JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - The petitioner Sharda Prasad Singh has approached this Court for the quashing of State Government order dated t 13th October, 1982 whereby representation of opposite party No. 3 Jagat Narain Misra against the petitioner's appointment to the post of Principal, Sarvodaya Higher Secondary School, Nasipur, district Barabanki (for short, school) has been set aside and direction has been issued for appointment of opposite party No. 3 to the said post. The State Government has exercised power under Section 16E (10) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (for short, Ace) The question for consideration is whether petitioner possessed the prescribed qualification of experience of teaching for at least four years (in) higher classes of a recognised Higher Secondary School. 2. The Petitioner's case is as follows. 3. He is M.A. in Economics and Hindi and L.T. On 1st July, 1973 he was appointed Assistant Teacher in C.T. Grade in the school. At this time, the school imparted instructions only upto Class VIII. On 24th June, 1974 the Board of High School and Intermediate Education. U.P. recognised the school for Higher Secondary Classes. In pursuance of this recognition the school started IX Class with effect from 8th July, 1974. On 20th September, 1974 the District Inspector of Schools accorded formal approval to the opening of IX class. Since July 1974 the petitioner taught students of Class IX on oral direction of the Management and on 21st September, 1974 the Manager issued letter to the Principal directing him to assign work of teaching students of Class IX to the petitioner and four other teachers. On 20th March, 1976 the petitioner was promoted to the L.T. grade. Promotion to this grade entitled the petitioner to teach students of higher classes, namely IX and X Classes. On 7th December, 1976 the petitioner was appointed officiating Principal. On 20th July, 1978 post of principal was advertised and thereafter selection was held. The petitioner as well as opposite party No. 3 were candidates at the said selection. The selection was held on 25th October, 1978. The selection Committee placed the petitioner at serial no. 1 and the opposite party No. 3 at serial no. 2. On 25th November, 1978, petitioner was appointed Principal on regular basis. On I8th August, 1979 opposite party no. The selection was held on 25th October, 1978. The selection Committee placed the petitioner at serial no. 1 and the opposite party No. 3 at serial no. 2. On 25th November, 1978, petitioner was appointed Principal on regular basis. On I8th August, 1979 opposite party no. 3 preferred representation to the Education Secretary, U.P. Government challenging petitioner's selection and appointment on the ground that he did not possess the prescribed teaching experience. On 22nd October, 1979 the Deputy Director of Education disapproved appointment of the petitioner. Petitioner challenged order of the Deputy Director through writ petition No. 3411 of 1979. In this writ Petition an interim order was passed on 4th October, 1979 whereby operation of the order passed by the Deputy Director of Education was stayed. Later by order dated 20th August, 1981 interim order was modified and the State Government was directed to decide the representation of opposite party no. 3 preferred under Section 16E (10) of the Act. After order dated 20th August, 1981 had been passed by this Court, show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 15th March, 1982 requiring him to meet the allegations made by opposite party no. 3. The petitioner submitted his reply on 25th March, 1982, pleading that he possessed the prescribed teaching experience as he had been teaching higher classes since 1974, It was also pleaded by him that in any case, he had completed the period of four years' by the time representation of opposite party no. 3 came up for consideration by the State Government and, therefore, there was no occasion for ousting him from the post of Principal. In support of his plea that he had been teaching higher classes since 8th July, 1974 the petitioner filed certificate dated 18th May, 1976 issued by the opposite party no. 3 purporting to certify that the petitioner had taught higher classes from 1974 to 1976. Similar certificate purporting to have been issued by the Manager on 26th July 1978 was also placed on record by the petitioner. It appears that the time table of 1974 was also brought to the notice of the State Government and the same did not show assignment of higher classes to the petitioner. Similar certificate purporting to have been issued by the Manager on 26th July 1978 was also placed on record by the petitioner. It appears that the time table of 1974 was also brought to the notice of the State Government and the same did not show assignment of higher classes to the petitioner. The State Government by the impugned order dated 13th October, 1982 negatived the petitioner's claim that he had been teaching higher classes from 1974 and held that the petitioner started teaching higher classes only from 20th March, 1976 when he was promoted to L.T. grade. From this date till 25th November, 1978 when the petitioner was appointed Principal on regular basis, he had not completed the period of four years. On this basis the petitioner's selection and appointment was set aside. The opposite party no. 3 was not found to be deficient in possession of the prescribed qualifications and his name was also contained in the panel of selected candidates. Accordingly, the State Government directed his appointment to the post in question. On 10th October, 1982 the present writ petition was filed by the petitioner to challenge the State Government's order dated 13th October, 1982. On the same day interim order was passed staying operation of the State Government's order. Thereafter applications were made on behalf of the Management as well as on behalf of the opposite party no. 3 for vacation of the interim order on the ground that the State Government's order had already been implemented on 18th October, 1982 inasmuch as opposite party no. 3 took charge of the post of Principal. These applications were disposed of by order dated 14th April, 1983 in which the plea of opposite parties that the order of the State Government had been implemented on 18th October, 1982 was accepted. Accordingly, the interim order dated 20th October, 1982 stood discharged. Since 18th October, 1982 opposite party no. 3 is holding the post of Principal. 4. In the writ petition, the petitioner's plea is that the finding that the petitioner did not teach higher classes prior to 20th March, 1976 is manifestly illegal and against the record and in recording the said finding, the State Government has ignored the experience certificates issued to the petitioner by the opposite party no. 3 and by the Manager of the School. 3 and by the Manager of the School. It is also claimed that copies of documents relied upon by the State Government for negating petitioner's plea that he has been teaching higher classes from 1974 has not been supplied to the petitioner and, therefore, the finding of fact recorded on the question of experience is vitiated also on the ground that no hearing was given to the parties in the presence of each other. It is alleged that the petitioner was heard by the Secretary to Government while the opposite party no. 3 was heard by the Deputy Secretary. In the alternative, it is pleaded that the petitioner had acquired the requisite experience before the date on which the State Government disposed of the representation and, therefore, there was no occasion to set aside the petitioner's appointment. In support of the last plea learned counsel has cited the following authorities: (i) AIR 1978 SC 1536 : 1979 (1 ) SCC 168, Ram Sarup v. State of Haryana and others; (ii) 1982 UPLBEC 365. Smt. Shanti Devi Verma v. The Deputy Director of Education & others; (iii) (1990) UPLBEC 598: Smt. Champa Seth v. U.P. Public Service Tribunal No. 1 and others; (iv) AIR 1990 SC 371 , Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation. (v) 1990(1) SVLR (1)109: (1990) 2 SCC 189 J.C. Yadav and others v. State of Haryana & others and (vi) 1990 (II) SVLR (1)157: (1990) 3 SCC 48 Miss Shainda Hasan v. State of U.P. & others. 5. The petition has been contested on behalf of the Management as well as on behalf of opposite party no. 3 in whose favour direction has been issued by the State Government for appointment to the post in question. Sri Pradeep Kant. Advocate representing the opposite party no. 3 has submitted that the finding that the petitioner did not start taking high school classes from July 1974 is a finding of fact and has been arrived at on the consideration of relevant evidence on record and the same cannot be interfered with in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Advocate representing the opposite party no. 3 has submitted that the finding that the petitioner did not start taking high school classes from July 1974 is a finding of fact and has been arrived at on the consideration of relevant evidence on record and the same cannot be interfered with in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel that in any case there was no valid appointment to L.T. grade in favour of the petitioner prior to 20th March, 1976 and therefore, even if be taught higher classes prior to the said date, the experience gained before the said date will be of no consequence for the purposes of the minimum qualification prescribed in the Regulations. According to the learned counsel experience gained is to be on the basis of a valid appointment. Learned counsel placed stress on sub section (3) of section 16E which provides: No person shall be appointed as Head of Institution....... unless he possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed by the regulations: The submission is that the requirement of the subsection (3) is mandatory and since no person can be appointed unless he possesses prescribed minimum qualification, any appointment made without that qualification, will be invalid. It is on this basis that it is submitted that any experience allegedly gained by the petitioner prior to 20 March, 1976 cannot be taken note of Learned counsel also invites attention to the proviso to subsection (3) whereunder the power to relax the prescribed qualification vests in the Board of High School and Intermediate Education and no one else. According to him, admittedly no exemption from the prescribed qualification was granted by the Board and therefore, the petitioner cannot take any advantage of the experience allegedly gained by him on the basis of illegal appointment made in the year 1974. Learned counsel lastly submits that the appointment of the petitioner made on 25th November, 1978 fell in jeopardy much before the completion of period of four years from 20th March, 1976 and the petitioner continued on the post of Principal on the basis of interim orders which cannot give him any benefit. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has cited the following authorities: (i) 1984 UPLBEC 461 (DB), Shitla Prasad Shukla v. State of U.P. & others; (ii) 1985 UPLBEC 224, Smt. Premwati Nautiyal v Narendra Mahila Vidyalaya and another. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has cited the following authorities: (i) 1984 UPLBEC 461 (DB), Shitla Prasad Shukla v. State of U.P. & others; (ii) 1985 UPLBEC 224, Smt. Premwati Nautiyal v Narendra Mahila Vidyalaya and another. (iii) 1989 Selected Civil Decisions 234 Dr. Kaushal Kishore Verma v. Director, Technical Education, U.P. Lucknow & others. 6. Section 16E of the Act deals with the procedure for selection of teachers and Head of Institutions. Subsection (3) as it stood at the time of the present selection, reads as follows; (3) No person shall be appointed as Head of Institution or teacher in an institution unless he possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed by the regulations: Provided that a person who does not possess such qualification may also be appointed if he has been granted exemption by the Board having regard to his education, experience and other attainments. The material qualification prescribed in Appendix A of Chapter II of the Regulations has been reproduced in paragraph 23 of the writ petition and the same is as follows: with an experience of teaching for atleast four years in a training institution recognised by the Department or higher classes of a recognised higher secondary school or in both combined or having atleast four years experience as a trained graduate, headmaster of a Junior High School recognised by the Department provided...... From the above statutory provisions it is apparent that the petitioner could be appointed to the post in question only if be possessed experience of teaching IX class and above for atleast four years. On this question, the finding of fact recorded by the State Government is that the petitioner did not have the experience. The petitioner has not placed on record any order of 1974 promoting him to the L.T. grade or requiring him to take higher classes. The State Government has relied upon the time table for the academic session 197475 for coming to the conclusion that the petitioner's claim of having taught in higher classes from the year 1974, is not sustainable Timetable is an important document for coming to this conclusion. In the absence of any appointment order and in view of the timetable available before the State Government, I am of the opinion that the finding of fact cannot be said to be arbitrary or based on no evidence. In the absence of any appointment order and in view of the timetable available before the State Government, I am of the opinion that the finding of fact cannot be said to be arbitrary or based on no evidence. Accordingly, there is no occasion to interfere with the said finding in the present proceedings. It is, therefore, established that the petitioner had not completed four years teaching experience by the date he was appointed to the post in question. The period was completed in March, 1980 during the pendency of the representation of opposite party no. 3 preferred to the State Government. 7. In Shitla Prasad Shukla's case (supra), the dispute was in respect of seniority in the lecturers grade. On the date petitioner was promoted to the said grade, he did not have the prescribed minimum qualification nor there was any exemption therefrom. The exemption was granted subsequently. The question for consideration before this Court was whether his seniority will count from the date he was actually promoted to lecturer's grade or from the date exemption was granted. This Court held that seniority will count from the date exemption was granted. In view of the language of section 16F, which was equivalent to the language of present section 16E (3) it was held that any appointment made without possession of minimum qualification and without exemption will be invalid. 8. In Premwati Nautiyal (Supra), appointment without approval of District Inspector of Schools, was held to be invalid. In this case, prescribed qualification was never acquired by the petitioner. In the appointment order issued to the petitioner it was specifically provided that the appointment would be valid only on approval of the Regional Inspectress of Schools. From this, it would appear that from the very beginning the appointment order was inchoate. 9. In Kaushal Kishore Verma's case (Supra), a Division Bench of this Court upheld petitioner's ouster from the post of lecturer which was based on lack of teaching experience. Power to relax the prescribed minimum qualification vested in the Director of Technical Education and the appointment order specifically provided that incase approval of the Director was not forthcoming, services would be terminable without notice. The appointment order in this case too was inchoate and could become complete only when approval was accorded by the Director. 10. The above authorities were cited by the learned counsel for the opposite party no. The appointment order in this case too was inchoate and could become complete only when approval was accorded by the Director. 10. The above authorities were cited by the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 3. Now authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the effect thereof may be considered. 11. In Ram Sarup's case (supra), the appellant before their Lordships was appointed Statistical Officer on 20th February, 1961 and he was confirmed in the post on 15th October, 1960. (sic) Thereafter he was appointed Chief Inspector of Shops on 22nd February, 1967 and LabourcumConciliation Officer on is t January, 1968. Thereafter order was passed on 28th April, 1977 reverting him to the post of Statistical Officer on the ground that he did not possess atleast five years experience in the working of Labour Laws as LabourInspector, Deputy Chief Inspector, of shops or wage Inspector. The Punjab & Haryana High Court upheld order of reversion, but their Lordships set aside the judgment and upheld the appellant's claim, holding that although initially appointment of the appellant was in breach of statutory rules, but it could not be said to be wholly ineffective. Appointment without possession of the prescribed qualification was held to be irregular and the irregularity was held to be cured from the date the lacking qualification was acquired. In the case before their Lordships the lacking experience qualification was acquired prior to the passing of the order of reversion. The proposition of law deducible from this case is that the appointment made without possession of prescribed qualification is not void but is merely irregular and once the lacking qualification is acquired, the order acquires complete validity. It may, however, be pointed out that in this case dispute was between the employer and appointee. There was no dispute inter se between rival claimants to the post. It is further to be noticed that the order of appointment to the post of LabourcumConciliation Officer did not fall in jeopardy before the lacking qualification was acquired by the appellant. 12. In Smt. Shanti Devi Verma's case (Supra) the petitioner had been appointed to the post of Assistant Teacher with the approval of the District Inspector of Schools and later her services were sought to be terminated on the ground that at the time of her appointment she 'id not possess prescribed qualification. 12. In Smt. Shanti Devi Verma's case (Supra) the petitioner had been appointed to the post of Assistant Teacher with the approval of the District Inspector of Schools and later her services were sought to be terminated on the ground that at the time of her appointment she 'id not possess prescribed qualification. Before the order of termination was passed, the petitioner had acquired the lacking qualification. A learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of termination. He has made some significant observations in paragraph 8 of the judgment which deserve reproduction. They are as follows: ......An analysis of the various provisions aforementioned leads to the conclusion that the intention was not to invest these provisions with such inflexibility as to make any departure from the same fatal to the appointment itself. An overall examination of the relevant provisions warrants the conclusion that they are to be treated as elastic and, therefore, where before any punitive or other adverse action is taken against the candidate appointment, if the disqualification has disappeared and the candidate at that stage fully satisfies the prescribed qualification, then the irregularity should be treated as cured and the appointment should not be struck down......In fact ....... ...the employers may really be estopped from pleading a disability for the purpose of dispensing with the services of an appointee, when they have themselves initially permitted such disability not to stand in the way of the candidate and allowed him to function and discharge his duties to their satisfaction. Obviously, it would not be in conformity with the principles of equity and justice that despite the fact that the appointee has acquitted himself well in his post the employer may be allowed at a later stage to turn round and remove the appointee on the ground of his initial lack of qualification at the time of his appointment...... (Emphasis supplied) 13. From the emphasised portion of this judgment three propositions are deducible (i) principle of estoppel is applicable against the employer, (ii) the case of the appointee is to be dealt with on the principle of equity and justice, and (iii) the employer will be estopped from taking action only if before he takes action, the lacking qualification has been acquired by the appointee. In the case on hand, the petitioner acquired the lacking qualification much after representation had been preferred by the opposite party no. 3. Further the opposite party no. 3 was not a party in the process of petitioner's appointment and, therefore, the principle of estoppel cannot be applied against him. 14. In Smt. Champa Seth (supra) the petitioner was sought to be reverted on the ground that at the time promotion order was passed, she was lacking in the prescribed qualification. Before the order of reversion was passed, the petitioner had acquired the lacking qualification, On these facts, this Court quashed the order of reversion and maintained the promotion of the petitioner to the higher post. In this case too dispute was between the employer and the promotee. There was no dispute between the employees inter se. 15. In Bhagwati Prasad (Supra) Daily Rated workers who had worked for more than three years were sought to be ousted from service on the ground that they did not possess prescribed educational qualification. They had approached their Lordships under Article 32 of the Constitution. Their petitions were allowed and in paragraph6 of the report, their Lordships observed as follows: ......The indisputable facts are that the petitioners were appointed between the period 1983 and 1986 and ever since, they have been working and have gained sufficient experience in the actual discharge of duties attached to the posts held by them. Practical experience would always aid the person to effectively discharge the duties and is a sure guide to assess the suitability. The initial minimum educational qualification prescribed for the different posts, is undoubtedly a factor to be reckoned with, but it is so at the time of the initial entry into the service. Once appointments were, made as daily rated workers for a considerable length of time, it would be hard and harsh to deny them the confirmation in the respective posts on the ground that they lack the prescribed educational qualification. In our view, three years' experience, ignoring artificial break in service in short period created by the respondents, in the circumstances, would be sufficient for confirmation ........ (Emphasis supplied). From the emphasised words, it would appear that this judgment is also based on consideration of equity and justice. In our view, three years' experience, ignoring artificial break in service in short period created by the respondents, in the circumstances, would be sufficient for confirmation ........ (Emphasis supplied). From the emphasised words, it would appear that this judgment is also based on consideration of equity and justice. In this case too there was no dispute between rival claimants to the post, the dispute being confined to the employer on the one hand and the employees collectively on the other. 16. Miss Shainda Hasan's case (Supra) is based on concession made by the learned counsel for the opposite parties. This was an appeal against the judgment of this Court. The case related to appointment to the post of LadyPrincipal in a degree college affiliated to the Lucknow University. One of the prescribed minimum qualifications was at least five years' experience of teaching degree classes as also administrative experience. The appellant did not possess this qualification. Selection Committee relaxed the qualification and selected her. Management of the college sought approval from the University to appoint her. The University did not accord approval. The appellant filed writ petition to challenge the action of the University. Interim order was passed by this court which enabled the appellant before their Lordships to take charge of the Post. The writ petition was ultimately dismissed. During pendency of the appeal, their Lordships passed an order to the following effect: ''It is admitted by the parties that as a result of the Court orders the appellant Ms. Shairda Khan is continuing to work as Principal in the Karamat Husain Muslim Girls' College, Lucknow ever since 1974. Having served the institution for over 16 years it would be unjust to make her leave the post. Under the circumstances let the University reconsider the whole matter sympathetically. The case was thereafter taken up on 20th April, 1990 when the learned counsel for the opposite parties agreed with their Lordships that asking the appellant to leave job after sixteen years would be doing injustice to her. Under the circumstances let the University reconsider the whole matter sympathetically. The case was thereafter taken up on 20th April, 1990 when the learned counsel for the opposite parties agreed with their Lordships that asking the appellant to leave job after sixteen years would be doing injustice to her. In view of this concession, their Lordships passed the following order: Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice we direct the Lucknow University and its Vice Chancellor to grant the necessary approval to the appointment of the appellant as Principal, Karamat Husain Muslim Girls' College, Lucknow with effect from the date She is holding the said post......... It is apparent from the judgment that it is based on equitable considerations and their Lordships considered it unjust to unsettle the position which has existed in respect of the appellant for sixteen years. In this case there was no dispute between the appointee and the Management under statutory provisions, a third party also came into picture and that was the Lucknow University. Appointment could be made only with the approval of the University which was lacking. Appointment of the appellant fell in jeopardy immediately after her selection, but all the same, relief was granted to her on equitable considerations to maintain the status which she was already enjoying. If the proposition deducible from this case is applied to the case on hand, opposite party no. 3 will be benefited and not the petitioner as he has been occupying the post in question with effect from 18th October, 1982. 17. In J.C. Yadav's case (Supra) it was observed that promotion made without possession of prescribed qualification was irregular and not ineffective and once qualification was acquired, the promotion became valid. This case related to promotion from class II post in the Engineering department of the Haryana Government to ClassI post in the same department. Statutory rule required eight years' complete service in class II post as qualification for promotion to Class I post. The appellants before their Lordships did not have this qualification, but they were promote by relaxing the prescribed qualification. The promotion was challenged by one of the officers of Class II post on the ground that he had not been considered and those considered and promoted lacked the prescribed qualification. The appellants before their Lordships did not have this qualification, but they were promote by relaxing the prescribed qualification. The promotion was challenged by one of the officers of Class II post on the ground that he had not been considered and those considered and promoted lacked the prescribed qualification. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that there was no general power of relaxation available and that relaxation could be made only in individual cases to mitigate hardship. The petitioner's challenge failed before learned Single Judge, but prevailed before a Division Bench of the High Court. Setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench and restoring the order of the learned Single Judge, their Lordships held that since the power of relaxation was available, the promotion could not be said to be illegal. In paragraph 12 of the report alternative argument of the appellants that the required experience having been acquired before the Division Bench set aside the promotion, there was no occasion to set aside the promotion, was accepted with the following observation: Undisputedly, the appellants completed eight years' of service before January 15, 1980, the date on which the Division Bench of the High Court set aside the promotions. In view of the principle laid down in Ram Sarup's case the appellants' appointment, even if irregular, stood regularised on the date they completed eight years of their service and, therefore, the promotion could not be set aside. From a superficial consideration of this case, it may appear that in this case there was a lis inter se rival claimants for promotion, but this is not so. The petitioner had indeed contended that his claim for promotion had not been considered, but the record showed that his case for promotion had been considered and he had not been found suitable for promotion. Once he is excluded on account of unsuitability, there was dispute between the employer and the appointee only. In this case, the prescribed qualification was acquired during the pendency of the writ petition at the appellate stage. The petitioner's plea that there was no general power of relaxation available to the Government had been rejected. Upholding promotion of those who lacked the prescribed qualification did not, in this case, affect right of any other person. 18. In this case, the prescribed qualification was acquired during the pendency of the writ petition at the appellate stage. The petitioner's plea that there was no general power of relaxation available to the Government had been rejected. Upholding promotion of those who lacked the prescribed qualification did not, in this case, affect right of any other person. 18. From the above authorities, proposition of law deducible is that order of appointment made in favour of a person who lacks prescribed qualification is not altogether invalid or ineffective, but is merely irregular and is capable of being cured with acquisition of the prescribed qualification. Once the prescribed qualification is acquired, the invalidity in the order is cured. The proposition of law has been applied mainly in disputes between the appointee and the employer and not in disputes between the employer on the one hand and rival claimants to the post on the other. The authorities are based on principles of estoppel, equity and justice. Principle of estoppel cannot be applied against rival claimants to a post. The Principles of justice and equity also cannot be applied against a person who claims the post, possesses the requisite qualification, but is not appointed for no reason whatsoever. I am accordingly, of the opinion that these authorities are of no assistance to the petitioner as in the present case the real dispute was not between the petitioner, who was the appointee, on the one hand and the employer but between the petitioner and opposite party no. 3 who was also a claimant to the post like the petitioner. This case will have to be decided on the basis of position existing at the time of petitioner's appointment to the post in question. At the time the petitioner was appointed he did not fulfil the prescribed qualification in view of the findings of fact recorded by the State Government. The opposite party no. 3, on the other hand, possessed the said qualification and had all the chance of being appointed as he was placed at serial no. 2 by the selection committee. To uphold petitioner's appointment would cause injustice to opposite party no. 3 and the same would be inequitable too. Accordingly, the petitioner's claim of regularisation by acquisition of the prescribed qualification during pendency of the representation before the State Government will have to be rejected. 19. 2 by the selection committee. To uphold petitioner's appointment would cause injustice to opposite party no. 3 and the same would be inequitable too. Accordingly, the petitioner's claim of regularisation by acquisition of the prescribed qualification during pendency of the representation before the State Government will have to be rejected. 19. In view of the above the petition lacks merit and is hereby dismissed with costs to opposite party no. 3. Interim order already stands discharged. (Petition dismissed.)