigating Agency. In other words, the prosecution took 18 months to give this information. (iii) Then, on 4.7.1985, the Court had directed the prosecution toproduce certain documents in the court. A similar direction was again given on 29.10.1988. The relevant portion of the order dated 29.10.1988 is reproduced as under:- ^^,-ih-ih- izFke mifLFkr gSA eqyfteku ij tekur e; odhy mifLFkr gSA fnukad 9-9-88 o 1-10-88 dks deZpkfj;ksa dh gM+rky ds dkj.k i=koyh vkt isk gqbZA eq- ua- 41@79 o 12@81 esa Jh ,y- vkj- lqjk.kk }kjk ,d nj[okLr vUrxZr /kkjk 91 n.M izfdz;k lafgrk isk dh xbZ ftl ij ;g vknsk fn;k x;kA ,-ih-ih- dks ;g funsZk fn;k tkrk gS fd mDr nj[okLr esa of.kZr nLrkostkr dks isk djs vU;Fkk vkbZVe okbZt fVIi.kh eaxok dj U;k;ky; esa vkxkeh frFkh dks vko;d :i ls isk dh tkosaA pwafd eqdnek dkQh iqjkuk gS] blesa vHkh rd pktZ ugha yxk gS vr% mDr nj[okLr esa of.kZr nLokostksa dks isk djus vFkok mudh vkbZVe okbZt fVIi.kh eaxokus gsrq ,-ih-ih- dks vkf[kjh ekSdk fn;k tkrk gSA ftl fdlh vkbZVe dh fVIi.kh ugha dh vkosxh mlesa vfHk;kstu ds fo:) Presumption Mªk dj fy;k tkosxkA i=koyh fnukad 15-12-88 dks isk gksaA The said documents were not produced by the prosecution even after taking several adjournments. (iv) Then, on 9.2.1990, the trial court has given further direction to the prosecution to explain the discrepancies between the figures of loss to the Government shown in the charge-sheet and in the reports of Checking Parties. The said order has yet to be complied with. (D) The above facts abundantly make clear: (i) The alleged works were completed by the Contractor-petitioner in the year 1970-71 and 20 years have already passed since then but the trial has yet to commence. (ii) The case was registered on 28.2.1973 and 18 1/2 years have already passed since the registration of the case. (iii) The prosecution took a long period of 7 years in the completion of the investigation. This long delay in the investigation was absolutely unwarranted. (iv) The trial court has taken 11 years in framing the charges. (v) The entire assessment of excess payments is based on theoritical calculations. (iii) The prosecution took a long period of 7 years in the completion of the investigation. This long delay in the investigation was absolutely unwarranted. (iv) The trial court has taken 11 years in framing the charges. (v) The entire assessment of excess payments is based on theoritical calculations. Even in the year 1972 when the measurements/checking were made the exact assessment was not possible looking to nature of the works under taken by the petitioner. (vi) The statements of some of the material witnesses have either not been recorded under section 161 Cr. P.C. or have not been made availabe to the court and the accused. Similarly, some material documents, which were summoned by the Court, have not been produced by the prosecution till now. (vii) The petitioner is not responsible for the above delay in the investigation or trial. (14). On the above undisputed facts, it has to be decided as to whether the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner should be quashed? To decide this question it is necessary to refer some relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the important judicial pronouncements made on this point. (15). Legislative intent for speedy Investigations and Trials: Provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have been made to ensure speedy investigations and trials on the recommendations made by the Law Commission in its 41st Report. Some of the relevant provisions in this connection may be referred: — (i) Section 157 (i) cast a duty on the officer incharge of the police station to proceed forthwith to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender. (ii) Section 167(2) is pointer to the legislative mandate and it plainly envisages that investigation, in cases of serious offences, to be completed within 90 days and in lesser ones in 60 days. It is true that this provision does not say that the investigation is vitiated if it is not completed within the aforesaid period, but it does speak of the legislative concern for speedy investigation. (iii) Section. 173 (1) further speaks that every investigation under Chapter II of the Code shall be completed without unnecessary delay. It is true that this provision does not say that the investigation is vitiated if it is not completed within the aforesaid period, but it does speak of the legislative concern for speedy investigation. (iii) Section. 173 (1) further speaks that every investigation under Chapter II of the Code shall be completed without unnecessary delay. (iv) Section 207 requires that the stage of the trial be set forth by furnishing police documents to the accused without any delay, and this duty is cast on the Magistrate to see that the compliance is made. Similar provision has been made under section 238 in a warrant case instituted on a police report wherein a duty is cast on the Magistrate to satisfy himself that he has complied with the provisions of Section 207 of the Code. (v) Section 309 again uses pre-emptory language by directing that in every enquiry or trial, the proceeding shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same to be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. Sub section (2) of Section 309 contains similar mandate in the matter of granting adjournment for remand of an accused. (vi) Section 437 (6) is also an indication to conclude the trial within a period of 60 days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case triable by a Magistrate. (vii) Section 468 further highlights the significance of speedy investigation by prescribing the period of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2). The offences covered in the said category are included which are punishable with imprisonment for a period upto three years. The aforesaid provisions of the Code embody the spirit of speedy investigation and speedy trial. (16). In S.M. Vikal Vs. A.L. Chopra(3), while dealing with the object of Section 468 Cr.P.C., P.N. Singhal, J. has observed as under : — "It is hardly necessary to say that statutes of limitation have legislative police (policy) behind them. For instance, they shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment. (16). In S.M. Vikal Vs. A.L. Chopra(3), while dealing with the object of Section 468 Cr.P.C., P.N. Singhal, J. has observed as under : — "It is hardly necessary to say that statutes of limitation have legislative police (policy) behind them. For instance, they shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment. They also save the accused from the risk of having to face trial at a time when his evidence might have been lost because of the delay on the part of the prosecutor." (17). Similarly, in State of Punjab vs. Sarwan Singh (4) the apex court of the country has again reiterated as under: — "The object of the Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence. The object which the statute seeks to subserve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or a private complainant, must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation. The prosecution against the respondent being barred by limitation the conviction as also the sentence of the respondent as also the entire proceedings culminating in the conviction of the respondent herein is non- est." Thus, the legislative mandate/intent of speedy investigations and speedy trials is clearly demonstrated from the various provisions of the Code. Speedy investigation and speedy trial is in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. A long delay may also seriously prejudice the defence of the accused. (18). Judicial Pronouncements: — Now, let us examine the judicial attitude towards the concept of speedy trial. For this purpose, the cases may be divided in two categories i.e. prior and after the landmark judgment in Menaka Gandhis case (supra). Prior to Menaka Gandhis case, some judgments of the apex court of the country may be referred. In Machander Vs. (18). Judicial Pronouncements: — Now, let us examine the judicial attitude towards the concept of speedy trial. For this purpose, the cases may be divided in two categories i.e. prior and after the landmark judgment in Menaka Gandhis case (supra). Prior to Menaka Gandhis case, some judgments of the apex court of the country may be referred. In Machander Vs. Hyderabad State(5), the accused was charged for the offence of murder. He was convicted under section 302 IPC by the trial court, as well as, by the High Court. The conviction of the accused was based on circumstantial evidence. One circumstance against the accused was his confession, but the same was excluded by Supreme Court as he was not questioned about it under section 342 Cr. P.C, 1898. While acquitting the accused, the prayer to remand the case was declined by Supreme Court observing: — "We are not prepared to keep persons who are on trial for their lives under indefinite suspense because trial Judges omit to do their duty. Justice is not one sided. It has many facets and we have to draw a nice balance between conflicting rights and duties. While it is incumbent on us to see that the guilty do not escape it is even more necessary to see that persons accused of crime are not indefinitely harassed. They must be given a fair and impartial trial and while every reasonable latitude must be given to those concerned with the detections of crime and entrusted with the administration of justice, limits must be placed on the lengths to which they may go." Chajoo Ram vs. Radhey Shyam (6) was a case of forgery. A delay of 10 years since the filing of the affidavit, which was the subject matter of the charge, was held against expediency of prosecution. In Union of India vs. G.K. Apte (7) the order of the High Court quashing the proceedings in exercise of the inherent powers was not interferred by the Supreme Court on certain grounds including that the material evidence sought to be produced related to the year 1960 and it may not be readily available after a lapse of nearly 11 years. In State of U.P. vs. Kapil Deo (8) the High Court had quashed the pending proceedings on the ground that it would be an abuse of the process of the Court if the trial protracted for about 20 years were to be allowed to go on. In this case, the accused was facing trial under section 408 and 477 A IPC. The High Court had also noticed the fact of impossibility of furnishing to the accused copies of the statements recorded by the police during investigation. In an appeal preferred by the State of U.P., the Honble Supreme Court observed as under: — "That the circumstances were likely to prevent the trial being altogether fair. It was neither expedient nor in the larger interest of justice that the trial with all such possible deficiencies could be allowed. It was further observed: — "It is a matter of some regret that on such a view the respondent against whom serious charges of a public nature stand, should not be proceeded with. But as against that there is equally the fact that long lapse of time and the impossibility of supplying him copies of police statements and other relevant documents is likely to end in the trial not being fair and just. In these circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that it is neither expedient nor in the larger interest of justice that the trial with all the aforesaid possible deficiencies should be allowed to proceed." (19). In Menaka Gandhis case (supra), it was held that it is not enough that there should be some semblance of procedure provided by law, but the procedure under which a person may be deprived of his life or liberty should be reasonable, fair and just. (20). In Hussainara Khatton vs. State of Bihar (Supra), the apex court of the country has further extended the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution by including the speedy trial in its ambit as a fundamental right of the accused. It has been observed: — "It is a sad reflection on the legal and judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for a larger number of years. It has been observed: — "It is a sad reflection on the legal and judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for a larger number of years. Even a delay of one year in the commencement of the trial is bad enough, : how much worse could it be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7 or even 10 years. Speedy trial is of the essence of criminal Justice and there can be not doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice. It is interesting to note that in the United States, speedy trial in one of the constitutionally guaranteed rights. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." So also Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that, "every one arrested or detained shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial." We think that even under our Constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court in Menaka Gandhi vs. Union of India ( AIR 1978 SC. 597 ). We have held in that case that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be reasonable, fair and just. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable, fair and just, such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be reasonable, fair and just unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be reasonable, fair and just unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Article 21.There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21." (21). In Hussainara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar (supra), the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution was again explained so as to include speedy trial as essential ingredient of reasonable, fair and just procedure guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. It was further held "It is the constitutional obligation of the State to device such a procedure as would ensure speedy trial to the accused. The State cannot be permitted to deny the constitutional right of speedy trial to the accused on the ground that the State has no adequate financial resources to incur the necessary expenditure needed for improving the administrative and judicial apparatus with a view to ensuring speedy trial." (22). In Kadra Pahadiya vs. State of Bihar (9) it was again held that a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution. (23). In State of Maharashtra vs. Champalal (10), this question was again considered in the light of the responsibility for delaying criminal trials in the background to the interpretation of Article 21 given by the Supreme Court in Menaka Gandhis case (supra) and Hussainara Khatoons case (supra). The problem was considered by the Supreme Court and it was observed in para No. 2: "What is the remedy if a trial is unduly delayed? In the United States, where the right to a speedy trial is a constitutionally guaranteed right, the denial of a speedy trial has been held to entitle an accused person to the dismissal of the indictment or the vacation of the sentence. In the United States, where the right to a speedy trial is a constitutionally guaranteed right, the denial of a speedy trial has been held to entitle an accused person to the dismissal of the indictment or the vacation of the sentence. But in deciding the question whether there has been a denial of the right to speedy trial, the Court is entitled to take into consideration whether the defendant himself was responsible for a part of the delay and whether he was prejudiced in the preparation of his defence by reason of the delay. The Court is also entitled to take into consideration whether the delay was unintentional caused by over crowding of the Courts Docket or understaffing of the Prosecutors." Then, it was observed: — "As pointed out in the first Hussainaras case (Supra), the right to a speedy trial is not an expressly guaranteed constitutional right in India but is implicit in the right to a fair trial which has been held to be part of the right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. While a speedy trial is an implied ingredient of a fair trial, the converse is not necessarily true. A delayed trial is not necessarily an unfair trial. The delay may be occasioned by the tactic or conduct of the accused himself. The delay may have caused no prejudice whatsoever to the accused. The question whether a conviction should be quashed on the ground of delayed trial depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. If the accused is found to have been prejudiced in the conduct of his defence and it could be said that the accused had thus been denied an adequate opportunity to defend himself, the conviction would certainly have to go. But if nothing is shown and there are no circumstances entitling the Court to raise a presumption that the accused had been prejudiced there will be no justification to quash the conviction on the ground of delayed trial only." Lastly, it was held: — "Shri Jethmalani also urged that the trial of the respondents was considerably delayed, that there was thus a violation of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and that was sufficient ground to entitle the accused to a dismissal of the complaint against him. We have earlier discussed the relevant principles, which should guide us in such situations. In this case the accused himself was responsible for a fair part of the delay. He has also not been able to show cause how he was prejudiced in the conduct of his defence by reason of delay." (24). In Kadra Pahadiya vs. State of Bihar (1.1), the aforesaid principle that a speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in the guarantee of life and personal liberty enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution was again emphasised. It was further observed: — "Any accused who is denied this right of speedy trial is entitled to approach the Supreme Court for the purpose of enforcing such right and the Supreme Court in discharge of its constitutional obligation has the power to give necessary direction to the State Governments and other appropriate authorities securing this right to the accused." (25). In T.V. Vatheeswaran Vs. Stale of Tamil Nadu (12), it was held that person under sentence of death can also claim fundamental rights. The sentence of death was quashed on the ground of delay in the execution and it was observed: — "The dehumanising factor of prolonged delay in the execution of a sentence of death has the constitutional implication of depriving a person of his life in an unjust, unfair and unreasonable way as to offend the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The appropriate relief in such a case is to vacate the sentence of death." (26). In Sheela Barse vs. Union of India (13), a writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution was filed by a social worker seeking release of children below the age of 16 years detained in jail. While considering speedy trial as a fundamental right in Art. 21 of the Constitution, it was observed as under: — "If an accused is not tried speedily and his case remains pending before the Magistrate or the Sessions Court for an unreasonable length of time, it is clear that his fundamental right to speedy trial would be violated unelss, of course, the trial is held up on account of some interim order passed by a superior Court or the accused is responsible for the delay in the trial of the case. The consequence of violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in breach of the fundamental right." (27). In this judgment, the Supreme Court also considered the primary reasons for the delay in the trial of the criminal cases which included inadequacy of judge strength and lack of satisfactory working conditions for the Presiding Officers, including heavy work load. It was, therefore,observed:– "We are , therefore, firmly of the view that every State Government must take necessary measures for the purpose of setting up adequate number of Courts, appointing requisite number of Judges and providing them the necessary facilities. It is also necessary to set up an Institute or Academy for training of Judicial Officers so that their efficiency may be improved and they may be able to regulate and control the flows of cases in their respective courts. The problem of arrears of criminal cases in the courts of Magistrates and Additional Sessions Judges has assumed rather disturbing propositions and it is a matter of grave urgency to which no State Government can afford to be oblivious." (28). So far a child accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment of not more than seven years, three months period was considered as a maximum time permissible for investigation from the date of filing of the complaint/lodging of the First Information Report and a period of six months from the date of filing of the charge-sheet as a reasonable period within which the trial of the child must be completed. It was further observed that if that is not done, the prosecution against the child would be liable to be quashed. (29). In Raghubir Singh vs. State of Bihar (14), the Supreme Court took a note of the fact that in foreign jurisdictions also, where the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time is a constitutionally protected right, the infringement of that right has been held in appropriate cases sufficient to quash a conviction or to stop further proceedings. (29). In Raghubir Singh vs. State of Bihar (14), the Supreme Court took a note of the fact that in foreign jurisdictions also, where the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time is a constitutionally protected right, the infringement of that right has been held in appropriate cases sufficient to quash a conviction or to stop further proceedings. Then, it was observed as under: — "The question whether the right to a speedy trial which forms part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 has been infringed is ultimately a question of fairness in the administration of criminal justice even as acting fairly as of the essence of the principles of natural justice (In re H.K. 1967(1) All ER 226) and a fair and reasonable procedure is what is contemplated by the expression procedure established by law in Art. 21 (Menaka Gandhi)." (30). However, having regard to all the circumstances, the Supreme Court did not think that the delay in the investigation and in the trial of the case was so unfair as to warrant quashing the proceedings on the ground of infringement of the right of the accused to a speedy trial and a direction was given to the trial court to proceed from day to day in the trial of the case. (31). In V.K. Agrawal vs. Vasantraj (15), the accused persons were prosecuted under section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968. The High Court had dropped the proceedings on the premise that the acquittal of the accused in the former proceedings under section 111 read with section 135 of the Customs Act, 1969 operated as a legal bar to the prosecution of the accused in the latter proceedings under section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the High Court and by that time 20 years had elapsed since the date of seizure. The Supreme Court then observed as under: — "That 20 years have elapsed since the date of the seizure (November 15, 1968) is, in our opinion, no ground for not proceeding further with the matter inasmuch as the offence in question is a serious economic offence, which undermines the entire economy of the Nation. The Supreme Court then observed as under: — "That 20 years have elapsed since the date of the seizure (November 15, 1968) is, in our opinion, no ground for not proceeding further with the matter inasmuch as the offence in question is a serious economic offence, which undermines the entire economy of the Nation. The delay occasioned in the working of the judicial system by the ever increasing work load can not provide an alibi for upholding such a plea. However, in the present case the Sessions Court has quashed the proceedings not only on this ground but also on the basis of certain factual findings as well and the learned counsel for the appellant himself found it difficult to assail these findings at this juncture. The operative order passed by the High Court cannot therefore be disturbed in view of the facts and circumstances peculiar to this particular case." (32). In M. Jiwaji Roa Sciendia vs. Chandroj Rao Angre (16), the Supreme Court has laid down: — "The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima-facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution or continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of the case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." (33). In Srinivas Gopal vs. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh (17), the Supreme Court has observed: — "Quick justice is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 9-1/2 years without any cause at all and none was indicated before the learned Magistrate or before the High court or before us, cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 9-1/2 years without any cause at all and none was indicated before the learned Magistrate or before the High court or before us, cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law. In that view of the matter, it is just and fair and in accordance with equity to direct that the trial or prosecution of the appellant to proceed no further. We do so accordingly." (34). Some decisions of this High Court, as well as , the other High Courts may also be examined in this connection. (35). In D.R. Devarajan v.s The State (18), the incident related to the period between 1968 and 1972 in respect of loans and advances granted to several ryots on the basis of false declarations, false particulars and false certificates and also by impersonation. The First Information Report was filed on 6.4.1974 and the charge sheet was filed on 4.6.1983 covering a period of 9 years or so. A petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed before the High Court to quash the proceedings in the criminal case. While quashing the proceedings, it was observed as under: — "The charges in the case before me relate to the period between 1968 and 1972 in respect of loans and advances granted to several ryots on the 0basis of false declarations, false particulars and false certificates and also by impersonation. More than 12 years have passed since then and it is impossible for any one, at this distance of time, to remember what happened before 1972, identify the witnesses, cross examine them and put forth their case effectively. The case of the prosecution depends mostly upon oral evidence and as many as 86 witnesses have been cited. After this long lapse of time, it is difficult to believe how these witnesses could remember things which happened more than a decade ago. The result is, the witnesses whether for the prosecution or for the defence could speak, so late in the day, not to what they saw or heard but only to what they should persuade themselves to believe that they saw or heard and this would be a total travesty of justice. No credibility could be attached to their testimony. The result is, the witnesses whether for the prosecution or for the defence could speak, so late in the day, not to what they saw or heard but only to what they should persuade themselves to believe that they saw or heard and this would be a total travesty of justice. No credibility could be attached to their testimony. In the circumstances, the accused must be held to be seriously prejudiced in the defence and to be deeply deprived of a reasonable opportunity to defend themselves on account of the inordinate and inexplicable delay. As pointed out by the Bench, in the aforesaid decision, this would amount to violation of the principles of natural justice and the prosecution must, therefore, be struck down." (36). In K.K. Tiwari Vs. S.P. (CBI) (19), it was held by the Division Bench of this Court that speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused and the delay which does not arise on account of the fault of the accused would violate the constitutional guarantee and the proceedings was quashed. (37). In Roop Narain Singh vs. State of Raj. (20), the accused was facing trial for embezzlement of the money amounting to over a lac of rupees between the period 1969 to 1974. However, the proceedings were quashed as the incident was 20 years old and even a single witness was not examined by the prosecution for about 1.2 years after the charge was framed. (38). In Laxmi Chand vs. State of Raj. (21), it was held by this Court as under: — "The position of law that emerges from the aforesaid decisions is that the right to a fair trial is crucial. An accused is entitled to a trial which is speedy. Any procedure which does not embody quick justice cannot be regarded as fair and just. Now it is beyond the pale of controversy that the right to speedy trial, which is an implied ingredient of a fair trial, is recognized as a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. In some cases, a period of seven years was treated as the outer limit for the completion of a trial. If the investigation or trial of a case has unreasonably been prolonged, the accused would be perfectly justified to complain that he has been denied the benefit of a fair and just trial. In some cases, a period of seven years was treated as the outer limit for the completion of a trial. If the investigation or trial of a case has unreasonably been prolonged, the accused would be perfectly justified to complain that he has been denied the benefit of a fair and just trial. A heavy burden lies on the prosecution to explain that the delay was due to circumstances which the accused was himself responsible. It is a great strain on any person to remain under prosecution for a long time. With the lapse of time, relevant evidence is lost, circumstances change and in the end one finds that the courts time was unnecessarily wasted without any purpose, whatsoever, having been served. The public interest would be better served, if old cases, which have no life to survive, are promptly attended and disposed off. The pendency of cases in the courts has already crossed the danger point. The arrear position is precarious and rather frightening. It is time that cases, which are shown to be frivolous or vexatious and are bound ultimately to result in failure are brought to a quick and such cases should not be allowed to add to its stock any further. The Courts time is valuable and it must be put to the maximum utility. It is not meant to be wasted in lifeless cases." (39). In State vs. Maksudan Singh (22), a Full Bench of the Patna High Court, after considering the various judgments of the Supreme Court etc. has laid down as under : — "To summarise on this aspect, the appellant States stand that the violation of the right of speedy and public trial pertain to the realm of sentence alone must be rejected, both on principle and precedents. has laid down as under : — "To summarise on this aspect, the appellant States stand that the violation of the right of speedy and public trial pertain to the realm of sentence alone must be rejected, both on principle and precedents. It must be held that once the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial and the right to a fair, just and reasonable procedure under Art. 21 has been violated, then the accused is entitled to an unconditional release and the charges levelled against him would fall to the ground." The final conclusion was held in para No. 26 as under: — "To finally conclude, it is held-(l) that the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy and public trial in all criminal prosecutions now flowing from Art. 21 of the Constitution by virtue of precedential mandate is identical in content with the express constitutional guarantee inserted by the Sixth Amendment in the American Constitution; (ii) that once the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial and the right to a fair, just and reasonable procedure under Art. 21 have been violated then the accused is entitled to an unconditional release and the charges levelled against him would fall to the ground; (iii) that the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution would be equally attracted and applicable as persuasive on this facet of Art. 21 of our Constitution as well: (iv) that inordinately prolonged and callous delays of 10 years or more entirely because of the prosecutions fault in the context of the reversal of a clean acquittal on a capital charge would be per se prejudicial to the accused and; (v) that the ratio and the reasoning of Ramdaras Ahirs case is hereby affirmed." This view has been further affirmed in Madheshwardhari Singh vs. State (23). The Full Bench of the Patna High Court again considered this question and held as under: — "To finally sum up, the answers to all the five questions formulated at the outset are rendered in the terms below and it is held: (i) that both on principle and precedent the fundamental right to a speedy public trial extends to all criminal prosecutions for all offences generally, irrespective of their nature. It is not confined or constricted to either serious or capit offences only. It is not confined or constricted to either serious or capit offences only. (ii) That the right to a speedy public trial is applicable not only to actual proceedings in Court but includes within its sweep the proceeding police investigation in a criminal prosecution as well. (iii) That a speedy investigation and trial are equally mandated both by the letter and spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (iv) That the ratios in Ramdaras Ahirs case (1985 Cr.L. J. 584) (Pat) and Maksudan Singhs case ( AIR 1986 Pat. 38 ) (FB) are mutatis mutandis applicable equally to all offences and irrespective of the fact whether the proceedings are a trial or an appeal against acquittal. (v) That an outer limit to concretise the right to speedy public trial is envisioned both by principle and precedent. A callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Art. 21". (40). After discussion of the various judicial pronouncements, the proposition of law in this connection can be laid down as under: — (i) A speedy trial is fundamental right of the accused within the ambit of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India is no more in dispute. But, the question whether this fundamental right has been violated or is likely to be violated on account of the delay in the trial will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no outer limit can be fixed in a general way for all the cases; (ii) While considering the length of delay, the Court will take into account the period consumed in the investigation of the case and the delay caused in actual proceedings in Court after filing of the charge-sheet. A speedy investigation and a trial arc equally mandated both by the letter and spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (iii) While deciding such question, the Court shall take into account the working of the judicial system in India and the lack of satisfactory working conditions in judicial courts, including large pendency and institution of the cases, inadequacy of judge- strength and under-staffing etc.; (iv) In a pending case to decide the question whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed or any other appropriate direction be given to the trial court to secure the ends of justice will depend on several factors to be taken into consideration, such as, the gravity and seriousness of the offence, whether the delay was occasioned by the tactic or conduct of the accused himself, whether the accused objected at any stage when such delay occasioned and whether the accused is prejudiced in his defence on account of the delay? (v) If the delay has caused prejudice to the accused in the conduct and his defence, the pending criminal proceedings should be normally quashed as in that situation it could be said that the accused has been denied an adequate opportunity to defend himself and the trial is not fair and reasonable; (vi) In grare and serious offences against the society or in relation to Nations economy, defence or security, the criminal proceedings shoud not be normally quashed on the ground of delay simplicitor without anything further. (vii) In trivial offences having no or very little impact on the society, quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of delay simplicitor shall be in the interest of justice as it will provide a room for serious and grave offences and will lessen the burden of the Court with heavy work-load. (41). Applying the aforesaid principles, the last question remains for consideration as to whether the criminal proceedigs in the cases pending against the petitioner be quashed or any other appropriate direction be given to the trial court. (42). Since the commission of the offence, two decades have passed, but still the trial has not commenced. In this connection, the matter has been examined in details in the preceding paragraphs No. 7(A), 7(B), 7(C), and 7(D) of this order and I need not repeat them. (43). A delay of two decades on the investigation and trial of the case is abnormal on its face. In this connection, the matter has been examined in details in the preceding paragraphs No. 7(A), 7(B), 7(C), and 7(D) of this order and I need not repeat them. (43). A delay of two decades on the investigation and trial of the case is abnormal on its face. Besides, the following facts will also show that on account of the delay, the defence of the accused is likely to be prejudiced and looking to the nature of the allegations and the evidence collected by the prosecution, the chances of an ultimate conviction is very bleak : — (i) The case against the accused depends mostly upon oral evidence and it is difficult to believe that the witnesses should remember things which happened more than two decades; (ii) After two decades, it is impossible for the accused to lead evidence that he had collected or used so much material at the site; (iii) It is difficult even to trace out the persons, who had collected or used the material at the site, even if traced out, it cannot be expected from them that they can give the proper evidence after 20 years. (iv) The trial court had directed the prosecution to make available to the accused the statements of some material witnesses recorded under section 161 Cr. P.C. but they have not been made available on the ground that their statements were not recorded. It shows that either the prosecution has not recorded the statements of material witnesses and if recorded, the same are not traceable or the prosecution does not intend to make them available to the accused and the court. This is also a serious infirmity which will have serious impact on the ultimate result of the case; (v) The trial court had directed the prosecution to produce certain documents which were summoned by the accused. The summoned documents are material, in as much as, they include the original measurement notes prepared by Party No. 1 to 3 at the time of rechecking/ remeasurement, the note book of Party No. 1 to 3 and of Executive Engineer-Ill for the year 1972- 73, the original measurement book No. 21, the original record which was sent by the Executive Engineer-Ill to the Chief Engineer vide his letter dated 16.12.1971. The non-production of these documents will also fall heavily on the prosecution case; (vi) The prosecution case largely hinges on the Inspection Reports/Checking Reports made by the Checking Parties in the year 1972. In the Checking Reports itself, it has been mentioned that it was not possible to make the assessment of the material collected at the site after 1 1/2 years looking to the nature of the works carried out by the petitioner. It was found that the material that was spread on the road must have got compacted with the traffic and it was also possible that the material might have been washed away or blown away due to rain or wind. Thus, the entire evidence against the petitioner is based on theorilical assessment, which cannot (sic can) hardly prove the guilt against him beyond reasonable doubt. (44). Therefore, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that it is-neither expedient nor in the larger interest of justice that the trial of the accused-petitioner with all the aforesaid possible deficiencies should be allowed to proceed, even after two decades, especially when the chances of the conviction are very bleak. (45). It is not doubt true that the charges against the petitioner may be considered of a serious public nature in which the high-ups of the Public Works Department of the State Government are also involved and it is also no doubt a matter of some regret that such charges should not be proceeded with. But a Court of law has to draw a nice balance between conflicting rights and duties. As observed by the apex court of the country "while it is incumbent on us to see that the guilty do not escape it is even more necessary to see that persons accused of crime are not indefinitely harassed. They must be given a fair and impartial trial and while every reasonable latitude must be given to those concerned with the detections of crime and entrusted with the administration of justice, limits must be placed on the lengths to which they may go." (46). The net result of the above discussion is that it is a fit case in which the criminal proceedings in the cases pending against the petitioner be quashed in exercise of powers under section 482 Cr. P.C. (47). Consequently, all the three petitions are allowed as indicated above.