Sarfaraz Ali Khan v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour
1991-07-11
S.H.A.RAZA
body1991
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT S.H.A. Raza, J. - Relying upon the judgment delivered in the case of Northern Railway Administration v. Sri Kaushal Kishore and another (Writ Petition No. 1333 of 1987), the Presiding Officer of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kanpur, by means of his award, which was published on 17-8-89. dismissed the reference made by the Central Government, only on the ground of laches and acquiescence, aggrieved against which the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. The brief facts, relevant for the decision of the writ petition are that upon the application dated 15-7-64, the Division Superintendent by means of his letter, informed the petitioner that he had been removed from service with effect from 27-3-64 vide notice No. 170E/I/IA dated 26-3-64. A copy of the order was enclosed with the said letter. In the said letter it was provided that the petitioner could submit his appeal to the Chief Personnel Officer, Northern Railway, New Delhi. The order dated 26-3-64 communicated to the petitioner by the aforesaid letter indicated that in accordance with orders passed by the Divisional Superintendent, the following penalty was imposed upon the petitioner :- 'Removed From Service. This penalty has been imposed for the following specific charges which stand substantiated. Unauthorised absence from duty from 29-9-63 and leaving station without permission from the competent authority. You are required to acknowledge receipt of this notice on the form sub-joined. Sd (B.L. Karamchandani) Assistant Personal Officer Lucknow." 3. Aggrieved against this the petitioner preferred an appeal on 24-5-65. The Assistant Personnel Officer, Lucknow, Northern Railway, intimated to the petitioner that the Chief Personnel Officer, the appellate authority had considered his appeal and passed the following order :- "I see no reason to amend or cancel the orders already issued." 4. The said letter also contained the following instructions :- "Under Rule 1732(3) RI the Rules regulating Disciplinary Action, you may apply, if you so desire within two months of the date of issue of this letter to the General Manager for a revision of the penalty imposed on you. In this application you may, if choose, request the General Manager to refer the ease to the Railway Rates Tribunal for advice before he disposes it." 5. Accordingly the petitioner preferred a revision before the General Manager.
In this application you may, if choose, request the General Manager to refer the ease to the Railway Rates Tribunal for advice before he disposes it." 5. Accordingly the petitioner preferred a revision before the General Manager. On 16-5-66 the Assistant personnel Officer, Lucknow, intimated to the petitioner that the General Manager had considered his revision petition and after obtaining advice of Railway Rates Tribunal dismissed the revision petition. 6. Thereafter the petitioner sent a notice to the opposite parties purported to be one under Section BO CPC. Thereafter the petitioner's wife preferred a representation to the Ministry of Railways, copies of which we sent to the President of India and the Prime Minister. The petitioner received acknowledgement dated 5-8-67 from the Prime Ministers's Secretariat informing the petitioner that the representation was forwarded to the Ministry of Railways for necessary action. Thereafter the petitioner himself made a representation to the Ministry of Law, Government of India. Thereafter vide letter dated 13-5-69 P.A. to Deputy Law Minister intimated to the petitioner as under :- "lam enclosing herewith a copy of a letter dated 9th May, 1969 from the Railway Minister to the Deputy Law minister regarding your re-in statement in service. The letter explains the position of your case." On 11-5-74, during the course of strike in Railways the petitioner approached the Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railways, Lucknow by offering his services without prejudice to the orders already passed in his case with regard to his removal from service on the charge of unauthorised absence. He intimated that he was prepared to serve the Railways and the country without remuneration and further assured that the offer from his side was in pursuance to his heartily feeling and without any ulterior motive. On 18-5-74 the Divisional Superintendent, Lucknow directed the petitioner to let that office know about the date of birth of the petitioner so as to enable his office to consider the case of his reemployment but it seems that the matter could not progress as the strike was called off. Later on the petitioner approached the office bearers of Uttar Railway Karmchari Union who demanded the reinstatement of the petitioner.
Later on the petitioner approached the office bearers of Uttar Railway Karmchari Union who demanded the reinstatement of the petitioner. The Union also raised an Industrial Dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (C), Kanpur but due to the adamant approach of the authorities no conciliation could he arrived at and the matter was referred for adjudication and accordingly the reference was made for adjudication before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kanpur. The notification for referring the dispute for adjudication to the said Tribunal was issued on 16th March, 1988 which reads as under : "Whether the action of the Divisional Railway Manager Northern Railway. Lucknow in dismissing Sh. Sharfaraz Ali Khan with effect from 27-3-1964 from service is justified ? If not to what relief the workman concerned is entitled to and from what date ?" 7. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kanpur, instead of deciding the dispute on merit rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground of laches and acquiescence. In its Award the Tribunal relied upon the following paragraphs of the observation made by Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.C. Mathur in Writ Petition No. 1333 of 1987 decided on 25-5-87. "It is true that in the absence of a statutory provision prescribing period of limitation for approaching the Tribunal a claim cannot be rejected on the ground that it is barred by time. Ail the same it is necessary that there should be no laches and the claim should not be stale. In Ram Krishna Ramnath (supra) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court observed in para 23 of the report as follows : ..........Industrial disputes are required to be settled as early as possible. Therefore, undue delay or laches would not be countenanced by the Labour Court. Whether there has been an unreasonable delay is a question to be decided by the Labour Court in its discretion. All that we need say now is that the Labour Court functioning under Section 33C(2), though not governed by the laws of limitation which might bar a Civil Court from giving relief in respect of a lawful right, will be entitled not to encourage or allow over stale claims unless there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay. AND I have not observed that the claim was liable to be dismissed on the basis that it was barred by time.
AND I have not observed that the claim was liable to be dismissed on the basis that it was barred by time. I have only observed that a claim may be rejected on the ground of laches. In case the discipline of approaching the Tribunal within a reasonable time is not enforced the Administration may be put to great hardship. The workman may not raise any dispute during the period the records have been weeded out rendering it almost impossible for the Administration to meet the plea of the workman. For these reasons a [though Limitation Act as such will not apply but the principle of laches may still be enforced. Whether in a particular case workman has been guilty of laches or not will have to be decided on the facts of that case. Similarly a Tribunal nay not be bound by rigid rules of procedure, including the law of evidence, but the evidence brought on record must be such as inspires confidence." 8. Although the Tribunal while rejecting the claim of the petitioner relied upon the aforesaid observations of Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.C. Mathur but committed manifest error of law in totally ignoring the operative portion of the order passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mathur in which a direction to the Tribunal was issued to reconsider the question of (i) delay : (ii)completion of more than 240 days, (iii) back wages, and (iv) existence of post to warrant re-instatement. While quashing the Award passed by the Tribunal the case was remanded back to the Tribunal to reconsider the claim of the workman in the light of the observations made above. 9. It is pertinent to mention here that the petitioner Kaushal Kishore in the aforesaid case was merely a casual labour and the grievance raised by him was only to the effect that he had completed more than 240 days of continuous service. By the time the dispute was referred to the Tribunal the record pertaining to his service was weeded out, in view of the aforesaid circumstances Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.C. Mathur was justified in observing that in case the discipline of approaching the Tribunal within reasonable time is not enforced the Administration may be put to great hardship.
By the time the dispute was referred to the Tribunal the record pertaining to his service was weeded out, in view of the aforesaid circumstances Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.C. Mathur was justified in observing that in case the discipline of approaching the Tribunal within reasonable time is not enforced the Administration may be put to great hardship. The workman may not raise any dispute during the period the record remained available and may raise the same after the records had been weeded out rendering it almost impossible for the administration to meet the pleas of the workman. For these reasons although the limitation as such will not apply but the principle of laches may still be in force. The facts of the instant case stand on a better footing inasmuch as the petitioner was a confirmed employee and was posted at Lucknow as clerk in the works section of Engineering Department. The only allegation against him was that he absented from duty from 29-6-63 and has left the station without permission of the competent authority. The petitioner has raised a grievance that he was removed from service without following the principles of natural justice and without affording any opportunity of hearing ; as no punishment could be imposed on any employee without serving any show cause notice for the punishment so proposed. He never absented himself unauthorisedly as he submitted medical leave application, along with the medical certificate. 10. In the instant case too, the Railways Administration took up a defence before the Tribunal that the matter pertained to the year 1964 to 1966 and due to considerable lapse of time the record was weeded out, hence he was not entitled for any relief. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that after the disposal of his revision the petitioner had sent a notice to Railway Administration on 26-9-66 purporting to be one under Section 80, CPC. Thus the cause of action accrued to the workman in April, 1966, when his revision was dismissed. The workman, therefore, should not have waited for 20, 21 years in raising the dispute. He should have filed a suit challenging the order of his dismissal from service, in Civil Court or should have pursued his remedy under the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Having not done so he waited till the record was weeded out.
The workman, therefore, should not have waited for 20, 21 years in raising the dispute. He should have filed a suit challenging the order of his dismissal from service, in Civil Court or should have pursued his remedy under the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Having not done so he waited till the record was weeded out. There was nothing on record as to what prevented him from bringing in action in the court of law against the management. Mere sending representation to the higher authorities mean nothing. 11. During the course of argument the learned counsel on behalf of the Railways produced before this Court the relevant order issued by the Railway Board regarding weeding out of the documents which reads as under : "Disciplinary Proceedings. 11. Class I 12. Class II 13. Class III 14. Class IV 15. Joint Enquiry (a) resulting in imposition of Penalties (b) Resulting later in of the accused officials with or without warning. 10 years or 3 years after the final disposal or final Judgment under the normal court of law, which ever is Subject to an authenticated copy of the order regarding imposition of penalty or warning being placed on and a suitable entry being made in the appropriate S/record 12. A perusal of the aforesaid order indicates that the weeding out Of the record pertaining to disciplinary, (proceeding) is subject to an authenticated copy of the order regarding imposition of penalty or warning being placed on the personal file and a suitable entry being made in the appropriate service record. 13. It is the admitted"case of the parties that the order passed by the punishing authority, appellate authority or the revisional authority were never served to the petitioner. Only the operative portion of the order was communicated to the petitioner. In absence of a copy of the order, it was not possible for him to prefer an effective appeal or revision before the authorities concerned. This aspect of the matter deserved to be considered by the Tribunal but the same was totally ignored.
Only the operative portion of the order was communicated to the petitioner. In absence of a copy of the order, it was not possible for him to prefer an effective appeal or revision before the authorities concerned. This aspect of the matter deserved to be considered by the Tribunal but the same was totally ignored. Even in absence of the record which has been alleged to be weeded out the Tribunal could have very well perused the authenticated copy of the orders regarding imposition of penalty imposed against the petitioner which must have been placed in the personal file and the service record of the petitioner and could have arrived at a conclusion alter perusing the same, as to whether the order indicated that any opportunity was given to the petitioner or not, during the course of enquiry or whether he had applied for grant of leave or not. It could have very well summoned the personal file and the service record of the petitioner and could have found as to whether there was any endorsement on the personal file or service record regarding the weeding out of the record or not or whether the orders passed by the disciplinary, appellate and the rivisional authority or its authenticated copies were placed on the personal file and service record of the petitioner or not. If there would have been no such endorsement and placement of authenticated copies of those orders the labour court could have very well presumed that the weeding out was not in accordance with the orders issued by the Board and if there existed any endorsement of weeding out of the record and the orders passed by the authorities concerned found place in the personal file and the service record of the petitioner then on the basis of the documents adduced by the parties as well as the orders placed in the personal file and service record of the petitioner, it could have very well passed an order on merit but the Tribunal in a most cursory and mechanical way has passed the impugned order under challenge rejecting the claim of the petitioner without entering into the merits of the case. The Tribunal has undoubtedly acted in a most arbitrary manner in replying to the reference in negative without entering into the merits of the case. 14.
The Tribunal has undoubtedly acted in a most arbitrary manner in replying to the reference in negative without entering into the merits of the case. 14. It has been held in Needle Industries v. Labour Court, reported in (1986) 1 LLJ, 405, that laches or delay in making reference are not ipso-facto any bar to seek relief under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is needless to mention that the terms of reference determine the scope of the Tribunal's power and jurisdiction. It is incumbent upon the Tribunal to give a finding on the basis of terms of reference. The Tribunal cannot shirk its responsibility by circumventing reference and instead of adjudicating the matter on merit decide the same only on the ground of laches and acquiescence etc. Undoubtedly the dispute should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after reconciliation proceedings have failed, particularly so when dispute relate to discharge of workman. The question as to whether it is for the Central Government or the State Government to refer the dispute expeditiously, but if it refers the dispute belatedly, it is incumbent upon the Labour Court to adjudicate upon the reference. It is the discretion of the Central or the State Government where a dispute is raised at an extra-ordinary belated stage to make a reference but when the Government makes reference either it should be replied in positive or negative on the merit of the case. It has been held in the case of Venkata Chaliah v. State of Mysore, (1970) 21 FLR 377, that a claim which was lying at the time of reference was not a belated claim. If the dispute existed or apprehended the Government would be competent to refer, 15. In the case of Wasir Sultan Tabacco Co. v. Andhra Pradesh, (1964) 1 LLJ, 622 (H. C. A. P.) it was held that the dispute referred after six years must be deemed to be inordinately delayed and unreasonable. A similar view was taken in the case of Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Workman, (1959) 2 LLJ, 26. 16. Thus there is no birth of rulings on this point, on both sides. 17. Every case depends upon its own facts and circumstances. In the present case the Tribunal came to conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of laches as he, through his union, raised a dispute belatedly.
16. Thus there is no birth of rulings on this point, on both sides. 17. Every case depends upon its own facts and circumstances. In the present case the Tribunal came to conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of laches as he, through his union, raised a dispute belatedly. It was incumbent upon the Tribunal to adjudicate upon the dispute if the material already on record, as indicated above, was sufficient to reply to the reference. It was also incumbent upon the tribunal to consider as to whether the record was actually weeded out or not, and if it was weeded out whether it was according to Government orders or not, otherwise the administration on this pretext could defeat the claim of the workman who, because of his poverty, could not approach the Government to raise industrial dispute expeditiously. The Industrial Di pules Act was enacted for the benefit of the workman. The objective of the Act is to provide redress to workman who has been subjected to retrenchment or dismissal etc. The Court should be very cautious while adjudicating upon the claim of the workman. The claim of the workman should not be decided in a cursory and mechanical way as was done in the instant case. The Tribunal while throwing away the reference also held that the petitioner was guilty of acquiescence as he had applied for reemployment during the course of railway strike. A perusal of his application indicates that the petitioner earnestly preferred application before the authorities concerned to allow him to work without remuneration, without prejudice to his case. It cannot be said that by offering his service during the course of strike when, according to the petitioner, country was in peril he had acquiesced with the order of dismissal. The Tribunal has taken a perverse view of the matter by giving a finding to the effect, that the petitioner has acquiesced with the order of dismissal. 18. In view of what has been indicated above, the writ petition is allowed and the order passed by the Tribunal is quashed. The Tribunal shall re-consider the claim of the workman in the light of the observations made herein above. It will be open to the parties to place additional pleadings and evidence before the Tribunal in support of his claim. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.