JAIN, J.—This revision petition is directed against the order of learned Civil Judge, Pali dated 5.8.1991 whereby he has allowed the application of the plaintiff dated 26.4.1991 striking out the defence of the petitioner as a whole. (2) In this case, the non-petitioner Bhag Chand filed a suit on 7.11.1977 against the petitioner for eviction on the ground of default, sub-letting and personal necessity. The trial court vide its order dated 12.9.90 ordered that defendants are debarred from producing evidence on issue no.3. But on an application dt. 26.4.91 u/s. 151 filed by the non-petitioner, the Court below has closed the evidence and for others it has observed that they will be decided at final stage of judgment. Thus, the defendant has filed this revision. (3) Mr. M.C. Bhoot, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the learned lower Court has no jurisdiction to review its earlier order dated 12.9.1990 and to pass the order dt. 5.8.1991. He has also submitted that the decision of this court in Inder Chand vs. Smt. Lilawati (1) needs reconsideration. (4) Mr. H.C. Jain, learned counsel for the non-petitioner has contended that the petitioner has made in all 58 defaults and the order of striking out defence has been maintained by this Court also. The learned trial court has every right to review its order. The learned trial court has rightly allowed the application. He has further submitted that the case is pending in the learned court below for last 14 years and with a view to delay the decision, the petitioner has filed this revision. The order of this Court passed in Inder Chand vs. Smt. Lilawati (supra) does not require any reconsideration. (5) I have considered the arguments of Mr. M.C. Bhoot, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. H.C. Jain, learned counsel for the non-petitioner at length and perused the case law cited before me. It is true that Single Judge is bound by the decision of earlier Single Bench and if he wants to differ then the only course open is to refer the matter to the larger Bench. With this aspect, I have again considered the case law. I have also considered the relevant Sec. 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (here in after referred to as the Act). (6) In Bansilal vs. Laxmichand (2), Honble CM. With this aspect, I have again considered the case law. I have also considered the relevant Sec. 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (here in after referred to as the Act). (6) In Bansilal vs. Laxmichand (2), Honble CM. Lodha, J. as he then was has held that "when the defence of the defendant-tenant has been struck out, it means all the defences available to him against ejectment under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 cannot come to his rescue. It was further held that the evidence already examined by him cannot be looked into as his defence has been struk out. (7) In Smt. Beladas & Ors. vs. Smt. Laxmi Devi (3) their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering a case of Bihar Building Lease Rent, Eviction Control Act, (3/1947)-Sec. 2 (d)/ll-A has held that the striking out of the defence has, therefore, the effect of striking out all defences raised by the defendant-qua tenant. Their lordships has further held that "his entire defence in the suit was in his capacity as a tenant and on its striking out, it was struck out as a whole." (8). In Surajnarain vs. Smt. Laxmi Devi (4) the Honble G.M. Lodha, J. as he then was held that once the penalty prescribed in sub-clause (5) comes into play, a tenant cannot be saved from consequence of eviction as the defence umbrella provided by sub-sec. (6) fails to protect him. (9) In Ramsaran vs. Nathulal (5) in a composite suit on default and personal necessity where a tenant failed to pay or deposit rent Honble N.M. Kasliwal, J. as he then was, while distinguishing Siya Sarans case reported in 1982 RLR-1005, has repelled the contention advanced by the learned counsel that even if the order striking out the defence against the eviction has been passed it may be restricted only against the ground of eviction on account of default in the payment of rent for more than six months as contemplated u/s. 13(1) (a) of the Act and not in respect of other grounds for eviction i.e. for reasonable and bonafide personal necessity and it has been held that defence against eviction was rights struck down. (10) In Ramjilal vs. Shyam (6), Honble S.S. Byas, J. as he then was, held that "If the tenant fails to make a compliance of the provisions of sub-section (4), the Court has no option except to order the defence against eviction to be struck out. The court has no jurisdiction in the matter. As soon as the default under sub-section (4) is there, the penal consequences envisaged in sub-section (5) will follow. The penal consequences cannot be averted or defeated by the tenant of the court. The two decisions of this Court referred to above, cover the present controversy on all its fours. The provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) have been held mandatory. No concession can be granted to a defaulter-tenant under sub-section (5)." (11). In Rajasthan State Agricultural Marketing Board vs. Smt. Gurdeep Kaur (7), Honble D.P. Gupta, J. as he then was, has held that if tenant fails to make payment his defence is liable to be struck out. (12). In Inderchand vs. Smt. Lilawati (supra) I have already held that the words used in Sec. 13(5) of the Act clearly mean that the whole defence against eviction will be struck off. Their lordships of the Supreme Court in Modula India vs. Kamakshya Singh (8) while considering Sec. 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 has held that if the defence is struck off the tenant will be placed in the same position as if he has not defended the claim of ejectment. The words used in Sec. 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 are the Court shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck out whereas in Sec. 13(5) of the Act the words used are the Court shall order the defence against the eviction to be struck out. Thus, the effect of both the provisions 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 is similar, in case defence struck out. Under these circumstances I see no good reason to change my earlier view. Therefore, as discussed above I dont consider it proper to refer the matter to a Larger Bench. (13) So far as the contention regarding order of learned Civil Judge reviewing his earlier order is concerned, in Chinnammal & Ors. Under these circumstances I see no good reason to change my earlier view. Therefore, as discussed above I dont consider it proper to refer the matter to a Larger Bench. (13) So far as the contention regarding order of learned Civil Judge reviewing his earlier order is concerned, in Chinnammal & Ors. vs. P. Armugham (9), it has been observed that "it is well to remember that Code of Civil Procedure is a body of Procedural law designed to facilitate justice and it should not be treated as an enactment providing for punishments and penalties. The laws of procedure should be so conustrued as to render justice wherever reasonably possible." It has been further held that duty of courts to take care that no act of court in the course of proceedings does an injury to the suitors in the court. (14) It is also well settled that if there is any mistake apparent on record or in the proceedings, the review is permissible. No one should suffer because of the mistake of the Court. This view is supported by a number of decisions of this Court, in State of Rajasthan vs. Mehta Chetan Das Kiram Das (10), Smt. Sona vs. Kamla (11) and Mohanlal vs. Mohanlal & Anr. (12). I do not find it necessary to make any detailed reference of these authorities. (15) In the instant case it is not disputed that the defence was struck off on 18.5.85. The appeal was rejected on 18.8.88 by the learned Distt. Judge. Thereafter, the revision was dismissed by this Court on 18.2.1989. Admittedly, the plaintiff non-petitioner has abandoned the issues of personal necessity and comparative hardship in his application dt. 26. 4. 1991. Thus, now the question of leading evidence does not arise. Therefore, the order dt. 5.8.1991 needs no interference. (16) In view of above decisions, the learned lower court has not acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity in reviewing its earlier order dt. 12.9.1990 vide its order dt. 5.8.1991. (17) In the result, this revision petition has no force, so it is hereby dismissed.