JUDGMENT S.C. Mohapatra, J. - Validity as award supported by reasons made under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" as amended in Orissa from time to time is subject matter in this appeal under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act. 2. On the basis of tender published on 16.7.1979, offer of respondent (contractor) was accepted for construction work of concrete-cum-massonary dam of Upper Kolab Multipurpose River Project. Work order was issued on 2.1.1981 on basis of written agreement of that day where it was stipulated that work was to be completed by 30.9.1982. Under the agreement contractor was to be paid escalation charges as per terms therein. Work was completed in 1985 for which extences were given by appellants till end of December, 1985. Escalation charges were paid by Executive Engineer in the running bills till 31.3.1985 after which no payment in this respect was made. A portion of running bill also remained unpaid. Added to it security deposit was not refunded. For receiving payment of the dues with interest, contractor made claims and thereafter referred the dispute to Arbitration Tribunal constituted under Section 41A of the Act as per clause in the written agreement. Dispute as per the claim statement of the contractor before the Arbitration Tribunal involved claim of Rs. 76,67,671.35 paise as revealed in the award. 3. After receipt of notice from the Arbitration Tribunal appellants filed a counter claim in the same proceeding for Rs. 4,83,36,989.30 paise which included excess payment of escalation charges and liquidated damages. 4. Arbitration Tribunal found the disputes to have involved claim of more than one crore rupees. Accordingly, it directed State Government to exercise power under Section 41A(1) Proviso of the Act to constitute a Special Arbitration Tribunal and refer the dispute to it. Pursuant to such direction, State Government constituted the Special Arbitration Tribunal with one retired Judge of High Court and referred the dispute by notification dated 6.5.1988, one of the terms and conditions of the constitution was that it shall make the award within 120 days of the first sitting. After receipt of the notification, Special Arbitration Tribunal issued notice to parties on 14.5.1988 and hand the first sitting on 28.5.1988. It made and signed the award on 10.2.1989 and filed the same in Court on 14.2.1989. Appellants filed an application to set aside the award. After receipt of the notification, Special Arbitration Tribunal issued notice to parties on 14.5.1988 and hand the first sitting on 28.5.1988. It made and signed the award on 10.2.1989 and filed the same in Court on 14.2.1989. Appellants filed an application to set aside the award. The same having been refused, this appeal has been filed. 5. Validity of an award can be challenged under Section 33 of the Act and an award can be set aside on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 30 of the Act. Thus, a court while considering the validity of an award to set it aside has to consider Sections 33 and 30 together within the limitation's of its jurisdiction since court is not an appellate forum to examine correctness of the findings in an award. For this purpose, court may consider the existence of a written agreement for arbitration and a dispute, validity of reference to an arbitrator, conduct of arbitrator and conduct of proceeding. Court is also to examine whether the award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. Term "otherwise invalid" is wide enough to include various other grounds than those specifically mentioned in Section 30. It includes the validity of an award made after expiry of the time for making such award. 6. Application under Section 33 of the Act is not a plaint as envisaged in the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, a party challenging an award is not bound to confine his challenge to the grounds made out in the application. Where, however, a ground has not been taken in the application and further evidence is necessary in support of the ground, the party in whose favour the award has been made cannot be taken by surprise. If such a ground is urged, opposite party shall be given adequate opportunity to meet the challenge. Where, however a ground is available from the award itself or the documents filed by the Arbitrator in court alongwith the award, court can consider the same to examine the validity of the award to set aside the same. 7. In the aforesaid background validity of constitution of the Special Arbitration Tribunal is to be examined since a Tribunal which is not validly constituted cannot make a valid award to be made rule of the court. 7. In the aforesaid background validity of constitution of the Special Arbitration Tribunal is to be examined since a Tribunal which is not validly constituted cannot make a valid award to be made rule of the court. Relevant part of Section 41A which is the provision under which Arbitration Tribunal and Special Arbitration Tribunals were being constituted in Orissa read as follows : "41A. Constitution of and references to the Arbitration Tribunal – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any contract or any other instrument, but without prejudice to the provisions contained in Section 47, in all cases where the State Government, a local or other authority controlled by the State Government, a statutory corporation or a Government Company is a party to the dispute, all references to arbitration shall be made to the Arbitration Tribunal : Provided that reference to arbitration of the disputes specified in sub-section (1) involving claims of rupees one crore or above may be made by the State Government to a Special Arbitration Tribunal comprising of one or more retired High Court Judges, as may be constituted by the State Government from time to time. (2) to (6) xx xx xx xx (7) All arbitration proceedings relating to a dispute of the nature specified in sub-section (1) which are pending before any arbitrator on the date of commencement of the Arbitration (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1982 and in which no award has been made by the said date, shall stand transferred to and disposed of by the Arbitration Tribunal : Provided that the State Government may by order in writing direct that the arbitration proceedings relating to disputes and claims involving rupees one crore or above, pending before any Arbitrator or Board of Arbitrators on the date of the commencement of the Arbitration (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1982 (Orissa Act 3 of 1983) shall be transferred to any Special Arbitration Tribunal constituted under the proviso to sub-section (1) for disposal in accordance with law". 8. Reading the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that existence of a written agreement for arbitration is sine qua non for their application. Under the provisions adjudication of all disputes by an Arbitrator is to be made either by Arbitration Tribunal or Special Arbitration Tribunal constituted statutorily where State Government amongst others specified therein is a party to the dispute. 8. Reading the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that existence of a written agreement for arbitration is sine qua non for their application. Under the provisions adjudication of all disputes by an Arbitrator is to be made either by Arbitration Tribunal or Special Arbitration Tribunal constituted statutorily where State Government amongst others specified therein is a party to the dispute. Even proceedings which were pending before other arbitrators get automatically transferred to the Arbitration Tribunal on coming into force of the provision constituted statutorily, Considering the language of Section 41A, Supreme Court in the decision reported in Executive Engineer, Irrigation Division, Puri v. Gangaram Chhapolia ( AIR 1984 SC 234 ) observed. "10. By reason of the non-obstante clause contained in sub-section (1) of Section 41A of the Act all references to arbitration in which the State Government, a local or other authority controlled by the State Government a statutory corporation or a government company is a party have to be made to the statutory Arbitration Tribunal constituted under sub-section (2) there of. Sub-section (7) of Section 41A provides that all arbitration proceedings relating to a dispute of the nature specified in sub-section (1), on or before the date of commencement of the Act in which no award has been made by the said date, i.e. March 21, 1982 (7) which is the date of publication of the Act in the Official Gazette, shall stand transferred to and disposed of by the said Arbitration Tribunal." Supreme Court referred the dispute to Arbitration Tribunal in respect of which an arbitrator has been appointed which was subject matter of challenge. It may be clarified that President assented to the Orissa Act 3 of 1983 on 21.3.1983 which was published in extraordinary issue of Orissa Gazette bearing number 358 on 26.3.1983. Validity of Section 41A was challenged in this Court. A Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Uchhabananda Samantaray and others v. State of Orissa and others (AIR 1991 Orissa 145) held that it has been validly legislated. Thus, after coming into force of Section 41A all disputes of the nature specified therein are to be adjudicated by Arbitration Tribunal only constituted under Section 41A, language of Section 41A makes it clear that there is no pecuniary limit for entertaining any dispute by the Arbitration Tribunal for adjudication. 9. Thus, after coming into force of Section 41A all disputes of the nature specified therein are to be adjudicated by Arbitration Tribunal only constituted under Section 41A, language of Section 41A makes it clear that there is no pecuniary limit for entertaining any dispute by the Arbitration Tribunal for adjudication. 9. By Orissa Act 17 of 1984, Legislature added provisos to sub-Sections (1) and (7) of Section 41A. State Government was vested with discretion to refer disputes involving claim of rupees one crore or more to Special Arbitration Tribunal constituted with one or more retired High Court Judges. Where proceedings were pending on 26.3.1983 involving claim of one crore rupees or more, State Government was vested with discretion to transfer the same to Special Arbitration Tribunal for reasons to be recorded in writing. Obviously, a proceeding which had already been disposed by them, could not have been transferred by State Government. In view of limited scope of transfer under section 41A(7) Proviso, State Government has no power to transfer a proceeding initiated after 26.3.1983 and pending, to the Special Arbitration Tribunal constituted although a dispute in respect of which no proceeding is pending on and after 26.3.1983 can be referred by State Government to a Special Arbitration Tribunal under Section 41A(1) Proviso. In the present case dispute arose in 1985 when Section 41A(1), Proviso was in the Statute book. However, claim of the contractor being less than one crore rupees could not have been referred to a Special Arbitration Tribunal constituted. Rightly, the contractor referred the dispute to Arbitration Tribunal by filing claim statement. If such claim would have involved one crore rupees or more, State Government could have been approached to refer the dispute to a Special Arbitration Tribunal. However, once a reference was made to Arbitration Tribunal and a proceeding remained pending before it, State Government had no jurisdiction to transfer such proceeding to Special Arbitration Tribunal as the proceeding was not pending on 26.3.1983 when Orissa Act 3 of 1983 came into force. Accordingly, Special Arbitration Tribunal constituted for the purpose of adjudicating the dispute in respect of which a proceeding was pending before the Arbitration Tribunal could not have been constituted. Such Special Arbitration Tribunal having no competence to adjudicate the dispute, award made by it is without jurisdicition and is invalid. 10. Accordingly, Special Arbitration Tribunal constituted for the purpose of adjudicating the dispute in respect of which a proceeding was pending before the Arbitration Tribunal could not have been constituted. Such Special Arbitration Tribunal having no competence to adjudicate the dispute, award made by it is without jurisdicition and is invalid. 10. Coming to counter claim by State Government, there can be no doubt that State Government has jurisdiction to constitute a Special Arbitration Tribunal under Section 41A(1) Proviso and refer the dispute to it since it involved claim of more than one crore rupees. State Government however, chose the forum of Arbitration Tribunal and filed the counter claim to be adjudicated in that forum alongwith claim of the contractor. Once the proceeding for adjudication of dispute remained pending with Arbitration Tribunal which has jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute, there is no power with State Government either to refer or to transfer the same to a Special Arbitration Tribunal constituted. In this view of the matter, Special Arbitration Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute to make an award since reference to it is invalid and without jurisdiction. Award made without jurisdiction in respect of claim of State Government is invalid on that ground. Estoppel, Waiver and acquiescence on account of participation of both parties in the proceeding does not arise since consent cannot confer or oust jurisdiction. 11. Award made after expiry of time stipulated is invalid as Arbitrator becomes functus-officio after that date. In this case time stiputated for making the award is found as a term in the constitution of Special Arbitration Tribunal. It reads as follows : "The Special Arbitration Tribunal shall complete the proceeding and the award be made within a period of 120 days from the date of first sitting of the Tribunal". In the next term it has been provided that the proceading shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Act. First sitting of the Special Arbitration. Tribunal was on 28.5.1988 when both parties appeared before the Tribunal, 120th day from 28.5.1988 is 25.9.89. Hence, under term No. 4 proceeding was to be completed and award made on or before 25.9.1988. Award was made on 10.2.1989 much beyond the stipulated period. This period has been enlarged by the Arbitrator with consent of learned counsels for parties who filed memorandum to that effect. Hence, under term No. 4 proceeding was to be completed and award made on or before 25.9.1988. Award was made on 10.2.1989 much beyond the stipulated period. This period has been enlarged by the Arbitrator with consent of learned counsels for parties who filed memorandum to that effect. In case Special Arbitration Tribunal would have been appointed by agreement of parties and time fixed in clause 3 of First Schedule read with Section 3 of the Act is to be held as part of the agreement, decision reported in State of Punjab v. Hardyal ( AIR 1985 SC 920 ) overruling view of this Court in a decision reported in Ganesh Chandra Misra v. Artatrana Misra and others (ILR Cuttack 685), would has been attracted where it has been observed : "Once we hold that the law precludes parties from extending time after the matter has been referred to the arbitrator, it will be contradiction in terms to hold that the same result can be brought about by the conduct of the parties. The age long established principle is that there can be no estoppel against a statute. It is true that the time to be fixed for making the award was initially one of agreement between the parties but it does not follow that in the face of a clear prohibition by law that the time fixed under clause 3 of the Schedule can only be extended by the Court and not by the parties at any stage, it still remains a matter of agreement and the rule of estoppel operates. It need be hardly emphasized that the Act has injuncted the arbitrator to give an award within the prescribed period of four months unless the same is extended by the Court. The arbitrator has no jurisdiction to make an award after the fixed time. It need be hardly emphasized that the Act has injuncted the arbitrator to give an award within the prescribed period of four months unless the same is extended by the Court. The arbitrator has no jurisdiction to make an award after the fixed time. If the award made beyond the time is invalid the parties are not estopped by their conduct from challenging the award on the ground that it was made beyond time merely because of their having participated in the proceedings before the arbitrator after the expiry of the prescribed period." In such cases court alone has power to extend time under Section 28 (1) as has been held by this court in the decision reported in Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla (dead) after him Shanti Devi and others v. State of Orissa, represented through the Executive Engineer, Express Way Division Kendrapara (1986 (1) OLR 361) relying on the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. In a later decision reported in M/s. Ram Das v. Union of India and others (64 (1987) CLT 315), without referring to the earlier decision of this Court and relying upon A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 920 (supra) Hari Krishna Wattal v. Vaikunth Nath Pandya (Dead) by L.Rs. and another ( AIR 1973 SC 2479 ), which decision had been considered in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 920 (supra), it has been held that time can be enlarged by consent of parties. The same view has again been reiterated in another decision of this Court reported in Srustidhar Mohanty v. The Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others (1989 (1) OLR 402), without referring to the first decision of this Court, which decision would be binding on me as a precedent, however, need not be considered, since time was not fixed by agreement in this case. 12. Position in this case comes within another category where State Government in exercise of statutory power constituted the Special Arbitration Tribunal and while so constituting fixed time for making the award in the terms and conditions. Time limit for such term having been fixed by the State Government in exercise of statutory power, it could not have been extended by the Arbitrator with consent of parties. Of course under Section 28(1) of the Act, Court has power to enlarge the time for making the award as has been held in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 920 (supra). 13. Time limit for such term having been fixed by the State Government in exercise of statutory power, it could not have been extended by the Arbitrator with consent of parties. Of course under Section 28(1) of the Act, Court has power to enlarge the time for making the award as has been held in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 920 (supra). 13. In view of the discussion above, I am inclined to hold that Special Arbitration Tribunal had no jurisdiction to extend time to continue the proceeding beyond time fixed by State Government without enlargement of such time fixed, by State Government or by the Court. It became functus-officio with effect from 25.9.1988 and award is invalid on that ground. Since State Government is a party and same State Government could have extended time, I might have considered in favour of extension of time impliedly. However, State Government fixing time as part of exercise of power under Section 41A(1) Proviso of the Act is to act on the basis of rules of business made by the Governor. State Government as a party represented by counsel and officer other than Secretaries of the State Government have not been vested with power under rules of business to exercise statutory power. Even if proceeding before the Special Arbitration Tribunal is to be governed by the provisions of the Act and Section 28 is applicable, with consent of parties, Special Arbitration Tribunal had no jurisdicion to enlarge time fixed by State Government which is a condition for its constitution. 14. On perusal of the order-sheet, I find that Member, Special Arbitration Tribunal decided to take remuneration of Rs. 1500/- per day. He engaged a Secretary who is a retired Private Secretary of Chief Justice on remuneration of Rs. 300 per sitting. He engaged a peon who was remunerated at Rs. 100 per sitting. When a sitting Judge gets less than Rs. 300 per day, a Private Secretary of Chief Justice gets about Rs. 150 per day, a peon regularly employed gets about Rs. 30/- per day and minimum wages of an unskilled labourer in Orrissa now is Rs. 25 per day, the rates seem to be abnormal. Added to it, Member, Special Arbitration Tribunal moved out of Cuttack which is the place of sitting fixed under the terms of Constitution of the Special Arbitration Tribunal without prior change of place of sitting by the State Government. 25 per day, the rates seem to be abnormal. Added to it, Member, Special Arbitration Tribunal moved out of Cuttack which is the place of sitting fixed under the terms of Constitution of the Special Arbitration Tribunal without prior change of place of sitting by the State Government. However, such matters are not contrary to any law and depend upon the personal ethics of persons. When State Government in exercise of statutory power has approved the rates and post facts approved the change in place of sittings and both parties have also accepted the same, my personal ethics would not be ground to interfere with the decision of the Special Arbitration Tribunal and it has no effect on the proceeding or the award. 15. Next question for consideration is whether on merits there is scope to interfere with the award. Claim of contractor relates to escalation charges, non-payment of running bills, security deposit and interest due. Claim of State Government relates to refund of escalation charges, special damages and some other small claims. Finding on appreciation of evidence on which payment of escalation charges as per term of the agreement depends in a finding of fact. Special condition 13 (3.13) of the agreement (Ext. O) relating to compensation for delay in work provides for non-application of escalation charges under certain circumstances in material. This clause takes note that work is scheduled to be completed on or before 30.9.1982 and provides that for delay of six months, i.e. till 30.3.1983 no compensation shall be claimed. In case contract gets delayed beyond six months for reasons not attributable to the contractor, the rates shall be revised for the unfinished work in consultation with contractor and escalation charges shall not be paid. Therefore, cause of delay is a material point for adjudication on appreciation of materials on record. After finding that cause of delay is not attributable to the contractor, effect of non-revision of rate is to be considered. Therefore, cause of delay is a material point for adjudication on appreciation of materials on record. After finding that cause of delay is not attributable to the contractor, effect of non-revision of rate is to be considered. Since there is no dispute that there was delay in completion of work beyond 30.3.1983, rightly Special Arbitration Tribunal considered such a question in issue No. 4 which is to the following effect : "Which of the parties is responsible for the delay in execution of the work in question." Special Arbitration Tribunal relied upon evidence of one witness examined on behalf of the contractor and various documents to come to the conclusion that contractor cannot in any manner be held responsible. In other words, cause of delay cannot be attributed to the contractor. Normally, there is no scope to examine correctness of this finding by court since it is not appellate authority of the Arbitrator. Court can, however, consider if all the materials available on record have been considered. Even if a wrong conclusion short of unreasonableness would have been arrived at, court has to tolerate such a finding. When, however, in an award supported by reasons arbitrator has not considered a document which would have material bearing on the finding and may give rise to different conclusion. Court would not be a silent spectator and would have to rise to the occasion. So rising, it cannot substitute its finding as an appellate court. It has to set aside the award in respect of such finding and remit back the proceeding to the Arbitrator in absence of any finding of factual or legal misconduct which might have affected the decision of the Arbitrator. Court has to remember that omission may be on account of honest mistake not attributable to any misconduct since to err is human and such error may be on account of many imponderables one of which may be absence of party or its counsel or their failure to highlight such a material. Mistake of Lawyer should not be cause for suffering of a party. Presiding Officer of a court is not just a human computer to indicate the result on the datas fed by the lawyer. Court has to remember the present social circumstance in matters of arbitration. Mistake of Lawyer should not be cause for suffering of a party. Presiding Officer of a court is not just a human computer to indicate the result on the datas fed by the lawyer. Court has to remember the present social circumstance in matters of arbitration. Even by while considering award by a retired District Judge, this court observed in a decision reported in State of Orissa represented by the Executive Engineer, R.E. Division, Puri and others v. Gangaram Chhapolia and another (54 (1983) CLT 214) : "If one were asked" what affects the State of Orissa ? The answer would be "Inter alia, the malady of the racket of arbitration". Arbitration of late is being considered as a sure way to over night riches and affluence." Observation of Full Bench of Kerala High Court in a decision reported in State of Kerala and another v. C. Abraham and another ( AIR 1989 Ker. 61 ) in matter of arbitration by engineers is as follows : "The engineering profession enjoyed a unique reputation by the acceptance of their status as decision-makers, even while in the employment of the one party or the other an objectivity and impartiality could rightly be attributed to them. Things have now changed much regretably indeed. The pattern of function of some of the arbitrators (who could pass non-speaking awards) tended to forfeit the credibility of the very system itself." These judicial warnings between 1983 and 1989 should be sufficient for the courts to be more scrutinising to materials available to test whether an award has stood the test of laws laid down by Apex Courts of the Republic and the State. It is high time to consider whether the principle that arbitrator is a Judge of choice of parties is applicable to a case where Statute provides for appointment of arbitration by a forum created under it and whether the basic underlying principle is shaken by such provision. However, till the precedents have binding effect, court, as a matter or discipline in judicial determination, has to follow the same in a manner so that on account of the decision rendered, it becomes acceptable to the society for which it has been established. Judicial experience and observations of social conduct with detachment by a Judge, would be the base on which such disputes are to be adjudicated. 16. Judicial experience and observations of social conduct with detachment by a Judge, would be the base on which such disputes are to be adjudicated. 16. In this case, before expiry of the stipulated period for completion of the work, Contractor made an application for extension of time on 28.8.1982 (Ext. 54). Item 11 of the said application indicated three reasons in support of extension. These three reasons are attributable to the contractor only. Undertaking in item 15 of such application may also have bearing on the question of payment of escalation charges. Although Ext. 54 was referred to in paragraph 52 of the award, the same was not taken note of while considering issue No. 4. Witness examined on behalf of contractor has not explained how the three grounds have not resulted in delay for completion of the work. What would have been effect of Ext. 54 is not a matter for court to consider. However, it can be held that in case Ext. 54 would have been accepted, a different inference might have been possible to attribute reasons for delay in completion of the work to the contractor. What would be the effect if such finding is arrived at, is a matter for the arbitrator to consider and it is not for the court to draw an inference. Counter-claim of State Government also depends upon such inference. On the aforesaid conclusion, I am inclined to held that award in respect of escalation charges is invalid. 17. Award of interest by the Special Arbitration Tribunal depends on the various liabilities including escalation charges. It cannot be separated from the main claim. Accordingly, award is invalid in that respect also. Added to it, date of completion of work was required to be determined by the Arbitrator on the materials available for calculation of interest. There is not effective finding in that regard. Award in this respect is also invalid. 18. In case, I would have held that award is otherwise valid, I would have considered to set aside the award in respect of escalation charges and interest thereon only since they are separable. Since I have discussed the various causes why award cannot be upheld on other grounds, I need not validate other parts of the award. 19. 18. In case, I would have held that award is otherwise valid, I would have considered to set aside the award in respect of escalation charges and interest thereon only since they are separable. Since I have discussed the various causes why award cannot be upheld on other grounds, I need not validate other parts of the award. 19. In conclusions : (a) Constitution of Special Arbitration Tribunal under Section 41A and reference of dispute by the State Government which was already pending before Arbitration Tribunal for adjudication is without jurisdiction. (b) Transfer of a proceeding which was not pending on 26.3.1983 when Orissa Act 3 of 1983 came into force was not envisaged under Section 41A(7) of the Act; (c) Question of jurisdiction which is available to be considered on materials on record can be considered by court even if not raised as a ground to assail an award or urged at the time of hearing; (d) In a reference under Section 41A(1) proviso. Special Arbitration Tribunal has no jurisdiction to enlarge time fixed by term of constitution of the same either for completing the proceeding or making the award even with consent of parties; (e) Estoppel waiver or acquiscence have no role to play in such cases; (f) Award even if otherwise valid is vitiated on account of non-consideration of relevant material available on record in respect of an issue on which claim depends and is liable to be set aside in that respect. 20. Question for consideration is whether award is to be remitted back to Special Arbitration Tribunal for fresh consideration of materials. On my finding that State Government could not have referred the dispute pending before the Arbitration Tribunal, there is no scope to remit the same back to Special Arbitration Tribunal specially when its term had expired after 120 days of first sitting. Assuming it to be a transfer from Arbitration Tribunal, there was no scope for the same as all the requirements of Section 41A(7) of the Act are not satisfied. Even if it would have been possible to remit the dispute back to Special Arbitration Tribunal, in view of Section 41A(8) added by Orissa Act 1 of 1990, there is no scope for the same. Even if it would have been possible to remit the dispute back to Special Arbitration Tribunal, in view of Section 41A(8) added by Orissa Act 1 of 1990, there is no scope for the same. It is as follows : "(8) All arbitration proceeding relating to a dispute, the nature specified in sub-section (1) and which are pending before any Special Arbitration Tribunal on the date of commencement of the Arbitration (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1989 shall stand transferred to and disposed of by the Arbitration Tribunal." Therefore, the proceeding has to go back to the Arbitration Tribunal where it is deemed to be pending. 21. In the result, appeal is allowed, award by the Special Arbitration Tribunal is set aside and proceeding is remitted to Arbitration Tribunal to adjudicate all disputes afresh. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. *-*-*-*-*