AGRAWAL, C.J. —This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance against the judgment dated 24th Aug. 1987 passed by learned Single Judge in Civil First Appeal No. 78 of 1979 reversing the judgment and decree dated 25th July 1979 of the District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur City. (2). Brief facts of the case-are that Ram Gopal and Sitaram were real brothers. Their father was Kalyan Bux. Ram Gopal died in 1969 leaving behind 3 daughters and two sons. Sita Ram has one son, namely, Govind Behari, respondent No. 6. The case of the plaintiffs is that one house was purchased by Ram Gopal and Sitaram on 30.1.1953. On the death of Ram Gopal the plaintiffs and other sons and daughters became the joint owners of the property with Govind Behari and Sita Ram. They alleged that in the event of partition in the joint family property, each one of the two branches, aforesaid, would have been entitled to the half share but the defendant nos. 1 and 2 sold away half portion of the house in dispute to Smt. Godawari Devi, defendant no. 3 on 15.7.1975 for a consideration of Rs. 21,999 and handed over possession of their share to her. The plaintiffs, thereafter, brought the suit for pre-emption claiming that by virtue of being co sharers of the joint family property, they had the prior right of purchase under the provisions of Rajasthan Pre-emption Act. According to the plaintiffs, the sale made by defendant nos. 1 and 2 to the defendant no. 3 was without any notice to them. Consequently, plaintiffs, who are the heirs and legal representatives of Ram Gopal brought the suit claiming that they being the co shares along with defendant nos. 4 and 5, were entitled to the right, title and interest as well as possession conveyed by defendant nos. 1 and 2 to the defendant no. 3 through the sale deed dated 15th July 1975. In view of their right of pre emption, they claimed that the sale deed executed in favour of defendant no. 3 was void and, thus, liable to be set aside. (3). Defendant nos. 1 to 3 filed two separate written statements contesting the claim set up by the plaintiffs. 3 through the sale deed dated 15th July 1975. In view of their right of pre emption, they claimed that the sale deed executed in favour of defendant no. 3 was void and, thus, liable to be set aside. (3). Defendant nos. 1 to 3 filed two separate written statements contesting the claim set up by the plaintiffs. It was alleged that the disputed house had been partitioned in between the two brothers, i.e., Ram Gopal and Sitaram during the life time of Ram Gopal and they were living separately in the said house. It was also alleged that out of three, two plaintiffs were married daughters and they were living with their husbands and that the) did not have any intention to shift to the house in dispute. They also asserted that apart from plaintiffs, there were other legal representatives of Ram Gopal, who were arrayed as defendant nos. 4 to 6 (Mohan Lal Madal Lal and Dharma Devi). Their rights and cuse of action being joint and unseverable, they should also have joined the suit and as they did not join, the plaintiffs cannot get a decree. They also took the pleas of waiver and acquiescence. (4). On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed as many as seven issues and on the oral and documentary evidence, it held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the decree on the following conditions :— (i) that they deposit Rs. 23,999 in the court by 1.9.1979; (ii) that on being depositing the amount, aforesaid, defendant no. 3 will be entitled to withdraw the same and plaintiffs would be entitled to get possession and documents of the disputed house and (iii) if the amount will not be deposited by the plaintiffs within the time prescribed, their suit will be deemed to have been dismissed. (5). Aggrieved, Smt. Godavari Devi preferred the first appeal, which was allowed by Honble Mr. Justice G.M. Lodha (as he then was) and the decree of the trial court was set aside. Consequent upon the same, the suit stood dismissed. Against the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge, the appellants (Plaintiffs) have come before us by way of this Special Appeal. (6). Justice G.M. Lodha (as he then was) and the decree of the trial court was set aside. Consequent upon the same, the suit stood dismissed. Against the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge, the appellants (Plaintiffs) have come before us by way of this Special Appeal. (6). The question that arises for determination before us is whether a partition in the family, in respect of the house in dispute, in between Sitaram and Ram Gopal, had taken place and by virtue of that partition, the plaintiffs had lost right to claim pre emption alleging that the sale deed executed by defendant nos. I and 2 in favour of defendant no. 3 was invalid being the property of joint family. (7). It is not disputed in this case that Ram Gopal and Sitaram were the co-sharers of the house in question. On the plea of partition, trial court framed issue no.l and after discussion of the evidence, held that the house had not been partitioned. We have also gone through the record and from Exb. A-2, which is a sale deed executed in favour of defendant no. 3 by defendant nos. 1 and 2 we find that it has been clearly recited that the disputed house was in the joint ownership and occupation of Sita Ram and Ram Gopal. At page 3 of the document, the following words are important:— "IS SAMPATTI PAR RAM GOPAL WA SITARAM DONO BHAI BA HASIAT BARABAR MALIK WA KABIJ RAHEN." From the rest of the rectial of this document, the trial court, in our opinion, rightly concluded that the partition in between the two brothers, aforesaid, not been established. Since this was not the controversy raised and decided either before the learned Single Judge or before we do not consider it necessary to deal with that matter any further. (8). The next question that was argued vehemently before the learned Single Judge as well as before us was that the plaintiffs were barred by acquiescence and waiver to bring the suit of pre- emption. (8). The next question that was argued vehemently before the learned Single Judge as well as before us was that the plaintiffs were barred by acquiescence and waiver to bring the suit of pre- emption. Learned Single Judge found that the plea of acquiescence and waiver stood proved on account of the following facts and circumstances:— (a) that the possession of some part on the property sold was given to the purchaser by the plaintiff and some parts were given in their presence without any demour or protest, oral or in writing by the defendants no. 4 to 6, and the pre-emptors; (b) that constructions of important apartment like stair case, chabutris and latrine were made by the purchaser in the presence of the plaintiffs without any demour or protest and constrcutions were continue at least for 15 dyas, as admitted; (c) that having come to know of the sale, and having handed over possession of some part voluntarily and allow handing over of possession of other parts and having witnessed the constructions by way of improvement or alterations referred to above costing minimum Rs. 2,000/- although the appellant claim more than Rs. 12,000/-, the plaintiff kept quite and remained conspicuously silent for the entire period of one year, till the last date of limitation, when the suit was filed and that too without notice of earlier date... (9). Estoppel has been considered to be a rule of evidence that prevents the person estopped from denying the existence if a fact. The English law on the subject is that estoppel is not a cause of action in itself nor does it crete one. Lord Wright, in Canada & Dominion Sugar Co. Ltd. V. Canada National (West Indies) Steam Ships Ltd. (1) estopped as under :— "Estoppel is a complex legal notion, involving a combination of several essential elements, the statement to be acied upon, action on the faith of it, resulting detriment to the actor. Estoppel is often described as a rule of evidence, as, indeed, it may be so described. The whole concept is more correctly viewed as a substantive rule of law." Lord Maugham, speaking for the Privy Council in Maritime Electric Co. Estoppel is often described as a rule of evidence, as, indeed, it may be so described. The whole concept is more correctly viewed as a substantive rule of law." Lord Maugham, speaking for the Privy Council in Maritime Electric Co. v. General Dairies Ltd. (2) noted as under :— "...this conclusion must follow from the circumstance that an estoppel is only a rule of evidence which under certain circumstances can be invoked by a party to an action." (10). Indian law regarding estoppel was that it could be taken only as a plea of defence but there is a trend of change in this preposition of law and now the law is that it can be a ground for action also. (11). Acquiescence has been defined at page 285 in Estoppel by Representation by Turner as the assential element of the form of estoppel and is no more than an instance of the law of estoppel by words or conduct. (12). In the instant case, the emphasis of the learned Single Judge was that as the plaintiffs stood silent and did not object to the construction of the stair case by the defendant No. 3, for which she spent about Rs. 2000/-and for the reason that the suit had been filed not by all the claimants or legal representatives of Ram Gopal but only by few of them and that too out of the three claimants, two were daughters, the suit was barred by waiver. We are not inclined to agree with the aforesaid view of the learned Single Judge. Undoubtedly, the right of pre-emption was a joint right inherited by all the legal representatives Of Ram Gopal. But, for some reasons or the other, if some of them did not like to join as plaintiffs, it did not mean that the others, who filed the suit for decree of pre-emption would not be entitled to get the same. A joint and several right makes everyone entitled to the said right or obligation to avail the same irrespective of any of them not joining. Merely because all the legal representatives of Ram Gopal did not come forward to the court, it did not mean that those who filed the suit on the basis of right inherited by them, would be deprived of the same. We have not come across any such law. (13). Merely because all the legal representatives of Ram Gopal did not come forward to the court, it did not mean that those who filed the suit on the basis of right inherited by them, would be deprived of the same. We have not come across any such law. (13). The other fact on which emphasis had been laid in the judgment was that the defendant no. 3 had spent Rs. 2,000/- on account of construction of stair case and the plaintiffs did not object to the same. This is absolutely a vague ground. Merely because the plaintiffs did not object to the construction of stair case or sundry repairs, it would not disentitle them to the decree inasmuch as defendant no. 3 was not justified in presuming that it was inaction on the part of plaintiffs by keeping silence. It was wrongly treated as an implied representation of the non-existence of anything which would impose or give rise to such a duty and if he altered his position, on the faith of representation, the latter would have to blame himself for the same. In case of delusion, one may try to take the benefit of silence on the part of a person whose rights were going to be affected by the same but from the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is quite clear that there was no delusion in the mind of defendant no. 3 and she was estopped from taking the advantage from the mere silence of the plaintiffs. Moreover, the construction of stair case does not take away the right of pre emption. It was not of such a magnitude as in the case of Indira Bai v. Nand Kishore (3). In that case, the persons claiming entitlement of the right of pre-emption had joined the vendees in the construction of the house and that fact largely impressed the Supreme Court in coming to the conclusion that the pre-emptors had waived their rights. (14). What constitutes binding precedent is the ratio decidendi of a case and this is almost always to be ascertained by an analysis of the material facts of the case that is, generally, those facts which the trial court, whose decision is in question, itself holds, expressly or implicitly, to be material. In Punjab Land Dev. Corpn. (14). What constitutes binding precedent is the ratio decidendi of a case and this is almost always to be ascertained by an analysis of the material facts of the case that is, generally, those facts which the trial court, whose decision is in question, itself holds, expressly or implicitly, to be material. In Punjab Land Dev. Corpn. Ltd. V. The Prisiding Officer, Labour Court (4), it was held as under:— "A judicial decision will often be reached by a process of reasoning which can be reduced into a sort of complex syllogism, with the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law (either statutory of judge made) and with the minor premise constituting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. The conclusion is the decision of the case which may or may not establish new law in the vast majority of cases it will be merely the application of existing law to the facts judicially ascertained. Where the decision does constitute new law, this may or may not be expressly stated as a proposition of law; frequently the new law will appear only from subsequent comparison of, on the one hand, the material facts inherent in the major premise with, on the other the material facts which constitute the minor premise. As a result of this comparison it will often be apparent that a rule has been extended by an analogy expressed or implied." For applying the law laid down in Indira Bais case (supra) we have to ascertain the principle on which the case was decided inasmuch as the only thing in a Judges decision binding as an authority upon the subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the precedent was decided. We have gone through the facts and law of Indira Bais case and we find that the facts of that case were different to that of the present one before us and as such, law laid down in the case is not applicable to the instant case. (15). It was next argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the right of pre-emption is a weak right and in this connection, he referred to some decisions of the Supreme Court. (15). It was next argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the right of pre-emption is a weak right and in this connection, he referred to some decisions of the Supreme Court. The correctness of the argument is not disputed that the right of pre-emption is a weak right but at the same time, it is also a settled law that the right of pre-emption of co-sharers has to be accepted. See Bahu Ram V. Brij Nath (5). That being the position of law, the claim of the plaintiffs in the present case has to be acknowledged, accepted and implemented where the pre-requisites are established. Learned Single Judge did not dispute the relationships between the plaintiffs and defendant nos. 1 and 2 to be that of co-sharers. (16). Learned Single Judge drew an incorrect conclusion that as the suit was filed on the last day of limitation, it must be held to be barred by time. We have no such law which provides that even if a suit is filed within limitation, the plaintiffs would be denied of a decree merely because it was preferred on the last day and not before that. There is no meaning of filing a suit on the first day or the last day of limitation. What is necessary is that it should be filed within the period of limitation and the present suit was filed within the period of limitation. (17). It is well known that the Limitation Act bars the remedy without extinguishing the right. See Hari Raj Singh v. Sanchalak Panchayat Raj. (6). (18). For what we have said above, the Special Appeal is allowed. Judgement and decree passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside and those of trial court, dated 25.7.79, restored. If the amount awarded by the trial court has not yet been deposited in the court, the plaintiffs shall have three months time from today to do so. If the plaintiffs deposit the amount of Rs. 23,999/-within the aforesaid prescribed period, they would be entitled to get or derive the benefit of the judgment and decree of the trial court. The plaintiffs are also entitled to get costs of this appeal from the defendant no.3.