M. RAMAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER-1 is a company (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner-company) incorporated under the Provisions of the Companies Act, 1913 having its registered office at lohadri bhavan, yeshawantnagar p. o. , sandur taluk, bellary district, Karnataka state. ( 2 ) THE petitioner-company owns two undertaking sone engaged in the production of pig iron from 1968 and the other engaged in the manufacture of ferro-silicon from 1977, both situate in the state of Karnataka. ( 3 ) PETITIONER-2 is a share holder of the petitioner-company and is vitally interested in the affairs and financial position of the petitioner-company. ( 4 ) IN this writ petition, the petitioners have'challenged the levy of electricity tax on the power consumed by the petitioner-company in its ferro-silicon plant at the rate of 8 paise per unit with effect from 8-3-1984. According to them, the respondents were under the obligation, by virtue of the government order No. Ci 177 fmi 71, dated 8-3-1972 (Annexure-L), to levy electricity duty only at the rate of 0. 25 paise per unit (i. e. , l/4th of a paisa) for a period of 12 years and the said period will have to be extended upto 20-2-1989 in the case of first furnace and 1-8-1992 in the case of second furnace of the ferro-silicon plant. ( 5 ) IT is needless to say that the ferro-siliconplant is a power intensive industry. About 10,000 units of power are required to produce one tonne of ferro-silicon. The installed capacity of the plant is 24,000 tonnes per annum consuming 248 million units of energy (i. e. , 20 million units per month ). The cost of such energy is important and is the largest single component of the overall cost of production of ferro-silicon, it being as high as half of the total cost. The correspondence in this behalf started somewhere in the year 1971 between the petitioners and respondent-1 for supply of energy to the plant. ( 6 ) IT is not in dispute that the supply and consumption of electric energy supplied to the petitioner-company is subject to taxation under the Karnataka electricity (taxation on consumption) Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the act ). ( 6 ) IT is not in dispute that the supply and consumption of electric energy supplied to the petitioner-company is subject to taxation under the Karnataka electricity (taxation on consumption) Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the act ). Section 3 is a charging Section by which subject to Provisions of this Act, a certain amount of levy by way of tax is chargeable and paid to the state government on the units of energy consumed every month. According to that Section, tax at the rate of 0. 08 paise per unit is chargeable and different rates may be specified in respect of different classes of consumers, as provided under the proviso to this section. ( 7 ) SECTION 8 deals with the power of the state government to notify exemptions and reductions of tax in this behalf. It reads: "8. Power of state government to notify exemptions and reductions of tax,the state government may by notification make an exemption or reduction in rate in respect of the tax payable under this act. (i) on energy supplied or consumed for any specified purpose or (ii) by any class of consumers. " ( 8 ) ON the representation made by the petitioner-company and taking into consideration the circumstances prevailing at that time, the state government issued the government order (Annexure-L), dated 8-3-1972 which reads: "proceedings of the government of mysore. Subject: establishment of ferro-silicon plant at sandur by M/s. The sandur manganese and iron ores Ltd.- sanctions of facilities. Order No. Ci 177 fmi 71, Bangalore, dated the 8th march, 1972. . Preamble: (1) M/s. The sandur manganese and iron ores limited, sandur, have been granted a letter of intent by the government of India for the establishment of a new undertaking at vyasankere, hospet, for the manufacture of 24,000 tonnes of ferrosilicon per annum. With a view to implementing the project expeditiously the company has requested certain facilities/concessions in respect of power and charcoal. The company would need 50 mva from 1974 and 24,000 tonnes of charcoal. (2) the requests made by the company have been examined and decision taken to afford the company the requisite facilities to set up the project. Order 1. With a view to implementing the project expeditiously the company has requested certain facilities/concessions in respect of power and charcoal. The company would need 50 mva from 1974 and 24,000 tonnes of charcoal. (2) the requests made by the company have been examined and decision taken to afford the company the requisite facilities to set up the project. Order 1. government are pleased to afford the following facilities to M/s. The sandur manganese and iron ores limited to set up the ferro-silicon plant at vyasankere in hospet: (i) the forest department will supply four lakhs of bags of charcoal per annum for a period of three years, initially. (ii) the power required for the project will be supplied at the regular tariff rates of mseb. Electricity duty will be levied at 0. 25 paise per unit for a period of twelve years only, after which the rates of electricity duty in force will apply. 2. This concession shall be available if a new plant is established for the manufacture of ferro-silicon and not if the existing plant is diverted for the manufacture of ferro-silicon. 3. this order is issued with the concurrence of the finance department vide its d. o. note No. 586, dated 29-2-1972 of the secretary, finance department. By order and in the name of the president of India sd/- (H. L. Lingaraj urs) deputy secy, to government, commerce and industries dept. " ( 9 ) THEREFORE, in view of the aforesaid government Order, an exemption is granted from levying tax payable on the consumption of energy under Section 3 of the act and only concessional rate at 0. 25 paise per unit came to be levied on every unit of electricity supplied to, and consumed by the petitioner-company. ( 10 ) THE said government order also deals with the supply of charcoal to the petitioner-company. But, in this writ petition, we are concerned only win the question of exemption and liability of the petitioner-company to pay the electricity duty. It is necessary at this juncture to mention an important aspect which will have to be borne in mind. Two days after the government Order, Annexure-L , was issued, on 10-3-1972 the petitioner-company addressed a letter to the secretary to government of mysore, commerce and industries department, vidhana soudha, Bangalore-1, as per Annexure-F , paragraph-2 of which reads: "2. It is necessary at this juncture to mention an important aspect which will have to be borne in mind. Two days after the government Order, Annexure-L , was issued, on 10-3-1972 the petitioner-company addressed a letter to the secretary to government of mysore, commerce and industries department, vidhana soudha, Bangalore-1, as per Annexure-F , paragraph-2 of which reads: "2. Electricity duty: the government states that the power required for the project will be supplied at the regular tariff rates of mseb. Electricity duty will be levied at 0. 25 paise per unit for a period of twelve years only, after which the rates of electricity duty in force will apply. ' in this connection, the company will be entering into a long term agreement with the electricity board for the supply of power over a specified period at an agreed rate which will not be varied or altered to the disadvantage of the company during the period of the agreement. As regards electricity duty, the government order makes it clear that the duty will be levied at 0. 25 paise per unit for a period of 12 years. However, it is necessary to dearly specify that the period of 12 years shall commence from the date on which the power is made available to the ferro-silicon plant viz. , 1974. It should also be clearly understood that after the period of 12 years what the duty should be will have to be renegotiated based on conditions obtaining at that time. The electricity agreement with the electricity board will also have to be renegotiated at the end of the specified period. Therefore, the way clause 2 (ii) of the government order is worded should not be construed to mean that the company automatically accepts the electricity duty obtaining at the end of the 12 years period and does not have the right to renegotiate. Obviously, the company cannot agree to something that might take place 12 years hence without knowing what that rate is likely to be and whether it is reasible. Subject to these clarifications and comments, we are going ahead with the ferrosilicon project and look forward to continued co-operation from the government as this will be one of the important industrial projects in the state. I take it that what I have stated above, on behalf of the company, conforms fully to government thinking in this regard. Subject to these clarifications and comments, we are going ahead with the ferrosilicon project and look forward to continued co-operation from the government as this will be one of the important industrial projects in the state. I take it that what I have stated above, on behalf of the company, conforms fully to government thinking in this regard. Yours sincerely, sd/- (m. y. ghorpade ). " ( 11 ) BY a perusal of the said letter, it is madeclear that the petitioner-company wanted to ascertain whether the government Order, Annexure-L , granting exemption under the act could be given effect to after the electricity power is made available to the ferro-silicon plant in the year 1974, and even after the period of 12 years, would it be subject to further negotiations. The state government did not accede to the request of the petitioner-company. This is an important factor to be noted. ( 12 ) THE case of the petitioner is that the period of 12 years referred to in the government Order, Annexure-L , has to be reckoned from the date of commissioning the ferro-silicon plant and obtaining the supply of electricity to the plant. On the other hand, the. stand taken by respondent-1 is that the period of 12 years seeking exemption as to the payment of electricity duty granted in favour of the petitioner-company under the government order having spent itself in 1984, the petitioner-company is liable to pay the tax under Section 3 of the act. Thus, demand notice came to be issued by respondent-1 calling upon the petitioner to pay the revised rate of electricity tax payable from 8-3-1984 in accordance Section 3 of the act. This stand of respondent-1 is, according to the petitioner, not correct. The contention is that the exemption period of 12 years granted under the government Order, Annexure-L , has not expired in 1974 as alleged by respondent-1 since the petitioner-company commissioned the first furnace of the silicon plant on 21-2-1977 and the second furnace on 1-9-1980. Hence, the period of 12 years for the purpose of availing the exemption under the government Order, Annexure-L , must be reckoned from these dates. Both the respondents did not concede to this contention. Hence, the period of 12 years for the purpose of availing the exemption under the government Order, Annexure-L , must be reckoned from these dates. Both the respondents did not concede to this contention. On the other hand, respondent-1 levied the tax on the electricity consumed by the petitioner-company for the period from march, 1984 to september, 1984 at the rate mentioned in Section 3 of the act and issued demand notice for a sum of Rs. 59,39,815-48 including interest of Rs. 2,82,954-47 @ 24% per annum. ( 13 ) AGGRIEVED by this action on the part of the respondents, the petitioners have approached this court in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for relief. ( 14 ) RESPONDENT-1 Karnataka electricity board has filed a statement of objections wherein it has taken a specific stand that the period of 12 years as disclosed in Annexure-L for the purpose of exemption from payment of electricity tax is to be reckoned from 8-3-1972 the date on which the government Order, Annexure-L was made and not beyond that. This has been made clear in para-3 of. the statement of objections. It is further pointed out therein that the request made by the petitioner-company by its letter dated 10-3-1972 (Annexure-F) for extending the period under the government Order, annexure- l, having not been acceded by the government, the question of reckoning the period of 12 years either from 1974 or subsequent thereto would not arise. It is further contended by respondent-1 that commission of the ferro-silicon plant immediately after the government order or any date subsequent to it is not its responsibility. On the other hand, if the petitioner-company wanted to avail of the benefit given under the government Order, it is for the petitioner to commission the plant availing the electric energy and for his fault, it cannot blame either respondent-1 or respondent-2 for the delay in commissioning the plant. The government order is specific that the concession given to the petitioner-company is for a period of 12 years and that would come into force when the government order came to be issued. Thus, 12 years period for the purpose of the availment of the concession would be reckoned from the date of the government order. After the expiry of the period of 12 years, the petitioner-company is liable to pay the tax in accordance with law. Thus, 12 years period for the purpose of the availment of the concession would be reckoned from the date of the government order. After the expiry of the period of 12 years, the petitioner-company is liable to pay the tax in accordance with law. Lastly, it is contended that enormous amount of revenue payable to the exchequer of the state government remained unpaid and so far as the construction of the statute is concerned, it must be strictly construed. It is further contended that on the strength of the interim order made by this court, it is not open to the petitioner-company to evade payment of tax which is outstanding for a long time. All other contentions canvassed in the writ petition are stated to be untenable and unsustainable. ( 15 ) RESPONDENT 2 - state of Karnataka has filed its statement of objections separately contending that the period of 12 years for purposes of concession to the petitioner-company regarding payment of electricity tax commences from the date of the government Order, Annexure-L and knowing fully well the said fact, the petitioner-company made several representations to extend the period; but that request was rejected by the government. The petitioner-company is liable to pay the tax under the act after the expiry of the period of 12 years as stated in the government order. ( 16 ) SRI Ramaswamy, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner-company, argued that the stand taken by respondent-1 construing the government order that the period of 12 years for purposes of concession for the payment of electricity duty expired on 7-3-1984 and that therefore the petitioner was liable to pay the tax in accordance with law, was not tenable as, according to him, the government order must be construed having regard to the background of the case put forward by the petitioner-company and the exemption period of 12 years must be understood as having begun to run from the date of the commission of the plant and not earlier to that. The main ground urged by the learned counsel is that the doctrine of estoppel will come into play, estopping the government from contending that it would not extend the exemption beyond 12 years from the date of the government Order, Annexure-L , inasmuch as unless the petitioner company puts the plant into operation and the electricity is supplied to the said plant, it is unreasonable on the part of the respondents to take a stand that the period of 12 years must be construed as having started from the date of the government order. This, according to the learned counsel, is most unreasonable and untenable. The learned counsel further submitted that respondent-1 itself was unable to supply electricity immediately after the government order was issued. The financial institutions on which the petitioner-company depended for financial help put a pre-condition that the petitioner-company must get supply of power at a fixed rate and despite efforts were made by the petitioner-company, power was supplied only in the year 1977 and therefore it would be unreasonable for the respondents to take a stand that the exemption granted under the government order could be reckoned from its date, and not beyond that. ( 17 ) SRI Sunderaswamy, learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent-1, argued that generally when the courts were called upon to deal with taxing statutes, they would have to deal with such statutes strictly. In other words, the government Order, Annexure-L , having been issued at the request of the petitioner-company so as to enable it to avail of the benefit of exemption so granted for a period of 12 years, unless it was expressly provided for, it must be construed that the period of 12 years mentioned therein started to run from its date. Consequently, the period expired on 7-3-1984. Therefore, whether the petitioner-company commissioned the plant immediately after the government order was issued or subsequently thereafter certain period, whatever may be the reason for the delay, could not be taken into account for the purpose of interpreting the taxing statute which could not be construed liberally or based upon the equity. He lastly submitted that the pronouncement by the Supreme Court was against the petitioner-company and that exemption granted in favour,of the petitioner-company had resulted in loss to the exchequer of the state government, which should be considered strictly in which event the petitioner-company had no case. He lastly submitted that the pronouncement by the Supreme Court was against the petitioner-company and that exemption granted in favour,of the petitioner-company had resulted in loss to the exchequer of the state government, which should be considered strictly in which event the petitioner-company had no case. Thus, he submitted that the writ petition was one without any force and was thus liable to be dismissed. ( 18 ) SRI C. Shivappa, learned Advocate general appearing for Respondent 2. State, argued that the writ petition was misconceived and in a case like this, the taxing statute should be construed strictly interms of the government order. The government order having granted exemption in favour of the petitioner-company from paying the electricity duty for a period of 12 years, the said period must be reckoned from its date and not beyond that. He lastly submitted that the doctrine of estoppel could not be applied in a case like this. Thus, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. ( 19 ) THE important questions that arise formy consideration in this writ petition are (1) whether the period of 12 years contained in clause (ii) of the government order (Annexure-L) allowing the petitioner-company to pay electricity duty at 0. 25 paise per unit for 12 years would commence right from its date or from the date of commission of the ferro-silicon plant by the petitioner- company or from the date of supply of electricity to the plant. (2) whether the demand notice issued by respondent-1 calling upon the petitioner-company to pay the tax at the rate fixed by the tariff from 7-3-1984 is proper and justified. ( 20 ) IN order to understand correctly the contention surged on both sides as to the interpretation and construction of the government Order, both the government order (Annexure-L) and the letter written by the petitioner-company to the government as per Annexure-F are extracted above. Paragraph-2 of the letter abundantly makes it clear by cursory glance of the same that the petitioner-company wanted exemption by way of concession for a period of 12 years from 1974 as to the payment of electricity duty. This is what is emphatically made clear therein: "however, it is necessary to clearly specify that the period of 12 years shall commence from the date on which the power is made available to the ferro-silicon plant viz. , 1974. This is what is emphatically made clear therein: "however, it is necessary to clearly specify that the period of 12 years shall commence from the date on which the power is made available to the ferro-silicon plant viz. , 1974. It should also be clearly understood that after the period of 12 years what the duty should be at that time. " These sentences have been underlined by the petitioner-company emphasising the need for doing so. In other words, the petitioner-company having understood that the period of 12 years specified in the government order would begin to run from its date i. e. , 8-3-1972, by its letter, Annexure-F , it emphatically pointed out that the period of exemption so granted in the government order may be clearly specified so as to reckon the period of 12 years not immediately but from theyear 1974. Therefore, without hesitation, I may point out that the petitioner-company having requested the state government long earlier seeking exemption under Section 8 of the Act, the government issued the order dated 8-3-1972 as per Annexure-L which came into force immediately thereafter and for this reason the petitioner-company immediately without any waste of time wrote the letter dated 10-3-1972 as per Annexure-F requesting the government to reckon 12 years period from 1974 and not immediately. Therefore, there is no difficulty about the understanding of the government order by the petitioner-company accordingly. However, the request of the petitioner-company to reckon the period of 12 years from 1974 was not accepted or acceded by the government. Thus, there was no intention on the part of the state government to do so. Hence, what remains to be seen is, having regard to the language employed in the government Order, whether the exemption peridd of 12 years could be construed to have come into force immediately or at a subsequent date. ( 21 ) SRI Ramaswamy Vehemently argued that the financial institutions, which offered financial help to the Petitioner-company in the commission of the ferro-silicon plant, delayed to finance and regard being had to the agreement entered into between the petitioner-company and respondent-1, the power was actually supplied to the plant in 1977 and accordingly the first furnace was commissioned on 21-2-1977 and the second furnace was commissioned on 1-9-1980. If this is accepted then, according to Sri Ramaswamy, twelve year period must be reckoned not from the date of the government order but from the year 1977 in respect of the first furnace and 1980 in respect of the second furnace. ( 22 ) OPPOSING the view of Sri Ramaswamy, sri Sunder Swamy, learned senior counsel for Respondent-1 argued that it was not possible to construe the government order in the manner in which the petitioner-company did for the simple reason that it was a well known principle that taxing statute must be construed strictly because it was the question of state exchequer. If, on the other hand, the construction of Sri Ramaswamy was accepted then it would result in heavy loss of the revenue to the state government. Similar is the argument of the learned Advocate general who opposed the writ petition. ( 23 ) FIRST, I deal with the authorities cited by Sri Ramaswamy in support of his contentions. Considering the Provisions of Section 8 of the Act, he submitted that the word 'may' occurring in that Section may also be considered as 'shall' for the purpose of conferring exemption or reduction in rate of the tax in favour of the petitioner-company. In order to appreciate his contention, it is better to extract Section 8 which reads: "8. Power of state government to notify exemptions and reductions of tax. the state government may by notification make an exemption or reduction in rate in respect of the tax payable under this act- (i) on energy supplied or consumed for any specified purpose or (ii) by any class of consumers. " By looking at the language employed in Section 8 extracted above, I do not think that is permissible because an exemption by way of reduction of tax is a concession granted by the state of Karnataka and that being the case, it is not possible to construe that a duty is cast upon the state government to grant such exemption, inasmuch as no such right was conferred upon the petitioner-company. Sri Ramaswamy relied upon the interpretation of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 . Sri Ramaswamy relied upon the interpretation of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 . In para-II of the judgment referring to the interpretation of the statute, it has been held as follows: "the use of the word "shall" in a statute, though generally taken in a mandatory sense, does not necessarily mean that in every case it shall have that effect that is to say, that unless the words of the statute are punctiliously followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid. On the other hand, it is not always correct to say that where the word "may" has been used, the statute is only permissible of directory in the sense that non-compliance with those Provisions will not render the proceeding invalid. " The context in which their lordships were interpreting the word "shall" occurring in Article 320 of the Constitution to mean "may" is entirely different. Therefore, it has no bearing on the question involved in this case. ( 24 ) ON the other hand, the reply of Sri Sunder Swamy by way of drawing my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in international Cotton Corporation (p) Ltd. V Commercial tax officer, hubli and others, 1975 (35) STC 1 would negative the contention of Sri Ramaswamy. While dealing with the interpretation of certain Provisions of taxation act referring to the exemption granted under such statute, then-lordships observed at page-9 as follows: "a concession is not a matter of right. Where the legislature taking into consideration the hardships caused to a certain set of tax-payers gives them a certain concession it does not mean that action is bad as another set of tax-payers similarly situated may not have been given a similar concession. " In other words, a concession under a taxing statute does not confer any right upon a citizen. Therefore, there is no right conferred upon the petitioner-company in the instant case when we refer to the government Order, Annexure-L by which an exemption is granted. Hence, there is no duty cast upon the respondents accordingly. Resultant position would be the word "may" occurring in Section 8 of the act cannot be construed as "shall" for purposes of holding it to be mandatory on the part of the state government to grant such concession or exemption. Hence, there is no duty cast upon the respondents accordingly. Resultant position would be the word "may" occurring in Section 8 of the act cannot be construed as "shall" for purposes of holding it to be mandatory on the part of the state government to grant such concession or exemption. To that extent also, the contention fails. ( 25 ) THE contention in a nutshell advancedby Sri Ramaswamy to drive home the point arising in the petition is that the concession granted under Section 8 of the Act, if not allowed to be given to the maximum extent, would offend Article 14 of the constitution. In other words, a right that is accrued to the petitioner by virtue of the government Order, Annexure-L , if taken away, would offend Article 19 (l) (g) of the constitution. He placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in R. L. Arora v State of U. P. , AIR 1964 SC 1230 . In that decision, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide how acquisition of certain land of the petitioner therein by the state would affect the right accrued to the petitioner under Article 31 (2) read with Article 14 of the constitution. Dealing with the public purpose, their lordships of the Supreme Court ruled having regard to the peculiar circumstances and facts obtained in that case. I am of the opinion that neither Article 32 (1) nor Article 14 would come into play in a case like this. Therefore, the observations made by their lordships in that case are of no assistance to the peculiar facts of this case. Hence this decision is of no assistance to the petitioner-company. ( 26 ) SIMILARLY, the decision rendered by the Allahabad High Court in State v Banshidhar, AIR 1969 all. 184 is of little help to the petitioner-company. This is a case arising out of the action taken by the union under the defence of India rules read with essential Articles (price control) Order, 1963. The question arose in that case was whether a mere issuance of a notification under the above Provisions through gazette publication would not come to the aid of the Union of India. This is a case arising out of the action taken by the union under the defence of India rules read with essential Articles (price control) Order, 1963. The question arose in that case was whether a mere issuance of a notification under the above Provisions through gazette publication would not come to the aid of the Union of India. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner-company referring to the above decision is of no consequence, inasmuch as in the instant case it is nobod's case that the government Order, Annexure-L , is required to be published in the gazette. On the pther hand, it is a concession by way of exemption granted to the petitioner-company in exercise of the powers under Section 8 of the act. Therefore, the interpretation put up by the Supreme Court dealing with the defence of India rules on the question whether a right of a citizen is involved, cannot be extended to the understanding of the government Order, Annexure-L , in this case because it does not affect the fundamental right of any citizen. Therefore, to that extent this decision is of little help to the petitioner. ( 27 ) SRI Ramaswamy also brought to mynotice the view taken by the Supreme Court in assistant commissioner of commercial taxes (asst.), Dharwar and others v Dharmendra Rrading co. , Etc. , Air 1988 SC 1247 . The Supreme Court was dealing with the Provisions of Section 8-a of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. A certain incentive scheme was launched by the state of Karnataka with a view to encourage new entrepreneurs and subsequently the government made an order depriving the petitioners therein of the concessions given to them in the earlier order. Hence, they challenged the action of the state government and also sought for refund of the tax so collected. In paragraph-6. Of the judgment, their lordships dealing with Section 8-a of the Sales Tax Act read with the incentive scheme have held as follows: "in our view, there is no substance in this submission at all. In order to test the validity of the order dated 30th june, 1969, one has to see the substance of the concession granted under the order and not merely certain words used out of context. In order to test the validity of the order dated 30th june, 1969, one has to see the substance of the concession granted under the order and not merely certain words used out of context. Although the benefit regarding sales tax granted to the new industries is by way of refunds of sales tax paid to the extent provided in the Order, it is clear that, in effect, the benefit granted is in the nature of an exemption from the payment of the sales tax or reduction in the sales tax liability to the extent stated in the order. In view of this, there is no substance whatever in the contention that the state government had no authority to provide for the grant of refunds. " All that their lordships were dealing with in that case was the concessions granted to the new entrepreneurs by the state government and the question as to the date on which the concessions were granted under the taxing statute by way of government order did not arise for consideration therein; therefore, the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph-6 in the above case are of no assistance to arrive at a conclusion in favour of the petitioner-company. ( 28 ) SIMILARLY, the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Indian Aluminium company v Kerala state electricity board, 1975 (2) SCC 414 , is also of little help to the petitioner-company because their lordships of the Supreme Court were called upon in. That case to deal with a question whether an agreement entered into between the electricity board and the petitioner would be binding or void having regard to the scope of sections 49 and 59 of the electricity supply Act, 1948. Their lordships were considering the question arising out of the Kerala s. e. b. high tension tariff Order, 1969, increasing the tariff for all high tension consumers including the petitioner therein. Such a question is not before us in this case. Whether an agreement made prior to the Constitution of the board for supply of electricity is binding under Section 60, is also not relevant for the purpose of this case. Therefore, the ruling in this decision relied upon by Sri Ramaswamy to drive home the point does not serve any purpose. Whether an agreement made prior to the Constitution of the board for supply of electricity is binding under Section 60, is also not relevant for the purpose of this case. Therefore, the ruling in this decision relied upon by Sri Ramaswamy to drive home the point does not serve any purpose. ( 29 ) LASTLY Sri Ramaswamy has drawn my attention tothe observations made by p. m. bakshi, learned author of the commentary on General Clauses Act, 1st edition, at page-167, wherein it has been observed as follows: "sub-section (3) is based on the principle that the law does not take account of fractions of a day. It applies to all Central Acts and regulations. In order that the sub-section may be applied to a Central Act or Regulation, the date of its commencement must first be ascertained. Once that date is ascertained, and subject to a contrary intention, sub-section (3) provides a Rule of construction by indicating that a central, act or regulation "shall be construed" as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement. In other words and put more simply the Central Act or regulation commences with the very first moment of the day of its commencement which date of commencement must first be ascertained either from the terms of the act or regulation (if it specifies a date) or from Section 5 (1), if it applies. " Sri Ramaswamy emphasises the last sentence of the observations of the learned author. ( 30 ) AT the out-set, the observations madeby the learned author in the above passage of his book could be applied to a case where the government order is silent about the date on which it comes into operation, whereas in the instant case, that is not so. By a plain reading of para-2 of the government Order, Annexure-L , granting exemption for a period of 12 years, one can understand that it has come into force immediately because it says that the concession shall be available if a new plant is established for the manufacture of ferro-silicon and not if the existing plant is diverted for the manufacture of ferro-silicon. In other words, this concession is not available to an existing plant or such a plant which is converted into a ferro-silicon plant. In other words, this concession is not available to an existing plant or such a plant which is converted into a ferro-silicon plant. It is in this context that Sri Ramaswamy emphasises that, having regard to the request made by the petitioner-company, supply of electricity would be availed only when the new ferro-silicon plant would come into existence. That being so, even though the government order has been issued on 8-3-1972, on that day, the plant having not been commissioned, it would be unreasonable on the part of the state government to say that the government order would begin to run from its date as it would be unthinkable for any person that the petitioner-company would avail of the electricity in the absence of the commission of the ferro-silicon plant. may be, there is some force in the contention of Sri Ramaswamy in this context. It was pointed out in the letter, anexure-f, written to the government by the petitioner-company that at the most the plant would be commissioned in the year 1974 and therefore the 12 years period may be reckoned from 1974. But the question is at whose fault the commencement of the plant is postponed, not at the fault of the state government. At the request of the petitioner-company, the state government has come forward to grant exemption under Section 8 of the act and if it is unable to avail of the benefit and its request for extension having not been acceded by the government, the petitioner-company must blame itself and not the state government and particularly when we deal with taxing statute, we must bear in mind the principles of interpretation which I presently deal with. ( 31 ) WE are aware, whether the exemption from payment of tax granted under the taxing statute is either by way of statute or by a notification, makes no difference. In the instant case, it is by the government Order, Annexure-L , that exemption came to be granted. Therefore, it is by way of an executive order in exercise of the powers under Section 8 of the act that exemption is granted in favour of the petitioner-company. Firstly, a notification should be read as a whole innamuri Gopalan v A. P. , (1963)11 STC 742 SC. A notification should be interpreted to avoid absurdity, (Shri Krishna v Union of India, 1972 TLR 1684 ). Firstly, a notification should be read as a whole innamuri Gopalan v A. P. , (1963)11 STC 742 SC. A notification should be interpreted to avoid absurdity, (Shri Krishna v Union of India, 1972 TLR 1684 ). Exemptions under taxing statutes must be strictly construed (Coromandel Fertilizers v Union of India, 1979 ELT 501 AP ). As sated by sutherland, "as a general Rule, grants of tax exemptions are given a rigid interpretation against the assertions of the tax-payer and in favour of the taxing power. The basis for the Rule is the same as that supporting a Rule of strict construction of positive revenue laws that the burden of taxation should be distributed equally and fairly among the members of society" (sutherland: 3rd edn. Vol. 3 p. 296 ). All exemptions from taxation increase the burden on other members of the community and should therefore be deprecated (1899)15 ac 334. It mows from the principle of strict interpretation of exemptions that it is not the object of the Rule making authority which has to be seen but the actual words used, Hansraj v H. H. Dave, AIR 1970 SC 755 . In Hansraj's case, the Supreme Court held that although the object of the exemption appeared to be to encourage handloom manufacturers to switch over to powerlooms, the defect in the language could not be made good by the court. ( 32 ) IN this context, Sri Ramaswamy, however, argued that the government having issuedthe government Order, Annexure-L , intending to grant exemption from payment of electricity tax, payable by the petitioner-company, for a period of 12 years, there is a doctrine of estoppel involved against the state, if it does not allow the petitioner-company to avail of the benefit of the government order from the date of the commencement of the plant, knowing fully well that as on the date of the government Order, the ferro-silicon plant had not been commissioned. In other words, learned counsel argued that there is an estoppel against the statute or the state government. I am afraid, this argument cannot be accepted because it is a well known principle that there cannot be an estoppel against the statute, inasmuch as the government order is to be construed as a notification, issued in exercise of the powers under Section 8 of the Act, which could be construed as a part of the statute. I am afraid, this argument cannot be accepted because it is a well known principle that there cannot be an estoppel against the statute, inasmuch as the government order is to be construed as a notification, issued in exercise of the powers under Section 8 of the Act, which could be construed as a part of the statute. That being so, it is not open to the learned counsel to argue that there is an estoppel against the statute. In this behalf, I may conveniently quote the ruling in entikoppa co-operative Society v Union of India, 1979 ELT 533 A. P. wherein it has been held that if the government has earlier placed an incorrect interpretation over a notification, it is not estopped from later placing a correct interpretation. ( 33 ) HOWEVER, the fact that there is no estoppel regarding interpretation of a notification does not mean that there can be no estoppel by a notification. In this context, Sri Ramaswamy brought to my notice the observations made by herbert broom in his legal maxims, 10th edition at page-191: "it is a maxim of law, recognised and established, that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong; and this maxim, which is based on elementary principles, is fully recognised in courts of law and of equity, and, indeed, admits of illustration from every branch of legal procedure. The reasonableness of the Rule being manifest, we proceed at once to show its application by reference to decided cases; and, in the first place, we may observe that a man shall not take advantage of his own wrong to gain t the favourable interpretation of the law. . . The reasonableness of the Rule being manifest, we proceed at once to show its application by reference to decided cases; and, in the first place, we may observe that a man shall not take advantage of his own wrong to gain t the favourable interpretation of the law. . . " Although Sri Ramaswamy argued that the above observations were in favour of the petitioner-company for the purpose of interpreting the government Order, Annexure-L , Sri Sunderswamy argued that these observations could be construed against the conduct of the petitioner-company itself, for, though, at its instance, the exemption came to be granted, for a period of 12 years from the date of the government Order, under the taxing statute, it is on account of the conduct of the petitioner-company that it could not avail of the benefit of exemption and it was for it to avail of the said benefit immediately or a subsequent date thereafter and the state government was in no way responsible for postponing the availment of such benefit and as such the reliance placed by Sri Ramaswamy was of no assistance to the petitioner-company. ( 34 ) IN this behalf, I may quote the view takenby the appeal court in Coltness Iron co. V Black, (1881)1 AC 315 wherein it has been held that when intention to levy the tax is clearly shown by the words used by parliament, it is not open 'to speculate on what would be the fairest and most equitable mode of levying that tax. Because there is a delay on the part of the petitioner-company to commission the ferro-silicon plant and to avail of the benefit of the government order granting exemption, the courts are not entitled to fill in any lacuna in any act muchless in a taxing Act, but the courts will also not stretch a point in favour of the tax-payer to enable him to get by his astuteness the benefit which other tax-payers do not obtain, as held by the Supreme Court in Yeshwantrao v Cwt, AIR 1967 SC 135 . In other words, when other tax-payers have not been able to obtain such a concession by way , of exemption, as urged by the learned Advocate general, the benefit that is granted in favour of the petitioner-company could not be brought under either sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) of Section 8 of the act. In other words, when other tax-payers have not been able to obtain such a concession by way , of exemption, as urged by the learned Advocate general, the benefit that is granted in favour of the petitioner-company could not be brought under either sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) of Section 8 of the act. However, it is not the case of the learned Advocate general that the benefit of exemption for 12 years granted in favour of the petitioner-company was denied. It is not open to the learned Advocate general to say so, for, the petitioner-company had already availed of the said benefit and therefore it can be strictly construed in accordance with the government order. ( 35 ) BE that as it may, the argument advancedfor the petitioner-company that the period of 12 years for the purpose of availing of the concession by way of exemption from payment of tax must be reckoned from the year 1974 or 1977 cannot be accepted because the intention of the government order that can be gathered by its plain reading is clear that that period of 12 years must be reckoned from the date of government Order, Annexure-L , and on the expiry of the said period, the petitioner-company shall be liable to pay usual tax payable under Section 3 of the act. Under these circumstances, I do not see any force in any of the submissions made by Sri Ramaswamy, learned senior counsel for the petitioner-company. ( 36 ) IN the result, I make the following:order ( 37 ) THE writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee is Rs. 1,000/ -. --- *** --- .