JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the orders dated 9.1.1990 and 29.1.1990 (Anexures 6 and 7). He has further prayed that the respondent-State Government be directed to absorb him on the post of Inspector, Commercial Taxes or in any other department according to his turn on the basis of 'first come first serve' as soon as the vacancies become available and intimated to the General Administration Department. 2. Petitioner has stated that he was appointed as LDC in the Industries Department by order dated 20.4.78 after his selection by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. He was confirmed on this post by order dated 2.7.81. He was promoted as Industries Extension Officer vide order dated 3.1.1985 in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6-A of the Rajasthan Industries Subordinate Service Rules, 1968. He was declared surplus from the Industries Department w.e.f. 1.3.88 in pursuance of the order dated 8.3.88 issued by the Director, Industries. Initially, he was directed to report to the Collector, Jaipur and thereafter the General Administration Department by way of transfer. Petitioner has been absorbed as Inspector against the vacancy available in that department vide order dated 9.1.90 of the General Administration Department. However, the Registrar Cooperative Societies returned the petitioner and 29 other Industries Extension Officers after accommodating 10 of the absorbed persons. The General Administration Department in its turn, sent the petitioner back to the Registrar, Cooperative Societies for his posting.This was done by a communication dated 29.1.90. Petitioner has stated that as per the settled policy and the Government instructions, as soon as the vacancies are intimated by any department, the General Administration Department is required to fill up the same. By a letter dated 9.5.88, Devsthan Department had intimated availability of 9 vacancies of Inspectors. The Commercial Taxes Department had intimated availability of 69 posts of Commercial Taxes Inspector vide letter dated 17.9.1988. 17 vacancies of Enforcement Inspector were intimated by the Food and Civil Supplies Department vide letter dated 27.9.89 and there were 31 vacancies of Inspector in the Industries Department between 1.4.1988 to 27.9.1989. In all 123 surplus hands were available to the General Administration Department and they could have easily been absorbed in these departments much before communication of vacancies of Inspector in the Cooperative Department by the Registrar, Co-perative Societies vide his letter dated 23.11.1989. In all 123 surplus hands were available to the General Administration Department and they could have easily been absorbed in these departments much before communication of vacancies of Inspector in the Cooperative Department by the Registrar, Co-perative Societies vide his letter dated 23.11.1989. The Registrar had intimated availability of 79 vacancies in the cadre of Inspectors in his department. Against these vacancies, candidature of the petitioner and other similarly situated persons was considered and that led to the issuance of the order dated 9.1.90 and communication dated 29.1.90.Petitioner has stated in his petition that it was the obligation of the General Administration Department to have made absorption against the vacancies, which were intimated to it by the Commercial Taxes, Department, Industries Department, Food & Civil Supplies Department and Devsthan Department. Instead of doing that, the General Administration Department has arbitrarily and capriciously absorbed the petitioner and other similarly situated persons in the Cooperative Department. This action of the respondent is liable to be declared as unconstitutional. 3. On a show cause notice issued by this court, the respondent has, in the first instance, raised a preliminary objection about maintainability of the writ petition on account of availability of alternative remedy of appeal before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal. According to the respondent, when an alternative effective remedy is available to the petitioner, there is no justification for the writ petition being entertained. On the merits of the case, the respondent has asserted that the petitioner as well as other persons were declared surplus due to abolition of number of posts Industries Extension Officer. All surplus personnels were directed to report to the General Administration Department. 5 surplus Industries Extension Officers were absorbed against vacancies of Inspectors in Devsthan Department. However, only 4 persons were taken by the Devsthan Department and remaining were sent to the General' Administration Department. So far as Commercial Taxes Department is concerned, out of 69 vacancies, 32 vacancies were ear-marked for promotion from amongst the ministrial staff. 24 vacancies were on account of promotion of the existing Inspectors on the higher posts on adhoc basis. Thus, in fact only 13 vacancies were available in Commercial Taxes Department. Against these 13 vacancies, 13 Industries Extension Officers were absorbed. Absorption has been done strictly on the basis of seniority and not on the basis of 'first come first serve'. 24 vacancies were on account of promotion of the existing Inspectors on the higher posts on adhoc basis. Thus, in fact only 13 vacancies were available in Commercial Taxes Department. Against these 13 vacancies, 13 Industries Extension Officers were absorbed. Absorption has been done strictly on the basis of seniority and not on the basis of 'first come first serve'. Under Rule 18 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Absorption of Surplus Personnels) Rules, 1969 it has been made clear that no surplus employee can have a right to claim absorption to a particular post or in a particular department,service or cadre. The decision of the Absorption Committee in the matter of absorption has been treated as final. The claim of the petitioner for absorption on the basis of 'first come first serve' is misconceived. In para 8 of the reply, the respondent has given details of the vacancies against which surplus employees have been absorbed according to their seniority in the cadre of Industries Extension Officer. It has then been stated that the petitioner cannot claim any right to be absorbed on the post of Inspector in the Commercial Taxes Department. The respondent has again reiterated that the question of absorption falls within the scope of terms 'service matters' as defined in the Rajasthan Civil Service (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976 and on account of availability of alternative remedy of appeal, the court will not interfere in its writ jurisdiction. 4. The question which arises on the basis of preliminary objection raised by the respondent is as to whether the matter relating to absorption falls within the scope of the term 'service matters' as defined in Section 2(f) of 1976 Act and, therefore, the appeal is maintainable against the order passed by the Government or any competent authority in the matter of absorption of a Government servant. 5. Section 2(b) defines-the term 'Government servant'. Section 2(f)defines the term 'service matters'. 5. Section 2(b) defines-the term 'Government servant'. Section 2(f)defines the term 'service matters'. Both these definition clauses have relevance to the subject matter of controversy involved in the writ petition and therefore, they are reproduced below: "2(c) [sic(b)] Government Servant means a person who is or has been a member of civil Service or who holds or has held a civil post under the Government of Rajasthan and includes any such person on foreign service or whose services are temporarily placed at the disposal of a local or other authority and also any person in service of a local or other authority whose services have been temporarily placed at the disposal of the State Government or a person in service on a contract or a person who has retired from the Government service elsewhere and is reemployed under the Government of Rajasthan, but does not include a person in the Civil Service of the Indian Union or a State Government servicing on deputation in Rajasthan who will continue to be governed by the rules applicable to such person." "2(f) Service matter - means one or more than one of the following matters relating to a Government servant (i) Seniority; (ii) Promotion; (iii) Confirmation; (iv) Fixation of Pay; (v) An order denying of varying pay, allowances pension and other ser- vice conditions to the disadvantage of a Government servant, otherwise than as a penalty; (vi) Cases of revision while officiating in a higher service, grade or post to lower service, grade or post otherwise than as a penalty; (vii) Withholding the pension or denying the maximum pension otherwise as the penalty; (viii) Any other notified by the Government." The petitioner is admittedly a Government servant because he was holding a civil post in the Government of Rajasthan on the date of being declared surplus. He continued to be a Government servant even when he reported to the Collector, Jodhpur or before the General Administration Department. The term 'service matters' comprehends within its scope the matters relating to seniority, promotion, confirmation, fixation of pay and other denying or verying pay, allowances and other service conditions to the disadvantage of a Government servant. The orders which relate to penalties imposed on Government servants are excluded from the scope of the term 'service matters'. It is clear from a perusal of Section 2(f)(v), (vi) and (vii). The orders which relate to penalties imposed on Government servants are excluded from the scope of the term 'service matters'. It is clear from a perusal of Section 2(f)(v), (vi) and (vii). Sub-clause (viii) of Section 2(f) provides that any other matter which may be notified by the Government would come within the definition of the term 'service matters'. Clearly the case of absorption does not directly relate to seniority, promotion or fixation of pay. Therefore, the crucial question, which remains to be examined is as to whether the matter relating to absorption falls within the scope of subclause (v) of section 2(f) ?6. A perusal of sub-clause (v) of Section 2(f) indicates that an order denying or varying pay, allowances, pension and other service conditions to the disadvantage of the Government Servant, except the order passed by way of penalty, comes within the scope of service matters. Truely, the question relating to absorption of an employee on a particular post is not an order denying or varying pay, allowances, pension. Whether it is included within the scope of the term 'other service conditions' now remains to be seen. The Act of 1976 was enacted with the object of providing for constitution of Appellate Tribunals for service matters and matters incidental thereto. The statement of objects and reasons which have been incorporated in the bill, which led to the enactment in 1976 Act can usefully be quoted below: Statement of Objects and Reasons: "The proposal to constitute Administrative Tribunals to decide service matters was under consideration of the State Government for a long time. Service matters are broadly of two types: one type relating to disciplinary proceedings and the other relating to the rules of recruitment and other conditions of service. So far as the disciplinary matters are concerned, the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules make provisions for Departmental appeal or review. As regards other Service matters, the present practice is only of making a representation to Government. In both the cases an aggrieved Government servant can approach the Civil Courts by way of suits and the High Court or the Supreme Court by means of writ petitions. The ordinary Civil Courts take a considerable time in deciding the service matters which is expensive and burdensome to both the Government Servant and the Government. In both the cases an aggrieved Government servant can approach the Civil Courts by way of suits and the High Court or the Supreme Court by means of writ petitions. The ordinary Civil Courts take a considerable time in deciding the service matters which is expensive and burdensome to both the Government Servant and the Government. The suggestion of establishing Administrative Tribunals has been from time to time considered by the Law Commission as well as by the other eminent Authorities. In view of the need for satisfactory and early final decision and to stop a .flood of litigation in the Civil Courts State Government has decided to constitute Administrative Tribunals to decide appeals from the order of Competent Authority and to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in service matters. These Tribunals would provide an independent forum for decision in service matters and would be more economical both to the I Government servant and the Government. It will also lessen the burden of judicial courts and enable them to concentrate on other judicial matters."Thus it is clear that the Administrative Tribunals have been constituted to reslove the service disputes except those arising out of the provisions of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958, expeditiously. It had been felt that the decisions of service disputes take long time in Civil Courts. The process is highly expensive and burdensome to both, the Government servants and.the Government and, therefore, with a view to evolve a machanism for expeditious and satisfactory final decision of the service disputes, the Tribunals were decided to be constituted. It is thus clear that the Legislature has intended to create a machinary for early and economical disposal of the controversies relating to service matters of the Government servants. The term 'other service conditions' has to be construed in the light of the object with which the Legislation has been enacted. Broadly speaking the term 'other service matters' include within itself all matters concerning a Government servant's right from the date of his appointment to the date of his retirement and even thereafter. This would obviously include within its scope all general conditions which are regulated by the provisions of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 and also those which are regulated by separate sets of Rules.7. In Lily Kurian Vs. Sr. This would obviously include within its scope all general conditions which are regulated by the provisions of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 and also those which are regulated by separate sets of Rules.7. In Lily Kurian Vs. Sr. Lawina and others 1979(1) S.LR.26 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court were called upon to interprete the term 'conditions of service' used in Section 19(j) of the Kerala University Act, 1957. That section related to the powers of the Syndicate of the University and it was provided that the Syndicate shall have the powers to fix emoluments and fix duty of the conditions of the employees in private colleges. Interpreting the phrase 'conditions of service', their Lordships observed as under: "The expression "conditions of service" covers a wide range, as explained by the Privy Council in N.W.F.Province V. Suraj Narain (1979 (1) SLR 273) which was approved by this court in State of U.P. V. Babu Ram ( 1989 (1) RLR 392 ) . These decisions and also a later decision of this court in State of M.P. & ors. V. Shardul Singh ( 1989 (1) RLR 392 ) have made it clear that the expression 'conditions of service' includes everything from the stage of appointment to the state of termination of service and even beyond, and relates to matters pertaining to disciplinary action. Thus, the expression 'conditions of service' as explained in the decisions of the Privy Council and of this court includes the power to take disciplinary action. The rules regarding these matters are contained in Chapter LVII of the Ordinance. The Management of a private College under Ordinance 33(2) is constituted the appointing and the disciplinary authority in respect of imposition of punishment. In the course of any disciplinary proceedings, a right of appeal before the Vice Chancellor is given to a teacher dismissed from service under Ordinance 33(4) of the Ordinance. The High Court thus rightly held that the right of appeal conferred by Ordinance 33(4) forms part of the 'conditions of service' and, therefore, is valid." The provision contained in Section 2(0(v) has been interpreted by a Single Bench in State of Rajasthan Vs. Dr. Ganpat Singh Bhandari 1979(1) S.LR. 273 . The High Court thus rightly held that the right of appeal conferred by Ordinance 33(4) forms part of the 'conditions of service' and, therefore, is valid." The provision contained in Section 2(0(v) has been interpreted by a Single Bench in State of Rajasthan Vs. Dr. Ganpat Singh Bhandari 1979(1) S.LR. 273 . In that case, the question which arose for consideration before the court was, as to whether compulsory retirement under Rule 244(2) of the Rajasthan Service Rules would fall within the scope of Section 2(f) of Act of 1976 so as to entitle the -Tribunal to decide the question relating to 9 Government servants. After considering the legislative history, which led to the enactment of 1976 Act, the learned Single Judge held that compulsory retirement falls within the scope of the phrase 'other service conditions' and it has been observed as under:"The first term 'appointment' means and is used for the purpose of the commencement of the service of an employee and termination or retirement means the end of the career. Between commencement and the end, there is along distance to be travelled by various service conditions in which the employee is sometimes promoted, the seniority is fixed, conditions of leave and pension are regulated so forth and so on. Alphabet A of the English script can never mean inclusion of all alphabets up to 'Z' also. The interpretation sought to be given by the learned Advocate General would result in saying that the 'term appointment' is so comprehensive, omnibus, omnipotent and omnipresent that it would cover all service conditions. Every phrase and every stage of the service conditions will have to be taken note of separately and the several different and divergent rules or plethora of rules and service conditions cannot be imbibed in one phrase. Every phrase and every stage of the service conditions will have to be taken note of separately and the several different and divergent rules or plethora of rules and service conditions cannot be imbibed in one phrase. The other branch of argument advanced by the learned Advocate General is that the principle of 'ejusdem generis' should be applied in order to interpret the word 'other service conditions' and in the Rajasthan law since section 2(f) sub-clause (v) mentions 'an order denying or varying pay, allowances or pension and other service conditions', the other service conditions should relate to pay, allowances and pension only and not to compulsory retirement.The principle ejusdem generis cannot be applied here while interpreting section 2(f)(v) and 'other service conditions' used in this sub-para would all mean the service conditions mentioned in the Rajasthan Service Rules or other laws on the subject of service."8. The Absorption of Surplus Personnel Rules, 1969 have been framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The pre-amble of these Rules reads as under: "In exercise of the powers conferred by proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the State of Rajasthan hereby makes the following Rules regulating recruitment by absorption of surplus personnel to the Civil services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State and their conditions of service." The scheme of 1969 Rules shows that they deal with the various facets of the absorption of a Government servant of equated or equivalent post after he is declared surplus from a particular department. A surplus employee continues to be a Government servant and only in that capacity, he is entitled to be absorbed. Rule 14 of these Rules clearly provides that pay, increments, allowances and leave etc. of surplus employees during the period they remain surplus and on absorption shall be regulated by the provisions of the Rajasthan Service Rules and other relevant Rules and orders issued from time to time. The benefit of past service is given to the surplus employees by virtue of the provisions contained in Rule 15 of these Rules. So Rule 18 gives option to the Government servants to seek termination of his service if he is not interested in absorption on the post which is offered to him. It is, therefore, clear that these Rules regulate the service conditions of an employee who is declared surplus. So Rule 18 gives option to the Government servants to seek termination of his service if he is not interested in absorption on the post which is offered to him. It is, therefore, clear that these Rules regulate the service conditions of an employee who is declared surplus. These Rules govern the conditions of service during the period one remains as a surplus employee and in some matters even after absorption.9. I am in full agreement with the observations of the learned Single Judge in Dr.Ganpat Singh Bhandari's case (supra). Incidently, it may be mentioned that the aforesaid decision was affirmed by a Division Bench (unreported decision). On the basis of wide interpretation of the term 'other service conditions', I hold that the matters relating to absorption of a surplus Government servant falls within the scope of Clause (v) of, Section 29(f) of 1976 Act.,10. Thus it is clear that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the appeals in the matters relating to absorption of Government servants.11. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that even if the Court comes to the conclusion that the matters relating to absorption of a Government servant comes within the scope of Section 2(f)(v) of 1976 Act, this court should entertain the writ petition notwithstanding the availability of alternative remedy. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the remedy available before the Tribunal is not an effective remedy because there is no machinary for the enforcement of the orders passed by the Tribunal and secondly that this writ petition has remained pending before the court for admission for sufficiently long time and, therefore, the petitioner should not now be asked to avail the remedy of appeal. He argued that mere availability of alternative remedy is not a ground for refusal to entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the. petitioner has placed on the decisions in Daulal Purohit Vs. Slate of Rajasthan and another 1989(1) RLR 392 , Vivek Prakash Mathur Vs. State of Rajasthan 1988 (2) RLR 428 = 1988 (2) WLN 471 , Jagdish Chand Agrawal Vs. State of Rajasthan 1988(1) RLR 998 , Th. Sachdev Singh Vs. State of J.& K 1973 SLJ 138 , Commissioner of Departmental Enquires Central Vigilance Commission Vs. Slate of Rajasthan and another 1989(1) RLR 392 , Vivek Prakash Mathur Vs. State of Rajasthan 1988 (2) RLR 428 = 1988 (2) WLN 471 , Jagdish Chand Agrawal Vs. State of Rajasthan 1988(1) RLR 998 , Th. Sachdev Singh Vs. State of J.& K 1973 SLJ 138 , Commissioner of Departmental Enquires Central Vigilance Commission Vs. Union of India 1976 SLJ 675 , Smt. Kuntesh Gupta Vs Hindu Kanya Maha Vidhyalaya 1987 (4) SCC 525 , Nenu Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan and others AIR 1967 Raj. 50 and Hindustan Zink Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan 1988(2) RLR 415 = 1988(2) WLN 320 12. I have given my serious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The question as to whether the remedy of appeal before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal is a remedy at all and also as to whether it is an effective remedy, has been examined in details by a Division Bench of this court in Ved Prakash Khare Vs. State of Rajasthan and others D.B.Civil Writ Petition No.2330/86, decided on 31.8.1987 In that case reference was made to the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act and it was argued that the very composition of the Tribunal does not inspire confidence in the litigating Government servants. It was also urged that the remedy of appeal before the Tribunal is not an effective remedy on account of absence of machinery for implementation of the orders passed by the Tribunal. Both these contentions were rejected by the Division Bench. In doing so, the Division Bench observed that the position of the Act of 1976 and the Administrative Tribunals Act is different. The composition of the Tribunal and the scope of the Act of 1976 does not lead to an inference that the Tribunal does not provide for an effective remedy. The Chairman of the Tribunal is required to be a senior Officer in Super-Time Scale of I.A.S. and out of two members, one is from the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service. The Division Bench held that in view of the above position, it cannot be accepted that the composition of the Tribunal does not inspire confidence. The Chairman of the Tribunal is required to be a senior Officer in Super-Time Scale of I.A.S. and out of two members, one is from the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service. The Division Bench held that in view of the above position, it cannot be accepted that the composition of the Tribunal does not inspire confidence. The Division Bench took notice of the absence of machinery for enforcement of the orders passed by the Tribunal, but proceeded to say that in the absence of any definite material particulars about the non-implementation of the orders of the Tribunal, it cannot be said that the remedy, of appeal is not an effective remedy. Mere failure of the departmental authorities to carry out the orders of the Tribunal in some cases cannot lead to laying down a proposition that the remedy of appeal before the Tribunal is not an effective remedy.13. The cases, to which learned counsel for the petitioner has made a reference contain general proposition of law except in the case of Daulal Purohit and Vivek Prakash Mathur (supra). There is not dispute so far as general principles regarding availability of alternative remedy and the question relating to exercise of discretion by the High Court in entertaining the writ petition despite availability of alternative remedy. Even in cases where a remedy of appeal is available before the Service Appellate Tribunal, a writ petition can be entertained by the High Court, if the ends of justice so warrant. In cases where there is a patent violation of the principles of natural justice or where the action complained of is founded on some provisions of law which are unconstitutional, the High Court can always entertain a writ petition. Even in other cases there cannot be any bar on the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a writ petition. However,'it is always a case of exercise of sound judicial discretion as to whether in a given case writ petition should be entertained or not, notwithstanding the availability of alternative remedy.14. So far as Daulal Purohit's case (supra) is concerned, the observations in that case were made by a learned Single Judge without taking note of the decision in Ved Prakash Khare's case (supra). In the face of the aforesaid Division Bench decision, the observations made by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be laying down a correct proposition of law. In the face of the aforesaid Division Bench decision, the observations made by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be laying down a correct proposition of law. In Vivek Prakash Mathur's case (supra), the Court prima facie found that the action of the Government was in violation of the principles of natural justice and, therefore, the preliminary objection about the maintainability of the writ petition was over-ruled.15. So far as the present case is concerned, I find that the controversy raised by the petitioner can more appropriately be decided by the Service Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal can make a detailed inquiry regarding the controversy raised by the petitioner. If it finds that in absorption, any violation of the principles laid down in the Government instructions has been made the Tribunal can give appropriate direction for re-absorption of the petitioner. As a matter of fact in such matters, the Tribunal can decide the matters more expeditiously. In my opinion, there are no extraordinary groundsfor over-looking the availabilty of alternative remedy of appeal to the petitioner under the Act of 1976. Mere fact that the writ petition has remained pending before this court is by itself no ground to ignore the plea of alternative remedy. It need only be noticed that the respondent had raised an objection of alternative remedy as early as on 25.5.90 after it had filed its reply.16. Thus, I am not inclined to entertain the writ petition because of availability of alternative remedy of appeal.17. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed. Petitioner will however be entitled to avail remedy of appeal before the Rajasthan Civil Service Appellate Tribunal. He will also be entitled to apply before the Tribunal for condonation of delay and the time spent between filing of the writ petition and the decision thereof will be taken note of by the Tribunal for condonation of delay.Parties are left to bear their own costs.Petition dismissed. *******