AJIT K. SENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) PURSUANT to the direction of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 216 of 1982, the following question of law has been referred to this court for the assessment year 1972-73 under Section 256 (2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 :"whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the firm of Hind Steel Corporation was entitled to be registered under Section 184 read with Section 185 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1972-73 " ( 2 ) SHORTLY stated, the facts are that the Income-tax Officer, vide his order dated December 22, 1973, under Section 185 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, has refused registration, inter alia, with the following observations :". . . Therefore, this clause cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be taken for the allocation clause. It merely records the intention of the partners to continue the business. The fact remains that the partnership deed is not particular on the question of allocation of profit or loss. The other arguments of the authorised representative boil down to the point that, constructively, with reference to surrounding facts, viz. , previous partnership was an equal partnership and that the accounts show equal allocation of the profits amongst the partners and that Form No. 11a shows them as equal partners, there is no doubt that the partners are intended to be equal under the deed. But I cannot agree with the authorised representative. In so far as the partnership deed omits to provide for the allocation of both profit and loss, the deed itself is invalid and there cannot be any partnership validly constituted ultra vires the law of partnership. Registration is not, therefore, granted to the firm. " ( 3 ) THE said finding of the Income-tax Officer was confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, vide his order dated July 14, 1977. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, the matter was further agitated by the assessee before the Tribunal by way of second appeal. The Tribunal also confirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. ( 5 ) SINCE no one appeared for the assessee, at our request, Mr. Poddar has appeared and made submissions before this court. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, the matter was further agitated by the assessee before the Tribunal by way of second appeal. The Tribunal also confirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. ( 5 ) SINCE no one appeared for the assessee, at our request, Mr. Poddar has appeared and made submissions before this court. Section 184 provides that an application for registration of a firm for the purposes of the Income-tax Act, 1961, may be made to the Income-tax Officer, if the partnership is evidenced by an instrument and, secondly, the individual shares of the partners are specified in that instrument. Clause 5 of the partnership deed in the present case shows that there is no provision in respect of the shares of the partners. As a matter of fact, there was no deed of partnership but, in the deed of dissolution, the shares of the continuing partners have not been specified. A deed of rectification was made on December 26, 1973, after the close of the relevant accounting year in question which specified the shares of the continuing partners. The question is whether in the absence of the individual shares of the partners being specified in the instrument, the deed of rectification can be taken to be effective for the purpose of registration under the Income-tax Act, 1961. A similar question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in N. T. Patel and Co. v. CIT [1961] 42 ITR 224. ( 6 ) IN that case, an application was made under Section 26a of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the registration of a firm (for the assessment year 1955-56) constituted by a deed of partnership dated March 29, 1954. In the course of the assessment proceedings, the Income-tax Officer pointed out that there was no specification of the shares of the partners in the deed. Thereupon, a deed of rectification was executed on September 17, 1955, after the close of the accounting year which recited that an error had crept in typing the partnership deed and that the parties had agreed to rectify the error by adding a new Clause (Clause 20a) to the deed specifying the shares in which the profits and losses of the firm should be apportioned. On a reference, the High Court held that, under Section 26a of the Act, the factual existence in the year of account of an instrument of partnership specifying the individual shares of the partners was necessary, a requisite which, in this case, was lacking and, therefore, the provisions of Section 26a were not satisfied. The matter went to the Supreme Court. ( 7 ) THE Supreme Court observed that, although an instrument of partnership was in existence in the accounting year, it did not specify the shares which was one of the requirements for registration and that condition was fulfilled only by the deed of rectification dated September 17, 1955. Therefore, it could not be said that the requirement that the instrument of partnership specifying the individual shares of the partners during the year of account was satisfied and the High Court was right in holding that the firm was not entitled to registration. ( 8 ) THE Supreme Court also observed that registration under Section 26a of the Act confers a benefit on the partners which the partners would not be entitled to but for Section 26a. This right can be claimed only in accordance with the statute which confers it and a person seeking relief under that section must bring himself strictly within the terms of that section. This right is strictly regulated by the terms of that statute. Unless the instrument of partnership specified the individual shares of the partners, the instrument of partnership would not conform to the requirements of Section 26a. ( 9 ) IN that case, so also in the case before us, a deed of rectification specifying the individual shares of the partners was executed after the close of the accounting year. Even then, the registration was refused to the firm. ( 10 ) MR. Poddar has also drawn our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Parekh Wadilal Jivanbhai v. CIT [1967] 63 ITR 485. In that case also, there was no clause specifying the individual share of each partner as required under Section 26a of the old Act. But the Supreme Court, in the context of the relevant facts and circumstances found in that case, held that there was specification of the individual shares of the partners within the meaning of Section 26a and the firm was entitled to registration. But the Supreme Court, in the context of the relevant facts and circumstances found in that case, held that there was specification of the individual shares of the partners within the meaning of Section 26a and the firm was entitled to registration. ( 11 ) IN that case, clause 3 of the partnership deed provided as follows (at page 486) :"3. The capital of the partnership shall be Rs. 2,40,000 (Rupees two lakhs forty thousand) divided into 15 shares of Rs. 16,000 each. The partners hereby agree that the shares allotted to different partners will be equal, i. e. , each partner gets five shares. " ( 12 ) CLAUSE 10 provided that " after meeting all expenses, interest and other charges, the resulting net profit or loss shall be ascertained and shall be divided amongst all partners". In the books of account, the profits had been apportioned equally among the partners. Further, in the application for registration, the partners have been shown to share the profits equally. ( 13 ) THERE the deed, as noted by the Supreme Court at page 486 of the report, contained the above clauses : In our view, the context in which the Supreme Court took into consideration the surrounding circumstances is extremely different from the facts as appearing in the instant case. ( 14 ) WE may add that, by the judgment dated February 24, 1981, the application made by the assessee under Section 256 (2) was rejected by a Division Bench of this court. There, the Division Bench observed as follows :" Learned advocate for the assessee stressed that on the surrounding circumstances read along with the deed of dissolution, a construction should be made that the shares were specified. There, the Division Bench observed as follows :" Learned advocate for the assessee stressed that on the surrounding circumstances read along with the deed of dissolution, a construction should be made that the shares were specified. It appears that, in the instant case, the deed dated February 23, 1973, itself is a deed of dissolution and the preamble mentioned 'whereas the parties hereto of this deed of dissolution of partnership' and 'whereas the first party and Shri Amal Kumar Banerjee and Shri Ashoke Kumar Banerjee entered into a deed of agreement dated September 8, 1970, agreeing to dissolve the partnership amongst the parties' and 'whereas the said Amal Kumar Banerjee and Ashoke Kumar Banerjee entered into the said agreement' and ' whereas the parties to this deed mutually agreed amongst themselves that the partnership should be dissolved and as such by executing the deed of agreement dated September 8, 1970, they agreed to have a deed of dissolution of partnership executed. . . ,' The question naturally would arise whether under Clause (23) of the deed dated February 23, 1971, it is implied that the dissolution was only in respect of the one-fourth of the share of the retiring partner. Clause (2) of the deed unequivocally stated that the partnership created by the deed dated July 5, 1963, should be deemed to be dissolved. In that view of the matter it could not be said that there was a dissolution in regard to one-fourth share of the retiring partner only. In a situation of this nature, the authorities below, viz. , the Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal, had taken a uniform view on the construction. In our opinion no question of law as such would arise out of such a finding though the said partnership does involve a question of construction. But in this case the deed undoubtedly is silent on the point of specifying the shares. In our opinion no question of law as such would arise out of such a finding though the said partnership does involve a question of construction. But in this case the deed undoubtedly is silent on the point of specifying the shares. " ( 15 ) IN our view, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and having regard to the specific provisions of Section 184 of the Act and having regard to the further fact that there was no partnership deed and it was in the deed of dissolution that there was an indication as to the contribution of the capital, merely from other surrounding circumstances, it cannot be inferred that there was a specification of the individual shares of the partners. ( 16 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, we answer this question in the reference in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs.