ORDER 1. The most accepted methodology of a governmental action is fairness and any departure therefrom will lead to judicial interference since lack of fairness will lead to arbitrariness which is the ante-thesis of law. There is no room for administrative caprice, whim or its ipse dixit. All administrative action must conform to reasons supported by the facts and figures and in the event of any deviation therefrom Law Courts shall rise up to the occasion and set right the wrong and to do so is the plain exercise of judicial power. 2. Before adverting to the rival contentions it would be convenient to deal with the factual aspects of the matter at this juncture. 3. To ameliorate the acute power shortage, the Government of India sanctioned a power project in the district of Bankura, West Bengal called Mejia Thermal Power Station consisting of three stations of 210 M.W. having a financial involvement of Rs. 700 crores as on 1989. To complete the project, Damodar Valley Corporation (in short D.V.C.) floated tender for electrical mechanical civil works including construction, manufacture and commissioning of equipments for three sets of Isolated Phase Generator Bus-ducts with auxiliary equipment Bearing No. PE-SPEC/534 in two parts. The first part comprises technical and commercial bid and the second part-the price bid. In the usual course of events the petitioner no.1 applied for the tender papers and shortly thereafter submitted its tender. On 7th March, 1988 the techno commercial part of the tender i.e. Part-I (One) was opened in the presence of the bidders and on 11th November, 1988 D.V.C. confirmed its acceptance of the technical and commercial part of the offer made by the petitioner no.1. On 24th November, 1988 the price part i.e. Part-II (Two) of the tender was opened and the petitioner no.1 offer was found to be the lowest after price evaluation made by the D.V.C. Subsequently on 24th August, 1989 Damodar Valley Corporation (D.V.C.) asked the petitioner no.1 for an extension of the validity of the offer up to 31st October, 1989 in pursuance whereof the petitioner by its intimation dated 29th August, 1989 extended the validity of the offer up to the date as required by the D.V.C. 4. Subsequently however, on 31st August, 1989 a conditional letter of intent was issued in favour of the respondent no.3, Transformer Electrical Kerala Limited, subject to the approval of the D.V.C. for joint collaboration undertaking with M/s. Hitachi, a foreign collaborator and it is this issuance of conditional letter of intent issued in favour of the respondent no.3 has prompted the writ petitioner no. 1 to move this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. Mr. Pal appearing in support of the writ petition mainly submitted on two counts-count one being that the tender submitted by the respondent no.3 ought to have rejected in accordance with the terms of the tender notice itself since the respondent no.3 did not fulfill the pre-requisite qualifications specified in the tender notice and on count two, Mr. Pal contended that D.V.C. has arbitrarily and illegally given preference to the respondent no.3, relying on its earlier resolution no. 5810 dated 22nd May, 1989. 6. It would be convenient at this juncture to note the pre-requisite qualifications as mentioned in the tender notice itself. The relevant extract of which is quoted herein-below:- "Tenderers should note the following pre-requisite qualifications:- 1. The bidder must be manufacturers of Isolated Phase Genorator Bus-duct. 2. The offered Generator Bus-duct must be backed by the proven performance and reliability in operation in Thermal Power Station application for minimum period of 3(three) years of identical equipments manufactured by the tenderer. In the absence of proven performance of 3 (three) tenderers who have collaboration with foreign electrical manufacturers must furnish collaboration guarantee for successful design, manufacture and performance of the equipments offered to meet the guaranteed parameters and qualities. The firm shall submit documentary evidence justifying fulfillment of above NIT pre-qualifications along with the Technical & Commercial bid, failing which, their offers will be deemed to be incomplete and will not be considered." 7. Furthermore, the tender specifications expressly provide in paragraph 3.0000 that in the event of non-submission of the required documents, the tender shall be deemed to be incomplete and liable for rejection. Admittedly the respondent no.3 did not have the pre-requisite qualification mentioned in the tendered notice, viz., being backed by the proven performance and reliability in operation in Thermal Power Station application for a minimum period of three years of identical equipment manufactured by the respondent no. Admittedly the respondent no.3 did not have the pre-requisite qualification mentioned in the tendered notice, viz., being backed by the proven performance and reliability in operation in Thermal Power Station application for a minimum period of three years of identical equipment manufactured by the respondent no. 3 as such it was a mandatory requirement so far as the respondent no.3 is concerned, to have a collaboration agreement with foreign manufacturers and the respondent no.3 was required to furnish a collaboration guarantee for successful design, manufacture and performance of the equipment offered to meet the guaranteed parameters and quality and to submit such collaboration guarantee along with the technical bid. It is on this count Mr. Pal strenuously contended that since the respondent no.3 has failed to provide such a guarantee as above, the tender for all intents and purposes was incomplete and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the tender conditions, the tender was liable to be rejected and ought not to have been considered. 8. Incidentally, the letter of intent issued in favour of the Respondent No.3 contained a clause to the effect that the joint undertaking by the collaborator M/s. Hitachi Limited, Japan on a non-judicial stamp paper as per NIT requirement subject to D.V.C.'s approval shall be submitted by the Respondent No.3, before issuance of the purchase order but not later than 31st October, 1989. 9. On this count however, four-fold submissions have been made by Mr. Pal viz. (A) The NIT requirement is of a collaboration guarantee. The Letter of Intent however, requires only joint undertaking. (B) Even the provisions of the joint undertaking are not spelt out in the Letter of Intent. In other words, what would be the contents of the undertaking is not specified in the Letter of Intent. Such requirement is totally vague and unworkable requirement and cannot serve any purpose at all. (C) The NIT requires a collaboration guarantee for successful design, manufacture and performance of the equipment offered to meet the guaranteed parameters and quality. The clear intention of NIT was to safeguard the purchase to be made by D.V.C in the absence of proven performance of three years as envisaged by the second pre-qualification mentioned in the tender notice. D.V.C has totally flouted these norms and departed from it without any justification. The clear intention of NIT was to safeguard the purchase to be made by D.V.C in the absence of proven performance of three years as envisaged by the second pre-qualification mentioned in the tender notice. D.V.C has totally flouted these norms and departed from it without any justification. No justification of any kind has been pleaded in the affidavit and in fact there can be none. (D) The collaboration guarantee was to be furnished along with the techno commercial bid. Admittedly, respondent TELK did not submit any such collaboration guarantee along with the techno commercial bid. But D.V.C discriminated in favour of respondent TELK by deviating from the NIT requirement and permitting respondent TELK to submit a joint undertaking (which in any event not the requirement of NIT) before the issuance of the purchase order. 10. Relying on observation of Frankfurter-J. in Vittarelli vs. Seatan, (1959) 359 U.S. 535: 3 LEd. 2d 1012, it was contended that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. Frankfurter-J. in the decision noted above observed:- "An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standard by which it professes its action to be judged. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirement that bind such agency, that procedure must be serupulously observed. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the proceedural sword shall perish with the sword." 11. It was contended that there is no scope for any discretion in such a situation and in effect the respondent no.3 was not qualified Or eligible to submit the tender even-as such acceptance of the tender by the Corporation in favour of the above-named Respondent No.3 cannot but be termed to be an administrative whim or caprice. It was contended that there is no scope for any discretion in such a situation and in effect the respondent no.3 was not qualified Or eligible to submit the tender even-as such acceptance of the tender by the Corporation in favour of the above-named Respondent No.3 cannot but be termed to be an administrative whim or caprice. While it is true that there was in fact, a departure from the usual tender conditions in this case and it is also now well settled that an executive authority must he rigorously held to be bound by the standard it proposes, but the issue has to be determined on the basis of the concept of justice-In the event it is found, in my view, by a reason of relaxation of tender conditions there is an utter prejudice to the other intending bidders, the concept of justice would prompt the Law Court to set right the wrong but in the event it is found that non-submission of the collaboration guarantee along with the tender papers did not in fact, create any prejudice in so far as the other tenderers are concerned on the aspect of submission of tender, Law Courts will be loath to interfere on this ground alone. Departure from the tender conditions cannot in my view, be said to be operative in the facts and circumstances of the matter under consideration being prejudicial to the submission of tender papers so far as the other bidders are concerned. Considering the Latter of Intent, in my view, it cannot be termed to be an absolute departure but at best a minor variation of the conditions. The delay involved in the matter of submission of the collaboration guarantee or undertaking by the collaborator cannot be termed to be of such a nature so as to deprive the Respondent No.3 from submitting its tender. Be it recorded here, however, that in the event the departure would keep the other tenderers Out of the race then and in that event, the concept of justice would have prompted this Court to set right the wrong. But in the facts and circumstances of the matter under consideration, it cannot be said to be of such a nature by reason wherefore the applicant was made to suffer or being kept out of the race. But in the facts and circumstances of the matter under consideration, it cannot be said to be of such a nature by reason wherefore the applicant was made to suffer or being kept out of the race. In my view, injustice is less apparent in the matter under consideration and as such I am unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Pal on the first count, that the tender submitted by the Respondent No.3 ought to have been rejected in accordance with the terms of the tender notice since the Respondent No.3 did not fulfill the pre-requisite qualifications specified in the tender notice. The observations of the Supreme Court in the case of G.J. Fernandaze vs. State of Karnataka, (1990) 2 SCC 488 , lend support to the view expressed above. 12. Turning now on to the second count of the petitioner's submission that D.V.C. has arbitrarily and illegally given preference to the Respondent No.3 relying on its resolution No. 5810 dated 22nd May, 1989. It appears that the Corporation by the above-noted resolution has decided that in the event a public sector undertaking participates in the tender, and such a tender is within the range of 10% of the lowest offer, the public sector undertaking should be invited for negotiation to match the lowest offer and in the event of such a matching offer the tender so submitted by the public Sector Undertaking may be accepted. 13. On the factual score admittedly, on evaluation of the price bid, the writ petitioner was found to be the lowest tenderer and the Respondent No.3 being a government undertaking was the second lowest. In the normal course of events, however, the writ petitioner ought to have been awarded the contract, but by reason of the resolution no. 5810 dated 22nd May, 1989 D.V.C. offered an opportunity to the Respondent No.3 to match the lowest offer and by reason of such matching offer, letter of intent was issued in favour of the Respondent No.3 and it is this opportunity to match the offer of the lowest tenderer given to a public sector undertaking evoked a very strong criticism from Mr. Pal. 14. Before proceeding further however, the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Harminder Singh Arora vs. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 247 , seems to be very apposite. Pal. 14. Before proceeding further however, the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Harminder Singh Arora vs. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 247 , seems to be very apposite. The Supreme Court observed:- "It was next contended that the conditions contained in the tender notice did not contemplate of giving 10 per cent price preference to government undertakings, yet 10 per cent price preference was given to the government illegally and the policy of the government to give 10 per cent price preference to government undertaking was discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The State policy places respondent 4 above the appellant without any basis or reasonable classification. In the absence of any such stipulation in the contract such price preference was unjustified. If the terms and conditions of the tender have been incorporated in the tender notice itself and that did not indicate any preference to the government undertakings of giving 10 per cent price preference to government undertakings, the authority concerned acted arbitrarily in allowing 10 per cent price preference to respondent 4. The only facility provided to the government undertakings was provided in para 19 which contemplates that the Central or State Government departments which are purely government concerns need not pay tender form fees and earnest money. This was the only concession available to the Central/State Government or to the purely government concerns, and no other concession or benefit was contemplated under the terms of the tender notice. If the appellant had known that 10 per cent price preference to government undertaking was to be given to respondent 4 the appellant would have taken every precaution while submitting the tender." 15. During the course of hearing it was contended on behalf of the D.V.C. that the Resolution No. 5810 dated 22nd May, 1989 was adopted by reason of a circular of 1980 issued by the Bureau of Public Enterprises and that being a policy decision Law Court ought not to intervene or interfere in the matter of preferential treatment if any, accorded to the Respondent No.3. Circular issued by such an authority as Bureau of Public Enterprises, it was contended has a binding effect on the D.V.C. and as a matter of fact, there cannot be any departure therefrom. Circular issued by such an authority as Bureau of Public Enterprises, it was contended has a binding effect on the D.V.C. and as a matter of fact, there cannot be any departure therefrom. In any event it was contended that such policy cannot also be deemed to be violative of the constitutional safeguards. In this context Mr. Das appearing for the D.V.C. laid very strong emphasis on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Bijay Bahadur Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1234 . In that decision the Supreme Court observed:- "It appears to us that the High Court had clearly misdirected itself. The conditions of auction made it perfectly clear that the Government was under no obligation to accept the highest bid and that no rights accrued to the bidder merely because his bid happened to be the highest. Under condition No.10 it was expressly provided that the acceptance of bid at the time of auction was entirely provisional and was subject to ratification by the competent authority, namely the State Government. Therefore, the Government had the right, for good and sufficient reason, we may say, not to accept the highest bid but even to prefer a tenderer other than the highest bidder. The High Court was clearly in error in holding that the Government could not refuse to accept the highest bid except on the ground of inadequacy of the bid condition No.10 does not so restrict the power of the Government not to accept the bid. There is no reason why the power vested in the Government to refuse to accept the highest bid should be confined to inadequacy of bid only. There may be a variety of good and sufficient reasons, apart from inadequacy of bids, which may impel the Government not to accept the highest bid. In fact, to give an anti-thetic illustration, the very enormity of a bid may make it suspect. It may lead the Government to realise that no bona-fide bidder could possibly offer such a bid if he meant to do honest business. Again the Government may change or refuse its policy from time to time and we see no reason why change of policy by the Government, subsequent to the auction but before its confirmation, may not be a sufficient justification for the refusal to accept the highest bid. Again the Government may change or refuse its policy from time to time and we see no reason why change of policy by the Government, subsequent to the auction but before its confirmation, may not be a sufficient justification for the refusal to accept the highest bid. It cannot be disputed that the Government has the right to change its policy from time to time, according to the demands of the time and situation and in the public interest. If the Government has the power to change its policy from time to time, it must follow that a change or revision of policy subsequent to the provisional acceptance of the bid but before its final acceptance is a sound enough reason for the Government's refusal to accept the highest bid at an auction. That is precisely what has happened here. The legislative policy which the Government was bound to implement sooner or later was clearly against auction of forest lots and in favour of allotment of the lots to the Forest Corporation. That was why though forest lots were originally advertised for auction the Government cancelled the proposal to auction the lots and decided to allot them to the Forest Corporation. The decision of the Government to do so was in implementation of the policy laid down by the legislature when it passed the Uttar Pradesh Forest Corporation Act." "The policy decision had already been taken by the legislature, when it enacted the Uttar Pradesh Forest Corporation Act and by the Government when it earlier decided to allot all the forest lots to the Forest Corporation. There was a deviation from the policy decision, at the instance of some legislators, in the case of the East Bahraich Forest Division. The events that took place later that is the fantasy of the bids at the auction on 1st, 3rd and 4th and the disturbances that took place on 5th exposed the folly of such deviation and resulted in the Government immediately reverting to its earlier decision to allot all the forest lots to the Forest Corporation. It is true that the auction held on 1st, 3rd and 4th November fetched bids totaling Rs. 1 crore 92 lakhs which was 71 per cent over the estimated price of the timber. This was far above of any amount that might be expected to be realised from the Forest Corporation. It is true that the auction held on 1st, 3rd and 4th November fetched bids totaling Rs. 1 crore 92 lakhs which was 71 per cent over the estimated price of the timber. This was far above of any amount that might be expected to be realised from the Forest Corporation. In our view that would not make the decision of the Government arbitrary. In the first place the bids were fantastically high and therefore, became suspect. One must wonder how such bids could be offered if the bidders did not propose to indulge in illicit felling. The State is not merely interested in realising revenue but is equally interested in the preservation and development of forests. It cannot knowingly enter into contracts with bidders who must have, at the back of their minds the opportunity or the gamble of illicit felling of trees. In the second place the Corporation is a wholly Government owned Corporation dedicated to the better preservation and developments of forests and the better exploitation of forest produce. The profits of the Corporation are in truth the profits of the State itself. The circumstance that the Corporation may not be able to pay the same price as forest contractors cannot be a reason for denying the Government the right to give effect to legislative policy. We are, therefore, unable to find any infirmity attaching to the decision of the Government." "It is clear that the auction was cancelled because the Government decided to allot the entire forest lots to the Forest Corporation. As already observed by us this decision to allot the forest lots to the Forest Corporation was in conformity with legislative policy and the earlier decisions taken by the Government to implement the legislative policy. It was on more than a reversion to a policy decision already taken. It was a good and sufficient reason for setting aside the auction. We are unable to hold that the decision of the Government was bad for failure to state reasons. In the circumstances we allow both the appeals with costs, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ Petition." 16. On a plain reading of the judgment in regard to the above-noted decision State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Bijay Bahadur Singh (supra) it appears that there was in fact, a legislative mandate when it passed the U.P. Forest Corporation Act. On a plain reading of the judgment in regard to the above-noted decision State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Bijay Bahadur Singh (supra) it appears that there was in fact, a legislative mandate when it passed the U.P. Forest Corporation Act. There was admittedly a deviation from the legislative policy which has subsequently been rectified. The other aspect of the matter ought also not to be lost sight of viz., preservation of the environment and the development of the forest. The Supreme Court took into consideration that the Government owned Corporation dedicated to the better preservation and development of forests and better exploitation of forest produce cannot knowingly enter into contracts with bidders who must have at the back of their minds the opportunity or the gamble of illicit felling of trees and having that in mind the Supreme Court finally observed that the circumstances that the Corporation may not be able to pay the same price as forest contractors cannot be a reason for denying the Government the right to give effect to a legislative policy and as such no informity was noticed by the Supreme Court in regard to the change of decision by reason of which the auction though originally held in terms of auction notice was subsequently cancelled. 17. Incidentally it is to be noted further that the Supreme Court decision, affirming the cancellation of the auction bid was arrived at with the observation that there must be good and sufficient reason to depart from the tender conditions. In the facts and circumstances of the matter under consideration before this Court no reason whatsoever has been disclosed excepting a circular letter issued by the Bureau of Public Enterprises issued in the year 1980, which, however, according to Mr. Pal has ceased to have any effect since the circular itself has been expressly superseded by the Bureau itself by its circular issued in the year 1988 after the decision of Harmindar Singh Arora's case (supra). Considering the above, the decision in Bijay Bahadur Singh's case (supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts and the same in my view, does not lend any assistance to the Corporation in support of its contention in the matter of awarding a contract contrary to the conditions laid down in the tender notice. It is, however, to be noted that Mr. Considering the above, the decision in Bijay Bahadur Singh's case (supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts and the same in my view, does not lend any assistance to the Corporation in support of its contention in the matter of awarding a contract contrary to the conditions laid down in the tender notice. It is, however, to be noted that Mr. Das relying upon the decision in Bijay Bahadur Singh's case (supra) submitted that the Supreme Court did permit the departure from the tender by reason of expresses clause reserving of the right of the respondent authority to cancel above at any time or not to accept the bid and since the tender notice in the facts and circumstances of the matter under consideration also contain a similar clause, the High Court' ought not to interfere with the decision of the Corporation. In the view I have taken as above I do not intend to deal with the matter in extenso, suffice however, to record that the observation of the Supreme Court pertaining to the condition attached to the tender was made in the special fads at the matter. It is further to be noted also at this juncture that the condition attached to the tender in the facts and circumstances of the matter under consideration and the condition attached to the tender in the Supreme Court case are not identical and as such submission of Mr. Das on this count cannot thus be accepted. 18. Before proceeding further however, let us now analyse the situation in a little more greater detail. A Government undertaking has issued a tender notice inviting tenders from all and sundry in regard to specified jobs and several parties including the Government undertaking in terms thereof submitted its tender; tender notice does not specify any preferential treatment to any bidder. The tender was then opened and the petitioner's tender was found to be the lowest. A Government undertaking has issued a tender notice inviting tenders from all and sundry in regard to specified jobs and several parties including the Government undertaking in terms thereof submitted its tender; tender notice does not specify any preferential treatment to any bidder. The tender was then opened and the petitioner's tender was found to be the lowest. It is at this juncture the Bureau of Public Enterprises's circular was taken recourse to and the Government undertaking being a favoured one in terms of the circular as above was asked to match the lowest offer inspite of the fact however, that there was certain lacunas in the tender itself which cannot though be termed to be major but in fact, there existed some-Be that as it may, and without taking note of the lacuna one finds that immediately on being informed to match the offer the Government undertaking does in fact, act in accordance with the desire of the Corporation. 19. On the state of facts it is apparent that the change of terms of the notice inviting tender was effected to benefit one as against all other bidders. It needs to be clarified however, if any, change is effected concerning all it would be unobjectionable but in the event, a benefit is conferred on to one affecting some or even one party, the Law Courts will not withstand the same. State action cannot but be fair-Can the action of the Corporation be said to be fair or reasonable or even fair dealing. In my view, the answer cannot but he in the negative. Departure or deviation can be effected but it ought not to result in arbitrariness or discrimination; Relaxation may be effected but the same ought to suffer the vice of unfair treatment to any. 20. The conditions attached to the notice inviting tender does not specify that as a matter of fact, such a privilege would be given to a government undertaking. A government undertaking or governmental agency cannot be a favoured participant more so when State is involved in everyday trade and commerce as an ordinary trader neither the Law Courts can have any obligation to ensure authoritism to a governmental agency in the matter of ordinary trade and commerce. A government undertaking or governmental agency cannot be a favoured participant more so when State is involved in everyday trade and commerce as an ordinary trader neither the Law Courts can have any obligation to ensure authoritism to a governmental agency in the matter of ordinary trade and commerce. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of G.J. Fernandaze vs. State of Karnataka, (1990) 2 SCC 488 but in my view considering the decision in its entirity the view expressed above finds support from the, decision though on the factual score the Supreme Court came to a conclusion that there was only a slight deviation from the terms of the notice inviting tender and it has not deprived the appellant of its right to be considered for the contract. (Emphasis supplied). 21. Considering the above it cannot but be concluded that the action of the Respondent-Corporation is opposed to law and suffers the vice of arbitrariness. 22. Before however, turning on to the nature of relief to be granted in the matter, the contentions raised on behalf of the Respondent No.3 being the declared successful tenderer ought to he noted. It was contended that the policy of purchase preference by the Respondent No.1-Corporation is a matter of economic policy and since judicial review is not concerned with matters of economic policy question of interference under the writ jurisdiction does not and cannot arise. While it is true that the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1277 , declared the law to be so but in the facts and circumstances under consideration question of applicability of the action of the decision in Sitaram's Case (supra) does not arise. This is more so by reason of the fact that question of any economic policy is not involved. Preference to a governmental agency in the matter of award of contracts, against other tenderers cannot be termed to be an economic policy of the Government which does not warrant Court's intervention. This is more so by reason of the fact that question of any economic policy is not involved. Preference to a governmental agency in the matter of award of contracts, against other tenderers cannot be termed to be an economic policy of the Government which does not warrant Court's intervention. The issue under consideration is whether there was any arbitrary act on the part of the Respondent-Corporation in the matter of selection of a government undertaking by conferring certain advantages on to the Government Company to the exclusion of all others-Can this issue be termed to be fair or reasonable: In view of the observation as above the answer of the question noted above cannot but be in the negative. 23. The other contention of the Respondent No.3 viz., that by merely giving bids, the bidders do not acquire any vested rights cannot also be accepted. It is too late in the day to contend that a governmental action cannot be challenged simply because of the fact that there was no concluded contract between a bidder, in terms of the NIT and the Corporation. The third contention raised by the Respondent No.3 viz., that by reason of specific clause in the notice inviting tender in the matter of reservation of right to reject any offer without assigning any reason, the Law Court would not be justified to interfere in the matter under consideration. In my view, however, if action be termed to be arbitrary, a governmental agency cannot take shelter under such an omnibus clause, if Law Courts give effect, an omnibus clause, no governmental action can be challenged since refuge under the clause shall be taken shelter of invariably to cover up the administrative ipse dixit. Fair treatment is the basic criterion in a governmental action and there cannot be any departure therefrom. In that view of the matter, the contentions raised by the Respondent No.3 cannot thus be accepted. 24. Turning now on to the issue as to the nature of relief to be granted, it appears that the decision in Harminder Singh Arora's case (supra) has its full application. The Supreme Court in the matter of grant of relief observed in Paragraph 30 of the Report as follows:- "30. In the result, the appeal must succeed. 24. Turning now on to the issue as to the nature of relief to be granted, it appears that the decision in Harminder Singh Arora's case (supra) has its full application. The Supreme Court in the matter of grant of relief observed in Paragraph 30 of the Report as follows:- "30. In the result, the appeal must succeed. It is accordingly allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court dated January 10, 1986 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed and the order of the authorities rejecting the tender of the appellant and accepting the tender of respondent 4 is quashed. The respondents authorities are directed to accept the tender of the appellant. There is, however, no order as to costs." 25. The direction given in Harminder Singh Arora's Case (supra) cannot be considered to be a stray direction. It is in fact based on a sound principle of law which has been laid down by the Supreme Court in a long catena of cases. The recent decision in the case of The Comptroller and Auditor General of India vs. K.S. Jagannathan, AIR 1987 SC 537 , ought to be noted. The Supreme Court observed:- "There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give direction to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government Or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion." 26. In any event to do complete justice between the parties the Writ Court can grant relief to subserve the ends of justice. Considering the view expressed as above, the acceptance of tender by the Corporation in favour of the Respondent No.3 shall have to be struck down but the issue at this juncture is whether a fresh tender shall have to be issued or the lowest tender submitted by the writ petitioner ought to be considered. If, in the event issuance of a fresh tender the practical reality cannot be ignored and there is bound to be higher price bid in view of the present trend of escalation. The consequent increase in the price structure shall be reflected on to the quotation and the government undertaking shall have to pay much more than what was offered by the writ petitioner. 27. In the premises the writ petition succeeds. The order of the authorities in accepting the offer of the Respondent No.3 is set aside and quashed. The Respondent authorities are directed to accept the tender of the writ petitioner. There shall however, be no order as to costs. Writ application allowed, impugned order set aside.