Judgment :- The defendants 1 to 3 in O.S.No.282 of 1975, who suffered a decree in the court as well as in the first appellate court, are the appellants in the second appeal. Respondents 1 and 2 herein were the plaintiffs in the suit. Respondents 3 and 4 were defendants 4 and 5 in the suit. For the purpose of convenience, I will refer to the parties per their rank in the original suit. 2. The suit was for declaring the plaintiffs title to l/3rd share in the suit property, partition and separate possession of the same, for directing the defendants to pay Rs.7,500 as mesne profits for three years prior to the suit and for future mesne profits. 3. The case of the plaintiffs was as follows: “The suit property of the extent of 7.83 acres belonged to three groups, namely, defendants 4 and 5 being one branch, Bomma Naicker and his two sons being the second branch and Nagammal and her minor sons being the third branch. On 9.8.1966 the fourth defendant (Malla Naicker) for himself and on behalf of his minor son-5th defendant (Kuppa Naicker) entered into a sale agreement with the plaintiffs for sale of a 1/3rd share belonging to the defendants 4 and 5 in the entire property, for a total consideration of Rs.17,500. 28.9.1966 there was an agreement for sale of the entire property for a total consideration Rs.52,000 to and in favour of the first defendant (Marappa Gounder), the agreement having been signed by eight persons as vendors. The defendants 4 and 5 were not signatories the said agreement dated 29.8.1.966. On the basis of the said agreement dated 29.8.1966, the first defendant (Marappa Gounder) filed O.S.No.250 of 1966 seeking specific performance of the agreement. The plaintiffs in this suit (Chennimalai Gounder R.Gurusami) were impleaded as nineth and tenth defendants in Q.S.No.250 of 1966 said suit was filed on or about 15.12.1966. On 26.12.1966 the agreement dated 9.8.1966 was given effect to and defendants 4 and 5 executed the sale deed in respect of 1/3rd share to the plaintiffs herein. Q.S.No.250 of 1966 was dismissed on 5.8.1970. An appeal was filed in this Court in A.S.No.706 of 1970. On 24.1.1975 the defendants 4 and 5 (Malla Naicker and Kuppa Naicker) executed a sale deed in favour of defendants 2 and 3 sons of (Marappa Gounder) in pursuance of the agreement dated 29.8.1966. Q.S.No.250 of 1966 was dismissed on 5.8.1970. An appeal was filed in this Court in A.S.No.706 of 1970. On 24.1.1975 the defendants 4 and 5 (Malla Naicker and Kuppa Naicker) executed a sale deed in favour of defendants 2 and 3 sons of (Marappa Gounder) in pursuance of the agreement dated 29.8.1966. In this sale deed defendants and 5 referred to the pendency of A.S.No.706 of 1970 and by way of compromise it decided to enforce the agreement dated 29.8.1966. A cam-promise was effected A.S.No.706 of 1970 only between the first defendant (Marappa Gounder) and defendants and 5 (Malla Naicker and Kuppa Naicker) on 12.2.1975. The appeal was allowed only against the defendants 4 and 5 (Malla Naicker and Kuppa Naicker). The appeal was not pressed against the other respondents and accordingly the appeal was dismissed against the other respondents. The plaintiffs have come forward with this suit O.S.No.282 of 1975 on account of the cloud caused by the compromise decree in A.S.No.706 of 1970. They claimed annual income of Rs.2,500 from their 1/3rd share and claimed mesne profits for a period three years. 4. The third defendant alone had filed a written statement and the same has been adopted by defendants 1 and 2. Defendants 4 and 5 remained ex parte. According to them they entitled to the entire property including the suit property. The sale deed dated 26.12.1966 (Ex.A-4) would not bind the defendants. Defendants 2 and 3 have acquired valid title the sale deed dated 24.1.1975 (Ex.A-2). The decree in O.S.No.250 of 1966 as modified the High Court in A.S.No.706 of 1970 would operate as res judicata against the claim plaintiffs. 5. The trial court held that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners in respect of 1/3rd the property, that the sale deed dated 26.121966 (Ex.A-4) is binding on the defendants that the plaintiffs are entitled to partition and separate possession of l/3rd share. The profits of Rs.7,500 for three years was also decreed. The future mesne profits was to be ascertained under O.20, Rule 12, C.P.C. 6. The profits of Rs.7,500 for three years was also decreed. The future mesne profits was to be ascertained under O.20, Rule 12, C.P.C. 6. On appeal, the appellate court framed the main point for consideration as follows: “Whether the original of Ex.A-2 sale deed, dated 24.1.1975 executed by fourth defendant Malla Naicker and his son fifth defendant Kuppa Naicker in favour of second defendant C.M.Ramasamy Goundar and third defendant C.M.Arumugham who are appellants No.2 3 in this appeal is valid or Ex.A-4 which is the sale deed executed by fourth defendant Naicker for himself and on behalf of his then Minor son Kuppa Naicker on 26.12.1966 favour of the plaintiffs is valid? Inasmuch as on the date of Ex.A-4, dated 26.12.1966 the fifth defendant, Kuppa was a minor, the appellate court has elaborately discussed the validity of the passing consideration under Ex.A-4. The appellate court has also discussed the evidence and to the conclusion that Ex.A-4 was for the discharge of binding antecedent debts of the and so the sale was binding on the minor, 5th defendant. On the question whether was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, the appellate court held as follows: “Hence so far as the plaintiffs are concerned, they are entitled to ignore Ex.A-2 and present suit for partition and separate possession (in O.S.No.282 of 1975). The appeal plaintiffs are concerned in A.S.No.706 of 1970 was dismissed and therefore the dismissal the suit in O.S.No.250 of 1966 so far as the plaintiffs are concerned has been confirmed appeal and hence the plaintiffs have won the appeal. The result is that the agreement 29.8.1966 in favour of first defendant, Marappa Gounder has not been held as true, and binding on merits by the High Court and consequently Ex.A-4 sale deed 26.12.1966 cannot be held as having been decided invalid.” The appellate court also went into the question whether the defendants 2 and 3 can the alienation under Ex.A-4, dated 26.12.1966, It was held that the minor, fifth defendant had not questioned the sale under Ex.A-4 within three years of his attaining majority consequently it was held that the transferees from minor, fifth defendant, defendants 2 and 3 cannot question the sale deed under Ex.A-4, For all the above the appellate court found that Ex.A-4, dated 26.12.1966 was a valid document transferred the share of defendants 4 and 5 to the plaintiffs. The decree for partition share in favour of the plaintiff was therefore confirmed by the appellate Court. So far past mesne profits were concerned, the appellate court reduced the same to Rs.5,250. 7. Before me in second appeal, the only point argued by Mr. S. Venkateswaran, appellants is that the sale deed Ex.A-4, dated 26.12.1966 having been executed during pendency of O.S.No.250 of 1966 was invalid, being hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. argument is that even though the suit was dismissed on 5.8.1970, on appeal, compromise decree the suit was decreed for specific performance as against the defendants 4 and 5 herein (Malla Naicker and Kuppa Naicker). The decree in A.S.No.706 of 1970 made on 12.2.1975. The contention therefore is that Sec.52 of the Transfer of Property cannot be avoided and the sale deed dated 26.12.1966 cannot be upheld. Sec.52 Transfer of Property Act reads as follows: “During the pendency in any court having authority within the limits of India excluding State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government any suit proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority the court and on such terms as it may impose. ” The learned counsel for the appellants relies on the words that the property cannot transferred by any party to the suit so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto any decree or order which may be made therein. The contention therefore is that defendants 1 and 2 in O.S.No.250 of 1966 cannot transfer the property to the plaintiffs herein so affect the rights of the plaintiffs (Marappa Gounder) in that suit, who is the first defendant this suit and who ultimately obtained a decree in A.S.No.706 of 1970. 8. On the other hand, Mr.V.Bharathi Dasan, learned counsel for the respondents 1 contends that the decree in A.S.No.706 of 1970 was collusive and behind the back plaintiffs. Therefore, according to them Sec.52 cannot be invoked in this case. considering the rival submissions, I would like to refer to a few facts. O.S.No.250 of was filed on or about 15.12.1966. 8. On the other hand, Mr.V.Bharathi Dasan, learned counsel for the respondents 1 contends that the decree in A.S.No.706 of 1970 was collusive and behind the back plaintiffs. Therefore, according to them Sec.52 cannot be invoked in this case. considering the rival submissions, I would like to refer to a few facts. O.S.No.250 of was filed on or about 15.12.1966. The exact date of filing of the suit is not clear from records. The sale deed Ex.A-4 was executed on 26.12.1966. There is no evidence and parties did not consider it important to find out whether the plaintiffs had been served summons in O.S.No.250 of 1966 prior to the date of the sale deed Ex.A-4. The parties proceeded on the basis that the sale deed Ex.A-4 was during the pendency of D.S.No.250 of 1966. Defendants 4 and 5 had been impleaded as defendants and 2 in O.S.No.250 of 1966 and were therefore made subject to the bar of lis under Sec.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, O.S.No.250 of 1966 was dismissed 5.8.1970. On the basis of the dismissal the sale deed Ex.A-4 would have been valid. A.S.No.706 of 1970 a decree was obtained by Marappa Gounder (first defendant) Malla Naicker and Kuppa Naicker (defendants 4 and 5) for specific performance. So far other respondents, including the plaintiffs herein (Defendants 9 and 10 in O.S.No.250 1966) the appeal was dismissed confirming the dismissal of the decree in O.S.No.250 1966. Even assuming that the compromise decree as between the consenting parties be assumed to be collusive, the question is whether the plaintiffs were bound by the and at any rate whether for the purpose of Sec.52 the sale deed, dated 26.12.1966 come under the mischief of Sec.52. 9. The object of Sec.52 of Transfer of Property Act is to afford protection of law in respect a property which is the subject matter of litigation, being alienated to the prejudice decree which may ultimately result in the pending suit. The law does not allow parties to give others, pending the litigation rights, in the property under dispute, prejudice the opposite party. The decision of the court shall be binding not only litigating parties, but also on those who derive title under them by alienations pendente The learned counsel for the respondent has cited a decision reported in Veeraraghava v. Subba Reddi and seven others, 37 M.L.J. 449: I.L.R. 43 Mad. The decision of the court shall be binding not only litigating parties, but also on those who derive title under them by alienations pendente The learned counsel for the respondent has cited a decision reported in Veeraraghava v. Subba Reddi and seven others, 37 M.L.J. 449: I.L.R. 43 Mad. 37:53 I.C. 428 to me that the facts of the said case are very close to the facts of the present case. therefore refer to the facts of the said case before referring to the ratio of the said The first defendant had executed two mortgages in favour of the fourth respondent subsequently impleaded) in the year 1914. The plaintiff’s mortgagee was long anterior said mortgages, being of the year 1895. The suit was brought upon the mortgage of or about February, 1907. The decree of the trial court was on March, 1910. It was during pendency of the appeal against the decree that the mortgage in favour of the respondent were created. The fourth respondent filed an application seeking to be impleaded in the suit, at the stage of the appeal. He was so impleaded. On 16.9.1915 a compromise was entered into between the plaintiff and the first defendant. The fourth respondent objected to the said compromise and a decree in terms of the compromise. It was found the compromise was not collusive, or the result of fraud. The question was whether fourth respondent was bound by the terms of the compromise. The Full Bench decision this Court took note of the fact that the purchaser had been made a party to the suit subject matter of the dispute in which he is interested could not be decided upon, prejudice without hearing him. That right the purchaser acquired once he is made as to the suit. The Full Bench decision this Court took note of the fact that the purchaser had been made a party to the suit subject matter of the dispute in which he is interested could not be decided upon, prejudice without hearing him. That right the purchaser acquired once he is made as to the suit. While recognising right of the parties to enter into a compromise under Rule 3 of C.P.C., the Full Bench pointed out: “If any one of them stands out it is a well recognised principle of jurisprudence compromise between the other parties should not in the least derogate from his follows from these provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure that although a pendente lite takes the transfer subject to the result of the litigation, and if he impleaded as a party he will be bound by any lawful compromise or adjustment which be entered into between the plaintiff and his transferor, the moment that he becomes defendant, the only detraction of right to which he subjects himself is the result litigation which has been openly and in his presence tried and decided upon. Once the array of parties what could have been done by way of compromise or adjustment not before the Court should not be allowed to interfere with his claim for a fair trial decision on the merits.” The Full Bench therefore gave the opinion that the compromise although it may be upon the parties to the compromise, could not affect the rights of the fourth respondent that case. It was held that the fourth respondent could argue and contest the validity compromise. 10. Respondents 1 and 2 herein can take advantage of the said judgment only to the extent that they are not bound by the compromise decree in O.S.No.250 of 1966 into between the plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 therein. To put it conversely defendants 1 and 2 therein (defendants 4 and 5 in the present proceedings) are disabled Sec.52 of the Transfer of Property Act from alienating the property to any third party, prejudicing the rights of the plaintiff O.S.No.250 of 1966 (first defendant in these proceedings) who obtained a decree favour compelling defendants 1 and 2 therein to execute a sale deed in his favour provided in the agreement dated 29.8.1966. In other words, the sale dated 26.12.1966 executed by defendants 1 and 2 in O.S.No.250 of 1966 in favour of the plaintiffs proceedings is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. The suit based on that sale deed has necessarily. The courts below have wrongly decided this substantial question of second Appeal is therefore allowed. The judgments of the courts below are set aside suit O.S.No.282 of 1975 shall stand dismissed. There will however be no costs throughout. Appeal allowed.