JUDGMENT 1. - The predecessor-in-title of the appellants had instituted on 30th Nov., 72 civil Original Suit No. 531/72, for arrears of rent and ejectment from a shop, situated at Bajajkhana, Tonk, against his tenant Machchhukhan, in the court of unsif, Tonk. Ejectment of Machchhukhan tenant from the shop was claimed on Against the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Tonk, dated 31st July, 1982, setting aside the judgment and decree of Munsif, Tonk, dated 3rd May, 1977. the ground that Madho Lal's son Vimalchand would carry on separately his business in cloth in the shop. The suit was resisted by Machchhukhan, who alleged that the landlord Madholal had five other shops, and that Vimalchand was carrying on his business in cloth, along with his brother Babulal in a shop. He also stated that he had not got any other shop with him, and that he was carrying on his tailoring work in the suit shop for the last about thirty years, and further that comparatively there would be greater hardship to him if a decree for ejectment was passed against him. Madholal's Civil Suit No. 531/72 was decreed by the Munsif, Tonk, on 29th Apr. 74, as against Machchhukhan. 2. Machchhukhan filed Civil First Appeal No. 29/74, which was dismissed by the ADJ, Tonk, on 25th Nov., 74. Machchhukhan came in Second Appeal No. 64/75 before this Court. There had been an amendment to the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, and S. 14(2) of the said Act, as amended, provided that "no decree for eviction on the grounds set forth in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of S. 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that having regard to all the c -cut-_ stances of the case, including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or to the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only". Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only". In view of this amendment in the law, counsel for the parties in Civil Second Appeal No. 64/75 agreed that the case be remanded to the trial court for framing an appropriate issue in the light of the amendment and to dispose of the same on merits in accordance with law. A learned Single Judge of this Court, by his judgment dated 30th Jan., 76, for the above reason, allowed the appeal filed by Machchhukhan; set aside the decrees of the courts below; and remanded the case back to the trial court. In the remand-order, it was stated that the parties would be free to lead fresh evidence, if they so desired, on the newly framed issue. The evidence recorded during the original trial was also, subject to just exceptions, was directed to be the evidence during the trial after remand. 3. After the remand of the suit, the trial court framed in additional issue on the question of comparative hardship. In relation to this additional issue, tenant Machchhukhan examined himself and three other witnesses. The plaintiff also further examined himself and his son Babulal. The Munsif, Tonk, by his decree dated 3rd May, 77, again decreed the suit of landlord Madholal for ejectment of the tenant. Aggrieved by this decree, Machchhukhan tenant filed Civil First Appeal No. 63/77. During the pendency of this civil first appeal, Machchhukhan tenant died, and by order of the first appellate court dated 23rd Apr., 80, the legal representatives of Machchhukhan were brought on record. This first appeal was decided by the Civil Judge, Tonk, by his judgment dated 31st July, 82. On the question of the requirement of the suit-shop by the plaintiff, for the purpose of his son for carrying on business by the latter in cloth, the first appellate court reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the suit-shop was not reasonable aid bona fide required by the landlord, for his son Vimalchand. On the question c f comparative hardship also, the first appellate court held that other suitable accommodation was available with the landlord. On the question c f comparative hardship also, the first appellate court held that other suitable accommodation was available with the landlord. As regards one shop with the plaintiff, it was held by the first appellate court that this was used as a 'Baithak' and for having access. The plaintiff's another son was doing 'Parchuni' business in it and it could be used by the plaintiff for the purposes of his son Vimalchand. The first appellate court held that deceased Machchhukhan and his sons were carrying on tailoring business in the demised shop for the last 30 years, and that if they were ejected from the shop, they would have no means of their livelihood. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances, the first appellate court held that the tenant would suffer comparatively greater hardship if a decree for ejectment was passed against him. It, therefore, allowed the appeal; set aside the decree for ejectment, passed by the Munsif, Tonk; and consequently, dismissed the suit of the landlord for ejectment of the tenant. Madholal then filed the present second appeal in this Court. 4. This appeal was admitted as two substantial questions of law arose in the appeal. The first substantial question of law, framed on 24th Aug./83, was to the effect as to whether the judgment of the first appellate court was perverse both on the question of reasonable and bona fide necessity as well as comparative hardship; and the second substantial question of law was whether in face of the findings that Vimalchand, son of the landlord, for whom the suit-shop was required for running a cloth-business, could the first appellate court dictate the plaintiff that Vimalchand should not do cloth-business, but should do 'Parchuni' business with his father with whom another son of the landlord named Rameshchand was also already working in the Tarchuni' shop. It may be mentioned that Madholal landlord expired during the pendency of this second appeal on 1st Nov., 90, and the present appellants were substituted as his legal representatives. 5. It may be mentioned that Madholal landlord expired during the pendency of this second appeal on 1st Nov., 90, and the present appellants were substituted as his legal representatives. 5. It may be mentioned here that when this second appeal came up before a learned Single Judge of this Court on 26th Feb., 90, the learned Judge mentioned in the order-sheet that one of the points which would come up for consideration, was about the powers of the courts if the case was remanded by the High Court, after setting aside the decree and judgment, passed by the trial court and the first appellate court. As has already been stated above initially, the plaintiff's suit had been decreed by the Munsif tonk, on 29th Apr., 74, and the first appeal preferred by the tenant was dismissed on 25th Nov., 74. In their judgments, both the Munsif, Tonk and the first appellate court had then found that the landlord reasonably and bonafide required the suit-shop for the purposes of his son Vimalchand. Remand of the case became necessary in Civil Second Appeal No. 64/75, on account of introduction of S. 14(2) in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 50. The first question, therefore, as posed in this Court's proceedings dated 26th Feb., 90 was with regard to the powers of the courts below, when the case was remanded by the High Court, after setting aside the judgment and decree, previously passed by the trial court and by the first appellate court. On this point, it may be mentioned that the remand-order was passed on 30th Jan., 76. Reference in this regard may be 'made to a decision of this Court in Misrilal v. Shiv Charan In Misrilal's case (Supra), one of the,contentions put forward was that the first appellate court should not have set aside the decree passed by the trial court and should not have remanded the entire suit, but, should have framed an additional issue and should have remanded the same under the provisions of 0.41, R. 23, CPC, to the trial court. The contention was rejected by this Court stating that 0.41, R. 23 was amended so far as Rajasthan was concerned, on 11th Mar., 65, and therefore, in Rajasthan, the provisions of amended 0. The contention was rejected by this Court stating that 0.41, R. 23 was amended so far as Rajasthan was concerned, on 11th Mar., 65, and therefore, in Rajasthan, the provisions of amended 0. 41, R. 23 are not confined to remand in a case where the suit has been disposed of by the trial court on a preliminary point only, but, the appellate court under the amended provisions of 0. 41, R. 23, CPC, is empowered to remand a suit to the trial court when it considers it necessary n the interest of justice to do so. The provisions of 0.41, R. 23 as amended were couched in very wide language and a fetter that a remand could only be made under the aforesaid provisions in case the suit was decided only on a preliminary point no longer subsisted. The learned Single Judge, therefore, held that the lower appellate court was justified in remanding the suit to the trial court and in allowing the parties opportunity to amend their pleadings, if they so desired, keeping in view the provisions of S. 14(2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 50, as amended by the Amending Act of 1976. This decision clearly goes to show that the learned Single Judge of this Court was perfectly competent to remand the entire suit by his appellate judgment dated 30th Jan., 76, to the trial court, after setting aside the previous decrees of the courts below and giving opportunities to the parties to lead fresh evidence on the newly framed issues and directing the trial court to decide the suit. The trial Court, therefore, was perfectly competent to give its findings on each issue in the suit again, and so also the first appellate court, to decide all the issues framed in the case. 6. It is true that when the suit filed by Madholal was previously decided by the trial court on 29th Apr., 74, and by the first appellate court on 25th Nov., 74, both the courts had held that the suit-shop was reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord, Madholal, for the use and occupation of his son Vimalchand, and even after the remand' of the case, the Munsif, Tonk, as a trial court, again decided the question regarding the requirement of the shop by Madholal, in his favour. However, the first appellate court, after the remand, in the first appeal filed against the decree of the trial court.dated 3rd May, 77, reversed the findings of the trial court on both issue No. 1 regarding reasonable and bona fide requirement as well as on the additional issue framed after the remand. regarding comparative hardship. The first appellate court was perfectly competent to go into the findings of the trial court on both these issues and to give its own findings in respect of them. 7. Now, the first appellate court has held that landlord Madholal had, in fact, two shops in his possession. One shop was occupied by Madholal himself, for carrying on his grocery business; and in the second shop, his son Babulal carried on cloth-business. Two other shops belonging to Madholal, were not in his possession, as one of them was occupied by the tenant, Machchhukhan;'and the other, by another tenant. The age of Vimal chand at the time when his statement was recorded, was 20 years. So far as one more shop was concerned, it was in a by lane, and was in fact, used as a 'Baithak' and for having access to the house, wherein, sometimes, another son of the landlord Madholal, named Ramesh Chand used to do Tarchuni' work. The first appellate court held that when there was joint-family business in Tarchuni' and in cloth, Vimal chand could also assist his father and brother in their respective business. If Vimalchand wanted a separate shop, he could use one of the shops which was being used as a 'Baithak'. As to the contention advanced on behalf of the landlord that the business of cloth cannot be carried on in a by-lane, the first appellate court held that cloth-business could be carried on anywhere, and that for that it was not necessary that the shop should be in the main market. 8. On the question of comparative hardship, the first appellate court held that Machchhukhan was tenant in the shop in dispute for the last thirty years, and he was doing tailoring work, in which, he was being assisted by his sons, and that if he was ejected from the suit-shop, he would he deprived of his means of livelihood, and further that it was very difficult for him to obtain another shop at such a rent of Rs. 15/- per month, as he was paying for the suit-shop. On the basis of these reasoning, the first appellate court decided the relevant issues against the landlord. 9. Counsel for the appellants urged that the findings of the first appellate court were conjectural and also perverse. He also urged that cloth-shop can only be carried on in the main market and not in a by-lane. He also contended that the first appellate court was much obsessed by the fact that the landlord was a rich person while the tenant, a poor tailor. As against this, counsel for the responder urged that the first appellate court, after considering all the facts and circumstances. of the case, has given the findings that the appellants did not require the suit shop reasonably and bona fide for the occupation of Vimalchand, and that having regard to the accommodation available with the landlord, comparatively, greater hardship would be caused to the tenant if a decree for ejectment was passed. He urged that the findings given by the first appellate court on both these matters are findings of fact, and should not be interferred with by this Court in second appeal. 10. In my view, the findings in relation to the requirement of the suit-shop by the appellants for Vimalchand and about comparative hardship that is likely to be caused if a decree for ejectment is passed, are both questions of fact, and findings on questions of fact cannot be interfered with in second appeal, unless, the findings are absolutely perverse, or, there would be miscarriage of justice.. Madholal has admitted in his statement that he owned five shops. The shop which he calls a 'Baithak', is vacant. It can conveniently be used by Vimalchand for carrying on business in cloth. It is a case where other reasonable accommodation was available with the landlord, and obviously, greater hardship was to result to the tenants who did not own any shop at Tonk or elsewhere to carry on tailoring business. It is apparent that the financial status of Machchhukhan was not such that he could arrange for another shop for carrying on his tailoring business. It has come in the evidence of Machchhukhan that his sons also sit in his tailoring shop. It is apparent that the financial status of Machchhukhan was not such that he could arrange for another shop for carrying on his tailoring business. It has come in the evidence of Machchhukhan that his sons also sit in his tailoring shop. When this fact was admitted that Madholal had one more shop, which was lying vacant, it cannot be said that the findings of the first appellate court was perverse. I am not ready to interfere in the finding of fact, arrived at by the first appellate court both on the questions of requirement of the suit-shop and comparative hardship. 11. Consequently, I do not find any.force in this second appeal, and the same is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.Appeal Dismissed. *******