ORDER R.R.K. Trivedi, J. - This petition has been filed challenging the judgment dated 12-3-1991 passed by Board of Revenue, U.P., Allahabad and order dated 5-4-1984 passed by Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizahad. 2. The facts, in brief, giving rise to this petition are that plots Nos. 326/1, 356, 353, 354 and 329 were recorded in names of Smt. Dulari and her mother-in-law Mst. Balwanta in revenue papers. Smt. Ram Dulari by registered sale deed dated 7-6-1965 transferred aforesaid plots in favour of petitioner. The sale deed has been filed as Annexure IV to the writ petition. In this sale deed Smt. Ram Dulari has described herself as Bhumidhar in the following manner " -------------------eueqfdjk vkjkft;kr eqUntkZ rsagr nLrkosat gktk ekSdwvk ekStk nfj;kiqj ijxuk ehjkuiqj rglhy o ftyk lqYrkuiqj dh Hkwfe/kj o flyflyk 'kkSgj [kqn jgh gS vkSj fcyk f'kjdr xSjs o enk[kkyr nhxjs dk fot o nk[khy pyh vk jgh gS vkSj mldks vf[r;kj bfUrdky gkfly gS----------- " She transferred the aforesaid plots for a consideration of Rs. 6,000/-. Name of Smt. Ram Dulari continued in revenue papers. Mst. Balwanta died some time in 1973-74 and after death her share devolved on Smt. Ram Dulari. Smt. Ram Dulari by registered sale deed dated 4-6-1979 transferred the share of Mst. Balwanta for consideration of Rs. 13,000/- in favour of respondents 3 and4. 3. Plaintiff-petitioner filed suit No. 127/141/78, under 5.229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act for declaration that they are exclusive tenure holders in possession of the aforesaid plots on the basis of the sale deed dated 7-6-1965. They claimed benefit of S. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act on the ground that Smt. Ram Dulari in the sale deed represented herself to be the exclusive Bhumidhar of the land in dispute and as she after death of Mst. Balwant inherited her share also, she was bound by her representation made in the sale deed and petitioner is exclusive Bhumidhar. 4. The trial court decreed the suit on 23-6-1981 and held that petitioner is entitled for benefit of S. 43. 5. Respondents filed appeal No. 164 of 1981 from the aforesaid decree. This appeal was allowed by Additional Commissioner by judgment dated 5-4-1984, annexure II to the writ petition and the decree passed by the trial court was set aside and suit of petitioner was dismissed. 5. Respondents filed appeal No. 164 of 1981 from the aforesaid decree. This appeal was allowed by Additional Commissioner by judgment dated 5-4-1984, annexure II to the writ petition and the decree passed by the trial court was set aside and suit of petitioner was dismissed. The judgment of the Additional Commissioner was questioned in Second Appeal 77 of 1983-84 before the Board of Revenue which has been upheld by judgment dated 12-3-1991. Challenging both these judgments the present writ petition has been filed. 6. Additional Commissioner, Faizabad found petitioner not entitled for the benefit of S. 43 on two grounds; firstly, that Smt. Ram Dulari did not describe herself in the sale deed as exclusive Bhumidhar of the land in dispute and stated herself only Bhumidhar in relation with her husband, and secondly, that in revenue papers both Mst. Balwanta and Smt. Ram Dulari were recorded and both the parties were aware that Smt. Ram Dulari was entitled to transfer only a share as cobumidhar and there was no question of any fraudulent or erroneous representation by the transferor. The Board of Revenue took the same view and held that the record of rights of the relevant year clearly mentioned that Mst. Balwanta and Smt. Ram Dulari both were recorded as co-tenants and it cannot be believed that petitioner purchaser had not looked into the revenue records before making the bargain and, therefore, it cannot be believed that she did not know at the time of sale deed that the transferor was not entitled in law to transfer the entire land. There was no question of any misrepresentation or fraud in the facts and circumstances of this case. 7. Shri S.D. Pathak, learned counsel for petitioner, after referring to the provisions of S. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act relied on a Full Bench decision in case Parmanand v. Champa Lal, reported in AIR 1956 All 225 . This Full Bench took the view that one of the doctrines of equity is that equity treats that as done which ought to be done. Thus equity creates personal obligation which compels the transferor to perform his contract when he is able to do so on the acquisition of subsequent interest. This Full Bench took the view that one of the doctrines of equity is that equity treats that as done which ought to be done. Thus equity creates personal obligation which compels the transferor to perform his contract when he is able to do so on the acquisition of subsequent interest. In the application of this doctrine of equity it is immaterial that the promisee or transferee knew the truth, namely that the promiser or the transferor had no authority to transfer the interest which he purported to transfer. Taking this view, the Full Bench answered the question referred to it as under (at p. 230 of AIR) : "I am clearly of opinion that the correct view is that S. 43, T.P. Act, does not require that the transferee who can take advantage of it should be one to whom not only a fraudulent or erroneous representation about the transferor's authority to transfer the property is made but should also be one who did not have knowledge of the true factual position and had merely acted on the belief of the erroneous or fraudulent representation made to him by the transferor. If, however, both the transferor and the transferee knew of the true position, and colluded to enter into a transaction which is invalid in law, the State of knowledge of the transferee becomes material and S. 43 cannot he availed of by him." I have thoroughly considered the submissions made by Shri Pathak and have also considered the view taken by the aforesaid Full Bench. In fact if the transferee is found to have the knowledge of the true facts it cannot be believed that he acted and purchased the land in dispute for consideration on the basis of the fraudulent or erroneous representation. The two cannot exist together. If the purchaser having full knowledge of the defective title of the vendor agrees to purchase, it cannot be said that he acted bona fide on fraudulent or erroneous representation and is entitled for equitable consideration raising estoppel against the transferor who acquired interest subsequently. For application of S. 43 it is not only necessary that there should be fraudulent and erroneous misrepresentation by transferor regarding his right to transfer but on the basis of misrepresentation action of purchase by transferee should also be based on the alleged representation. For application of S. 43 it is not only necessary that there should be fraudulent and erroneous misrepresentation by transferor regarding his right to transfer but on the basis of misrepresentation action of purchase by transferee should also be based on the alleged representation. If the transferee has knowledge of the truth, it cannot be said that his action of purchase was based on the fraudulent and erroneous representation made by the transferor regarding his title. Provisions of S. 43 were considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Jumma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, reported in AIR 1962 SC 847 . The view taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding provisions of S. 43 mentioned in para 15 of a the judgment supra is being extracted below: "(15) This reasoning is open to the criticism that it ignores the principle underlying S. 43. That Section embodies, as already stated, a rule of estoppel and enacts that a person who makes a representation shall not be heard to allege the contrary as against a person who acts on that representation. It is immaterial whether the transferor acts bona fide or fraudulently in making the representation. It is only material to find out whether in fact the transferee has been misled. It is to be noted that when the decision under consideration was given, the relevant words of Section 43 were. "where a person erroneously represents", and now, as amended by Act 20 of 1929, they are "where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents", and that emphasises that for the purpose of the Section it matters not whether the transferor acted fraudulently or innocently in making the representation, and that what is material is that he did make a representation and the transferee has acted on it. Where the transferee knew as a fact that the transferor did not possess the title which he represents he has, then he cannot be said to have acted on it when taking a transfer. Section 43 would then have no application, and the transfer will fall under S. 6(a). But where the transferee does act on the representation, there is no reason why he should not have the benefit of the equitable doctrine embodied in S. 43, however, fraudulent the act of the transferor might have been." 8. Section 43 would then have no application, and the transfer will fall under S. 6(a). But where the transferee does act on the representation, there is no reason why he should not have the benefit of the equitable doctrine embodied in S. 43, however, fraudulent the act of the transferor might have been." 8. In view of the aforesaid judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in my opinion the view expressed by Full Bench of this Court is no more a good law and stands overruled. In my opinion, for claiming benefit of S. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, a transferee should not only prove that there was a fraudulent and erroneous misrepresentation about title by the transferor but he should also prove that even after taking all due care as can be expected from a reasonable person, he could not find out the correct position regarding title and he was ignorant about the trun In the present case as the two courts below have recorded a finding that Smt. Ram Dulari was recorded only as a co-tenant and the purchaser-petitioner was fully aware that she is not exclusive bhumidhar of the land in dispute, the provisions of S. 43 could not be attracted. The suit of the petitioner has rightly been dismissed. The orders impugned in this petition passed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 do not suffer from any error of law. 9. The writ petition has no force and is accordingly dismissed in limine.