Judgment :- DR.AS.ANAND. C.J. 1. The only question which this writ appeal raises is, whether the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, can interfere with the penalty awarded by the competent authority after a domestic enquiry is held and misconduct established, only on the ground that it is disproportionate to the misconduct proved? To answer the question, a brief note of the facts would be necessary. 2. The respondent was employed as a foundry worker in the Government Press. On a charge of steeling conemetal weighing about 540 grams he was proceeded against departmentally. A criminal case was also registered against him and he was prosecuted in C.C. No. 18991 of 1919 before the V Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras. 3. In the domestic enquiry the respondent was charge sheeted and was asked to submit his explanation. He submitted no explanation. The Assistant Works Manager, Government Press, held an enquiry. The respondent apparently did not extend any assistance in the enquiry. The enquiry officer, after conducting an enquiry, concluded that the case of theft of metal by the respondent stood proved. Reliance was also placed on a written statement made by the respondent after he had been caught red handed while committing the theft. On receipt of the enquiry report, a provisional conclusion was arrived at by the competent authority to dismiss the respondent are he was called upon to show cause in writing within seven days from the date of receipt of the memorandum, as to why the proposed punishment of dismissal from service be not imposed upon him. A copy of the findings of the enquiry officer was enclosed. He submitted his explanation to the show cause memorandum wherein he pleaded that the complaint against him was false and was born out of some misunderstanding between him and another person. The competent authority considered the explanation given by the respondent and found that the story of misunderstanding did not carry any force. The competent authority, therefore, imposed the punishment of dismissal from service on the respondent, by his proceedings dated 14.7.1980. The competent authority considered the explanation given by the respondent and found that the story of misunderstanding did not carry any force. The competent authority, therefore, imposed the punishment of dismissal from service on the respondent, by his proceedings dated 14.7.1980. The respondent did not immediately question the proceedings dated 14.7.1980 and according to his own averments in the writ petition, in para graph 5 of the affidavit filed in support thereof, stated that an appeal was filed before the first respondent in the writ petition, through a representation dated 29.11.1982. That was more than two years after the order of dismissal was made. 4. After the respondent had been dismissed from service by the competent authority, as a result of the departmental proceedings, it appears that the criminal case also came to be concluded. In the criminal case, however, the respondent was acquitted on 5.8.1980. The respondent approached the Government for his reinstatement on the ground that he had been acquitted by the criminal court, without in any way at that stage assailing the order of dismissal made by the competent authority on 14.7.1980. Since the Government did not accede to the request of the respondent, he preferred writ petition No. 11090 of 1983 in this Court, Various grounds were raised in the writ petition including the ground that since the respondent had been acquitted in the criminal Case, no punishment could have been imposed upon him in the domestic enquiry. The learned single Judge rightly repelled the argument. The learned single Judge found that the domestic enquiry had been properly conducted and that it was not one of those cases where the findings of the disciplinary authority could be characterised as based on no evidence or on no acceptable evidence. The learned single Judge, therefore concluded in paragraph 45 of the judgment under appeal that the finding of the domestic enquiry regarding the misconduct of the respondent did not call for any interference. After having returned the finding, the learned single Judge observed as follows— “5. The last contention though not actually raised in this proceeding that the extreme punishment of dismissal is highly excessive considering the theft of material of value of Rs20, appears to me to be well founded. After having returned the finding, the learned single Judge observed as follows— “5. The last contention though not actually raised in this proceeding that the extreme punishment of dismissal is highly excessive considering the theft of material of value of Rs20, appears to me to be well founded. Following the decision in W.P. 6593 of 1983, I am inclined to set aside the order of dismissal, but with a condition that the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner only as a new employee with no right to the petitioner to claim benefit of any kind on the basis of his past services. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed however, there will be no order as to costs.” 5. The Government Pleader, appearing for the appellants submits that after having found no fault with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, is was not open to the learned single Judge, in exercise of the writ jurisdiction, to interfere with the punishment imposed by the competent authority. It was submitted that the power to impose penalty on a Government employee is conferred on the competent authority by rhe service rules framed under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution of India and the quantum of punishment is in the exclusive domain and the jurisdiction of the competent authority. The learned Government Pleader went on to submit that the adequacy of penalty which was not questioned on any ground, much less on the grounds of mala fides, was not a matter for the learned single Judge to concern with. It support of his submission the learned Govt. Pleader has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India v. State of Haryana and others 1 wherein after a review of a catena of authorities, including the judgment reported in State of Orissa v. Bidhyabbhushan 1, Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh 2, and O.P. Guptas case 3, the Supreme Court stated the law like this— “We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matter or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the enquiry officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. The tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the enquiry officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penally on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an act of Legislature or rules made under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the inquiry officer or competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter.” 6. The learned Government Pleader, on basis of the settled law enunciated by the Supreme Court of India as noted herein above, submitted that the judgment of the learned single judge deserves to be set aside. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent, in reply, submitted that since the respondent had been tried for the criminal offence in a competent court, he could not have been proceeded with in the departmental enquiry, According to the learned counsel, the acquittal of the respondent by a criminal Court was binding on the departmental authorities and no finding contra to the finding of the criminal Court could have been recorded against the respondent Learned counsel relies upon an earlier judgment of the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 6593 of 1983, decided on 12.12.1985 in support of his submission. 8. We are not impressed with the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent. 8. We are not impressed with the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent. Whereas in a particular case it may be desirable for the domestic enquiry to be kept in abeyance during the proceedings in a criminal Court where the question in issue both in the domestic enquiry and in the criminal Court is the same and is based on the same facts, it is an absolutely different thing to say that if the domestic enquiry continues simultaneously, the findings of the domestic enquiry would get vitiated only on the ground that the criminal Court records an order of acquittal. There is no scope for such a view, in the view that we take, we are fortified by the view of the Supreme Court in Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workers 4 9. Apart from the legal position as we have indicated herein above, we find that the order of dismissal had been made in the domestic enquiry against the respondent on 14.7.1980. The order of acquittal was passed by the Criminal Court on 5.8.1980. How the enquiry officer was required to take note of the acquittal made subsequent to the findings of the domestic enquiry, is not at all intelligible? The respondent waited for more than two years to make a representation against the order of dismissal dated 14.7.1980, and thereafter for further almost one year before he filed the writ petition in 1983 questioning the order dated 14.7.1980. He certainly was guilty of laches. Since the learned single Judge found no reason to interfere with the findings of misconduct recorded at the domestic enquiry, it is not permissible for him to have proceeded to interfere with the punishment, only on the ground that the punishment of dismissal was excessive considering the value of the material of which theft was committed. The judgment of the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 6593 of 983, following which the learned single Judge interfered with the order of punishment came up for consideration in W.A. 56 of 1986 by a Divi sion Bench of this Court. 10. The judgment of the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 6593 of 983, following which the learned single Judge interfered with the order of punishment came up for consideration in W.A. 56 of 1986 by a Divi sion Bench of this Court. 10. Ramalingam, J speaking for the Bench, after a reference to a number of authorities held that it is not open to the Court, in exercise of its powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, after accepting, the findings of the domestic enquiry regarding the established misconduct, to interfere with the quantum of punishment. The judgment of the learned single Judge which had been relied upon by him to interfere with the quantum of punishment was set aside by the Division Bench on the 11th July 1989. 11. In view of the law laid down above and in Union of India v. Parmananda 1, supra, we hold that in exercise of the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court cannot interfere with the quantum of punishment, after finding the domestic enquiry to have been properly conducted and upholding the findings recorded during the domestic enquiry, Once there has been an enquiry consistent with the service rules and in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and the findings recorded at that enquiry are not frowned upon, the Court would not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless the adequacy of the penalty is shown to be vitiated by mala fides , which certanly is not the position in the instant case. Thus, for what we have said above, we find the judgment of the learned single Judge cannot be sustained and we accordingly set aside the same. There shall be no order as to costs. 12. Before parting with the judgment, we would like to observe that should the appellants decide to review the question of punishment on represention to be made by the respondent, the dismissal of the writ petition or the grant of this writ appeal shall not be an impediment.