SHIVARAJ PATIL, J. ( 1 ) BRIEFLY stated the facts, necessary to dispose of this appeal are:- The appellant herein had taken the premises in question on lease for 11 months from the Corporation Bank Ltd. , predecessor of the 2nd respondent. He had executed a lease deed for 11 months at the time of entering into the possession of the schedule premises. On expiry of the said period he continued in possession as a statutory tenant. The Corporation Bank Ltd. , issued a registered legal notice dated 3-10-1978 under which the tenancy of the appellant was terminated and he was called upon to surrender vacant possession of the schedule premises. The appellant gave reply to the said notice on 16-10-1978. Thereafter the Corporation Bank Ltd. , filed HRC 406/1978 in the Court of the Munsiff at Mangalore for eviction of the appellant the Corporation Bank Ltd. , was nationalised on 15-4-1980. Thus the 2nd respondent herein is the successor of the Corporation Bank ltd. The eviction petition filed in HRC 406/1978 filed earlier, was withdrawn by the 2nd respondent on 17-1 -1981. Thereafter the 3rd respondent issued a show cause notice to the appellant under Section 4 (1) of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974 (for short hereinafter referred as 'pp Act') as to why he should not be evicted as he was an unauthorised occupant of the premises. In response to the said notice the appellant gave a reply on 23-3-1981 objecting to the eviction. The 3rd respondent after enquiry passed an order under Section 5 of the pp Act, on 7-9-1981 directing the eviction of the appellant. The appellant feeling aggrieved by the said order dated 7-9-1981 passed by the 3rd respondent filed an appeal to the District Judge, dakshina Kannada at Mangalore (1st respondent ). The 1st respondent after hearing the appeal on merits, dismissed the same by his order dated 25-2-1982. The appellant pursued his case further by filing Writ Petition no. 14150/1982 in this Court assailing the said order dated 25-2-1982 passed by the first respondent affirming the order of the 3rd respondent. The learned single Judge heard the batch of Writ petitions including this Writ Petition 14150/1982, and dismissed the same by a common and considered order dated 28-9-1988. Hence this Writ Appeal. 14150/1982 in this Court assailing the said order dated 25-2-1982 passed by the first respondent affirming the order of the 3rd respondent. The learned single Judge heard the batch of Writ petitions including this Writ Petition 14150/1982, and dismissed the same by a common and considered order dated 28-9-1988. Hence this Writ Appeal. ( 2 ) BEFORE the learned single Judge, several contentions were urged including whether the PP Act providing for eviction of unauthorised occupants from the public premises belonging or taken on lease by a Corporation established by or under the Central Act and controlled by the Central Government is ultra vires and/or whether the karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (for short KRC Act), would prevail over the PP Act. The learned single Judge having referred to and relied on various decisions of the Supreme Court did not accept the contentions of the Writ Petitioners. In the view he took, dismissed the writ Petitions. ( 3 ) THIS Writ Appeal 427/1989 was posted along with W. A. Nos. 597 and 598/1989 as all these Writ Appeals were connected and filed against the said common order of the learned single Judge. In Writ appeals 597 and 598/1989 at the hearing, the parties filed a joint memo under which the appellants were satisfied if only time was granted to them upto 31-10-1991, to vacate the petition premises. We have passed a separate Order acting on the joint memo in those cases. ( 4 ) SRI U. P. Mallya, learned Counsel for the appellant in this appeal (W. A. 427/1989), urged before us:- that the determination of jural relationship of landlord and tenant by the 2nd respondent was a condition precedent for the issue of show cause notice under Section 4 of the PP Act and such a notice of termination of tenancy having not been issued, the proceedings taken up for eviction under Sections 4 and 5 of the PP Act are vitiated. He would construct this argument stating that sub-section (5) of section 5 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of undertakings) Act, 1980 provides that the suit, appeal or other proceedings may be continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against the corresponding new bank. He would construct this argument stating that sub-section (5) of section 5 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of undertakings) Act, 1980 provides that the suit, appeal or other proceedings may be continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against the corresponding new bank. HRC 406/1978 pending adjudication on 15-4-1980 on which date Corporation Bank Ltd. , was nationalised should be taken as continued by the 2nd respondent by virtue of Section 5 (5) read with Section 17 of the Banking Companies act, 1980 up to 17-1-1981 on which date HRC 406/1978 was withdrawn. The jura! relationship between the appellant and the 2nd respondent continued to be governed by the KRC Act. The notice of termination issued in 1978 by the erstwhile Corporation Bank Ltd. , ceased to have any effect. The provisions of the Act became applicable to the premises of the 2nd respondent only from 17-1 -1981. Since there was no termination of tenancy of the appellant after 15-4-1980 the appellant was in lawful and authorised possession of the schedule premises as a contractual tenant and he could never be treated as an unauthorised occupant of public premises. The 2nd respondent ought to have issued notice terminating the jural relationship of landlord and tenant keeping in view the provisions of section 2 (g) and Section 11 (1) of the PP Act. Unless one more notice terrminatir. j tenancy was issued the proceedings under Section 4 and 5 of the PP Act could not have been taken. As such proceedings taken and order passed are vitiated for reason of non-issuing such a notice in the instant case. In support of this argument he placed reliance on the case of state OF HARYANA vs RAMKISHAN and ORS He wants to take support from the said Decision to state that there is no provision in the pp Act declaring the authorised lawful occupation of the premises as an unauthorised occupation automatically. ( 5 ) WE have carefully considered this argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant. ( 5 ) WE have carefully considered this argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant. But we find it difficult to accept the same for the following reasons:- section 2 (g) of the PP Act reads thus:-" (G) "unauthorised occupation" in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises, without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. " (Emphasis supplied) it is the case of the appellant himself, that the lease was for a period of 11 months and he executed a lease deed for 11 months at the time of entering into the possession of the schedule premises. It is also not disputed the Corporation Bank Ltd. , issued the legal notice dated 3-10-1978 terminating h?s tenancy and thereafter hrc. 406/1978 was filed in the Court of the Munsiff at Mangalore. The said HRC. 406/1978 was withdrawn by the 2nd respondent on 17-1-1981. The definition as contained in Section 2 (g) of the PP Act clearly takes the appellant within its ambit. The said definition includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired. Admittedly the appellant was allowed to occupy the premises under lease deed for a period of 11 months and the said period of 11 months has expired long back. Hence it is not possible to accept the contention to the contrary advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. His submission that the appellant continued as a tenant till 17-1-1981 the date on which HRC. 406/1978 was withdrawn. Under the provisions of the KRC Act, his possession was protected. No order of eviction could be passed against him. Hence it is not possible to accept the contention to the contrary advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. His submission that the appellant continued as a tenant till 17-1-1981 the date on which HRC. 406/1978 was withdrawn. Under the provisions of the KRC Act, his possession was protected. No order of eviction could be passed against him. Hence he was not an unauthorised occupant when the show cause notice under Section 4 of the PP Act was issued, without issuing a notice of termination of tenancy prior to it; In this argument, the learned counsel for the appellant has failed to see Section 21 (1) of the KRC act only provided a protective umbrella against order of eviction otherwise than on the grounds mentioned under Section 21 (1) of the krc Act. In view of the law in force namely, the PP Act governing the field, the unauthorised occupant does not become authorised merely because protection was given against the arbitrary evictions under the provisions of the KRC Act earlier. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant was not in a position to dispute as to the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge that the PP Act, prevails over the KRC Act. In other words, the provisions of the PP Act are applicable to the facts of the case on hand. If that be so after the expiry of the lease period of 11 months initially fixed the appellant became unauthorised occupant. Even his tenancy was terminated by the notice dated 3-10-1978, mere filing of hrc. 406/1978 or its continuance till it was withdrawn on 17-1-1981 did not make him authorised occupant when he became unauthorised occupant within the meaning as contained and defined under Section 2 (g) of the PP Act. ( 7 ) THE Decision reported in 1988 (3) SCC 416 in our. opinion does not help the appellant. It is a Decision in which Section 4a of the mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 came up for consideration by the Supreme Court in the matter of giving opportunity of hearing to tne affected lessees before taking decision. In the said Decision it was held Section 4a by itself does not prematurely terminate any mining lease. It is a Decision in which Section 4a of the mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 came up for consideration by the Supreme Court in the matter of giving opportunity of hearing to tne affected lessees before taking decision. In the said Decision it was held Section 4a by itself does not prematurely terminate any mining lease. The decision in this regard has to be taken by the Central Government after considering the circumstances of each case separately and for exercise of such power it is necessary to fulfil the condition mentioned therein, namely, that the proposed action would be in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development. The Supreme Court in para-10 of the said Judgment has stated thus:- "10. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the opinion that there was no effective consultation between the Union of India and the State government, and the Central Government did not form any opinion as required under Section 4a of the Act. We are further of the view that the lessees, the respondents before us, were entitled to be heard before a decision to prematurely terminate their leases was taken but they were not given any opportunity to place their case. " hence as stated above this Decision is not at all helpful to the appellant. Under the provisions of the PP Act it is not at all contemplated that any prior notice of termination of tenancy be given to an unauthorised occupant. Even under the K. R. C. Act, the notice of termination had already been issued in the instant case as early as on 3-10-1978. ( 8 ) IN view of this clear legal position, we have no hesitation to hold that there was no necessity of issuing notice of termination of tenancy once again before initiating action under the PP Act and passing orders under the provisions of the said Act, for eviction of unauthorised occupant, like the appellant. ( 9 ) THUS, therefore, there is no merit in this Writ Appeal. Consequently what follows is its dismissal. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the learned single Judge and dismiss this appeal. --- *** --- .