JUDGMENT 1. - The above writ petition and the connected writ petitions, mentioned in the schedule annexed with the judgement, can be conveniently disposed of by a common order as all of them pertain to land acquisition proceedings of the same area and raise common questions to be decided. 2. With rapid industrialization and concentration of population in urban areas, proper and planned development of residential colonies have become essential. In order to prevent haphazard growth of houses and unplanned development of colonies, the various Government and Semi-government bodies like Housing Boards, U.I.T., Development Authorities, Municipal Boards/Councils etc. have been undertaking various residential schemes.Delhi being the capital of India, the pressure of industrialization and urbanization is increasing on contiguous areas of Delhi also. In Bhiwadi area in the State of Rajasthan, where in contiguity of Delhi, tremendous industrialisation has taken place, and this area is development very fast with concentration of population with commercial and industrial activities. Hence, development of residential colonies with proper planning and facilities became necessary for this area to check haphazard and unplanned growth of colonies. For the same purpose, National Capital Region has been formed. In the said Region, the whole of Tehsils, namely, Behror, Mandawar, Kishangarh and Tizara in Alwar District and part of Al war Tehsil have been included, from Rajasthan which are near to Union Territory of India. This Capital Region has been formed to promote a balanced and coordinated development in the areas included in it, though the responsibility for the implementation of the plans have been put on the concerned States. 3. From the reply of the State Government, it appears that the Secretary, U.I.T., Alwar is also an Ex-officio Director of National Capital Region for the purposes of development of the area falling in the State of Rajasthan. From the Additional affidavit of Shri Kamal Kant, Head Legal Assistant U.I.T., Alwar, it also appears that the U.I.T., Alwar has earlier developed one residential colony, namely Bhagat Singh Colony, convening an area of about 150.18 Bigas. Initially, this scheme was undertaken by RICCO, but subsequently, it was handed over to U.I.T. under the orders of the State Government dated Feb.27, 1985. The possession of the land measuring 150.18 Bighas i.e. 94.3125 acres was handed over to U.I.T. through the Assistant Engineer Shri Kailash Chandra Gupta vide Annex.R-6 dated 2-12-1987. Initially, this scheme was undertaken by RICCO, but subsequently, it was handed over to U.I.T. under the orders of the State Government dated Feb.27, 1985. The possession of the land measuring 150.18 Bighas i.e. 94.3125 acres was handed over to U.I.T. through the Assistant Engineer Shri Kailash Chandra Gupta vide Annex.R-6 dated 2-12-1987. In the said colony, 679 plots of various sizes were demarcated and, as stated by the U.I.T. 601 plots were disposed of by draw of lottery and 30 plots were sold by it in public auction. The said colony is said to be fully developed with facilities of roads, drinking water and park etc. 4. In continuation of the process of planned development of the Bhiwadi area, residential colonies, namely, Chitrakoot Nagar, Jawahar Nagar, Chandra Nagar and Vasundhara Nagar were undertaken by the U.I.T., Alwar and to pro- vide lands for the schemes, land acquisition proceedings were initiated. The preliminary notification declaring the intention to acquire the land was published on December 16, 1989 under section-4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act') and the same was published in the official Gazette of the State of Rajasthan on March 1, 1990 for each of the aforesaid schemes. It was notified that the proposed acquisition was for a public purpose, namely, the development of Vasundhara Nagar/Chittrakoot Nagar/jawahar Nagar/Chandra Nagar for the development of Bhiwadi area by the U.I.T. Alwar under the schemes of National Capital Region. Individual notices were served upon the petitioners and objections were filed by them. After consideration and rejection of the objections, notifications for acquisition of the lands under section 6 of the Act were issued for each of the aforesaid schemes on June 23, 1990. It also appears that the substance of the notice under section- 4(1) of the Act was also affixed at convenient places in the concerned localities i.e. village Bhiwadi and Alampura for each of the Schemes on Jan.9,1990 and Jan.10,1990.It also appears that the substance of the notice under section-4(1) of the Act was also affixed at convenient places in the concerned localities i.e. village Bhiwadi and Alapura for each of the Schemes on January 9, 1990. The said notice was also published in two daily hindi newspapers, namely, 'Rajasthan Patrika' and 'Dainik Nyay'. 5. The said notice was also published in two daily hindi newspapers, namely, 'Rajasthan Patrika' and 'Dainik Nyay'. 5. From the reply of the respondent No.2 in writ petition No. 4953/90, it appears that for all the four residential colonies, acquisition proceedings with regard to the land measuring 1000 Bigas were started. The present petitions relate to Chander Nagar Scheme, Vasundhara Nagar Scheme and Chittorakoot Nagar Scheme.As per the additional affidavit of the officiating Land Acquisition Officer, U.I.T., Alwar dated 12/7/1991, the total land acquired for Chander Nagar Scheme is 289 Bigas, for Vasundhara Nagar Scheme is 266 Bigas and 7 Biswas and for Chitrakoot Nagar Scheme is 266 Bigas and 7 Biswas. Out of the aforesaid lands, five writ petitions have been filed in relation to Chander Nagar Scheme pertain- ing to 7 Bigas and 2 Biswas only. Similarly, twenty two(22) writ petitions have been filed in relation to Vasundhara Nagar Scheme pertaining 43 Bigas and l(one) Biswa and in relation to Chitrakoot Nagar Scheme, seventeen(17) writ petitions have been filed for about 30 Bigas and 5 Biswas of land only. Thus, it appears that in these writ petitions, the total land involved is only about 80 Bigas, out of total 821 Bigas of land and the said lands are also at scattered places. It further appears that the Land Acquisition Officer had passed the awards on 22/9/1990, 4/10/1990 and 1/12/1990 with regard to the land pertaining to the aforesaid three residential colonies, and in consequence to the awards, the possession of the land has been taken and the compensation has been paid to the awardees. The copies of the relevant awards have also been filed. The respondent No.2 has also given the details of these facts in Schedule-A, Schedule-B and Schedule-C annexed with the additional affidavit.From the affidavit of Shri Kamal Kant, Head Legal Assistant U.1.T., Alwar dated 27/5/1991, it is further borne out that the lay-out plan for the aforesaid residential colonies has been sanctioned by the Senior Town Planner, Rajasthan vide his order dated May 10, 1991. The plots of various sizes from 48 sq. The plots of various sizes from 48 sq. meters to 200 sq.meters have been demarcated as under:- 48 sq.meters 3082 plots 60 sq.meters 1934 plots 72 sq.meters 1720 plots 160 sq.meters 1454 plots 200 sq.meters 1098 plots In addition to the residential plots, provision has been made for the development of community centre, primary schools, high schools, dispensary, shopping centre, police post etc. It is also borne-out that the U.I.T. Alwar has taken loan of huge amount from HUDCO in the tune of Rs. 10,05,35,000/- for payment of the compensation to the awardees and Rs. 8,31,40,000/- have already been paid to the various khatedars.From the reply of the U.I.T.,Alwar, it also appears that the-compensation amount at the rate of Rs. 91,000/- per Biga excluding the construction/ improvements on the land, was fixed by the authorities with mutual agreement with the khatedars and this amount was sanctioned by the State Government vide its communication dated May 18,1990 (Annex.R.2). 6. In the background of the aforesaid facts, I have to examine the various grounds raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners to challenge the acquisition proceedings. The first and the foremost contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the land is not being acquired for a public purpose and the present acquisition of the lands is with an ulterior object of profit making. In this connection, it was argued that the action of the respondents is malafide and the so called purpose is merely a colourable device for freezing huge areas of land. To substantiate this argument, Mr. Lodha further argued that prior to the present acquisition, the respondents had acquired about 700 to 800 Bigas of land for development of Bhagat Singh Colony and the major part of the said land is still lying vacant and un-utilized.In reply to the above submissions, the learned counsel for the U.I.T. Mr. Mathur contended that the aforesaid argument is without any basis. It was submitted that so far Bhagat Singh Colony is concerned, 769 plots of various sizes were demarcated, out of which 601 plots were disposed of by the UIT by way of draw of lots, 30 plots were sold by open auction and the remaining plots are also going to be disposed of very soon. It was further stated that the Bhagat Singh Colony has been fully developed having all facilities/amenities like roads, water etc. It was further stated that the Bhagat Singh Colony has been fully developed having all facilities/amenities like roads, water etc. Further, in the said colony, UIT has constructed 53 houses for allotment to the persons belonging to economically weaker section. It was also argued that the lands in question are being required for development of residential colonies in order to prevent unplanned and haphazard development of Bhiwadi area where concentration of population is increasing on account of enormous industrial development. It was also argued that the State Government has issued notification under section 6 of the Act after being satisfied that the purpose for which the land is being required is a public purpose and, as such, it cannot be challenged by the petitioners without giving the particulars and dates to show that the action of the respondents is malafide or is a colourable device for freezing the huge areas of land. Then, it was contended that whenever a notification under section-4 of the Act is issued, its true effect is always to freeze the land, but this fact itself does not vitiate the proceedings as a colourable device. In this connection, the learned counsel for the respondents pendents has placed reliance on Smt. Somawanti and others v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 S.C. 151 , Ratilal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1970 S.C. 984 , Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1966 S.C. 1788 , flatoon v. LtGovernor, Delhi AIR 1974 S.C. 2077 , Land Acquisition Collector v. Durga Pada, AIR 1980 S.C. 1678 , Lila Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1975 S.C. 2112 , Ramgir Uttamgir Goswami v. State of Gujarat, (1988) 1 SCC 466 . 7. In Arnold Rodricks v. State of Punjab (supra), it was held by Supreme Court that a notification under Section 4 of the Act which stated the land was needed for "Development and utilisation of the said lands as an industrial and residential area" was sufficient specification of public purpose.In Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor, Delhi (supra), the land was acquired for the planned development of Delhi and it was held to be a public purpose. Governor, Delhi (supra), the land was acquired for the planned development of Delhi and it was held to be a public purpose. In Lila Ram v. Union of India(supra) a notification under section-4 was issued stating therein that the land was required "for the execution of the Interim General Plan for the Greater Delhi" and the Supreme Court upheld the validity of this notification observing that the public purpose mentioned in the notification was specific. It was further held that the object of the Interim General Plan was to prevent haphazard and unplanned development of Delhi and thereby to ensure planned development of Delhi,the execution of the Interim General Plan must be held to be a "Public purpose" within section-4 of the Act. A similar argument was raised before the Supreme Court in this case that the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were liable to be struck down on the ground that the notification under section 4 of the Act was issued for the collateral purpose of freezing the land of the appellant. This submission was turned down and it was observed as under: "It is true that the effect of the notification under section-4 of the Act was to freeze the land, but that fact would not in any way affect the validity of the notification. The object of a notification under section-4 is to give public notice that it is proposed to acquire the land mentioned in the notification and that any one who deals in that land subsequent to the notification would do so at his own risk. According to Section 23 of the Act, in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under the Act, the Court shall take into consideration,besides other factors, the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4. It is further provided in Section 24 of the Act that the Court shall not take into consideration any outlay or improvements on or disposal of the land acquired, commenced, made or affected without the sanction of the Collector after the date of publication of the notification under section-4. It is, therefore, obvious that the consequence of the "freezing of the land" about which complaint has been made by the appellant is inherent in the nature of things once a notification under section 4 is issued". 8. It is, therefore, obvious that the consequence of the "freezing of the land" about which complaint has been made by the appellant is inherent in the nature of things once a notification under section 4 is issued". 8. Sub-section (3) of Section -6 of the Act provides that a declaration made under section -6 shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the case may be. For the sake of convenience, it may be reproduced as under: "Sub-section(3) of Section-6 The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the case may be, and, after making such declaration, the (appropriate Government), may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appearing." "In Somawanti v. State of Punjab (supra), it was observed in para No.19 as under. "In substance, therefore, there is no difference between conclusive evidence and conclusive proof. Statutes may use the expression conclusive proof where the object is to make an act non-justiciable. But the legislature may use some other expression such as 'conclusive evidence' for achieving the same result. There is thus no difference between the effect of the expression 'conclusive evidence' from that of 'conclusive proof' the aim of both being to give finality to the establishment of the existence of a fact from the proof of another." Then, it was held in para No.26 as under : "It would, therefore, be clear that the declaration that a particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a company is not to be made by the Government arbitrarily, but on the basis of material placed before it by the Collector. The provisions of sub-section(2) of Section-5A make the decision of the Government on the objections final while those of sub-section(1) of Section-6 amble the Government to arrive at its satisfaction. The provisions of sub-section(2) of Section-5A make the decision of the Government on the objections final while those of sub-section(1) of Section-6 amble the Government to arrive at its satisfaction. Sub-section(3) of Section-6 goes further and says that such a declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company." The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the conclusiveness or finality attached to the declaration of Government is only as regards the fact that the land is needed, but not as regards the question that the purpose for which the land is needed is in-fact a public purpose or what is said to be a company is real company, and it was observed as under: "The Government has to be satisfied about both the elements contained in the expression" needed for a public purpose or a company". Where it is so satisfied, it is entitled to make a declaration. Once such a declaration is made sub-section(3) invests it with conclusiveness. That conclusiveness is not merely regarding the fact that the Government is satisfied but also with regard to the question that the land is needed for a public purpose or is needed for a company, as the case may be." In Ratilal v. State of Gujarat (supra), it was again held that where there is a declaration under section- 6 that the land proposed to be acquired is needed for a public purpose, the Court cannot go into the question whether the need was genuine or not unless it is satisfied that the action taken by the Government was a fraudulent one. The conclusiveness in Section 6(3) must necessarily attach not merely to a need, but also to the question whether the purpose was a public purpose. The conclusiveness in Section 6(3) must necessarily attach not merely to a need, but also to the question whether the purpose was a public purpose. It was also held that a housing scheme even for a limited number of persons is a public purpose.In Land Acquisition Collector v. Durga Pada (supra), it was held that in the face of the conclusive presumption which the Court has to raise under sub-section(3) of Section-6 of the Act about the nature of the purpose stated in the declaration being true, the onus on the landowners to displace the presumption is very heavy indeed and the same could not be said to have been discharged by a mere allegation in that behalf which has been denied by the State.In Ramgir Uttamgir Goswami v. State of Gujarat (supra), it was held that the assessment of suitability of the land proposed to be acquired for the concerned public purpose is primarily for the Land Acquisition Officer to consider. 9. Thus, it cannot be said that acquisition of land for development of new residential colonies is not a public purpose. So far the contention with regard to colourable device to freeze the land or malafide intention of respondents is concerned, there is absolutely no material on the record. The petitioners have made only mere assertions in some of the writ petitions without anything more, which have been denied by the respondents. So far the development of Bhagat Singh Colony is concerned, the U.I.T. has categorically given the details asserting that the said colony has been developed with all facilities/amenities to the residents. The State Government has made a declaration under section-6 of the Act and this is a conclusive evidence of the fact that the land is required for a public purpose. Therefore, the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is wholly devoid of force and it can be easily over-ruled. 10. Another contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that there is a non-compliance of Section 40) of the Act, in as much as,the substance of such notification has not been given at convenient places in the concerned localities. Though, a further argument was also raised at the initial stage that the notification under section-4 was not published in the official Gazette and two daily newspapers circulating in that locality. Though, a further argument was also raised at the initial stage that the notification under section-4 was not published in the official Gazette and two daily newspapers circulating in that locality. However, this contention was sub- sequently given up by the learned counsel stating that they were satisfied that such publication has been made in the official Gazette, as well as, in the two daily Hindi newspapers. But, they maintained their argument that the substance of the notification was not given at the convenient places in the concerned localities. In this connection, the learned counsel argued that the publication of the notification in the official Gazette and public notice in the locality are the essential elements of section-4(1) of the Act, and the entire acquisition proceedings are liable to be vitiated if there is a non-compliance of any of the mandatory requirements. In this connection, reliance has been place On Narinderjit Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1973 S.C. 552 , Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 S.C. 306, Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1974 S.C. 1074, C.K. Narayana Chary v. P. Ashanna, AIR 1986 S.C. 317 , Dr. Laxmi and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others, 1986 RLR 226 , and Collector v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, (1985)3 SCC 1 . 11. In reply to the above contention Mr. Mathur and Mr. Saxena made three-fold submissions. Firstly, it was argued that there was a strict compliance of Section 4(1) of the Act, in as much as, the notification has been published in the official Gazette and a public notice has been given in the two daily newspapers having circulation in the locality and the substance of the notice has been affixed at convenient conspicuous places in the concerned localities. Secondly, it was submitted that a public notice was also published in the daily newspaper of December 23,1989 declaring the intention to acquire the lands in question for the development of the colonies and this fact has been admitted in the various writ petitions by the petitioner himself. Reference in this connection has been made to writ petition No. 5379/1990 Smt. Phoolwati v. State of Rajasthan in which a copy of the said notice has been placed on the record by the petitioner as Annex. 5. Reference in this connection has been made to writ petition No. 5379/1990 Smt. Phoolwati v. State of Rajasthan in which a copy of the said notice has been placed on the record by the petitioner as Annex. 5. A perusal of Annex.-5 shows that such notice has been issued by the City Magistrate, Alwar having the powers of Collector under the Act and the entire notice under section 4(1) issued by the State Government was also published along with the said notice. Thirdly; it was submitted that the sole purpose behind the publication of a notice in the locality under section 4(1) is to give an opportunity to the person interested in land to object to the acquisition under section-5A of the Act, and in the present cases all the petitioners have submitted their objections under section 5-A of the Act, after having received individual notices, as such, they are not prejudiced at all even if there has been non-compliance of a public notice. It was also argued that none of the petitioners raised any objection about this ground in their objections under section 5-A of the Act, and that, under the facts and circumstances, where a major part of the land has been taken into possession and compensation has been paid to the khatedar tenants, it would be the travesty of justice if the proceedings are quashed on this ground. 12. I have given my careful consideration to the above submissions.In Narandrajit Singh v. State of U.P.(AIR 1971 S.C. 306) , it was observed that a notification under section 4(1) of the Act is a sine qua non of process of acquisition and must be strictly construed. It was held that a notification, which does not complying with essential requirement of that provision of law must be held to be bad and such defect is not cured by giving particulars in later notification under section 6(1) of the Act. In this case, the locality was not specified where the land needed to be acquired and on this ground, the notification was quashed.In Narinderjit Singh v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1973 S.C. 552 ) , it was held that Section 4(1) is mandatory and its non-compliance vitiates entire acquisition proceedings.The same view has been taken in other above noted cases, as such, I need not to repeat them. Therefore, there is no quarrel so far the legal position is concerned that a strict compliance of Section-4(1) of the Act is a mandatory requirement and the non- compliance of the same vitiates the entire acquisition proceedings. But, in the instant case, the respondents have stated that the sub-stance of the notice has been given/affixed at convenient places in the concerned localities. From the perusal of the awards also it appears that a public notice in relation to Chitrakoot Nagar Scheme was affixedat convenient places in the village Bhiwadi and Alampura on 9.1.1990, a similar public notice was affixed in relation to Vasundhara Nagar Scheme on 10.1.1990 at convenient places in village Alampura and a public notice was also affixed in relation to Chander Nagar Scheme on 10.1.1990 at convenient places in village Alampura. It is true that the respondents have not placed on the record the copies of the public notices so affixed at the convenient places, but in the present case, there is hardly any reason to hold that the public notice was not affixed at convenient places in the concerned localities. It is noteworthy that the petitioners have denied even the issuance of public notice in two daily newspapers and publication of notification in the official Gazette, but later on did not pursue his contention. It is also note-worthy that a public notice was also issued in the daily newspaper of Dec.23,1989 by the City Magistrate, Alwar having the powers of Collector under the Act disclosing the intention to acquire the lands in question. The petitioners have also filed their objections under section 5-A of the Act in which they did not assert at all that there was no publication of a public notice at convenient places in the concerned localities. It is also noteworthy that a major part of the lands has been taken into possession and compensation has been paid to the khatedars and these petitions relate to 80 Bigas of land only and that too at scattered places and the other khatedars also nowhere challenged that there was a non-compliance of the provision of Section 4(1) of the Act in relation to affixation of a public notice at convenient places in the concerned localities. 13. 13. Thus, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, I have no hesitation in holding that the substance of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act has been given/affixed at convenient places in the concerned localities.13a. The Supreme Court has repelled the assumption that the sole purpose behind the publication of a notice in the locality under section 4(1) is to give an opportunity to the person interested in land to object to the acquisition under section 5-A of the Act.In Collector v. Raja Ram Jaiswal (supra), it was observed as under: "A bare perusal of Section 4(1) clearly shows that in order to comply with the statutory requirements therein set out, a notification stating therein 'the land which is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose' has to be published in the Official Gazette. The second part of the sub-section provides that 'the Collector has to cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the locality in which the land proposed to be acquired is situated. Both the conditions are held by a catena of decisions to be mandatory. Whether the second condition is mandatory or directory is no more res integra. In Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan , Subba Rao, C.J. speaking for the court observed that: the statutory intention is, therefore, clear, namely, that the giving of public notice is mandatory. If so, the notification issued under section -4 without complying with the said mandatory direction would be void and the land acquisition proceedings taken pursuant thereto would be equally void." Then, it was observed as under: " Mr. Kacker however, drew our attention to a few more observations in the judgment wherein it was said that there is an important purpose behind publication of the substance of the notification in the locality because in the absence of such publication, the interested persons may not be able to file their objections challenging the proposed acquisition and they will be denied an opportunity afforded by Section 5-A which confers a very valuable right. Relying on this observation Mr. Relying on this observation Mr. Kacker urged that if the underlying purpose behind publication of a notice in the locality is to give an opportunity to the person interested in the land to object to the acquisition, where in a case the purpose is achieved as in this case the petitioner having filed his objections, the failure to publish the substance of the notification in the locality need not be treated fatal and cannot invalidate the proceedings. The submission as presented is very persuasive and but for binding precedent, we would have accorded considerable attention to it. But we would not whittle down a mandate of legislation recognised by a long line of decisions solely depending upon the facts of a given case. Further the sub-mission is predicated upon an assumption that the sole purpose behind publication of substance of notification in locality is to make requirements of Section 5-A functionally effective. The assumption as would be pointed out is not well founded." While considering the argument that the petitioner has not suffered any prejudice by the failure of the Government to publish a notice in the locality because the petitioner had filed detailed objections against the proposed acquisition, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "To be brutally frank if this was the only ground for invalidating the notification, in the backdrop of facts we would have our serious reservations in upholding the decision though as the law stands, the High Court was perfectly justified in reaching this conclusion." (emphasis provided)Thus, the ground of prejudice though was in the mind of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but the previous judgements were not considered on this ground as there were other defects in the acquisition proceedings.However, till a contrary view is taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the law as it stands today is that publication of the substance of the notice under section 4(1) of the Act at convenient places in which the land proposed to be acquired is situated is mandatory and without complying with the said mandatory direction the land acquisition proceedings taken pursuant thereto is void. However, in the instant case, I have held that there was a compliance of this provision, therefore, this argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is also without any merit and deserves to be repelled. 14. However, in the instant case, I have held that there was a compliance of this provision, therefore, this argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is also without any merit and deserves to be repelled. 14. Another argument, which more or less is connected with the first argument, raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the acquisition proceedings have been undertaken in a mechanical manner without application of mind, in as much as, there are number of buildings etc. in the areas sought to be acquired, while vacant land was available for development of residential colonies and further, 700 to 800 Bigas of land which was acquired in the name of development of Bhagat Singh Colony is still lying vacant and unutilised. This argument was also considered by me while deciding the first argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. However, suffice it to say that so far the development of Bhagat Singh Colony is concerned, the total land which was handed over to U.I.T. Alwar by RIICO was only 150 Bigas and 18 Biswas equivalent to 94.3125 acres of land and not 700 or 800 Bigas of land as alleged by the petitioners in some of the writ petitions. It is also not correct that the said land has not been utilised by the U.I.T. Alwar as discussed by me in details while deciding the first argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners.The State Government has denied that there was no appropriate survey of the land or that the acquisition proceedings have been initiated without application of the mind in a mechanical manner. The State Government has categorically stated that the acquisition proceedings have been undertaken after duly surveying the land and after seeing the viability and feasibility of the schemes and the requirement of land for the said schemes. It cannot be disputed that the assessment of suitability of the land proposed to be acquired for the concerned public purpose is primarily for the Land Acquisition Officer or the State Government to consider and simply because in the areas where the lands are situated and proposed to be acquired, some buildings are constructed would not warrant to hold that the action of the respondents is malafide or without application of the mind. No further material has been placed on the record by the petitioners to challenge the action of the respondents on the ground of malafides or non-application of the mind except the mere assertions that some buildings or shops are already constructed in the said area.It may also be stated here that the petitioners and other khatedars have submitted their objections under section 5-A of the Act and they have been considered and decided by the State Government after giving full opportunity of hearing. After consideration and rejection of the objections, the notification under section-6 has been issued by the State Government, as such, it cannot be said that the acquisition proceedings are without application of mind. The issuance of notification under section 6 of the Act after consideration and rejection of the objections raises a presumption that the lands in question are acquired for a public purpose and unless there are strong circumstances supported by cogent material and evidence the said presumption cannot wither.The decision in U.P.R.E. Co-op. Society v. New Okhala Industrial Dev. Authority, AIR 1990 SC 1325 , relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners has no application in the present case.Another decision in Bamandas Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal and Others AIR 1986 Cal. 159 , relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners has also no application in the present case. In that case acquisition was being made for the expansion of a college in North Calcutta, which is a crowded area. In that context,the Single Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the acquisition in question cannot be equated with any other acquisition made for public purpose, as it is not a case of establishment of a college for the girls there being no other girls' college in the vicinity, but being a case of expansion, the acquisition should not be allowed till an alternative accommodation is provided.Similarly, the decision in Hukam Chand v. Union of India, 1986 Supp. SCC 464 , relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application in the present case. In this case, the lands in the vicinity of Delhi was being acquired for housing purposes, while Gaon Sabha had already proposed to utilise its land in the vicinity for housing homeless,under privileged and economically backward class of people of the area. In this case, the lands in the vicinity of Delhi was being acquired for housing purposes, while Gaon Sabha had already proposed to utilise its land in the vicinity for housing homeless,under privileged and economically backward class of people of the area. In this back-ground, it was observed" We see no reason as to why these lands should be subjected to acquisition, particularly when it is proposed to be utilised for housing some of the under-privileged and the economically backward section of the community."In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana (1984) RLR 398 .In this case, the land was being acquired for a public purpose, namely, for the development and utilisation of land for industrial purpose at Gurgaon under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act. Amongst others, an argument was raised to challenge the acquisition that the State Government had not applied its mind before starting the proceedings as contained in the circular No. 2099-R-11I-82/17113 dated May 18,1982 wherein it has been stated that in the matter of State's need for land for its development activities, utmost restraint should be exercised in the acquisition of land. This contention was repelled and it was observed as under: "In a welfare State, it is the duty of the Government to proceed with the work of development and take steps for the growth of industries which are necessary for the country's progress and prosperity and for solving the question of unemployment. It is true that agricultural land is necessary and should not ordinarily be converted to non-agricultural use, but keeping in view the progress and prosperity of the country, the State has to strike a balance between the need for development of industrialisation and the need for agriculture. The allegation that before initiating the acquisition proceedings, the Government has not applied its mind to the need for agricultural land is a very vague allegation without any material in support thereof. The contention is overruled." 15. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that UIT Alwar has no jurisdiction over the Bhiwadi area which is far from the city of Alwar, as such, the land cannot be acquired for UIT, Alwar for implementing housing schemes. The contention is overruled." 15. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that UIT Alwar has no jurisdiction over the Bhiwadi area which is far from the city of Alwar, as such, the land cannot be acquired for UIT, Alwar for implementing housing schemes. In the same sequence, it was also argued that the aforesaid housing schemes have not been sanctioned by the State Government under section-38 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust Act (in short the UIT Act), as such, the trust cannot proceed to execute the housing schemes. In this connection, reliance has been placed on Urban Improvement Trust v. Balveer Singh and Others, 1984 RLR 398 , Indore Development Authority v. Madan Lal, (1990) 2 SCC 334 and Hukam Chand v. Union of India (1988 Supp. SCC 464) .In reply, it was contended on behalf of the respondents that a notification has been issued under section-8 of the UIT Act on Dec.23,1985 (Annex.R-5) whereby the revenue village Bhiwadi (including Panchayat) has been included under the working jurisdiction of UIT, Alwar. It was also contended that six Tehsils of Alwar district have been included in the Central Capital Region and the development of these Tehsils has been undertaken by the UIT, Alwar under the development programme in the N.C.R. and the area in question is included in those Tehsils, which are very close to Delhi. It was further submitted that Central Capital Region has been formed to develop contiguous area of Delhi in the proper and planned manner and as Bhiwadi is developing very fast due to enormous industrialisation, it has become necessary to develop suitable residential schemes to cope with the increasing demand of residential accommodation. It was also stated that UIT, Alwar had submitted the plan for the development of residential colonies as required under section 36 of the UIT Act and after proper consultation with the State Government, the notification under section 4(1) has been published by which it can be presumed that the schemes have been sanctioned by the State Government. The State Government has also stated in the reply that the proposed schemes are sanctioned and the State Government has started acquisition proceedings after application of its mind. The State Government has also stated in the reply that the proposed schemes are sanctioned and the State Government has started acquisition proceedings after application of its mind. It was also con-tended that the acquisition of the land was being made under the Land Acquisition Act for the development of residential colonies under the schemes of National Capital Region and the State Government is competent to initiate acquisition proceedings. It was also stated by the State Government that the Secretary,UIT, Alwar is an Ex-officio Director of National Capital Region and the duty for the development of the area has been shouldered on UIT,Alwar. Lastly, it was submitted that the acquisition of the land generally preceds the development. The learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1966 S.C. 1788 ) and Aflatoon v. Lt.Governor, Delhi. 16. The object of the establishment of Urban Improvement Trust is to prevent unplanned and haphazard development and construction and to carry out improvement of any urban area in the State. whether a master plan in respect thereof has or has not been prepared. The 'urban area' has been defined in section 2(x) of the UIT Act to mean the urban area notified under section 3 or, as the case may be, under section-8. 17. After issuance of notification (Annex.R.5) dated Dec.23.1985, there remains no dispute that the area in question is included in the 'urban area' of UIT, Alwar, as such, it cannot be said that UIT, Alwar has no jurisdiction to develop the said area. It is also noteworthy to state here that the Secretary, UIT has been made an Ex-officio Director of National Capital Region in order to ensure planned development of the residential colonies in the area included under National Capital Region and an office has also been established at Bhiwadi by the UIT, Al war for this purpose.The second limb of the argument of attack may be negatived in two ways. First, the area in question falls under National Capital Region and the housing schemes have been notified under the schemes of National Capital Region and the lands are being acquired for that purpose as it is clear from the notifications issued under section 4(1) and under section-6 of the Act.The National Capital Region Planning Board has been constituted for the preparation of plan for the development of the National Capital Region and for coordination and monitoring, the implementation of such plan and for evolving harmonised policies for the control of land uses and development of infrastructure in the National Capital Region so as to avoid any haphazard development of that region and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.The development under National Capital Region has to be carried- on by the UIT and there is nothing in the UIT Act to debar the Trust for execution of such schemes and a general approval of the Trust is there, in as much as, the development has been undertaken by it. The primary duty to carry-out the development work under National Capital Region is on the State Government, which can be executed through the Improvement Trust. When such schemes are executed by the UIT and the State Government undertakes the acquisition proceedings of the land for that purpose, then it can be safely held that the UIT, as well as, the State Government have approved for the execution of such schemes.Further, the acquisition of the land is not being made under the UIT Act, but under the Land Acquisition Act and there is no bar in the Land Acquisition Act that the land cannot be acquired by the State Government for the development of residential colonies without prior sanction of any scheme. Then, acquisition of the land precedes the development and in the absence of any scheme, the acquisition can be made under the Act.The case may be judged from another angle also. There is no dispute that the UIT has framed the schemes in .question and these schemes have been submitted for sanction to the State Government as required under section 36 of the UIT Act. The initiation of the acquisition proceedings and the notification under section-6 of the Act has been issued by the State Government after due application of mind on the schemes. The initiation of the acquisition proceedings and the notification under section-6 of the Act has been issued by the State Government after due application of mind on the schemes. The issuance of notification under section 6 of the Act itself is sufficient to amount sanction of the schemes by the State Government. Further, the State Government can also accord sanction to the schemes after the acquisition of the land. Viewed from this angle also this contention has also no force.Then, in Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra (supra), similar argument was raised that the Government had not prepared any scheme before issuing the notification. It was answered as under: 'This is true that the Government has not up till now prepared any scheme for the utilisation of the developed sites. But the notification itself shows that the sites would be used as residential and industrial sites. There is no law that requires a scheme to be prepared before issuing a notification under Section 4 or Section 6 of the Act. We have, however, no doubt that the Government will,before disposing of the sites, have a scheme for their disposal." In Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor, Delhi (supra), the land was being acquired for the planned development of Delhi. An argument was raised to challenge the acquisition that when the notification under Section-4 was published, the Government had not declared any area in Delhi as a development area under Section 12(1) of the Delhi Development Act, nor was there a Master Plan drawn up in accordance with Section 7 of that Act and so the acquisition of the property for planned development was illegal.Under section 12(3) of the Delhi Development Act, no development of land can be undertaken or carried out except as provided in that clause, Section 2(d) states "development" with its grammatical variations means the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land or the making of any material change in any building or land and includes redevelopment. Section-2(c) states "development area" means that any area declared to be a development area under sub-section(l) of Section-12.Similar argument was repelled with the following observations: "it is true that there could be no planned development of Delhi except in accordance with the provisions of Delhi Development Act after that Act came into force, but there was no inhibition in acquiring land for planned development of Delhi under the Act before the Master Plan was ready (see the decision in Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi (1963) Supp (2)SCR 812- AIR 1963 SC 1077 ) . In other words, the fact that actual development is permissible in an area other than a development area with the approval or sanction of the local authority did not preclude the Central Government from acquiring the land for planned development under the Act. Section-12 is concerned only with the planned development. It has nothing to do with acquisition of property; acquisition generally precedes development." Thus, judged from any view the above argument has no merit and is hereby overruled. 18. A short reference to the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners may also be made.In Urban Improvement Trust v. Balveer Singh and Others (supra), the compulsory acquisition of the land was being made under section 52 of the UIT Act and not under the Land Acquisition Act. Further, in this judgement, it has been laid down that in the absence of any sanctioned scheme under Chapter-V of the UIT Act acquisition of the land cannot be made.In Indore Development Authority v. Madanlal (supra), the facts were that M.P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam 1973 ("the Adhiniyam") was brought into force on March 16, 1973. Prior to that date, there was in force an Act called M.P.Town Development Trust Act, 1960. Under the Trust Act, the Indore Improvement Trust was constituted. The Indore Improvement Trust had framed a Town Expansion Scheme No.72 under the provisions of the Trust Act. The said scheme was forwarded to the State Government for grant of sanction. Section 51 of the Trust Act empowered the State Government either to sanction the scheme with or without modification or to refuse the sanction or to return the scheme for reconsideration by the Improvement Trust.When the scheme was pending for consideration by the State Government, the Development Authority was established. Section 51 of the Trust Act empowered the State Government either to sanction the scheme with or without modification or to refuse the sanction or to return the scheme for reconsideration by the Improvement Trust.When the scheme was pending for consideration by the State Government, the Development Authority was established. It was established on July 13,1977 when the Trust Act stood repealed and the Improvement Trust was replaced. The scheme No.72 prepared by the Improvement Trust was adopted by the Development Authority. Section 50 of the Adhiniyam provides a complete procedure for preparation of Town Development Schemes. It was not in dispute that the Development Authority did not follow the procedure framed under the Adhiniyam for preparation of scheme No.72. In these circumstances, it was held that the scheme No. 72 adopted by the Development Authority was not in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 50 of the Adhiniyam.The decision in Hukam Chand v. Union of India (supra) also does not through (sic throw) any light to the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners and this case has already been considered in the preceding para-graphs of this order. 19. Lastly, it was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that many of the persons from whom lands are being acquired have raised larger constructions over their respective lands and if they are thrown out from their lands, they would be exposed to serious prejudice.In this connection, reference has also been made to Section 60 of the UIT Act and Section 31 (3) of the Act. Reliance has also been placed on State of U.P. v. Pista Devi, AIR 1986 S.C. 2024 , M/s Northern Carriers P. Ltd. v. Jullunder Improvement Trust, AUR 1983 S.C. 282 .Since the land is being required for providing residential accommodation to the people of Bhiwadi area and the petitioners belong to that area, as such, this request is quite reasonable.We may also refer at this stage to the provisions contained under Section-60 of the UIT Act reads as under Section-60 of the UIT Act "Disposal of land by the Trust-(1) The Trust may- (a) with the sanction of the State Government dispose of any land acquired by the State Government and transferred to the Trust without undertaking or carrying on any improvement thereon, or (b) subject to any directions given by the State Government dispose of are such land after undertaking, or carrying on such improvement as it thinks fit, to such persons, in such manner and subject to such terms and conditions as it considers for securing the improvement of the urban and concerned according to the master plan or the scheme or both. (2) The power of the Trust with respect to the disposal of land under sub-section(2) shall be so exercised as to secure so far as practicable, that persons who are living or carrying on business or other activities on the land shall, if they desire to obtain accommodation on land belonging to the Trust and are willing to come with any requirements of the Trust as to its improvement and use have an opportunity to obtain thereon accommodation suitable to their reasonable requirements on terms settled with due regard to the price at which any such land has been acquired from them: Provided that where the Trust proposes to dispose of by sale any land without any improvement having been undertaken or carried out thereon, it shall offer the land in the first instance to the persons from whom it was acquired, if they desire to purchase it, subject to such requirements as to its improvement and use as the Trust may think fit to impose. (3) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as enabling the Trust to dis-pose of land by way of gift, mortgage or charge but subject as afore aid references in this Act to the disposal of land shall be construed as reference to the disposal thereof in any manner, whether by way of sale, exchange or lease or by the creation of any easement, right or privilege or otherwise." Sub-section (3) of Section-31 of the Act may also be referred which reads as under: Sub-section(3) "Notwithstanding anything in this Section, the Collector may, with the sanction of the (appropriate Government), instead of awarding a money compensation in respect of any land, make any arrangement with a person having a limited interest in such land, either by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land-revenue on other lands held under the same title, or in such other way as may be equitable having regard to the interests of the parties concerned." It is also noteworthy that the Land Acquisition Officer, after considering the objections filed under section 5-A of the Act by the petitioners and after due inspection of the site sent a detailed report to the State Government on or about May 17, 1990. He himself observed in the case of Sunderlal and Others that the objectors can be allotted a plot at the time of award if there is any such provision.In State of U.P. v. Pista Devi (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while holding the notification under section 4 and section 17(1) of the Act to be legal took into consideration that the land was being acquired for providing residential accommodation and the persons whose lands were being acquired shall be subjected to serious prejudice and taking into consideration the provisions contained in section 21(2) of the Development (sic) which is pari materia to Section 60 of UIT Act held as under : "Although the said section is not in terms applicable to the present acquisition proceedings, we are of the view that the above provision in the Delhi Development Act contains a wholesome principle which should be followed by all Development Authorities throughout the country when they acquire larger tracts of land for the purposes of land development in urban areas. We hope and trust that the Meerut Development Authority, for whose benefit the land in question has been acquired, will as far as practicable provide a house site or shop site of reasonable size on reasonable terms to each of the expropriated persons who have no houses or shop buildings in the urban area in question." In M/s Northern Carriers P.Ltd. v. Jullundur Improvement Trust (supra), the Trust was directed by the Supreme Court to allot one plot of land in the scheme at reserved price.The interest of an individual can no doubt be sacrificed and ignored for the betterment of the society, but it is avowed object of every democratic Government to give homes to the homeless and not to make a person homeless. The petitioners have been living on their respective lands for ages where they have raised constructions for their residence or business. The land is being acquired for execution of housing schemes. As per the affidavit of Kamal Kant on behalf of the respondent No.2 UIT, Alwar, it is clear that in these colonies about 9297 plots have been demarcated of various sizes from 48 sq.m. to 200 sq.m. and there is also a shopping centre. The persons who are being evacuated or already evicted from their houses and the place of business can be provided alternative accommodation, conveniently to case their sufferings.Therefore, while upholding the validity of the acquisition proceedings, I direct UIT, Alwar for whose benefit the land in question has been acquired to provide a house site or shop site or reasonable size -to those persons whose residential houses or place of business have been acquired in the acquisition proceedings. The UIT, Alwar shall charge reserve price from them and if there is no reserve price then a reasonable price to be decided by the UIT, Alwar. It is however made clear that co-petitioners in one case shall form one unit and they will be entitled to get house site or shop site jointly. 20. In writ petition No. 4478/90 Orient Synthetix v. State of Rajasthan and Others , an additional argument has been vehemently urged by Shri R.S. Rathore, Advocate. The additional argument is that the lands bearing Khasra Nos. 130,131,132, 133 and 140 cannot be acquired under the land acquisition proceedings in view of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provision) Act, 1985. The additional argument is that the lands bearing Khasra Nos. 130,131,132, 133 and 140 cannot be acquired under the land acquisition proceedings in view of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provision) Act, 1985. Section 22(1) of the said Act runs as under: Section 22(1) "Where in respect of an industrial company an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 to 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board, or as the case may be, the Appellate Authority." On the basis of this section, the argument has been developed that the land acquisition proceedings under the Act is also included in the proceedings within Section-22 and as an enquiry, under section-16 in respect of the petitioner-industrial company is pending, the said proceedings is not maintainable in the absence of the consent of the Board, or as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. According to learned counsel, no such consent has been obtained, as such, the proceedings should be quashed in relation to the land bearing khasra Nos. 130, 131, 132, 133 and 140.In my view, this argument has also no force, in as much as, the land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act is not included in the proceedings referred in the aforesaid section. The language of the section "no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company" cannot be stretched unnecessarily so as to debar even the land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. Here the word 'proceedings' has been used in relation to legal proceedings.Then, it was argued by Mr. Here the word 'proceedings' has been used in relation to legal proceedings.Then, it was argued by Mr. Rathore that the petitioner-company had purchased the aforesaid land for the construction of the staff quarters for the employees/ workers of the company and for that purpose, the Company got converted 1000 sq. yards of land out of khasra No. 130 on 16th May, 1985 and another 1000 sq. yards of land out of khasra No. 140 on March 10, 1986, as such, the UIT, Alwar be directed to make allotment of a piece of land of reasonable size to the company to meet out the above requirement which is also a public purpose. In my view, this submission is reasonable as the requirement of land for residential quarters of the staff members of the Company is also a beneficial purpose.Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the petitioner-Company should also be allotted plot or plots of reasonable size but not exceeding 2000 sq. yards in total for the construction of staff quarters for the employees/ workers of the Company. The UIT, Alwar shall take into consideration the requirement of the Company for this purpose and shall make allotment accordingly. 21. The net result of the above discussion is that the land acquisition proceedings and the notices issued under section 4(7) or under section-6 of the Land Acquisition Act are valid, as such, the acquisition proceedings are not liable to be quashed. However, the UIT, Alwar shall make the allotment of plot/plots to the petitioners in the light of the observations made in this order.The writ petitions are disposed of as indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.Petition disposed of. *******