JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - Whether social and beneficial legislation in case of some incongruity has to be interpreted so as to advance the dominant purpose of the statute is the short but significant question that falls for our determination in this petition filed by the second wife (Smt. Vimla Devi) of Sri Ram Sumer a class IV employee of the respondent, who died in harness. The relief sought is for a writ of certiorari and mandamus, quashing the impugned order and directing the respondent U.P. State Electricity Board to appoint her in place of her deceased husband Ram Sumer Petrol-Man in Obra Plant Division, Obra under the provisions of Rule 5 of the U.P. State Electricity Board Employment of the Dependents of Employees Dying in Harness Rules, 1975 (for short the Rules). 2. The facts are these. One Ram Sumer Petrol-Man was employed in the U.P. State Electricity Board as a class IV employee. He has Smt. Tapeshwari Devi as first married wife and1 Smt. Vimla, petitioner as second wife who lived with the deceased as his wife- and from their union Km. Urmila Devi, a daughter was born. Even though it was contended on behalf of the respondent that petitioner was not legally wedded wife of the deceased but as she In ed with the deceased as his wife for a number of years and has been accepted as wife by the society, and other family members and relatives hence we have no option but to decide the petition assuming her to be second wife. 3. It has been admitted in Para 11 of the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by Sri D. N. Chaurasia, Assistant Engineer in Obra Hydel Plant Division, on behalf of respondents that the petitioner (the second wife) was paid half of the amount payable to the widow of the deceased employee as guardian of Km. Urmila as per Court's order. 3. It has been admitted in Para 11 of the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by Sri D. N. Chaurasia, Assistant Engineer in Obra Hydel Plant Division, on behalf of respondents that the petitioner (the second wife) was paid half of the amount payable to the widow of the deceased employee as guardian of Km. Urmila as per Court's order. The relevant portion about the payment to the petitioner (as second wife) and her daughter are set out; - "Both the petitioner and Smt. Tapeshweri Devi were asked to submit clearance certificate but none of them have submitted clearance certificate from the Executive Engineer (Civil), Executive Engineer, (Hydel), Obra Plant Division in respect of the house in their occupation and the electricity bills, which as per rules must be submitted before the final settlement of payment of dues is made to the persons entitled to receive the money on behalf of the deceased. It is reiterated that petitioner is to be paid half amount only for her being custodian and guardian of Km. Urmila Devi as per Court's order. The amount already paid to both of them was Rs. 1590 in May, 1985 on equal basis i. e. Rs. 795 to each of them was paid. Out of the said amount of Rs. 1590 which was in respect of G. P. F., while the amount of group insurance scheme being a sum of Rs. 12,835 too has been paid on 22nd June, 1987. Apportionment of the above amount has been done equally between them as a result each has got a sum of Rs. 6417. Most of the amount payable to them by was of the dues of provident Fund and gratuity shall be paid only when the clearance certificate in respect of the house accommodation in their possession is submitted by them. It is reiterated that payment of half of the amount of provident Fund and group Insurance late Sri Ram Sumer was made to the petitioner in pursuance of the order made by the District Judge, mentioned above." 4. The case of the respondents was that as the petitioner was not the legally wedded wife of the deceased, hence she was not entitled to the appointment as dependent of deceased Ram Sumer dying in harness. 5. Mr. The case of the respondents was that as the petitioner was not the legally wedded wife of the deceased, hence she was not entitled to the appointment as dependent of deceased Ram Sumer dying in harness. 5. Mr. V.C. Mishra, the learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that as Smt. Tapeshwari was over-age and hence not fit to be appointed in place of deceased, in any case, her health was not such as to perform the duties assigned to her. The Rules were a social legislation with a view to to do social justice envisaged by the preamble' of our Constitution hence its different provisions particularly Rules 5, 7 and 9 (with its proviso) has to be harmoneously interpreted so as to attain the object of the Rules and to evidence the concept of social justice. The subordinate Court has also assumed petitioner as the second wife and directed a part of amount payable to her so that she might maintain her minor daughter Km. Urmila. The petitioner was entitled to be appointed in place of Ram Sumer deceased. 6. Sri A. P. Singh, the learned Counsel for the U. P. State Electricity Board, on the other hand, urged that as petitioner was second wife of deceased hence she could not be appointed in view of proviso to Rule 9. Reliance was placed on State of Orissa v. Debki Devi, AIR 1964 SC 1413 and State of Rajasthan v. Mrs. Leela Jain, AIR 1965 SC 1296 . 7. Before adverting to the actual controversy it is better to have the scheme of the Rules, Rule 1 provides the name of the Rules. Rule 2 contains definition clause ; Out of it Rule 2 (c) defines 'family' of deceased which shall consist of (i) wife of husband (ii) son (iii) unmarried or widowed daughters. Rule 3 provides that these Rules would apply to employees below the rank of Junior Engineer. Rule 4 provides that these Rules shall have overriding effect inspite of any other provision to the contrary in some other service Rules. Rule 5 provides that one member of the family of deceased shall be employed provided she or he is suitable for the job. Rule 6 contains procedure for making an application. Rule 4 provides that these Rules shall have overriding effect inspite of any other provision to the contrary in some other service Rules. Rule 5 provides that one member of the family of deceased shall be employed provided she or he is suitable for the job. Rule 6 contains procedure for making an application. Rule 7 provides that where two members of the family want to be employed, the Head of the Office of the employer would decide the suitability of one out of two persons seeking employment keeping in view the welfare of the family particularly the welfare of the minor members. Rule 8 provides relaxation in age, Rule 9 provides satisfaction of the Appointing Authority about qualifications of the person seeking employment, Rule 9 (a) provides that the person seeking employment must bear such a conduct which entitles him to the employment. Rule 9 (b) provides mental and physical fitness. Rule 9 (c) provides that in case of a male candidate, he must not have more than one wife alive and in ease of a woman candidate, she must not have married a man who has already one wife alive. Rule 10 provides that State Government or the State Electricity Board would have power for removal of difficulties. 8. It need not be stressed that these Rules are a piece of social welfare legislation. The cardinal principles of interpretation are that the social beneficent legislation has to be interpreted in such a way so that the object, of the rules pertaining to social welfare are attained, 9. While interpreting social legislations the approach to a statute of predominant social nature has to be made in that light. The judges must take a broad view of the back ground and policy of the statute in question. (See Okerake v. Brant London Borough Council, (1967) 1 QB 42 . 10. While interpreting social legislations the approach to a statute of predominant social nature has to be made in that light. The judges must take a broad view of the back ground and policy of the statute in question. (See Okerake v. Brant London Borough Council, (1967) 1 QB 42 . 10. In Otheyath Lakshmi Awme and another v. Nellachinkuniyil Govinden Naiyer, Judgments Today (1990) 3 SC 230, it was held that benevolent provision in a statute has to be interpreted keeping in view the dominent purpose of the statute, the intention of the legislature and the policy underlying the same, in the instant case under Rule 5 it has been provided that if any employee dies before attaining the age of superannuation one of his dependant family member may be employed either on the post held by him or on some other inferior post. Rule 7 provides that while making appointment, when more than one dependant member is claimant to be appointed in place of deceased in that event the utility anil competence of the person seeking employment has to be ascertained and special care shall be taken for the welfare of the widow or other minor members of the family. Rule 9 (c) however provides that in case of woman dependant she must not be married to a person who has already one wife alive. 11. The provisions of Rule 9 (c) appear to be inconsistant rather it has been added as a proviso to the provisions of Rule 5. But the object of the proviso is not to enact any provision contrary to the main provision. Rules 5 & 7 specifically provide that any member of the family who was dependant on the deceased must be appointed. It there arc more claimants than one, the utility of the employee has to be ascertained by the employer before making the appointment. Rules 5 & 7 specifically provide that any member of the family who was dependant on the deceased must be appointed. It there arc more claimants than one, the utility of the employee has to be ascertained by the employer before making the appointment. In the present case Smt. Tapeshwari being first wife of the deceased is party to the petition but even after service she did not turn up to file counter-affidavit and she appears to be not of such age so as to serve or perform the duties of peon or any other class IV employee or on the post on which deceased was serving immediately before her death, liven the Court below has directed that half of the amount payable to the widow of deceased was to be paid to Smt. Virnia Devi, the petitioner as the mother of Km. Urmila. It is to be noticed that Smt. Vimia was living as wife of deceased since prior to so many years of death and she was accepted to be the wife of deceased and she has got minor daughter Km. Urmiia to be maintained and the Court below has directed half of the amount to be paid for the maintenance of the minor daughter of the petitioner, under these circumstances as the petitioners age is less than that of Smt. Tapeshwari consequently her length of service may be more than that of Smt. Tapeshwari and as such her utility is more than that of Smt. Tapeshwari in the service of the department. Substantial compliance of the intention of the legislature as envisaged under. Rules 5 and 7 appears to be to keep welfware of minor children, suitability and utility of the employee. The appointment has to be made out of so many claimants to the post held by the deceased. The object of Rule 9 (c) is like proviso and it cannot be assumed that Rule 9 (c) was enacted to provide something contrary to the provisions contained under Rules 5 and 7 of the Rules. The proviso has to be interpreted so as to carry out the object of the legislature, prior to the Rule in question, there was no such provision that the dependant of an employee dying in harness may be provided employment. The proviso has to be interpreted so as to carry out the object of the legislature, prior to the Rule in question, there was no such provision that the dependant of an employee dying in harness may be provided employment. Present rules are piece of social legislation containing these provisions and they have to be interpreted in that light so as to achieve objects aimed by the legislature. 12. In Jugal Kishore v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1989 SC 159 . It has been held that socio-economic legislations operating in the same field should be read in a precautionary manner and construed constructively otherwise operation of different Acts in same field would create contradiction. In the present case the Rule has to be read as a whole and different provisions have to be construed in a harmonious way so as to advance the object sought to be attained. We are of the opinion that Rule 9 (c) has not to be read in isolation but it has to be read subject to Rules 5 and 7 consequently as the petitioner was living as wife of deceased for a number of years, under law she has to be assumed as if she was the legally Wedded wife of the deceased and she has given birth to a daughter from the union of the deceased and she along with daughter was dependants on the deceased at the time of death. The object of the Rule is to provide employment to the dependant of the deceased which can be achieved by providing employment to the petitioner so that she may maintain her minor daughter. In case the submissions of the respondents are accepted then the very object of the social legislation would be frustrated and the provisions of Rule 9 would have to be taken as separate provision in contradiction to the Rules 5 and 7. This cannot be the intention of the legislature while enacting Rule 9. 13. In the State of Rajasthan v. Mrs. This cannot be the intention of the legislature while enacting Rule 9. 13. In the State of Rajasthan v. Mrs. Leela Jain and others, AIR 1965 SC 1296 (supra), relied upon by the respondents, it has been held (on page 1300, under para 14) that so far as a general principle of construction of a provision is concerned, it has been broadly stated that the function of a provision is to limit the main part of the section and carve out something which but for the proviso would have been within the operative part. In the present case, the proviso if interpreted in the light of the submissions of the learned Counsel for the respondents, would be laying down entirely a different and contradictory provision, consequently this case is of no assistance to the respondents. Similarly State of Orissa v. Debki Devi (supra) relied upon by the respondents is besides the point. 14. Under these circumstances the only irresistible conclusion is that Rule 9 has to be read subject to Rules 5 and 7. The Rules contain benevolent provisions and it should be construed taking into consideration the dominent object of the Rules, intention of legislature and underlying policy to the effect to provide employment to one of : the dependents so that family may bear the burden. Under the circumstances that construction which is just and equitable has to be adopted. The Rules have to be viewed with a constructive approach. The spirit of the Rules have to be searched out. (See World Wide Agencies (E.) Ltd. Margarat v. Desor, AIR 1990 SC 737 O. Thayath Lekshmy Amrna v. Nellachin Kuniyil Govinden Naiyar, 1990 3 SCC 374 and Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480 . 15. The benevolent object can be attained by providing employment to a dependant member of deceased's family keeping in view the welfare of the woman and minor child. It was the duty of the employer to provide employment to the petitioner at the earliest after she made an application, after ascertaining her suitability but they failed to perform their legal duties consequently impugned order cannot be sustained and the case for issuance of a writ of mandamus has been made out. 16. Applying the priori and posteriori reasonings, the petition succeeds and is allowed. 16. Applying the priori and posteriori reasonings, the petition succeeds and is allowed. A writ of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order and writ of mandamus is issued directing the respondents to appoint the petitioner within two weeks from the date of receipt of this order, in place of deceased. It is further directed that of the salary and other service emoluments would be paid by the petitioner 'to Smt. Tapeshwari Devi so that she also makes her both ends meet. There shall be no order as to costs. K.K. Birla, J. - T. have the advantage of going through the proposed judgment of my learned Brother. However, respectfully I have not been able to agree with some of his conclusions which effect the manner in which this petition may be disposed of. On some points I have not been able to accept the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 18. The facts of the case are already given in the judgment of my learned Brother. In her writ petition Smt. Vimla Devi relied on the provisions of U. P. Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974: Ram Sumer deceased was an employee in the U. P. State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board). The Board framed rules known as U.P. Rajya Vidyut Parishad Sewakal Main Mrit Parishad ya Sewako ke Aashrito Ki Bharti Niyamawali, 1975 (here in after referred to Harness Rules). It came into force with effect from 20th June, 1974. There is no dispute that the petitioner will be governed by these rules and not by the U. P. Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974. In fact, the short point remains for consideration in the writ petition, in my opinion, is whether Smt. Vimla Devi can be legally said to be the wife of the deceased and as such entitled to get the employment under the rules. 19. The relevant rules relevant for the purposes of this petition have already been given in the judgment of my learned Brother. Under Rule 2, clause (c) wife or husband (as the case may be) besides son, un-married daughters and widowed daughters are included in the term 'family' so as to be entitled to the employment on the death of the employee. 20. Under Rule 2, clause (c) wife or husband (as the case may be) besides son, un-married daughters and widowed daughters are included in the term 'family' so as to be entitled to the employment on the death of the employee. 20. After the death of Ram Sumer a dispute arose between Vimla Devi petitioner and Smt. Tapeshwari Devi respondent No. 4 regarding succession. By an order dated 1st February, 1985 the Civil Judge, Mirzapur in the proceedings, for the succession certificate passed the order to the effect that Smt. Tapeshwari Devi will be entitled to share and Smt. Vimla Devi in the capacity of the guardian of Km. Urmila to the other share. This judgment has been vehemently relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of the contention that Smt. Vimla Devi is also the wife of the deceased and has been issued succession certificate in respect of share. After considering the relevant documents the learned Civil Judge found that Smt. Tapeshwari Devi was the first wife of the deceased. According to him, Ram Sumer married Vimla Devi as well according to the custom of Hindu religion and both of them are married wives according to Hindu custom and religion. It was also contended before him that in view of Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, Ram Sumer could not have contacted second marriage and as such marriage with Smt. Vimla Devi (petitioner) was void. Learned Civil Judge gave no categorical finding on this point. According to him, if it be so, the daughter born out of the union of Kam Sumer and Vimla Devi would be legitimate under Section 16 of the Act. Therefore, he passed the order already mentioned above. In my opinion, from this order the proper inference which can be raised is that Smt, Vimla Devi was also married with Ram Sumer, and Smt. Vimla Devi gave birth to a daughter. However, this order further shows that the learned Civil Judge did not accept Smt. Vimla Devi as a legally wedded wife of the deceased and therefore, succession certificate of share was issued to her, not in her personal capacity or as a legal widow of the deceased but as a guardian of the minor daughter who will be a legitimate daughter under Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 21. 21. I agree with my learned Brother that Smt. Tapeshwari Devi is the first wife of the deceased It is clear from the material on record that Smt. Vimla Devi was married to the deceased much after 1956 and therefore, the status of the petitioner will be governed by the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act even though they had been living together as husband and wife and so accepted by others. 22. Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act deals with the conditions when a marriage may be solemnized between two Hindus. Clause (i) is to 'the effect that neither party has a spouse living at the time of marriage. Section 11 of the Act provides : "Any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party there to, against the other party be so declared by a decred of nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in class (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5." The marriage between the deceased and petitioner was clearly against the conditions mentioned in clause (i) of Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, under Section 11 of the Act this marriage was null and void. In my opinion, there can be no escape from this conclusion. When a person marries another person knowing fully well that another spouse of such person is already living at that time, he/she incurs all the disability imposed by law under the Act. In case the children born of this union were also treated as illegitimate, they would have suffered throughout their lives for no fault of theirs. The framers of the Hindu Marriage Act were quite aware to this and therefore under Section 16 (1) children born out of such null and void marriage have been treated as legitimate and therefore, for all purposes such children are legitimate children. 23. Section 16 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act clearly provides that "notwithstanding that the marriage is null and void under Section 11, any child of such marriage who would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid, shall be legitimate............." Therefore, in view of the above provisions in the Hindu Marriage Act and personal Law the second marriage is null and void and, therefore, the petitioner does not get a status of a wife under the law. 24. 24. This controversy is also squarely covered by the principles laid down in the case of Yammabai v. Anantrao, AIR 1988 SC 644 . The point involved in that case was whether a Hindu woman who is married after coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to a Hindu male having a living lawfully wedded wife can maintain an application for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Under Section 125 (I) of the Code of Criminal Procedure a wife, unable to maintain herself, is end tied to maintenance. In the cited case Anantrao had earlier married one Smt. Lilabai who was alive and the marriage was subsisting. He again married Smt. Yamunabai by observance of rites under Hindu Law. The provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, namely, Section 5(1), Section 11, Section 12 and Section 16 were considered. It has been held that Section 16 (t) clearly implies that a void marriage can be held to be so without a prior formal declaration by a Court in a proceeding........... It is also to be seen that while the legislature has considered it advisable to uphold the legitimacy of the peternity of a child born out of a void marriage, it has not extended a similar protection in respect of the mother of the child. The marriage of the appellant must, therefore, be treated as null and void from its very inception." (See para 3). Therefore, applying these principles to the instant case it is clear that the marriage of Vimla Devi petitioner shall have to be treated as null and void from its very inception. In the above cited case it had also been contended that the expression 'wife' should be given a wider and extended meaning so as to include there in not only a law fully wedded wife but also a woman married in fact by performance of necessary rites or following the procedure laid down under the law. This contention was repelled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court (See p. 5). In view of the above discussion the marriage of Smt. Vimla Devi with Ram Sumer deceased was null and void from its very inception, that it did not give her a legal status of wife and therefore for the purposes of the Rules she cannot be treated to be the wife of Ram Sumer deceased. In view of the above discussion the marriage of Smt. Vimla Devi with Ram Sumer deceased was null and void from its very inception, that it did not give her a legal status of wife and therefore for the purposes of the Rules she cannot be treated to be the wife of Ram Sumer deceased. That being so, in my opinion, the petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone and it would not be necessary to consider other aspects. However, on some other aspects as well the petitioner does not have a good case. 25. Annexure 3 to the counter-affidavit is the decision dated 28th May 1985 to the effect that Smt. Vimla Devi had married a person (Ram Sumer) whose first wife was alive and therefore according to Rule 9 of the Rules.it is not possible to give her employment in the Board, Smt. Vimla Devi made a representation to the General Manager of the Board for considering her matter. She also filed Writ Petition No. Nil of 1987 decided on 10th August, 87 for the relief in this regard. This writ, petition was disposed of with the direction that this representation would be disposed of within two months from the date of the production of the certified copy of the order before the General Manager of the Board, and before doing so, the Manager would afford an opportunity to Smt. Tapeshwari Devi. The representation was considered and by the impugned order dated 14th October, 1987 it was again ordered that as she had married a person (Ram Sumar) whose first wife was alive she would not be given employment under Rule 9, clause (c) of the Rules. 26. The legality of Rule 9, clause (c) has been challenged on behalf of the petitioner on the ground that this clause is inconsistent with Rule 5. It is contended that this rule should be considered with Rules 5, 7 and the definition of 'family' given in Rule 2. It is contended that the object of this rule is to provide employment to the member of the family of the deceased. The wife is a qualified person to get such employment under Rule 5. Under Rule 7 if there are more than one claimants their respective claims have to be considered. It is contended that the object of this rule is to provide employment to the member of the family of the deceased. The wife is a qualified person to get such employment under Rule 5. Under Rule 7 if there are more than one claimants their respective claims have to be considered. Clause (c) of Rule 9 puts a restriction on a wife in given situation and therefore this Rule is bad being- inconsistent with and over riding the provision of Rule 5. 27. It had been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that Smt. Tapeshwari Devi has become over age, that in spite of service of notice on her she had not put in appearance in the Court and did not show any interest in getting employment. On the other hand, it was contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that Smt. Tapeshwari Devi had also put an application for employment, and the documents to that effect have been filed by the respondents. However, in view of the above findings, this aspect has become irrelevant. Further, the petitioner will not be entitled to get employment, if she is not entitled to get the same under law merely on the ground that Smt. Tapeshwari Devi had not come to contest her claim in the Court. The main thrust of the contention on behalf of the petitioner is that after the death of a deceased employee, the employment must be given to a member of his family and that the petitioner is more suitable and qualified for the same : that the object of framing the rules is to give social justice to the members of the family of the deceased and therefore it should be liberally construed. No doubt the object of the rules is to give relief to the family of the deceased employee who may otherwise be thrown on the street. However, in my opinion, this benefit can be given only to a person who is legally entitled to get the benefit and such employment is not a gift. It has been pointed out earlier that the petitioner cannot be treated to be a wife under law and as such will not be included in the word, 'family' of the deceased so as to be entitled to get employment. 28. It has been pointed out earlier that the petitioner cannot be treated to be a wife under law and as such will not be included in the word, 'family' of the deceased so as to be entitled to get employment. 28. It may be pointed out that bigamy is also a social evil and in order to give social justice to Hindu women, the Hindu Marriage Act was enacted. Therefore, it will be too much to say that the petitioner should be given employment, even if her marriage is null and void in direct violation of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. That being so, even if clause (c) of para of Rule 9 of the Rules would not have been there, the petitioner was not entitled to get the employment. 29. It has next been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that clause (c) of Rule 9 is inconsistent with Rule 5 and as such should not be given effect to. In my opinion, this contention too cannot be accepted. Rule 5 provides that one member of the family shall be given employment subject to the condition that that person is eligible for that post. Rule 9 provides that before appointing any candidate the appointing authority shall satisfy himself that the character of the candidate is such that he is fit for employment. Clause (b) of Rule 9 provides that such candidate is mentally and physically healthy and clause(c) of Rule 9 provides that in case of the male candidate more than one wife should not be alive and in case of female candidate she had not married any person whose one wife was alive from before. Reading Rules 2, 5 and 9 together it is clear that it is not enough that the candidate should be a family member and having eligible qualifications. Under Rule 9 she should also have a good character and should be mentally and physically healthy. No grouse can be and has not been raised with regard to clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 9, As regards clause (c) this has a direct bearing on the social evil of bigamy and aims to discourage persons indulging in this social evil. Thus the provision is in consonance with the social justice and does not appear to be bad or unenforceable. 30. Thus the provision is in consonance with the social justice and does not appear to be bad or unenforceable. 30. Rule 9 rather lays down additional conditions which a candidate should satisfy, before the appointing authority can give him employment. Rule 5 and Rule 9 should be harmoniously construed particularly when Rule 9 (c) aims at discouraging a social evil and aims at furthering the social justice and social equality for women. 31. Without expressing any final opinion about the legality of this provision (as interview of the earlier discussion it is not necessary to do so) it may be said that the appointing authority cannot be blamed for enforcing this clause nor its action can be said to be unjustified. It may also be pointed out that these rules were amended in 1978. Under the amended Rule 10 the Board had been declared to. be the final authority with regard to the implementation of the provisions of the Rules. In any ease, I am of the opinion that it is not a fit case where any relief could have been or should be given to the petitioner in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 32. In view of the above discussion 1 am of the opinion that this petition deserves to be dismissed, In the result, I would dismiss the petition with no order as to costs. B.L. Yadav and K.K. Birla, JJ. - In view of the difference of opinion, let the record of this petition be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice within a week for nominating another Hon'ble Judge for his opinion.