Judgment :- Six brothers, S.V.S. Sivalinga Nadar, S.V. Harikrishnan, S.V. Chandrapandian, S.V. Kasilingam, S.V. Ramachandran and S.V. Natesan, who were carrying on business in partnership together with other partners, under several partnership names and holding shares and managing a public limited company, namely, Madras Vanaspati Limited, Villupuram, agreed to refer their disputes to three Arbitrators, namely, Shri B.B. Naidu, Sri K.R. Ramamani and Sri R. Seetharaman. 2. In the reference dated 8.10.1981, they stated as follows: We are carrying on business in partnership together with other partners under several partnership names. We are also holding shares and Managing the Public Limited., Company, namely. The Madras Vanaspati Ltd., at Villupuram. Disputes have arisen among us with respect to the several business concerns, immovable and movable properties standing in our names as well as other relatives. We are hereby referring all our disputes, the details of which would be given by us shortly to you, namely, Sri B.B. Naidu, Sri K.R. Ramamani and Sri Seetharaman. We agree to abide by your award as to our disputes.” 3. The Arbitrators proceeded with the arbitration enquiry, received statements and finally delivered the Award on 31.1.1983. This, however, was found containing several grave errors. The Arbitrators withdrew the Award and continued further proceedings. The arbitration proceedings, however, were not free of objections and litigations were brought to the court, even during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings. Yet eventually, the Arbitrators delivered the Award on 9.7.1984. 4. S.V. Chandrapandian and three others filed a petition under S. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act for a direction to the Arbitrators to file the Award in court and also filed Application No. 3505 of 1984 for passing a decree in terms of the Award. S.V. Sivalinga Nadar filed separate petition, O.P. No. 234 of 1984 for a direction to the Arbitrators to file the Award. He filed O.P. No. 247 of 1984 to set aside the Arbitration Award dated 9.7.1984. Several other petitions were also filed in the proceedings on the Original Side. 5. However, by a judgment dated 17.11.1988, O.P. No. 230 of 1984 and Application No. 3505 of 1984 have been allowed and a decree has been passed in terms of the Award dated 9.7.1984. 6. Several other petitions were also filed in the proceedings on the Original Side. 5. However, by a judgment dated 17.11.1988, O.P. No. 230 of 1984 and Application No. 3505 of 1984 have been allowed and a decree has been passed in terms of the Award dated 9.7.1984. 6. Besides the contentions on the merits of the Award, for which a detailed reference to the facts in issue may be necessary, the appellants in O.S.A. No. 191 of 1988 and O.S.A. No. 16 of 1989, in their objections before the trial court, as well as before us, have raised a contention as to the maintainability of the proceedings under S. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act and since the contention relates to the question of jurisdiction, we would first deal with it. 7. S. 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 provides as follows: “17(1). The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act No. XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force, namely:— (a) instruments of gift of immoveable property; (b) other non-testamentary instruments, which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immoveable property; (c) non-testamentary instrument which acknowledge the receipt of payment of any consideration on account of the creation declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right, title or interest; and (d) leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent; Provided that the State Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, exempt from the operation of this sub-Section any leases executed in any district, or part of a district, the terms granted by which do not exceed five years and the annual rents reserved by which do not exceed fifty rupees. (2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-S. (1) applies to. (2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-S. (1) applies to. (1) any composition deed; (ii) any instrument relating to shares in a Joint Stock Company notwithstanding that the assets of such Company consist in whole or in part of immoveable property; or (iii) any debenture issued by any such company and not creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest, to or in immoveable property except in so far as it entitled the holder to the security afforded by a registered instrument whereby the Company has mortgaged, conveyed or otherwise transferred the whole or part of its immoveable property or any interest therein to trustees upon trust for the benefit of the holder of such debentures; or (iv) any endorsement upon or transfer of any debenture issued by any such company; or (v) any document not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or immoveable property, but merely creating a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest; or (vi) any decree or order of a court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding; or (vii) any grant of immoveable property by the Government; or (viii) any instrument of partition made by a Revenue Officer; or (ix) any order granting a loan or instrument of collateral security granted under the Land Improvements Act, 1871, or the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, or (x) any order granting a loan under the Agriculturist Loans Act, 1884, or instrument for securing the repayment of a loan made under that Act; or (xa) any order made under the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890, vesting any property in a Treasurer of Charitable Endowments or divesting any such Treasurer of any property; or (xi) any endorsement on a mortgage-deed acknowledging the payment of the whole or any part of the mortgage-money, and any other receipt for payment of money due under a mortgage when the receipt does not purport to extinguish the mortgage; or (xii) any certificates of sale granted to the purchaser of any property sold by public auction by a civil or Revenue Officer Explanation - A document purporting or operating to effect a contract for the sale of immoveable property shall not be deemed to require or ever to have required registration by reason only of the fact that such document contains a recital of the payment of any earnest money or of the whole or any part of the purchase money. (3) Authorities to adopt a son, executed after the 1st day of January, 1872, and not conferred by a will, shall also be registered. 8. To the above, by Act XXI of 1929, a clause has been added in sub-S. (1) of S. 17, which reads as follows: “(e) non-testamentary instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of a court or any award when such decree or order or award purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immoveable property.” 9. S. 17 enlists the instruments, which are compulsorily registrable. For it uses the expression: “The following documents shall be registered.” Those which may be registered, that is to any, not compulsorily registrable are mentioned in S. 18 and the language therein reads: “Any of the following documents maybe registered” In sub-S. (2) of S. 17 exceptions are enumerated. Except Instruments enumerated in sub-S. (2) of S. 17, all other instruments falling under S. 17(1), unless registered, will not be valid instruments. All non-testamentary instruments, which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immoveable property as mentioned in clause (b) of sub-S. (1) of S. 17, unless registered thus, will not be valid documents. 10. Clause (a) in sub-S. (1) of S. 17 of the Registration Act reinforces that non-testamentary instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of a court or any award when such decree or order of award purports or operates to create declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immoveable property shall be registered. 11. The appellant, S.V. Sivalinga Nadar, in his objections thus contended that the Award involved a partition of immoveable properties, as a consequence of dissolution of the erstwhile partnership and the immoveable properties, in fact, were worth more than Rs. 100/- and unless registered, the Award could not be made a rule of the court. 11. The appellant, S.V. Sivalinga Nadar, in his objections thus contended that the Award involved a partition of immoveable properties, as a consequence of dissolution of the erstwhile partnership and the immoveable properties, in fact, were worth more than Rs. 100/- and unless registered, the Award could not be made a rule of the court. He also contended that the Award fell under Schedule I Article 12 of the Stamp Act and since it was insufficiently stamped it was not a valid document. 12. In regard to this contention, the learned trial Judge has said; “As regards the contention about the award being insufficiently stamped and also being not registered it may be pointed out that they were not grounds raised in the petitions, but however the matter having been put forward, it could be considered. It is the contention of the petitioners that having regard to the allotment of the properties under the Award and also having regard to the provisions under S. 49 of the Partnership Act prescribing mode of settlement of accounts between the partners the Award should be affixed with proper stamps and also it should be registered. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that immoveable properties concerned are assets of two partnership firms which have been directed to be dissolved under the Award and after such dissolution properties are directed to be allocated to erstwhile partners and in such circumstances, interest of a partner in such partnership assets even where such assets comprised immoveable property according to the counsel for the respondents, cannot be considered as interest in immoveable property under S. 17(1) of the Registration Act. The learned counsel for the respondents also contended that the Award falls under Schedule I Article 12 of the Stamp Act and the allocation of properties owned by partner-ship firm on dissolution to the erstwhile partners is not partition of immovable properties. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance in the decision reported in AIR 1959 Andhra Pradesh 380 (FB) which decision has been confirmed in Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krislmappa ( AIR 1966 S.C. 1300 = 1966 (2) MLJ 60 (S.C). It was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the contentions with regard to stamp and registration put forward by the petitioner cannot be accepted. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the contentions with regard to stamp and registration put forward by the petitioner cannot be accepted. It is to be pointed out that the award had been submitted for registration long ago on 27.10.1984 itself and it is stamped and if there is any deficiency, the Registering Authority could direct proper stamp to be affixed and therefore I feel there could be no impediment for the Award being ma de a rule of the court and a decree being passed in terms of the Award as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents.” 13. It is seen there is some answer given by the learned Judge, about the deficiency of stamps, if any. He has noticed the fact that the Award had been submitted for registration on 27.10.1984. He has however not found that the Award has been registered. The fact remains even to-day that the award has not been registered and that it is somewhere pending registration. 14. The question before the Andhra Pradesh Full Bench Narayanappa v. Krishnappa AIR 1959 A.P. 380 (F.B.) was whether Ex. B18, a document dated 27th August, 1936 executed by the plaintiffs relinquishing their share, which was called an unregistered karar, was admissible in evidence. The karar was in the following terms: “You and we have been jointly carrying on groundnut machine, mandi and other business in Mulakalacheruvu. In the business, not only outstanding remained uncollected, but also loss was sustained. As disputes have arisen in our family regarding partition, it is not possible to carry on the business or to make investment in future. Moreover, you yourself have undertaken to discharge some of the debts payable by us in the coastal parts in connection with our private business. Therefore, from this day onward s, we have given up (our) share in the machine, etc., and in the business, and we have made over the same to you alone completely by way of adjustment. You yourself shall carry on the business without ourselves having anything to do with the profit and loss. Herefor, you have given up to us the property forming our Venkatasubbayyas share which you have purchased and delivered possession of the same to us even previously. You yourself shall carry on the business without ourselves having anything to do with the profit and loss. Herefor, you have given up to us the property forming our Venkatasubbayyas share which you have purchased and delivered possession of the same to us even previously. In case you want to execute and deliver a proper document in respect of the share which we have given up to you, we shall at your own expenses, execute and deliver a document registered. To this effect is this karar deed got written by Ramiah out of us and delivered with our consent.” 15. By this document, the plaintiffs before the Andhra Pradesh Court declared that they gave up their share in machine, etc., and in the business and also made over the same to the other partner alone completely by way of adjustment. The document also stated that the other partner would carry on business without the plaintiffs having anything to do with the profit and loss. It further recited that the other partner had given up to the plaintiffs the property forming one Venkatasubbayyas share previously. 16. The Andhra Court first adverted to consider the position in law of the right of the share of a partner in a partnership. According to that court, that would determine as to whether it was movable or immoveable property, and stated at outset: “So far as English law is concerned it may be taken to be settled, that a partner has no interest in Partnership Realty as distinguished from the money arising from its sale. The share of a partner therefore, is nothing more than his proportionate share of the partnership assets after they have been turned into money and applied in liquidation of the debts of the partnership. Further, in equity whether the assets of a partnership consist of land or not the share in a partnership must be deemed to be pe rsonal and not real estate. No doubt, the tendency of decisions in England has been to bring partnership agreements conveying interests in land along with other assets within S. 4 of the Statute of Frauds. Further, in equity whether the assets of a partnership consist of land or not the share in a partnership must be deemed to be pe rsonal and not real estate. No doubt, the tendency of decisions in England has been to bring partnership agreements conveying interests in land along with other assets within S. 4 of the Statute of Frauds. It may be said that the rule adopted by English courts is that real estate intended by the partners to constitute a part of the partnership property or treated by them as belonging to the partnership is regarded in equity as converted into personality for all purposes, and also for the settlement of the claims of the partners inter se . The law in India is not different. Ss. 14 and 15 of the Indian Partnership Act of 1932 speak about what would constitute the property of a firm and declare that such property shall be held and utilised for the purposes of the partnership thereby indicating that so long as the partnership continues no part of the assets of a partnership could be regarded as belonging to any individual partner. Further, no part of the partnership assets could be utilised for a purpose other than that of the partnership. A partner, therefore, seeking to get his share could not get his share in specie in the moveable and immoveable properties but only after the assets have been converted into money, debt and liabilities discharged and it is only in the residue that he could get his proportionate share. The statute enjoins this process being gone through before a partner gets a share in the assets of the partnership and it is governed by Ss. 46, 48 and 49 of the Partnership Act. It would, therefore, follow that a partner cannot predicate of a definite share in immoveable property which he could trans fer or give up.” 17. After considering as above, the judgment has proceeded to take notice of the case law on the subject and referred to certain judgments of this Court as well. It will be useful, if the discussions in this behalf, by the Full Bench, is extracted in full wherein reference in particular has been made to a Division Bench judgment of this Court, 18. It will be useful, if the discussions in this behalf, by the Full Bench, is extracted in full wherein reference in particular has been made to a Division Bench judgment of this Court, 18. The Andhra Court has said: “Questions have arisen incidentally though not directly in this form, but the decisions in those cases lend further support to the view that the interest of a partner under the partnership assets which include immoveable property cannot be regarded as an interest in immoveable property. In a suit for dissolution of partnership which owned a factory, the question arose as to whether the suit fell under clause (a) or (d) of S. 16, Civil Procedure Code. It was held that a suit for dissolution of partnershi p was not a suit for the determination of any right to or interest in immoveable property within the meaning of clause (a) or (d) of S. 16, Civil Procedure Code. Vide Durga Das v. Jainarayan (1919 Allahabad 350), the ratio decidendi of this decision being that a decree could only be for the immoveable property belonging to a partnership being sold and the sale proceeds being disposed of in accordance with the rule in S. 46 of the Partnership Act and the plaintiff given his share in the residue. In the case of Sudarsana Maistri v. Narasimloo Maistry (ILR 25 Madras 149), before the Madras High Court the plaintiff filed a suit for a share in the partnership property which consisted of immoveable property as part of the partnership assets. The defence to the suit was that the suit was barred by limitation. This plea was met by the argument that the suit must be regarded as a suit for a share in immoveable property purchased by the partner from the profits of the partnership and therefore no question of limitation arose. Sir Arnold White, C.J. and Bashyam Ayyangar, J., held that it was partnership property alone. They further held that although immoveable property were comprised in the properties of the partnership a suit for dissolution of partnership would be governed by the three-year rule. In Venkataratnam v. Subbarao 24 L.W. 529=ILR 49 Madras 738, the question for decision was whether a release by a partner of his share in the partnership property evidenced by a deed was compulsorily registerable under S. 17 of the Registration Act. In Venkataratnam v. Subbarao 24 L.W. 529=ILR 49 Madras 738, the question for decision was whether a release by a partner of his share in the partnership property evidenced by a deed was compulsorily registerable under S. 17 of the Registration Act. Phillips and MahavanNair, JJ., observed that when a partner retires from a partnership by releasing his rights therein, the property still remains the property of the partnership, and the action is releasing this rights does not actually extinguish his right in the immoveable property. The reason for this, according to the learned Judges, was that the partner was merely receiving his share of the assets on going out of the partnership and the immoveable property still remains the property of the partnership as before. This matter came up for consideration in the case of Samuvier v. Ramasubbier 1 and Curgenven and Cornish, JJ., were reluctant to follow the view taken in the earlier case. Here in this case the plaintiff and the defendant were partners in a money lending business and also a chit fund business. The two firms had dealings each with other. The partners of the two firms happened to be brothers. Disagreement arose between the brothers and by an agreement Exhibit K., the plaintiff purported to take over the defendants interest in the money lending business under the name V.S.R.S. Firm while the interest of the plaintiff in the other firm, viz., R.S. Firm was assigned to the defendant. The defendant also accepted liability for a sum of Rs. 13,000/- due by the R.S. Firm to the V.S.R.S. Firm. Later on another partner who had a half share in the V.S.R.S. Firm and the plaintiff dissolved their partnership and it was arranged that the debt due from the R.S. Firm should be taken over by the plaintiff. The plaintiff tried to recover this amount/Among the various objections raised by the defendant, one was that the document Exhibit K under which the defendant took over the liability of the R.S. Firm was compulsorily registrable and, therefore, could not be received as evidence of any transaction affecting immoveable property. The learned Judges did not agree with the view taken in Venkataramam v. Subbarao for the reason that according to them, in that case the provisions of S. 253(7) of the Contract Act were not considered and lost sight of. The learned Judges did not agree with the view taken in Venkataramam v. Subbarao for the reason that according to them, in that case the provisions of S. 253(7) of the Contract Act were not considered and lost sight of. S. 253(7) says:— “If from any cause whatsoever any member of a partnership ceases to be so, the partnership is dissolved as between all the other members.” The learned Judges who decided the case Samuvier v. Ramasubbier , opined that where there was a partnership of three persons and one went out the whole partnership was dissolved and if the two remaining persons resume business as the partners it would only be by the formation, tacit or express, of fresh partnership. They further observed that if the original partnership of three held immoveable property and it afterwards vests in the new partnership of two, it can only be by a transfer of interest from the one to the other. The matter incidentally arose in Panjam Thirumalappa v. Holasyam Ramappa 1937-2. MLJ 511. Varadachariar, J. while adverting to S. 253 of the Contract Act stated that all immoveable property purchased with partnership funds must be deemed to be held by the partners as joint owners. The learned Judge further observed that on a dissolution, when the partners settle their affairs they may either allot to one or either of them particular items in entirety or in varying shares not necessarily in the peculiar proportion of the share of each partner in the whole partnership property. The following observations of the learned Judge are significant.- “There is much to be said in favour of the view taken in Samuvier v. Ramasubbier that the question of registration may arise in such cases though there is also authority to the contrary.” This observation of the learned Judge would clearly indicate that the question of registration does not automatically arise when a partner releases his share in the partnership assets containing immoveable property. It is dependent, therefore, on how the matters are settled at the time of the dissolution. This case came on appeal before a Bench consisting of Sir Lionel Leach, C.J. and Somayya, J. in Holasyam Ramappa v. Thirumalappa 1939 2 M.L.J. 649 = 50 L.W. 331. It is dependent, therefore, on how the matters are settled at the time of the dissolution. This case came on appeal before a Bench consisting of Sir Lionel Leach, C.J. and Somayya, J. in Holasyam Ramappa v. Thirumalappa 1939 2 M.L.J. 649 = 50 L.W. 331. The learned Judges allowed the appeal and held that the document Exhibit A, which set out the terms of the dissolution and was signed by all the partners and which declared that three partners have rights for equal shares to the lands (the suit properties) was compulsorily registrable and not being registered was inadmissible in evidence. The learned Judges observed that until an account had been taken and provision made for the discharge of the liabilities, no partner could be claimed to be entitled to have a definite share in a particular asset. But in this case as it happened that on a dissolution the remaining assets which included immoveable property were divided among the partners in equal shares and as that document declared that each one of the partners was entitled to a share in the immoveable property that remained after the taking of accounts they held S. 17 of the Registration Act, applied. In our opinion this case is distinguishable from the case before us for the reason that there has been no dissolution of the partnership as such. We may point out that in the case of Samuvier v. Rainasubbier , the document was an agreement whereby the partnership was dissolved and by the severance of their interest, specified assets in the two distinct partnership were assigned to each of them and these assets included immoveable property and under those circumstances, where the assets were assigned to the individual partners who retired, it amounted to a declaration of a right in immoveable property and as it affected immoveable property the document was compulsorily registrable. The learned Judges deciding that case, in not approving the previous decision in Venkataratnam v. Subbarao were influenced by the fact that the former decision did not take note of the provisions of S. 253(7) of the Contract Act whereby a complete dissolution, followed on the retirement of a partner, for their lordships observed as follows: “In Venkataratnam v. Subbarao I.L.R. 49 Madras 738 = 24 L.W. 529 Phillips and Madhavan Nair, JJ., have held that a document of the nature of Exhibit K. does not require registration, but with all respect I am unable to adopt the reasoning upon which the decision is based. The theory underlying is that both before and after a partner releases his rights the property is and still remains the property of the ‘partnership’ meaning by the phrase, I think the learned Judges would have conceded a legal entity which does not itself undergo change. But this is surely to lose sight of the fact that ‘if from any cause whatsoever any member of a partnership ceases to be so, the partnership is dissolved as between all other members Contract Act, S. 253(1)” The reasons why the learned Judges who Decided the case of Samuvier v. Rainasubbier thought that there was no analogy between the transfer of shares of a joint stock company and that in a partnership is that in the latter case release of a partners share would result in a dissolution of the partnership whereas the case was different with regard to joint stock companies. This distinction, we must point out has not vanished with the change in the Law of Partnership under which the retirement of a partner does not ipso facto bring about a dissolution of the partnership. Consequently, it may be stated that the principle underlying the decision in Samuvier v. Ramasubbier may not hold good after the change in the Law of Partnership. Our attention was invited by the learned counsel for the appellant to a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Secretary, Board of Revenue v. Alagappa Chettiar 1937 I M.L.J. 174. Consequently, it may be stated that the principle underlying the decision in Samuvier v. Ramasubbier may not hold good after the change in the Law of Partnership. Our attention was invited by the learned counsel for the appellant to a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Secretary, Board of Revenue v. Alagappa Chettiar 1937 I M.L.J. 174. There, the question was as to whether a particular document fell within the definition of an instrument of partition within S. 2(15) of the Stamp Act and it was argued that the document could not be regarded as an instrument of partition, because it would not be proper to regard partners as co-owners of the partnership property. While dealing with this argument, the learned Judges of the Full Bench referred to both the earlier cases of the Madras High Court and only observed that S. 253 of the Contract Act declared the partners to be joint owners of the partnership property. They stated that the wording of S. 14 of the Partnership Act of 1932 which replaced the provisions of law of partnership in the Contract Act though slightly different did not make any difference in principle. We do not think that that decision dealt with the question directly at issue in this case and, therefore, is not in point. In determining whether transfers of shares of partnership which hold immoveable property among other asset, require registration the court must be influenced by the policy of the partnership Act. The legal conception of the share of a partner in a partnership cannot be assessed, in our opinion, by reference to the possibility of his getting a share in the immoveable property possessed by the partnership, for his getting a share in the immoveable property is only an uncertain factor. A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in the case of Ajudhi A Pershad v. Shamsunder I.L.R. (1947) Lahore 417 held that the interest of partner in partnership. Assets comprising of moveable and immoveable property would be treated as moveable property. We are in agreement with the view expressed in the above. Our answer to the question referred to is that the interest of a partner in partnership assets cannot be regarded as a right or interest in immoveable property within the meaning of S. 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act.” 19. We are in agreement with the view expressed in the above. Our answer to the question referred to is that the interest of a partner in partnership assets cannot be regarded as a right or interest in immoveable property within the meaning of S. 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act.” 19. While affirming this judgment, the Supreme Court in Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappat AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1300 has also stated, “The whole concept of partnership is to embark upon a joint venture and for that purpose to bring in as capital money or even property including immoveable property. Once that is done whatever is brought in would cease to be the exclusive property of the person who brought it in. It would be the trading asset of the partnership in which all the partners would have interest in proportion to their share in the joint venture of the business of partnership. The person who brought it would, therefore, not be able to claim or exercise any exclusive right over any property which he has brought it, much less over any other partnership property. He would not be able to exercise his right even to the extent of his share in the business of the partnership. As already stated his right during the subsistence of the partnership is to get his share of profits from time to time as may be agreed upon among the partners and after the dissolution of the partnership or with his retirement from partnership of the value of his share in the net partnership assets as on the date of dissolution of retirement after a deduction of liabilities and prior charges. It is true that even during the subsistence of the partnership, a partner may assign his share in another. In that case what the assignee would get would be only that which is permitted by S. 29(1). that is to say, the right to receive the share of profits of the assignor and accept the account of profits agreed to by the partners. There are not many decisions of the H igh Courts on the point. In the few that there are preponderating view is in support of the position which we have stated.” 20. that is to say, the right to receive the share of profits of the assignor and accept the account of profits agreed to by the partners. There are not many decisions of the H igh Courts on the point. In the few that there are preponderating view is in support of the position which we have stated.” 20. After saying so and referring to the views in several judgments of the court, Supreme Court considered the earlier judgments of this court and cited in particular the judgments of the Bombay High Court in Joharmal v. Tejram Jagrup 1892 ILR 17 Bombay 235, which was a case decided by Jardine and Telang, JJ., The Supreme Court preferred the view expressed by Jardine, J., who stated his opinion in these words, “To lay down that the three letters in question, which deal generally with the assets, moveable and immoveable, without specifying any particular mortgage or other interest in real property require registration, would, I incline to think, in the present state of the authorities, go too far. It may be argued that such letters are not instruments of gift of immoveable property’ but rather disposal of a share in a partnership. Of which the business is money lending, and the mortgage securities merely incidental thereto.” and commented upon the view of Telang, J., who took the view that though a partners share does not include any specific part of any specific item of partnership property, still where the partnership is entitled to immoveable property, such share does include an interest in immoveable property. The Supreme Court observed: “The view of Telane, J., was not accepted by the Madras High Court in Venkataratnam v. subbarao ILR 49 Mad. 738 = AIR 1926 Mad. 1040 = 24 L.W. 529. The learned Judges there discussed the English decisions as also the decision in Suaarusanam Maistri Narasimhalu Maistri (1902) ILR 25 Mad. 149) and Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachariar I.L.R. 45 Mad. 378 = 16 L.W. 200 (P.C.): (AIR 1922 P.C. 115) and the opinion of Jardine, J., Joharmals case (1893) ILK 17 Boml. 235 held that unregistered deed of release by a partner of his share in the partnership business is admissible in evidence, even where the partnership owns immoveable property. 149) and Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachariar I.L.R. 45 Mad. 378 = 16 L.W. 200 (P.C.): (AIR 1922 P.C. 115) and the opinion of Jardine, J., Joharmals case (1893) ILK 17 Boml. 235 held that unregistered deed of release by a partner of his share in the partnership business is admissible in evidence, even where the partnership owns immoveable property. The learned Judges pointed out that though a partner may be a co-owner in the partnership property he has no right to ask for a share in the property but only that the partnership business should be wound up including therein the sale of immoveable property and to ask for his share in the resulting assets. This decision was not accepted as laying down the correct law by a Division Bench of the same High Court in Samuvier v. Ramasubbier 33 L.W. 576 = AIR 1931 Mad. 580 ). The learned Judges there relied upon the decision in Ashworth v. Munn 1880 15 Ch. D. 363 in addition to the opinion of Telang, J. and also referred to the decision in Gray v. Smith 1889 43 Ch. D. 208 in coming to a conclusion contrary to the one in the earlier case. It may be pointed out that the learned Judges have made no reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Gopala Chettys case ILR 45 Mad. 378; 16 L.W. 200 (PS.) AIR 1992 P.C. 115 though that was one of the decisions relied upon by Philips, J. in the earlier case. In so far as Aswroths case (1880) 15 Ch. D. 363) is concerned that was a case which turned on the provisions of the Mortmain Acts and is not quite pertinent for the decision on the point which was before them and which is now before us. In 1889) 43 Ch. D. 208 Kekewich, J. held that an agreement by one of the partners to retire and to assign his share in the partnership assets including immoveable property is an agreement to assign an interest in land and falls within the Statute of Frauds. The view of Kekewich, J., seems to have received the approval of Cotton, L.J., one of the Judges of the Court of Appeal, though no argument was raised before it challenging its correctness. The view of Kekewich, J., seems to have received the approval of Cotton, L.J., one of the Judges of the Court of Appeal, though no argument was raised before it challenging its correctness. It may, however, be observed that even according to Kekewich, J., the authorities 1800 5 ves 308 and (1846) 5 Hare 369 on appeal to 1847) 2 Ph. 266 establish that one may have an agreement of partnership by parol, notwithstanding that the partnership is to deal with land. He, however, went on to observe: “But it does not seem to me to follow that an agreement for the dissolution of such a partnership need not be expressed in writing, or rather that there need not be a memorandum of the agreement for dissolution when one of the terms of the agreement, either expressly or by necessary implication, is that the party sought to be charted must part with and assign to others an interest inland. That seems to me to give rise to entirely different consideration. In the one case you prove the partnership by parol: you prove the object, the terms of the partnership and so on. But in the other case it is one of the essential terms of the agreement that the party to be charged shall convey an interest in land, and that seems therefore, to bring it necessarily within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds.” In the case before us, as also in Sairmviers case , ILR 55 Mad 72 = 33 L.W. 576 the document cannot be said to convey any immovable property by a partner to another expressly or by necessary implication. If we may recall, the document executed by the Addanki partners in favour of the Bhaskara partners records the fact that the partnership business has come to an end and that the latter have given up their share in the machine etc., and in the business and that they have made over same to you alone completely by way of adjustment. There is no express reference to any immovable property herein. No doubt the document does recite the fact that the Bhaskara family has given to the addanki family certain property. This, however, is merely a recital of a fact which had taken place earlier. To cases of this type the observations of Kekewich I. which we have Quoted do not apply. No doubt the document does recite the fact that the Bhaskara family has given to the addanki family certain property. This, however, is merely a recital of a fact which had taken place earlier. To cases of this type the observations of Kekewich I. which we have Quoted do not apply. The view was taken in Samuviers case ILR 55 Mad. 72= 46 L.W. 910, seemed to commend itself to Varadachariar, J. in Thirumalappa v. Ramappa , AIR 1938 Mad. 133 but it was reversed in Ramappa v. Thtrumalappa AIR 1939 Mad 884 =50 L.W. 331. We may also refer to the decision of a Full Bench in Judhia Pershadram Pershad v. Sham Sunder , AIR 1947 Lah. 13 (F.B. in which Cornelius, J. has discussed most of the decisions we have earlier referred to, in addition to several earlier others and reached the conclusion that while a partnership is in existence, no partner can point to any part of the assets of the partnership as belonging to him alone. After examining the relevant provisions of the Act, the learned Judge observed: “These sections require that the debts and liabilities should first be met out of the firm property and there after the assets should be applied in ratable payment to each partner of what is due to him firstly on account of advances as distinguished from capital and, secondly on account of capital, the residue, if any, being divided rateably among all the partners. It is obvious that the Act contemplates complete liquidation of the assets of the partnership as a preliminary to the settlement of accounts between partners upon dissolution of the firm and it will, therefore, be correct to say that, for the purposes of the Indian Partnership Act, and irrespective of any mutual agreement between the partners, the share of each partner is, in the words of Lindley: his proportion of the partnership assets after they have been all realised and converted into money, and all the partnership debts and liabilities have been paid and discharged.” This indeed is the view which has commended itself to us”. 21. 21. It is thus evident in this judgment of the Supreme Court that the view of Kekewich, J., that there may be two types of cases, one an agreement for the dissolution of a partnership, when one of the terms of the agreement, either expressly or by necessary implication, is that the party sought to be charged must part with and assign to others an interest in land, in the other case, the essential terms of the agreement how that the immoveable property is left to the partnership, and in case the partnership is dissolved, the shares of the partners are determined as if immoveables are moveables. In the former case, parol evidence cannot be admitted. That will be a case of conveying interest in land and the other according to the judgment of the Supreme Court, like the one in Samuviers case (AIR 1931 Madras 580) or Narayanappa v. Bhaskara (1959) 1 An. W.R. 300 would be a case where the document executed to bring immoveable property under the partnership or assign interest of one to other partners would give no interest in immoveable property. In fact, in Narayanappa v. Bhaskara (1959) 1 An. W.R. 300 the Supreme Court noticed that there was no expression for any immoveable, property, although the document did recite the fact that Bhaskara family had given to the Addanki family certain property. To such cases, the Supreme Court observed: “The observations of Kekewich, J., which we have quoted, do not apply.” 22. In the case of Ratan Lal v. Purshottam , the Supreme Court considered the case of the New Bengal Engineering Works, which had a factory and various moveable and immoveable properties. It was a running business. The appellant had set up the business with the respondents, as partners in December, 1962. When the partners fell out, they agreed to refer the dispute to the arbitration of two persons. The agreement in writing referred, “the disputes of our concern” and gave “the arbitrators full authority to decide our dispute”. The arbitrators gav e their award and filed the award in the court. The respondent filed an application for determining the validity of the agreement and for setting aside the award. A learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed the application as time barred. But he declined the request of the appellant to proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award. The respondent filed an application for determining the validity of the agreement and for setting aside the award. A learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed the application as time barred. But he declined the request of the appellant to proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award. The appellant filed an appeal. A Division Bench dismissed the appeal as not maintainable. One of the arguments before the court was that the award sought to assign the respondents share in the partnership to the appellant and so did not require registration. The Supreme Court said: “It is well settled now that the share of a partner in the assets of the partnership which has also immovable properties is movable property and the assignment of the share does not require registration under S. 17, Registration Act. See Ajudhia Pershad Ram Pershad v. Sham Sunder 1966 S.C. 1303 (AIR 1947 Lah. 13 at p. 20 (F.B.) Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa , ( 1966 3 SCR 400 at pp. 406 and 407 = AIR 1966 S.C. 1390) and Commr. of Inomc Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Juggilal kamalaper AIR 1974 S.C. 1066 ( 1967 1 SCR 784 at p. 790 = AIR 1967 SC 401 ). But the award with which we are concerned does not seek to assign the share of the respondent to the appellant either in express words or by necessary implication. We set out the relevant portion of the award: “(We) make our award as follows: (1) The factory and all assets and properties of New Bengal Engineering Works are exclusively allotted to Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma, who is absolutely entitled to the same. He will pay a liabilities of the factory. (2) Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma shall have no claim for the receipts signed by Sri Purushottam Harit. (3) Payment of all cheques issued by Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma on behalf of Modern processors to Shri Purushottam Harit shall be treated invalid. (4) Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma shall pay Rs. 17,000/- (Rupees Seventeen thousand only) to Shri Purushottam Harit. (5) Shri Purushottam Harit shall render all assistance to Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma for realising all the dues of the said firm as and when necessary and for transfer of tenancy right of the Factory in favour of Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma. (4) Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma shall pay Rs. 17,000/- (Rupees Seventeen thousand only) to Shri Purushottam Harit. (5) Shri Purushottam Harit shall render all assistance to Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma for realising all the dues of the said firm as and when necessary and for transfer of tenancy right of the Factory in favour of Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma. (6) All papers and documents in respect of the said business shall be made over to Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma. (7) The following sums when realised shall be divided equally between Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma and Shri Purushottam Harit. Name of Debtors. 1. Associated Engineering Corpn. Rs. 284.17 2. Link Machinery Ltd. Rs. 1079.28 3. Clendent Products Rs. 47.25 4. Minerva Engineering Works. Rs. 514.18 Rs. Rs. 1924.88 N.B. (8) The factory should not be run by Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma until and unless the payment of the award is not made to Shri Purushottam Harit.” 5. The word ‘not’ is slip here. The parties conceded before the learned single Judge that the award deals with immoveable property worth above Rs. 100/- so if it is found by us that the award purports to create rights in the appellant over immoveable property, it would require registration under S. 17, Registration Act. (See Satish Kumar v. Surinder Kumar 1069 2 SCR 244 at pp. 251-252 = AIR 1970 S.C. 833 . On the dissolution of the partnership or with the retirement of a partner from the partnership the share of the partner in the partnership assets is equal to the value of his share in the net partnership assets after deduction of all liabilities and prior charges. Even during the subsistence of the partnership, he may assign his share to another partner. In that event the assignee partner would get only the right to receive the share of profits of the assignor. (See Narayanappa (supra) at p. 407 (of 1966-3-SCR 400= AIR 1966 S.C. 1300 ) 6. Now the award does not transfer the share of the respondent, interpreted in the aforesaid sense, to the appellant in express words. Nor such is the necessary intendment of the award. It expressly makes an exclusive allotment of the partnership assets including the factory and liabilities to the appellant. It goes further and makes him absolutely entitled to the same” in consideration of a sum of Rs. Nor such is the necessary intendment of the award. It expressly makes an exclusive allotment of the partnership assets including the factory and liabilities to the appellant. It goes further and makes him absolutely entitled to the same” in consideration of a sum of Rs. 17.000/- (See clause 4) plus half of the amount of Rs. 1924.88 to the respondent and the appellants ren ouncement of the right to share in the amount already received by the respondent. So in express words it purports to create rights in immoveable property worth above Rs. 100/- in favour of the appellant. It would accordingly require registration under S. 17, Registration Act. As it is unregistered, the court could not look into it. If the court could not, as we hold, look into it, the court could not pronounce judgment in accordance with it. S. 17 Arbitration Act presupposes an award which can be validly looked into by the court. The appellant cannot successfully invoke S. 17. 7. The award is an inseparable tangle of several clauses and cannot be enforced as to the part not dealing with immovable property. As already stated, various other relevant clauses constitute consideration for clause (1), that is, for the creation of absolute rights in the factory and other properties in favour of the appellant. This is perfectly clear from the note of the arbitrators appended to the award as clause 8. The appellant is not given a right to run the factory unless he has paid the awarded consideration to the respondent. 8. For the reasons already discussed, we agree with the learned single judge that the award requires registration and not being registered no judgment could be pronounced upon it. In the view that we have taken, the special leave petition cannot be admitted.” 23. In Lachman Das v. Ram Lal AIR 1989 S.C. 1923 , the dispute was between two brothers. They appointed an arbitrator for settlement of dispute of about 242 killas of land. The said land stood in the name of the appellant before the Supreme Court. According to the respondent, it was benami in the name of the appellant. That was the dispute. The arbitrator gave his award and moved an application before the Court for making the award the rule of the Court. Several issues were framed including the question as to registration. According to the respondent, it was benami in the name of the appellant. That was the dispute. The arbitrator gave his award and moved an application before the Court for making the award the rule of the Court. Several issues were framed including the question as to registration. The High Court, in appeal, however held that the award did not create any right in immoveable property and as such no registration was necessary. The Supreme Court took notice of the award, which has stated inter alia “Land of Tibbi comprising of rect. No. 13 Kila No. 23 (3-11), 26(1-11), 16(5-15), 17(5-14), 25(4-4) 23/27 and 26/1 situated in Mauz Kheri, near Chandni bagh, which is in the joint name of Shri Ram Lal. Party No. 1 and Shri Lachman-dass, party No. 2. The half ownership of Shri Lachmandass shall be now owned by Shri Ram Lal in addition to his share owned by him in these lands.” and said: “On a proper construction of the award, it does appear to us that the award did create, declare or assign a right, title and interest in the immoveable property. The award declares that share of the ownership of Shri Lachman Dass shall be now owned by Shri Ram Lal, the respondent in addition to his share owned in these lands.” Therefore, the said award declares the right of Ram Lal to the said share of the said property mentioned in that clause. It is not in dispute that the said property is immoveable property and it is not merely a declaration of the pre-existing right but creation of new right of the parties. It is significant to bear in mind that the section enjoins registration wherever the award purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit of extinguish whether in present or in future any right, title or interest of the value of Rs. 100/- or upwards in immovable property.” 24. Lachman Dasss case AIR 1987 S.C. 2195 is significant in another respect also. That was a case, in which when the arbitrator applied to the Court for making the award a rule of the court, the award was not registered. Subsequently, however, before the final disposal in appeal, the award was registered. 100/- or upwards in immovable property.” 24. Lachman Dasss case AIR 1987 S.C. 2195 is significant in another respect also. That was a case, in which when the arbitrator applied to the Court for making the award a rule of the court, the award was not registered. Subsequently, however, before the final disposal in appeal, the award was registered. One of the arguments advanced before the Supreme Court was that since the award had been subsequently registered, unless registration was set aside, the award did not suffeir from any defect. The Supreme Court said: “We have, however, to examine whether the High Court was right in accepting the award and in pronouncing the judgment in terms of the award. At the relevant time, the award was not registered. If that is the position, then the subsequent registration of the award whether in conformity with Ss. 23 and 25 of the Act or whether in breach or in violation of the same is not relevant. 25. The Supreme Court said so in the case of Lachman Dass, although its attention was drawn to the earlier judgment of that court in Raj Kumar Dev v. Tarapada Dev . On the peculiar facts of that case, the Supreme Court said that there was a subsequent injunction preventing the arbitrators from taking any steps for registration and that during the entire period, the award was in the custody of the court. The Supreme Court said: “We have to bear in mind two maxims of equity which are well settled, namely Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit” An act of the court shall prejudice no man. In Brooms Legal Maxim is explained that this maxim was founded upon justice and good sense, and afforded a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. The above maxim should, however be applied with caution. The other maxim is Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossibilia ” (Brooms Legal Maxims P. 162). The law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. The above maxim should, however be applied with caution. The other maxim is Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossibilia ” (Brooms Legal Maxims P. 162). The law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and the administration of it, said sir, W. Scot, with reference to an alleged infraction of the revenue laws must yield to that to which everything must bend to necessity; the law, in its most positive and peremptory injunctions is understood to disclaim, as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and administration of laws must adopt that general exception in the consideration of all particular cases.” The aforesaid two legal maxims the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform and an act of the court shall prejudice no man would apply with full vigour in the facts of this case and if that is the position then the award as we have noted before was presented before the Sub Registrar, Arambagh on 25th November, 1983 the very next one day of getting possession of the award from the court. The sub-Registrar pursuant to the order of the High Court on 24th of June, 1985 found that the award was presented within time as the period during which the judicial proceedings were pending that is to say, from 28th of January 1978 to 24th November, 1983 should be excluded in view of the principle Laid down in S. 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion was wrong in holding that the only period which should be excluded was from 26th July 1978 till 20th of December, 1982. We are unable to accept this position. 26th July. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion was wrong in holding that the only period which should be excluded was from 26th July 1978 till 20th of December, 1982. We are unable to accept this position. 26th July. 1978 was the date of the order of the learned Munsiff directing maintenance of status quo and 20th of December, 1982 was the date when the interim injunction was vacated, but still the award was in the custody of the court and there is ample evidence as it would appear from the narration of events hereinbefore made that the arbitrators had tried to obtain the custody of the award which the court declined to give to them.” On the peculiar facts and circumstances the said case alone, the Supreme Court pronounced as follows: “It was argued before us that an award affecting the immoveable properties which was not registered and which was made outside the court could not form the basis of an award and an unregistered award, in other words could not form the basis of the award. We are unable to accept that position. There is no dispute to the proposition that an award affecting immoveable properties as in the instant case should be registered. It is, therefore not necessary to discuss in detail the ratio of the decision of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Venkataramam v. M. Chelamayya AIR 1967 Andh. Pra. 257.” 26. The law, in its cystalised form thus, is that all properties, whether moveable or immoveable, if constitute the trading assets of the partnership, will belong to the partnership and not to any individual partner. Any person, brought up in the partnership, would therefore not be able to claim or exercise any exclusive right over such property. He would not be able to exercise his right even to the extent of his share in the business of the partnership. His right, during the subsistence of the partnership will be to get his share of profits from time to time as may be agreed upon among the partners and after the dissolution of the partnership or with his retirement from the partnership he will get the value of his share in the net partnership assets as on the date of dissolution or retirement, after deduction of liabilities and prior charges. During the subsistence of the partnership, a partner may assign his share to another; But that will be only to the extent permitted by S. 29(1) of the Partnership Act, of the right to receive the share of profits of the assignor and accept the account of profit agreed to by the partners. (2) Where however the terms of the dissolution, particularly under the award of an arbitrator expressly made an allotment of the partnership assets and liabilities to one or more persons, which included immoveable property, that however will not be a case of the sharer of a partner assigned to another. If there is exclusive allotment of the partnership assets to one or the other partner, as a consequence of the dissolution and such person is made absolutely entitled to the property allotted to him, that will be a case of creating rights in immoveable property. If the value of the property is Rs. 100/- or more, unless registered, it will not be admissible. 27. There has been however another line of cases brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the respondents. They do not in any way touch the matter in issue and relate to liabilities. The three cases cited at the bar are Commissioner of Income Tax West Bengal, Calcutta v. Juggilal Kamalapet AIR 1967 S.C. 401 ; Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh Npgpur and Bhandara v. Dewas Cine Corporation AIR 1968 S.C. 676 and The Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P. v. Bankey Lal Vaidya AIR 1968 S.C. 2270. These are the cases, in which liability to pay tax under the head capital gains or otherwise under the Income tax Act 1922 was determined. 28. S. 12 1-1 B(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, in so far as it is relevant, quoted in the last cited judgment read:— “The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head Capital gains in respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange or transfer of a capital asset effected after the 31st day of March, 1946.and such profits and gains shall be deemed to be income of the previous year in which the sale exchange or transfer took place. Provided further that any transfer of capital assets.on the dissolution of a firm or other association of persons, shall not, for the purposes of this section, be treated as sale, exchange or transfer of the capital assets.” The court, on the facts of the said case, found that there was no sale or exchange of share in the capital assets of the firm by the respondent; nor did he transfer his share in the capital assets and thus held in favour of the respondent that he had no tax liability. 29. The other two cases also do not have any bearing to the question before us. Thus, there is nothing contrary to the law that we have noticed already. All that would be necessary therefore is to see the contents of the award to find out whether it is compulsorily registrable or not. If the value of the property is above Rs. 100/- and it is a document creating a right in immoveable property, the court shall have no option but to hold that it is compulsorily registerable. 30. The agreement, has already been quoied above. It acknowledged disputeswith respect to the several business concerns, immovable and movable properties standing in our names as well as other relatives. 31. The relevant portion of the award reads as follows: “We hereby direct that each of the parties be allotted the schedule of properties mentioned in the various schedules A to F annexed to this award. 1. S.V. Sivalinga Nadar Schedule ‘A’ 2. S.V. Harikrishnan.. Schedule ‘B’ 3. S.V. Chandrapandian Schedule ‘C’ 4. S.V. Kasilingam .. Schedule ‘D’ 5. S.V. Ramachandran ..Schedule ‘E’ 6. S.V. Natesan. .. Schedule ‘F’ 5. We direct that the firm of Sivalinga Nadar & Bros, and S.V.S. Oil Mills and also the joint house property Rent Account be dissolved as at the close of business on 14th July, 1984.”. 32. Having said so, the arbitrators have proceeded to specify different items of dispute and stated how the division of the partnership firm was/is resolved by them. Schedules however are remarkable, in the sense that they specify the properties which are allotted to one or the other parties. 33. Schedule ‘A’ allotted to S.V. Sivalinga Nadar reads: “1. Land and Building bearing No. 90, west Mada Church Road, also known as No. 1 Kalmandapam Road East, Royapuram and 7 shops facing Kalmandapam Road, measuring 7 grounds 1157 sq. 33. Schedule ‘A’ allotted to S.V. Sivalinga Nadar reads: “1. Land and Building bearing No. 90, west Mada Church Road, also known as No. 1 Kalmandapam Road East, Royapuram and 7 shops facing Kalmandapam Road, measuring 7 grounds 1157 sq. ft. or thereabouts, marked ‘D’ in the plan annexed. 2. Land and Building No. 79-80 Suryanarayana Chetty Street, Madras-13 measuring 6 grounds and 2040 sq. ft. or thereabouts and Plant and Machinery known as Pandian Oils and the Business Unit of Pandian Oil Mills.” 34. Schedule ‘B’ allotted to S.V. Harikrishnan reads: “1. Land and Buildings bearing No. 76 Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras. 81 measuring 13 grounds and 886 sq. ft. or thereabouts and Plant and Machinery known as Ambika Oil Mills and the business unit run under that name. 2. Land and Building bearing No. 30 Pandalay Colony and shop bearing 173, Gollavar Agraharam Road, Madras. 81 measuring 3 grounds 2325 sq. ft or thereabouts”. 35. Schedule ‘C’ allotted to S.V. Chandrapandian reads: “1. Land attributable to house New No. 1-A, Kalman-dapam Road East and Land and Building pertaining to 7 shops including one twin shop, all facing Kalmandaparn Road and shop No. 7 (including a shop) facing Arathoon Road, and 9 shops including a twin shop all bearing Kalmandaparn Road, numbers, marked E in the plan annexed hereto measuring in all 5 grounds and 1206 sq. ft. or thereabouts. 2. th share in the following: (a) Land and Building No. 245, Suryanarayana Chetty Street, Madras measuring 1 ground and 245 sq. ft or thereabouts and the business unit. (b) Land and Building at No. 50, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras, measuring 1806 sq. ft. or thereabouts and the business unit. (c) Land and buildings No. 126, Mannarsamy Koil Street, measuring 1 ground and 341 sq. ft. or thereabouts and the business unit. (d) No. 8, Rettaikuli Lane lease and Madras-81 and the business unit. (e) Lease land and Shed at No. 5, waltax Road, Madras-3 known as wood wharf and the business unit. (f) Shed only at lease, land at No. 1 Kuppam Road, Madras and the business unit. (g) Fire wood business unit at 712, Thiruvottiyur High Road and Shed only. (h) Firewood Depot unit in rented premises No. 1, Kummalamman koil street. (i) Shed and ground No. 16-A, Santhangadu, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras-19 measuring 14 grounds 813 sq. (f) Shed only at lease, land at No. 1 Kuppam Road, Madras and the business unit. (g) Fire wood business unit at 712, Thiruvottiyur High Road and Shed only. (h) Firewood Depot unit in rented premises No. 1, Kummalamman koil street. (i) Shed and ground No. 16-A, Santhangadu, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras-19 measuring 14 grounds 813 sq. ft or thereabouts and the firewood business unit run there at. (j) Land and building No. 80-81, Thandavaraya Gramani Street, Madras-21, measuring in all 1 ground 240 sq. ft. or thereabouts and 83, Thandavaraya Gramani Street, Madras-21 and tenancy rights of 82, Thandavaraya Gramani Street occupied by S.V.S. Maligai Stores and the business unit. (k) Freehold Land and Buildings and Plant and Machinery and godowns and drying yards at No. 8, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras and the adjoining leasehold lands Drying yards and Godowns presently occupies by S.V.S. Oil Mills and the business unit of S.V.S. Oil Mills. (l) Land and Building No. 320, Suryanarayana Chetty Street, Madras-13 measuring 2 grounds and 761 sq. ft. or thereabouts. (m) Land and buildings No. 12, Murugesa Naicker Thottam, Madras-81, measuring 1 ground 161 sq. ft. or thereabouts.” (— Presently occupied by S.V.S. Bros. Firewood Depots. 36. Schedule ‘D’ allotted to S.V. Kasilingam reads: “1. Land attributable to House No. 90-A West Mada Church Road, Royapuram, situated in the South Western Corner in the original house property, then No. 1 Kalmandaparn Road, measuring 2 grounds and 1403 sq. ft. or thereabouts and marked ‘A’ in the annexed plan. 2. th share in the following: (a) Land and Building No. 245, Suryanarayana Chetty Street Madras, measuring 1 ground and 245 sq. ft thereabouts and the business unit. (b) Land and Building at No. 50, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras measuring 1806 sq. ft. or thereabouts and the business unit. (c) Land and Buildings No. 128, Mannarsamy Koil Street, measuring 1 ground and 341 sq. ft or thereabouts and the business unit. (d) No. 8, Rettaikuli Land lease land Madras-81 and the business unit. (e) Lease land and shed at No. 5, Waltax Road, Madras-3, known as wood wharf and the business unit. (f) Shed only at lease land at No. 1, Kuppam Road, Madras and the business Unit. (g) Firewood business unit at 712, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras. 19 and shed only. (h) Firewood depot unit in rented premises No. 1, Kurnmalamman, Koil Street. (f) Shed only at lease land at No. 1, Kuppam Road, Madras and the business Unit. (g) Firewood business unit at 712, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras. 19 and shed only. (h) Firewood depot unit in rented premises No. 1, Kurnmalamman, Koil Street. (i) shed and ground No. 18-A, Santhangadu Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras. 19, measuring 14 grounds 813 sq. ft. or thereabouts and the firewood business unit run threat. Presently occupied by S.V.S. Bros. Fire wood Depots. (j) Land and Buildings No. 80-81, Thandavarayan Gramani Street, Madras-21 measuring in all 1 ground 240 sq. ft or thereabout and 83, Thandavarayan Gramani Street, Madras and tenancy rights of 82, Thandavarayan Gramani Street occupied by S.V.S. Maligai stores and the business unit. (k) Freehold land and Buildings and Plant and Machinery and godowns and dryingyards at No. 8, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras and the adjoining leasehold lands Drying yards and Godowns presently occupied by S.V.S. Oil Mills and the business unit of S.V.S. Oil Mills. (1) Land and Building No. 320, Suryanarayana Chetty Street. Madras-13 measuring 2 grounds and 761 sq. ft. or thereabouts. (m) Land and buildings No. 12, Murugesa Naicker Thottam, Madras. 81 measuring 1 ground and 151 sq. ft. or thereabouts.” 37. Schedule ‘E’ allotted to S.V. Ramachandran reads: “1. Land attributable House No. 9-B, West Mada Church Road, Royapuram situated in the Eastern centre of original House property and grounds thereon No. 1, Kalmandaparn Road, measuring about 2 grounds 725 sq. ft. or thereabouts marked ‘B’ in the annexed plan. 2. the share in the following (a) Land and Building No. 245, Suryanarayana Chetty Street, Madras, measuring 1 ground and 245 sq. ft. or thereabouts and the business unit. (b) Land and Building at No. 50; Thiruvottiyur High Court, Madras measuring 1806 sq. ft. or thereabouts and the business unit. (c) Land and Buildings No. 126, Mannarsamy Koil Street measuring 1 ground and 341 sq. ft. or thereabouts and the business unit. (d) No. 8, Rettaikuli Land lease land, Madras-81 and the business unit. (e) Lease land and shed at No. 5, Waltax Road Madras-3 known as wood wharf and the business unit. (f) Shed only at lease land at No. 1, Kuppam Road, Madras and the business unit. (g) Firewood business unit at 712, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras and shed only. (h) Firewood depot unit in rented premises No. 1, Kurnmalamman Koil street. (e) Lease land and shed at No. 5, Waltax Road Madras-3 known as wood wharf and the business unit. (f) Shed only at lease land at No. 1, Kuppam Road, Madras and the business unit. (g) Firewood business unit at 712, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras and shed only. (h) Firewood depot unit in rented premises No. 1, Kurnmalamman Koil street. (i) Shed and ground No. 16-A, Santhangadu, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras-19, measuring 14 grounds 813 sq. ft or thereabouts and the Firewood business run thereat. Presently occupied by S.V.S. Bros. Firewood shop. (j) Land and Buildings No. 8-80, Thandavaraya Gramani Street measuring in all one ground 240 sq. ft or thereabouts and 83 Thandavaraya Gramani Street, Madras and tenancy rights of 82, Thandavaraya Gramani Street, occupied by S.S. Maligai stores and the business unit. (k) Freehold land and buildings and plant and Machinery and godowns and drying yards and at No. 8, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras and the adjoining leasehold lands Drying yards and Godown presently occupied by S.V.S. Oil Mills and the business unit of SV.S. Oil Mills. (1) Land and Buildings No. 320 Suryanarayana Chetty Street, Madras-13 measuring 2 grounds and 761 sq. ft. or thereabouts. (m) Land and Buildings at No. 12, Murugesa Naicker Thottam, Madras. 81 measuring 1 ground and 151 sq. ft. or thereabouts.” 38. Schedule ‘F’ allotted to S.V. Natesan reads: “1. Land attributable to House No. 90-C West Mada Church Road, Royapuram, situated in the North Eastern Corner of original House property and grounds then No. 1, Kalmandaparn Road, measuring about 2 grounds and 1494 sq. ft or thereabouts marked ‘C’ in the annexed plan. “2. th share in the following: (a) Land and Building No. 245, Suryanarayana Chetty Street, Madras measuring 1 ground and 245 sq. ft. or thereabouts and the business unit. (b) Land and Building at No. 50, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras measuring 1808 sq. ft. or thereabouts and the business unit. (c) Land and Buildings No. 126 Mannarsamy Koil Street, measuring 1 ground and 341 sq. ft. or thereabouts and the business unit. (d) No. 8, Rettaikuli Lane lease land, Madras-81 and the business unit. (e) Lease land and Shed at No. 5, Waltax Road, Madras-3, known as wood wharf and the business unit. (f) Shed only at lease land at No. 1 Kuppam Road, Madras and the business unit. ft. or thereabouts and the business unit. (d) No. 8, Rettaikuli Lane lease land, Madras-81 and the business unit. (e) Lease land and Shed at No. 5, Waltax Road, Madras-3, known as wood wharf and the business unit. (f) Shed only at lease land at No. 1 Kuppam Road, Madras and the business unit. (g) Firewood business unit at 713, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras and Shed only. (h) Firewood depot unit in rented premises No. 1, Kurnmalamman Koil Street. (i) Shed and ground No. 18-A, Santhangadu Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras. 19, measuring 14 grounds 813 sq. ft. thereabouts and the firewood business unit run thereat. Presently occupied by S.V.S. Bros. Firewood Depot. (j) Land and Buildings No. 80-81, Thandavarayan Gramani Street, Madras-21 measuring in all 1 ground 2450 sq. ft or thereabouts and 83, Thandavaraya Gramani Street, Madras and tenancy rights of 82, Thandavaraya Gramani Street, occupied by S.V.S. Maligai stores and the business unit. (k) Freehold land and Buildings and Plant and Machinery and godowns and drying yards at No. 8, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras and the adjoining leasehold lands, Drying Yards and Godowns presently occupied by S.V.S. Oil Mills and business unit of S.V.S. Oil Mills. (I) Land and Building No. 320, Suryanarayana Chetty Street, Madras-13 measuring 2 grounds and 761 sq. ft. orthere-abouts. (m) Land and Buildings No. 12, Murugesa Naicker Thottam Madras 91 measuring 1 ground and 151 sq. ft. or thereabouts.” 39. There can be no doubt that the allotments are exclusive to the brothers and that they get independent rights of their own under the award in the properties allotted as per the Schedules of the award. It has thus been not a case of an assignment of the shares in the partnership, without spelling out the exclusive rights of the allottees, There would have been some chances to think that it was a case of assignment of the shares in a partnership and thus it would fall in that category of cases, in which registration is not required, had there been any doubt as to right in the immoveable property. Firm S.V. Sivalinga Nadar & Bros. which is dissolved as a consequence of the award, owned extensive house properties as well as Ambika Oil Mills, including rice mill; Pandian Oil Mills, Maligai Stores and Shakti Oil Mills and nine depots, all located at different places. Firm S.V. Sivalinga Nadar & Bros. which is dissolved as a consequence of the award, owned extensive house properties as well as Ambika Oil Mills, including rice mill; Pandian Oil Mills, Maligai Stores and Shakti Oil Mills and nine depots, all located at different places. In making the allotment, the award states: “The Fixed Assets of S.V. Sivalinga Nadar & Bros. have been considered by us separately and included in one or other of the Schedules or partly in one or more schedules containing properties allocated to the above persons. Hence we direct that all the Fixed Assets of the Firm be written off to the accounts of the present partners and S.V. Sivalinga Nadar at their book values.” and having said so, specifically about the appellant, the award says: “We have allotted the Land, Buildings Plant and machinery of Pandian Oil Mills and the Business to S.V. Sivalinga Nadar a former partner of S.V. Sivalinga Nadar & Bros. He shall also take over the business and the assets and liabilities of that business unit subject to monetary adjustments to square up accounts with the other disputants.” 40. Coming to the land and buildings occupied by S.V.S. Oil Mills and also buildings housing shops and lodge at No. 8, Thiruvottiyur High Road, the award states:— “There are properties of S.V. Sivalinga Nadar & Bros. and we have allotted these in the schedules annexed hereto to S.V. Chandrapandian S.V. Kasilingam S.V. Ramachandran and S.V. Natesan in equal shares.” 41. Proceeding, as noticed by us, with respect to other items, it is said generally in the award, “Other land and Buildings and House properties belonging to S.V. Sivalinga Nadar & Bros. standing in the name of the firm and or otherwise jointly owned by the disputants. These have been allotted by us to one or other or jointly to some of the disputants as per schedules annexed hereto. All the business units of S.V. Sivalinga Nadar & Bros. can all be dissolved. The Business and the Current assets and liabilities of each unit-shall be taken over by the party or parties to whom the relevant business place is allotted either single or jointly as per the various schedules annexed hereto subject to monetary adjustments to square up accounts among the disputants.” 42. can all be dissolved. The Business and the Current assets and liabilities of each unit-shall be taken over by the party or parties to whom the relevant business place is allotted either single or jointly as per the various schedules annexed hereto subject to monetary adjustments to square up accounts among the disputants.” 42. It is indisputable here that the arbitrators have found land and buildings and house properties belonged to S.V. Sivalinga Nadar & Bros. But, at the same time, there has been some immovable property jointly owned by the disputants. The award says, “These have been allotted by us to one or other or jointly to some of the disputants as per schedules annexed hereto.” 43. It is not in dispute that the award has been presented for registration. But it is also admitted that it has not been registered. A petition (C.M.P. No. 14742 of 1991) been filed before us, on behalf of the contesting respondents that this Court should accept additional evidence and take notice of the conduct of the appellant. It is stated that the document which was presented for registration in time has not been registered, for the appellant got a legal notice served upon the Registering Authority. It is that notice, which they proposed to bring on the record as additional evidence. 44. We do not think that there can be any change in the circumstances of this case by taking the so-called legal notice as additional evidence at the appellate stage. If we take the notice as additional evidence, we shall have to permit the parties to prove or disprove, as the case may be, the same, in accordance with law by such evidence, that may be available to the parties. If this is taken to be proved and established, ??? on fact, this will not change the situation the sustained, when the award was ordered to be made a rule of, the court. On the day, the award was presented to the court, it was not registered. It was not register even on the day the award was made a rule of the court and it has not been registered even till to-day. We have already noticed the principles stated in this behalf by the Supreme Court in Lachman Dass v. Ram Lal AIR 1989 S.C. 1923 that unless registered, such an award cannot be looked into at all. We have already noticed the principles stated in this behalf by the Supreme Court in Lachman Dass v. Ram Lal AIR 1989 S.C. 1923 that unless registered, such an award cannot be looked into at all. For these reasons, we are not inclined to take any additional evidence at this stage. Much can be said why steps were not taken by the arbitrators or any party interested in getting the award made a rule of the court to set the award registered in accordance with law. There are specific provisions of law to compel the Registering Authority to register the award/document/instrument. We do not know, if any such step was ever taken by any of the party. Had such steps been taken, perhaps the contesting respondents would not have suffered the present consequence. 45. Many other contentions have been raised before us, touching the validity of the award, objections to the legal misconduct of the arbitrators, including whether there can be any award, in the absence of the sister, who admittedly was a partner with the brothers and/or incomplete adjudication for the reason that the entire dispute between the parties has not been finally adjudicated. Since we have taken the view that the award, unless registered, is not admissible, it will be without jurisdiction to proceed to examine the validity of the award otherwise. 46. Since we are of the opinion that unless the award is registered, it cannot be looked into by the court, there can be no proceeding for making the award a rule of the court. We have no option but to hold that the judgment of the courts below is without jurisdiction. For this infirmity alone, the judgment has to be set aside, and it be declared that there is no award in the eye of law presented before court, which can be made a rule of the court. It however does not mean that if the award is validly registered and presented to be made a rule of the court in accordance with law, the court cannot entertain the same. 47. The view that we have taken with respect to the validity of the award will substantially affect the adjudication in C.S. No. 1016 of 1987 as well as Application Nos. 6293 of 1987 and 9 of 1988. 47. The view that we have taken with respect to the validity of the award will substantially affect the adjudication in C.S. No. 1016 of 1987 as well as Application Nos. 6293 of 1987 and 9 of 1988. The learned Single Judge has taken notice to the contest between the parties as to the exclusive trade mark S.V.S. substantially on account of the award, the adjudication as to the allotment of the shares in various properties to the parties. It is obvious thus that the impugned order in O.S.A. No. 48 of 1988 in Application Nos. 6293 of 1987 and 9 of 1988 cannot stand. The said order for the reason as above, has to be set aside. This will only mean that Application Nos. 6393 of 1987 and 9 of 1988 shall be deemed to be pending for fresh adjudication in accordance with law and in the light of the consequence of the award being not registered and thus not made a rule of the court. 48. In the result, O.S.A. No. 191 of 1988 is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. As a consequence of the above. O.P. No. 230 of 1984 and all consequential applications therein are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 49. O.S.A. No. 48 of 1988 is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The case is remitted to the trial court for a fresh hearing of Application No. 6293 of 1987. There shall be no order as to costs. 50. In view of the order passed in O.S.A. No. 191 of 1988, O.S.A. No. 16 of 1989 has become infructuous and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs. 51. C.M.P. No. 14742 of 1991 is also dismissed.