JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - Whether the Governor has power under Article 213 of the Constitution to re-promulgate the same Ordinance successively without bringing it before the Legislature and whether the power of the Governor to re-promulgate Ordinances successively, can be challenged after the Ordinances were replaced by Act of U.P. Legislature, and whether State of U.P. has legislative competence to enact U.P. Dacoity Affected Areas Act (U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 for short U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983) particularly when it is an ex post facto law; are short questions, but of immence constitutional significance which fall for our determination in these connected petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The prayer in Siya Ram v. State of U.P. and another, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4022 of 1982 (for short the first petition) is to declare the U.P. Ordinance No. 10 of 1982 as ultra vires and to direct the respondents not to give effect to the same. In Virendra Singh and others v. State of U.P. and another, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7212 of 1990 (for short the IInd petition) the prayer is to declare U.P. Act No. XXXI of 1982 to be unconstitutional to declare impugned notification dated 5-11-1981 under S. 3 of the Ordinance No. 16 of 1981 to be illegal and inoperative after the expiry of Ordinance No. 16 of 1982, to withdraw the State v. Nawab Singh and others, Sessions Trial No. 25 of 1990 pending in the court of Special Judge Dacoity Affected Areas Act Etah and to direct the respondents No. 2 not to proceed further in aforesaid Sessions trial. 2. On the suggestions of learned counsel for the petitioner 3 petitions were directed to be connected but after having summoned the file we find that Ajay Kumar v. State of U.P. and others, Civil Misc. Writ petition No. 6974 of 1984 has been dismissed on 18-9-1984 as having become infructuous, consequently we are proceeding to decide Ist & IInd writ petitions. 3. The factual matrix of the case is that His excellency the Governor of U.P. promulgated U.P. Ordinance No. 10 of 1982 in exercise of powers conferred under Article 213 of the Constitution of India, by notification No. 692(2)/XVII/V-ka-3-1982. Prior to that U.P. Ordinance No. 16 of 1981 was promulgated and notified under U.P. Extra Ordinary Gazette dated 22-10-1981. 3. The factual matrix of the case is that His excellency the Governor of U.P. promulgated U.P. Ordinance No. 10 of 1982 in exercise of powers conferred under Article 213 of the Constitution of India, by notification No. 692(2)/XVII/V-ka-3-1982. Prior to that U.P. Ordinance No. 16 of 1981 was promulgated and notified under U.P. Extra Ordinary Gazette dated 22-10-1981. Thereafter U.P. Ordinance No. 27 of 1981 was promulgated in which there was no mention that Governor has been pleased to promulgate the same after obtaining previous Sanction of the President of India. In brief, different ordinances were promulgated (first of them was U.P. Ordinance No. 16 of 1981 which was enforced with effect from 22-10- 1981. When the U.P. Legislative Assembly and U.P. Legislative Council were in session these Ordinances were not replaced by the Act as such the Governor prima facie spears to have usurped the legislative function of the elected representatives. These Ordinances however, were ultimately replaced by U.P. Act 31 of 1983 (U.P. Dacoity Affected ;Areas Act). Virendra Singh and others, petitioners in Second writ petition were sought to be prosecuted under S. 395/397, IPC by the order dated 9-2-1990 on the protest petition filed by the complainant as on 10-1-1990 police had submitted the final report. 4. Mr. Tejpal, learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously urged that the Governor cannot repromulgate the Ordinances under Article 213 of the Constitution, successively without placing it before the legislature, the U.P. Legislature has no legislative competence to enact U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 as an "Ex post Facto Law. It was in violation of fundamental rights envisaged by Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Reliance was placed on Dr. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 579 , Mithu v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 473 : 1983 Cri LJ 811 and some other cases which require no mention. 5. Sri Umesh Chandra, the learned Advocate-General appeared on, behalf of the State and urged that no doubt Governor has no legislative function except as provided under Article 213 of the Constitution of India. He was fair enough to state that an Ordinance need not be replaced by another Ordinance but so far as present case was concerned, validity of the Ordinances could not be gone into when the same have been replaced by the U.P. Act 31 of 1983. He was fair enough to state that an Ordinance need not be replaced by another Ordinance but so far as present case was concerned, validity of the Ordinances could not be gone into when the same have been replaced by the U.P. Act 31 of 1983. The validity of the Ordinance could have been challenged only by the time it was an Ordinance and not now when it has been replaced by the Act. The shortcomings attributable to an Ordinance could not be gone into once the same has been replaced by the Act. The State of U.P. has legislative competence to enact U.P. Dacoity Affected Areas Act 1983 (U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983) particularly under Items 2 & 3 of List III, the concurrent list of 7th Schedule under Article 246 of the Constitution of India. U.P. Act -31 of 1983 was not violative of Articles 14, 19, 20 & 21 of the Constitution of India and it could be given retrospective effect. A number of decisions of Supreme Court were referred but mainly reliance was placed on T. Venkat Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 724 : 1986 Lab IC 357 and Dr. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 579 . 6. Before we proceed closely to examine the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties as the provisions of Articles 14, 19, 20 & 21 and Article 213 and different entries of seventh Schedule of the Constitution have to be interpreted, it is pertinent to refer certain principles for interpretation of the Constitution. The Broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose duty is to interpret the Constitution. Our Constitution is a living document, hence court is not required to interpret it in a narrow and pedantic sense. 7. The Broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose duty is to interpret the Constitution. Our Constitution is a living document, hence court is not required to interpret it in a narrow and pedantic sense. 7. In Good Year India Ltd. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 SC 781 considering the observations in Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubrication Taxation Act 1938 AIR 1939 FC 1 Hon'ble Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (the then Hon'ble Chief Justice of India) observed that while considering the scope of particular Article or an item of an Entry in order to ascertain the competence of State Legislature one has to bear in mind that the provisions of the Constitution are to be construed not in narrow or pedantic sense, nor it has to be considered as a mere law, rather the Constitution has the greatest claim to be considered broadly and liberally. 8. In India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1990 SC 85 it was observed that the courts are enjoined to gather the meaning of the Constitution from the language used and one should interpret the words of the Constitution on the same principles as one applied to ordinary law. But these very principles of interpretation compel one to take care of the language and scope of the Act which requires interpretation and also the fact that it is the constitution that requires interpretation. 9. Hon'ble Oliver Wendell Holmas in Gompers v. United States, (1913) 233 US 604, 610 observed :- "The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form, they are organic living institutions transplanted from English Soil. Their significance is vital, not formal. It is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a Dictionary but considering their origin and the line of their growth". 10. In our opinion the Constitution is not just merely law, rather it is vehicle of the aspiration of the people, it is an organic living institution, hence its provisions are to be interpreted with liberal spirit and in a broad sense not by a just narrow and pedantic approach. The provisions of the Constitution have to be looked in a broader perspective and widest amplitude should be given to the language of these entries under Lists I, II and III of the Seventh Schedule. The provisions of the Constitution have to be looked in a broader perspective and widest amplitude should be given to the language of these entries under Lists I, II and III of the Seventh Schedule. Further particular legislation is to be examined in its pith and substance to ascertain if it falls in one or the other of the items of the three lists. We are conscious that lists are designed to limit and define the respective areas of legislation by State or Union. Different entries in the three lists are not power of legislation but fields of legislation. The power to legislate is traceable under Article 246 and other Articles of the Constitution. Further it would not be inapt if we say that the constitutional provisions may be interpreted with experience so as to make the provisions dynamic and flexible so that the provisions might adapt itself to the changing conditions of the nation and Indian Society at large. 11. So far as first petition is concerned, first Ordinance No. 16 of 1981 was promulgated on 22-10-81 followed by second Ordinance No. 10 of 1981, then third Ordinance No. 16 of 1982 which was promulgated on 7-4-1982 followed by fourth Ordinance No. 28 of 1982 which was promulgated on 28-9-82, fifth Ordinance No. 8 of 1983 was promulgated on 14-8-83 and sixth Ordinance No. 25 of 1983 was promulgated on 28-4-83. The first petition was filed on 20-4-82 which was admitted and notices were issued by Division Bench on 20-9-82 but the application for interim stay was rejected at a time when third Ordinance No. 16 of 1982 was in force but the petition could not be decided by the time that Ordinance remained in force or was being replaced by successive Ordinances. 12. In order to determine the first question whether the Governor has power to re-promulgate the Ordinance successively without bringing it before the Legislature it is better to have Article 213 which confers power on the Governor of the State to promulgate Ordinance. Ex abundanti cautela, the relevant portion of Article 213 is set out as follows :- "213(1). 12. In order to determine the first question whether the Governor has power to re-promulgate the Ordinance successively without bringing it before the Legislature it is better to have Article 213 which confers power on the Governor of the State to promulgate Ordinance. Ex abundanti cautela, the relevant portion of Article 213 is set out as follows :- "213(1). If at any time, except when the Legislative Assembly of a State is in session, or where there is a Legislative Council in a State except when both houses of the Legislature are in session the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require : (2) An Ordinance promulgated under this Article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor, but every such ordinance....." 13. Power to legislate is within the exclusive domain of the legislature, which consist of the elected representatives of the people in a democracy like ours, but sometimes exigencies of situations may demand that for the purposes of legislation the Legislative assembly of the State or even the Parliament may not be given in session, for that purpose by the framers of the Constitution under Chapter IV Article 213 was enacted. This chapter is headed with the title `legislative powers of the Governor. This connotes that except under Chapter IV, the Governor has no legislative power. But for the purposes of promulgating ordinance in the event when the Legislature is not in session and the Governor is satisfied that special circumstances exist which make it obligatory for him to take immediate steps, in that event he may promulgate the ordinance under the circumstances as the situation demands. The Ordinance is promulgated under exceptional circumstances when both the houses are not available. In other words, it is an emergency power vested in the Governor for taking immediate action. For this limited purpose the legislative power has been given to the executive. Under Chapter III the legislative powers of the President have been indicated and for that purpose Article 123 has been enacted. In other words, it is an emergency power vested in the Governor for taking immediate action. For this limited purpose the legislative power has been given to the executive. Under Chapter III the legislative powers of the President have been indicated and for that purpose Article 123 has been enacted. Every ordinance has to be placed before the legislature and the ordinance would cease to have effect after the expiration of 6 weeks from reassembly of the legislature or even before that, provided the resolution disapproving it is passed by the legislative assembly. Article 174 provides that the legislature shall meet at least twice a year and six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for the first sitting in the next session and the ordinance ceased to be operative after six weeks from the re-assembly of the legislature. In this view of the matter the maximum life of an ordinance is 7 months unless it is replaced by an Act or disapproved by a resolution of the legislative Assembly. It is to be noticed and stated again, that it is very exceptional that the Executive must have power to legislate. Six months has also been provided with a view to enable the legislature to pass an Act replacing the Ordinance. To put it differently without going to legislature normally the life of an ordinance could not be extended. In case an ordinance is replaced by an other ordinance, that would amount to usurpation of power of legislature by the Executive. We are, accordingly, of the considered opinion that in cursory and leisurely fashion the ordinances could not be issued nor repromulgated successively. But it is to be emphasised that the unconstitutionalities, disabilities or short-coming in an ordinance must be pointed out or urged only by the time it is an Ordinance and has not been replaced by an Act. 14. In other words once an Ordinance is replaced by an Act of the Legislature it becomes totally `non est' just like `ATMA' i.e. soul merging in `PARMATMA' (or Jeev merging in BRAHMA) and thereafter it ceases to remain identified as such. 14. In other words once an Ordinance is replaced by an Act of the Legislature it becomes totally `non est' just like `ATMA' i.e. soul merging in `PARMATMA' (or Jeev merging in BRAHMA) and thereafter it ceases to remain identified as such. As the unconstitutionality in the Ordinances could not be pointed out in the first or second petitions by the time it were ordinances now it has been replaced by the U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983, and hence it is not open to the petitioner to challenge it now. 15. Dr. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 579 (supra) was a case relied upon by both sides. In that case, it so happened that in Bihar a number of Ordinances were promulgated on a massive scale without bringing them before the House, and without getting them replaced by the Act of Legislature. The law making function is entrusted by the constitution to the Legislature consisting of duly elected representatives of people, if executive were permitted to continue the provisions of an Ordinance by adopting the methodology of re-promulgation, without submitting to the voice of people that would be usurpation by the Executive of the law making function of the Legislature. By the time petition (in Dr. D. C. Wadhwa case (supra) under Article 32 came up for hearing only Bihar Intermediate Education Council Ordinance 1985 was in operation, others were either replaced by Act or had lapsed. The Supreme Court struck down that ordinance. 16. In our opinion as on the date of hearing no ordinance survived rather they have been replaced by Act No. 31 of 1983. When Act No. 31 of 1983 came on Statute Book, no constitutional or any other infirmity attributable to the Ordinances, may be that the ordinance have been successively promulgated by the Governor, can now be argued. In other words, the points which were open for argument by the time the Ordinances were in operation cannot be argued when the Ordinances have been replaced by the Act. We are accordingly of the view that the Ordinances cannot be repromulgated without bringing it before the legislature, but now there are no more Ordinances as they have been replaced by the Act 31 of 1983 hence we cannot examine infirmities of Ordinances. 17. We are accordingly of the view that the Ordinances cannot be repromulgated without bringing it before the legislature, but now there are no more Ordinances as they have been replaced by the Act 31 of 1983 hence we cannot examine infirmities of Ordinances. 17. Reverting to the question as to whether U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 was "an ex post facto law", and was it within the Legislative competence of the U.P. Legislature and whether the same was ultra vires of the Constitution particularly was violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. It appears relevant to discuss the concept of ex post facto law : In Kant Commentaries, 10th Edition, Vol. I page 458, the following statement may be noticed. "the works Ex post facto laws are technical expression and meant every law, that made an Act which was innocent when done, before passing of the law criminal or which aggravated a crime and made it greater than it was when committed, or which changed the punishment and inflicted a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed." Philips v. Eyre, 28 LJ QB 28 and Calder v. Bull, L. Ed. 548. 18. It is to be noticed that the language of Article 1, Sections 1, 9(3) of the American Constitution is different in some respect than the language of Article 20(1) of our Constitution, hence American cases are not very material in interpreting Article 20(1) of our Constitution. 19. In Ratan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444 Para 6 : 1965 (1) Cri LJ 360 it was observed as follows : "Every law that takes away or impairs a vested right is retrospective. However, expost facto law is necessarily retrospective. Under Article 20(1) of the Constitution, no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of law in force at the time of commission of that act. However, expost facto law is necessarily retrospective. Under Article 20(1) of the Constitution, no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of law in force at the time of commission of that act. But an ex post facto law which only mollifies the rigour of a criminal law does not roll within the said prohibition under Article 20 of the Constitution a particular court or by a particular If a particular law makes provision to that procedure effect, though retrospective in operation, it law is retrospective and, if so, to what extent it was observed as follows : depends upon the interpretation of a "All that Article 20(1) prohibits is ex post particular statute, having regard to the well settled rules of Constitution." 20. Article 20(l) of our Constitution was considered innocent when done. It only provides that no person shall be convicted of prohibits the conviction of a person or his any offence except for violation of a law in being subjected to a penalty under ex post force at the time of commission of the act facto laws. A person as an accused cannot charged as an offence, nor be subject to any object to a procedure different from what penalty greater than that which might have obtained at the time of commission of the been inflicted 'under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. 21. In our opinion the present Article 20(1) of the Constitution sets two limitations upon connection with adjudication proceedings for the law making power of every sovereign contravention of S. 23(1) of Foreign Exchange legislative authority, as regards retrospective Regulations Act, 1947 (as substituted by Act criminal legislation (i.e. ex post facto law) 39 of 1957), it was held under Para 9 as What Article 20(1) forbids are (a) making ex post facto criminal law in other words making an act crime for the first time and then making that law retrospective (b) infliction of a greater penalty than that which could have been inflicted under the law which was in force when the act was committed. What is prohibited is not only the enactment of a statute with retrospective operation but also against conviction under such law. 22. What is prohibited is not only the enactment of a statute with retrospective operation but also against conviction under such law. 22. In Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., 1953 SCR 1188 : AIR 1953 SC 394 : 1953 Cr LJ 1480, it was held that Article 20(1) in its broad import has been enacted to prohibit convictions and sentences under ex post facto laws, laws, whether the same was a post Constitution law or a pre-Constitution law. It was also held that what was prohibited was only conviction and sentence under ex post facto laws and not the trial thereof. Such trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of commission of the offence or by a Court different from that which had competence, at the time cannot ipso facto be held to the unconstitutional. An accused has no fundamental right to trial by a particular court or by a particular procedure. 23. In G.P. Nayyar v. State (Delhi) Administration), AIR 1979 SC 602 : 1979 Crl LJ 589 it was observed as follows: "All that Article 20(1) prohibits is ex post facto laws and is designed to prevent a person being punished for an act or omission which was considered innocent when done. It only prohibits the conviction of a person or his being subjected to a penalty under ex post facto laws. A persons as an accused cannot object to a procedure different from what obtained at the time of commission of the offence." 24. In Union of India v. Sukumar, AIR 1966 SC 1206 , at p. 1209 : 1966 Cri LJ 946 in connection with adjudication proceedings for contravention of S. 23(1) of Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947 (as substituted by Act 39 of 1957), it was held under Para 9 as follows: " A person accused of the commission of an offence has no vested right to be tried by a particular court or a particular procedure except in so far as there is any constitutional objection by way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right is involved........There is no principle underlying Article 20 of the Constitution which makes a right to any course of procedure a vested right." 25. In Dobert v. Floride, US SC. Reports 53 L. Ed. In Dobert v. Floride, US SC. Reports 53 L. Ed. 2nd 347 (356), it was held as follows : "The inhibition upon the passage of ex post facto laws does not give a criminal right to be tried in all respects by the law in force when the crime charged was committed. The Constitution does not limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance. Even though it may work to the disadvantage of an accused a procedure change is not ex post facto." 26. The emphasis was laid by Sri Tej Pal that as under S. 1(3) of U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 it was provided that the Act shall be deemed to have come into operation on October 20, 1981, hence it is an ex post facto law. We shall examine different provisions of U.P. Act No. 31 of 1971. But at this stage suffice it to say that U.P. Ordinance No. 15 of 1981 was promulgated since 22-10-81. Thereafter it was replaced by different Ordinances till U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 was enacted. Even though the U.P. Ordinance was replaced by subsequent Ordinances, but nevertheless it cannot be said that the action taken or act done during the operation of the first Ordinance of 1981 would become illegal even though the same was not replaced by the Act. Even though the Ordinance lapsed after its life, but nevertheless the act done or the action taken during its life remains valid and effective. 27. Nova Constitution Futuris Forman Intonert Devert Non Vrageris maxim connotes that a law sought to be regulated what is to follow and not the past. To put it differently a law which is to follow and not attacks a right in existence at the time of passing of the statute is not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. The Parliament and State legislatures have powers of legislation within the field of legislation indicated by Lists I, II and III of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. They (the Parliament and State legislatures) have at the same time legislative power to legislate retrospectively as well as prospectively. Ram Krishna v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1667 ; M/s. J.K. Jute Mills Co. They (the Parliament and State legislatures) have at the same time legislative power to legislate retrospectively as well as prospectively. Ram Krishna v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1667 ; M/s. J.K. Jute Mills Co. v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1534 , Sabally v. A.G., (1964) 3 All ER 377, Western Transport v. Kropp, (1964) 3 All ER 722. 28. In our opinion, it cannot be said that the U.P. Legislature has no power to enact U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 with retrospective operation in view of S. 1(3) of the Act which provides that the Act shall be deemed to have come into operation since October 22, 1981 when the first Ordinance No. 16 of 1981 was promulgated. Even if no retrospective operation could have been given to U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983, never the less action taken or orders passed when the first ordinance No. 16 of 1981 was promulgated, would not become illegal. The cardinal principles of action taken or order passed during the operation of an ordinance is that even if it is not revived or not replaced by an Act of legislature, nevertheless action taken would not become illegal. Strictly speaking it would not require to provide under S. 1(3) of the Act 31 of 1983 that it shall be deemed to have come into operation since October 22, 1981. It is just for the sake of precaution that the legislature provided it. Otherwise also the orders pass and actions taken, during the time of Ordinance No. 16 of 1981, the first ordinance remained in operation, could have remained valid. Even assuming that that Ordinance could not have been replaced by an Act or could not have been continued by passing another Ordinance, an illustration may clarify. Assuming that an accused was convicted and sentenced with life imprisonment under the provisions of 1st ordinance No. 16 of 1981, even though that ordinance may not have been replaced by another ordinance or Act, but nevertheless the conviction and sentence awarded would continue to be operative and it cannot be urged on behalf of the accused that as the Ordinance lapsed, hence that conviction may be set aside. 29. 29. In T. Venkata Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 724 , at page 732, para 19 : 1986 Lab IC 357, the Andhra Pradesh Abolition of Posts of Part Time Village Officers Ordinance, 1984 (Ordinance No. 1 of 1984) was promulgated on 6th January, 1984 by which part time village Officers posts were abolished, but the ordinance was not replaced by the Act of the Legislature. The question arose as to whether it can be said, that on failure of the State Legislature to pass an act in terms of the Ordinance, can it be assumed that the Ordinance, has never become effective and that it was void ab initio and the posts of part time village Officers which were abolished under the Ordinance revived. Hon'ble E. S. Venkataramaih, J. (as he then was) speaking for the constitution Bench held that such a plea overlooks two important factors, namely, the language of clause (2) of Article 213 and the nature of the provisions contained in the Ordinance. Article 213(2) says that an ordinance promulgated shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature. Article 213 does not say that the Ordinance shall be void from the commencement of State Legislature disapproving it. It says it shall cease to operate which means that it should be treated as being effective till it ceased to operate on happening of events mentioned in clause (2) of Article 213. In other words whatever action was taken or order passed during the life time of the ordinance, even though the same may not have been replaced by the Act, or its life may not have been extended by another ordinance; nevertheless the action taken shall continue to be valid. 30. It is thus abundantly clear that even if the provisions of S. 1(3) of Act No. 13 of 1983 would not have been provided that the Act shall be deemed to have come into operation on October 22, 1981 when the first ordinance of 1981 was promulgated, nevertheless as the first ordinance was continued by promulgation of subsequent ordinances till the same were replaced by U.P. Act No. 13 of 1983, hence there was no occasion to consider that the act done or the order passed under another ordinance since October 22, 1981 would become illegal. But it is just for the sake of precaution, a fortiori that it has been provided that the Act shall be deemed to have come into operation since October 22, 1981. 31. As the sixth ordinance No. 25 of 1983 was repealed and it was to be replaced by U.P. Act No. 13 of 1983, consequently what shall be the effect of repeal may be ascertained, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner with reference to S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and S. 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 and the provisions of the same are set out below :- "6. Effect of repeal. - Where any Uttar Pradesh Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then unless different intentions appear, the repeal shall not - (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect : or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder : or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed : or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any remedy, or any investigation or legal proceeding commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid : and any such remedy may be enforced and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be continued and concluded, and any such penalty, forfeiture, punishment imposed as if the repealed Act had not been passed." 32. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions indicates that a repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect, or affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder of affect any right or any liability acquired or incurred under the Ordinance or Act so repealed or any legal proceedings or remedy may be instituted or any penalty or punishment may be imposed as if the repealed Act has not been passed. The reasons for enacting S. 6 of the General Clauses Act was indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84 : 1955 Cri LJ 254 as follows (at Page 88 of AIR) : "Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in S. 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that S. 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. S. 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the Section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the provisions of a new law and mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. It is in the light of these principles that we now proceed to examine the facts of the present case." 33. In Municipal Board, Kanpur v. Behari Lal, AIR 1960 All 546 : 1960 All LJ 376 Full Bench of this Court held that the repeal of U.P. Pure Food Act, 1950 had the necessary consequence of terminating the appointment of Public Analyst appointed under that Act unless their appointments were specifically safe. 34. In Wadid Hasan Khan v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 Hyd. 204, a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court held that when an Act is repealed it is same thing as if it had never existed except with reference to such parts as are saved by the repealing statute. 35. 34. In Wadid Hasan Khan v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 Hyd. 204, a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court held that when an Act is repealed it is same thing as if it had never existed except with reference to such parts as are saved by the repealing statute. 35. It is thus obvious that just to obviate the doubt that the act done or action taken since the enforcement of the first ordinance till the last ordinance replaced by U.P. Act No. 31 of 1981 may not become illegal, it was provided by the U.P. Legislature that U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 shall be deemed to have come into force on October 22, 1981 (when the first Ordinance No. 16 of 1981) was promulgated. It cannot, therefore, he said that U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 was ex post facto law. It was not intended to be in operation from the date in past, when in fact there was no law, rather it was just for the sake of precaution that the U.P. Legislature provided that it shall be deemed to have come into operation on October 22, 1981. The first Ordinance was promulgated and the same was replaced or continued by subsequent ordinances till the VIth Ordinance was promulgated which was repealed and replaced by U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 (U.P. Dacoity Affected Areas Act). 36. In view of the dictum of law laid down in T. Venkata Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (supra) even without spefifically stating that the Act shall be deemed to have come into operation on October 22, 1981, the actions taken and orders passed since the first Ordinance was promulgated, would have remained effective in view of the provisions of Article 213 of the Constitution, which provides that an ordinance shall cease to operate, and does not say that the ordinance shall be void from the commencement of the State Legislature disapproving it. This obviously connotes that it should be treated as being effective till it cease to operate on the happening of events mentioned in clause (ii) of Article 213 of the Constitution. This obviously connotes that it should be treated as being effective till it cease to operate on the happening of events mentioned in clause (ii) of Article 213 of the Constitution. We are accordingly of the considered opinion that it was just for the sake of precaution that the State Legislature of U.P. provided under S. 1(3) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1981 that the Act shall be deemed to have come into operation since October 22, 1981, otherwise that would have remained in operation and the orders passed and actions taken since the first Ordinance was promulgated till the enactment of U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 would have remained valid. 37. U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 (U.P. Dacoity Affected Areas Act) does not deal with the trial of any new offence rather it has provided procedure for the offences which have been scheduled in Schedule of the Act. These offences including the offences under Sections 395, 396 and 397, IPC are the offences triable under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and are defined under the Indian Penal Code. It is just the procedure that has been slightly changed and the object of changing the procedure was to curb effectively the commission of scheduled offences and to make provision for arrangement of speedy trial there of and for the attachment of properties for commission of such offences and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. With this object in view the U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 was enacted just with a view to make provision for the attachment of property acquired for the commission of such offences the different provisions have been made. The enactment of U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 cannot therefore be said to be beyond the legislative competence of the U.P. Legislature. 38. Coming to the point whether U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 is violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The object of Article 14 of the Constitution is the fullest development of individual and ensuring his dignity through rule of law which permeates the entire fabric of the Constitution and it forms one of its basic features. It excludes arbitrariness. Its necessary element is that law must not be arbitrary or irrational and the same must satisfy the test of reason. It excludes arbitrariness. Its necessary element is that law must not be arbitrary or irrational and the same must satisfy the test of reason. Article 14 applies equally to ordinances as it applies to an Act of Legislature. We have to see if the U.P. Act 31 of 1982 applies unequally to persons similarly situate. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees general right of equality. It forbids class legislation and does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. The classification may be based on general basis. We have to examine whether classification rests on a reasonable basis and whether it bears nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Our judicial scrutiny cannot extend to embarking upon a very fine or a mathematical evaluation of the basis of classification. In case such a scrutiny is permissible in that event it shall be open to the courts to substitute their own judgment for that of legislature on the need to classify or the destrability of achieving a particular object according to the specified or pressing needs of a particular state. 39. The object of U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 which was published in U.P. Gazette Extra .dated 13th October 1983, is as follows : "An Act to make provision for specifying certain offences in the dacoity affected areas of the Uttar Pradesh in order to curb effectively the commission of scheduled offences and to make provision for punishment and speedy trial thereof and for the attachment of properties acquired through the commission of such offences and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto." 40. It is thus obvious that the object is to specify certain offences in the dacoity affected areas of U.P. with a view to curb effectively commission of scheduled offences specified in the schedule including offences of Dacoity under Sections 395 and 397 of IPC etc. and murder under S. 302 IPC and similarly a number of other offences, and for making provisions for speedy trial, punishment and attachment of properties and to provide for more stringent punishment. 41. and murder under S. 302 IPC and similarly a number of other offences, and for making provisions for speedy trial, punishment and attachment of properties and to provide for more stringent punishment. 41. We have to bear in mind that where the constitutionality or validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it contravenes Article 14, the burden is on the petitioner to make precise and specific averments in specific, clear and unambiguous terms and must be proved that the statute is discriminatory and it has nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the said statute. 42. Even though the counsel for the petitioner did not refer the specific provisions of U.P. Act 31 of 1982 nor he argued how certain provisions are discriminatory even though burden of proof was squarely on the petitioner to prove it. We would, however, examine it our selves. Section 3 of the Act deals with the declaration of Dacoity Affected areas Act under Chapter 1. But it is not discriminatory in as much as a particular District or area is declared as dacoity affected area on the basis of report of a police officer or other information in respect of incidence of a scheduled offence. It is on the basis of sufficient material that a particular District or area is declared as dacoity affected area by the State. The declaration is not discriminatory. Similarly procedure for creation of special courts under S. 5 or provisions of S. 6 for creation of jurisdiction of special courts and S. 7 providing procedure and powers of special Courts and S. 10 enacting special provision regarding bail cannot be said to be discriminatory as these provisions apply to all accused equally and there is the nexus of speedy trial and to curb effectively the commission of scheduled offences, which are sought to be achieved. We have examined other provisions and they are not discriminatory. 43. Considering the question as to whether U.P. Act 31 of 1983 was based on violation of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, suffice it to say that there is a fundamental distinction between the cases arising under Article 14 and those arising under Article 19 or 21. Consequently we have considered constitutionality of the Act. 43. Considering the question as to whether U.P. Act 31 of 1983 was based on violation of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, suffice it to say that there is a fundamental distinction between the cases arising under Article 14 and those arising under Article 19 or 21. Consequently we have considered constitutionality of the Act. In the challenge based on violation of Article 19 the petitioner has to plead his right to freedom of speech or his right for movement thought the territory of the State. In respect of Article 21 he has to plead specifically about his fundamental right in respect of life and personal liberty and once he prima facie proves it the burden of proof would shift on the State to justify the impugned law or action by proving that deprivation of the petitioner's right of speech or movement was safe by Clause 2, or the petitioner was deprived of his right of personal liberty according to just fair and reasonable procedure established by the law. It may however be stated that under Article 19 the burden is not on the petitioner to prove that the restriction is not unreasonable or that the restriction is not in respect of matters covered by Clause 2. Under Article 21 also the burden is never on the petitioner to prove that the procedure prescribed by law which deprived his right of personal liberty is not unjust, unfair and unreasonable. 44. As a matter of fact the provisions of U.P. Act 31 of 1983 are certainly directed towards deprivation of the freedom of petitioner and similar other citizens as a measure of exceptions contained under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. It is a reasonable restriction on the rights conferred by sub-clause (1) that the U.P. Act 31 has been enacted and brought on the statute book. Similarly there are other exceptions contained under sub-clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Article 19. Under these circumstances the provisions of Article 19(2) to (6) have been enacted in such a wide sweep and the U.P. Act 31 of 1983 has been enacted as a measure of exceptions to the fundamental-rights contained under Article 19(1) of the Constitution. 45. Now considering as to whether U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 is in violation of Article 21 which deals with protection of personal liberty. 45. Now considering as to whether U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 is in violation of Article 21 which deals with protection of personal liberty. The object of Article 21 is to prevent encroachment of personal liberty by executive save in accordance with the law and in conformity with the provisions thereof. Before a person is deprived of the life and personal liberty the procedure established by law must be strictly followed. In other words, the right to life or personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is not absolute or inevitable, rather the same is subject to provisions of any law and in accordance with the procedure provided under that law. Even the right to life and personal liberty can be deprived. The deprivation of right to life and personal liberty must be at the hands of the State and not by an individual. Right to life also includes right to live with permissible dignity. At the same time this can also be said that a person has also fundamental right of not being convicted of an offence which is not established by law. It cannot, however, be said that any citizen has got the right to open public trial. Normally the trial may be an open public trial, but under certain circumstances the trial may be held within the jail premises and that cannot be said to be in violation of fundamental rights, inasmuch as the trial in jail premises with the directions of the High Court or as directed under some special circumstances would be a trial according to law and in respect of procedure to be followed in a trial nobody can be said to have his own choice of procedure. Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1988 SC 1883 . Right to life does include right to live with human dignity. Unless the procedure established can be said to deprive a person of some right of appeal or some other right and the procedure to be followed was prescribed under U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 and also under the Code of Criminal Procedure and if those procedures applied, it cannot be assumed that petitioners were deprived of their right to life or right to liberty. It is just with a view to curb effectively the commission of scheduled offences in the dacoity affected areas and to make provision for speedy trial and for attachment of property required to the commission of such offences that U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 has been brought on the statute book and special procedure has been provided, with a view to achieve the object of the Act. There is some slight. deviation but that was consistent with the object of U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983, particularly with the object to have speedy trial for the scheduled offences and with a view to have speedy trial some special procedure as provided in that behalf, it cannot be said that the citizens would be deprived of his right to life and liberty in case the procedure established by the Act No. 31 of 1983 is followed. State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath, AIR 1989 SC 558 : 1989 Cri LJ 813; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1988 SC 1531 : 1988 Cri LJ 1661; Raghubir Singh v., State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 149 : 1987 Cri LJ 157). 46. We are accordingly of the view that as the procedure established by U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 was with a view to have speedy trial in respect of scheduled offences and in connection with the matters specified thereunder, it cannot be said to be in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. 47. Mithu v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 473 : 1983 Cri LJ 811 relied upon by counsel for the petitioner was a case pertaining to constitutionality of section 303 (Three hundred and three), I.P.C. and is not relevant for the purpose of this case. 48. Reverting to the question whether the State Legislature has restrictive power to enact U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983. The power of legislation is provided under Article 246 of the Constitution, whereas the field of legislation has been provided under various entries in List I, Union list in respect of which only Union of India has power to legislate. Whereas List II is in respect of that piece of legislation where the State Government has got power to legislate. The third list is the Concurrent List where the Union of India as well as the State Government has got power to legislate. Whereas List II is in respect of that piece of legislation where the State Government has got power to legislate. The third list is the Concurrent List where the Union of India as well as the State Government has got power to legislate. The entries in these lists must be given widest possible interpretation and the words in the entries must be taken to be of very wide amplitude. The narrow construction would be out of place. Each word employed must be held to extend onerous or substantially less which can normally be said to be comprehended in it. The entries in List III are the heads of legislation and are to be interpreted in a liberal manner. No entry is to be read in a restricted sense. In the case of overlapping of entries the doctrine of pith and substance would be applied. Wherever there appears overlapping of entries the Court is to examine the pith and substance of the legislation with a view to ascertain as to which entry can be substantially related. Even though there maybe a slight connection with another entry in another list. In the matter of apparently conflicting entries the duty of the Court is to make all successful efforts to harmonise those conflicting entries. 49. In the present case we are concerned. with U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 as to whether the U.P. Legislature has restrictive competence in the concurrent list and the Union of India and the State Legislature both have power to legislate. Item I of List III provides criminal law including all matters including the Indian Penal Code. Item II of List III is in respect of criminal procedure including all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Item III contains preventive detention for the reasons connected with the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. These three items of List III are as comprehensive, particularly Item II providing sufficient legislative field to the State of U.P. to enact U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 with the object specified in the Objects and Reasons. In such matters what is to be decisive is not consequence of the enactment or the subject matter, but whether its pith and substance does lay down the subject matter in question. In such matters what is to be decisive is not consequence of the enactment or the subject matter, but whether its pith and substance does lay down the subject matter in question. Here Item II of List III, Criminal Procedure including all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure is so comprehensive that U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 is covered under that. Even assuming that slightly the subject matter may trench upon the field, but that would be merely incidental to the main purpose. With the object of speedy trial and other incidental matter the State Legislature has sufficient power to legislate U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983. It cannot be said that the field of legislation is occupied by the Union List nor it can be said that only the Union of India has the power to legislate. 50. Any way the matter can be viewed from another angle. Items I, II and III are so widely worded that there is no scope for any restrictive meaning to be assigned to each item. So far as Item No. II of the Criminal Procedure Code the item opens with the word `including, hence it has the inclusive meaning that has been assigned to all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure on the commencement of the Constitution. This word `inclusive' wherever used indicates that something more is to be read including such and such. In other words, "including" is the word of enlargement and not restriction. Consequently all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure on the date of commencement of the Constitution where in respect of procedure or the substance read would be a concurrent restrictive subject. (See Ukha v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1531 : (1963 (2) Cri LJ 418)). We are conscious that these entries are the fields of legislation particularly Items I, II and III of List III need not be read in a narrow or pedantic sense, but must be given their fullest meaning and by widest amplitude and be held to extend all and sundry and subside matters. Express Hotels Private Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1989 SC 1949 : 1989 Tax LR 944. 51. We have considered the constitutionality of different provisions of U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 and we have no manner of doubt that the U.P. Legislature has competence to enact the same. Express Hotels Private Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1989 SC 1949 : 1989 Tax LR 944. 51. We have considered the constitutionality of different provisions of U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 and we have no manner of doubt that the U.P. Legislature has competence to enact the same. We are also conscious about the rule of construction and if the constitutional provision is susceptible and admits of two reasonable possible views, then the one which would promote its constitutionality should be preferred on the ground that the legislature is presumed not to have intended any excess of its own jurisdiction. This rule however applies only when two views are possible. In the present case in our opinion only view is possible that U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 is constitutional and within competence of U.P. Legislature and is not hit by Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. 52. Our answer to the question proposed by ourselves are that the Governor has no power under Article 313 of the Constitution to re-promulgate the same ordinance successively but the restrictive competence or the infirmities in that Ordinance must be challenged by the time the same remains as an Ordinance as is not replaced by an Act of Legislature. U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983 is not an ex post facto law, rather for the sake of precaution and consistent with the provisions of S. 6, U.P. General Clauses Act, it has been provided that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on October 22, 1981 when the U.P. Legislature has legislative competence to enact the U.P. Dacoity Affected Areas Act (U.P. Act No. 31 of 1983). 53. Applying the Aristotalean and Baconian reasonings, we are of the view that the present petitions are devoid of merits and the petitioners are not entitled to any relief. 54. In the result, these petitions lack merits and are dismissed. The interim stay order as extended from time to time is vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.