JUDGMENT G. P. Mathur, J. 1. A first information report was lodged at P. S. Jamalpur, district Mirzapur, at 5.30 p.m. on 18-9-1989 alleging that on account of litigation regarding land, which had been decided in favour of the deceased Ram Briksha Singh by the High Court, there was enmity between Sattan Singh and the deceased. The deceased was going on a cycle from school to his village when at about 5 p.m. applicant Pappu Singh alias Ashoka Kumar Singh, armed with a country made pistol, and four others armed with spears surrounded the deceased. The applicant fired from his pistol at the deceased and he fell down and thereafter the remaining four accused assaulted with spears. On the basis of the first information report lodged by the complainant a case was registered under sections 147, 148, 149 and 302/5-4 IPC as Crime no. 100 of 1989 at P. S. Jamalpur, district Mirzapur, post mortem was performed on the dead body of the deceased which showed that he sustained a fire-arm wound of entry of the size of 2 cm x 2 cm x bone deep on the right side of the head just above the right ear besides seven incised wounds. Internal examination showed that right and left parietal bones and frontal bones were fractured. According to the applicant he surrendered on 22-9-1989. On 11-12-1989 a bail application moved by the applicant was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge, Mirzapur. The applicant then moved a bail application in the High Court which was also rejected on 14-3-1990. Subsequently the applicant moved a second bail application in this court on 17-5-1990. It was contended on behalf of the applicant that as the case had not been committed to the court of sessions and as nine months had elapsed, the applicant was entitled to be released on bail. Reliance was placed on a decision of Hon'ble S. I. Jafri, J. in Sri Narain Rai v. State, 1989 AWC 28/, wherein it has been held that if the accused was in jail for nine months and the case has not been committed to the court of sessions, he should be released on bail. Reliance was placed on a decision of Hon'ble S. I. Jafri, J. in Sri Narain Rai v. State, 1989 AWC 28/, wherein it has been held that if the accused was in jail for nine months and the case has not been committed to the court of sessions, he should be released on bail. Disagreeing with the view expressed in Sri Narain Rai's case (supra) to the effect that if an accused was in custody lor nine months and the case had not been committed to the court of sessions he should be released on bail, Hon'ble B. L. Yadav, J. referred the bail application to a Division Bench for reconsideration of the view expressed in the aforesaid case. The bail application has thus come up before us for hearing. 2. At the outset we may mention here that the applicant is involved in a case under section 302 IPC which is punishable with death or imprisonment for life. We would therefore confine our discussion to those cases where an accused is in custody in respect of serious offences punishable with the sentence of death or imprisonment for life, like sections 302, 396, IPC etc. Part III of the Constitution of India guarantees some fundamental rights. Article 19 (1) (d) lays down that all citizens shall have the right to move freely though out the territory of India and Article 21 lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. The framers of our constitution borrowed heavily from the American constitution. The Fifth amendment of American constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law and the sixth Amendment provides that : "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." 3. By the objectives resolution adopted on January 12, 1947, the Constituent Assembly solemnly pledged itself to draw up for India's future goverance a constitution. Two days after the adoption of the resolution the Assembly appointed an Advisory committee for report on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, Tribals and Excluded Areas. The Advisory Committee in turn constituted on February 27, 1947, five sub committees one of which was to deal with fundamental rights. Two days after the adoption of the resolution the Assembly appointed an Advisory committee for report on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, Tribals and Excluded Areas. The Advisory Committee in turn constituted on February 27, 1947, five sub committees one of which was to deal with fundamental rights. The sub-committee on Fundamental Rights discussed the subject on March 23/26 and 29, 1947, and included in its draft report two clauses, clause 11 and 29, which read as follows ; "11. No person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law." 29. No person shall be subjected to prolonged detention preceding trial, to excessive bail, or unreasonable refusal thereof, or to inhuman or cruel punishment." The Drafting Committee, however, introduced a far reaching change in the clauses by replacing the expression "without due process of law" by the expression "except according to the procedure established by law" and clause 29 of the draft report was altogether dropped, (see The Framing of India's constitution -A study" edited by B. Shiva Rao) at page 175 and 231. 4. Though the Indian Constitution does not guarantee a speedy trial as the sixth amendment to the American constitution does, the Supreme Court while interpreting Article 21 of the constitution in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 , laid down that the procedure must be "right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive." The Supreme Court stated the law more clearly in Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360 , where at page 1365 it was observed as follows. "We think that even under our constitution, through speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 . "We think that even under our constitution, through speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 . We have held in that case that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be 'reasonable' fair and just.' If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable, fair or just, such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be 'reasonable, fair or just, unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fail foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21," It is therefore, clear that the constitution guarantees a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of an accused person. Some provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, may also be noticed in this connection, Proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167 provides that no magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under sub-section (2) for a total period exceeding ninety days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years and sixty days where the investigation relates to any other offence, and on the expiry of the aforesaid period the accused shall be released on bail. Therefore, the Code provides that in case the investigation is not completed within ninety days where it relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term not less than ten years; if it is not completed in sixty days where the investigation relates to any other offence, the accused shall be released on bail. However, if the investigation is completed within the period of ninty days or sixty days as the case may he and charge sheet is submitted the code does not provide for automatic grant of bail except under subsection (6) of section 437 Sec 437 (6) provides that if in a case triable by a magistrate, the trial of a person accused of any non bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in custody during the whole of such period, be released on bail to the satisfaction of the magistrate unless for reasons to be recorded in writing the magistrate otherwise directs. Therefore, even in those cases which are triable by a magistrate the Code contemplates a situation where an accused may remain in custody for a period of sixty days prior to the submission of charge-sheet and again for a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case. Besides this period of four months some time is bound to be taken between the period when the charge sheet is submitted and the first date is fixed for taking evidence. However, the code does not provide for grant of bail on the ground of delay in trial in these cases which are triable by a court of sessions. The offences which are punishable with sentence of more than ten years RI are generally triable by the court of sessions and not by a court of magistrate. 5. Sri V. C. Misra, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the applicant, has vehemently contended that as an accused is entitled for a speedy trial of the case and as the applicant has remained in custody for more than nine months and his case has not been committed to the court of sessions, his right for a speedy trial is being defeated and he is entitled to be released on bail. In support of his submission SRI Misra placed reliance on the cases of Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360 Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 939 and AIR 1982 SC 1167 , Babu Singh v. State of U. P., AIR 1978 SC 527 Bissu v. State of U. P., 1989 LCrR 281, Dilip Kumar v. State of U. P., 1990 LCrR 91 and Madheshwardhari Singh v. State, AIR 1986 Pat. 324 (FB). He also referred to certain observations made in para 15.09 to para 15.21 in the Constitution of India by Jagdish Swarup, 1st Edition, wherein the learned author expressed his opinion that to keep a person in jail for an indefinite period was against the mandate of Part III of the Constitution of India. 6. Sri R. P. Tripathi, learned Additional Government Advocate, has, however, submitted that section 4 (1) of the Code provides that all offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. According to SRI Tripathi, the legislature in its wisdom has fixed a time limit for completing the investigation under section 167 (2) and if the investigation is not completed within the prescribed period the accused gets an automatic right for being released on bail. Neither Chapter XVI of the code, which provides for commencement of proceedings before the magistrate as well as for commitment of the case to the court of sessions, nor Chapter XVIII which provides for trial before a court of sessions, lays down any time limit. The contention of SRI Tripathi is that as the legislature has neither fixed a time limit for holding the inquiry proceedings by magistrate before commitment of the case to the court of sessions nor for trial before the court of sessions, and as the legislature has also not made any specific provision like subsection (6) of section 437 for grant of bail on account of delay, the accused has got no right to claim bail on account of delay in holding of inquiry or trial. It is true that the code does not fix a time limit for concluding the inquiry or trial before the court of sessions nor it provides for grant of an automatic bail to an accused who is being tried for an offence triable exclusively by the court of sessions in the event an inquiry or trial is not concluded within a particular period, Article 21 of the constitution, as interpreted by Hon'ble Supreme Court, clearly lays down that an accused has got a fundamental right of speedy trial for determination of his guilt. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration is whether an accused is entitled to be released on bail if he is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of long and delayed trial. 7. In order to appreciate the argument advanced by Sri Misra it will be useful to consider the Supreme Court decision in some detail. IN Hussainara Khatoon's case, AIR 1979 SC 1360 , the court was hearing a writ of habeas corpus. The persons detained in prison included men, women and children who were in custody for periods ranging from 3 to 10 years. IN para 1 the court observed :- "........The offences with which some of them are charged are trivial, which, even if proved, would not warrant punishment for more than a few months, perhaps for a year or two, and yet these unfortunate forgotten specimens of humanity are in jail, deprived of their freedom, for periods ranging from three to ten years without even as much as their trial having commenced.....". In para 2 the court observed : ".....Some of the under trial prisoners whose names are given in the newspaper cuttings have been in jail for as many as 5, 7 or 9 years and a few of them, even more than 10 years, without their trial having hegun... ." IN para 13 it was observed :- "......It appears from this counter-affidavit that there are quite a few women prisoners who are in jail without even being accused of any offence, merely because they happen to be victims of an offence or they are required for the purpose of giving evidence or they are in "protective custody" ....." The court considered individual cases in para 14 of the judgment. This shows that Bhola Mahto was accused in a case under sections 363 and 368 IPC and he was directed to be released on bail by the order dated 5th February, 1979, when he was in jail from 23rd November, 1968. Thus he was in jail for more than ten years when the Supreme Court directed him to be released on bail. The offences for which he was charged were punishable with a maximum sentence of seven years and thus he was in jail for a period greater than the sentence which could have been awarded to him even if he was ultimately convicted in the trial. IN the same paragraph the court considered the case of Ram Sagar who was accused in a case under section 395 IPC. He was in jail since 28th March, 1971, i.e. for about 8 years. The report does not show that he was also granted bail but the Hon'ble Supreme Court called for an explanation from the Sessions Judge, Patna, as to why his sessions trial had not commenced though the case had been committed on 28th June, 1972. Para 17 of the report mentions about the case of one Lambodar Gorain who was in jail as an under trial prisoner for a period of 8 1/2 years for an offence under the Arms Act for which maximum punishment is two years. The Court took notice of the fact that many under-trial prisoners were confined in jail for periods even exceeding the maximum punishment which could be awarded to them even if they were found guilty for the offences levelled against them. 8. In the second Hussainara Khatoon's case, AIR 1979 SC 1369 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court drew a distinction between the under trial prisoners who were in custody in respect of major offences and those who were in custody in respect for major offences which will be clear from para 1 of the report. Paras 5 and 8 of the report show that some of the under-trial prisoners were in jail for periods longer than the maximum terms for which they could be sentenced if convicted. Paras 5 and 8 of the report show that some of the under-trial prisoners were in jail for periods longer than the maximum terms for which they could be sentenced if convicted. Para 8 of the report shows that the court issued a direction that all those under-trial prisoners who were in jail for periods exceeding one half of the maximum punishment that could be awarded to them, if convicted for the offences with which they were charged, should be provided with lawyers by the State Government for moving bail applications on their behalf or for opposing the prayer for remand if made on behalf of the prosecution. A careful reading of the decision in the aforesaid cases shows that persons were in prison for many years in respect of trivial or minor offences and some of them were in custody for periods longer than the maximum terms for which they could be sentenced if convicted. The court ordered their release on their furnishing personal bonds, some of those under trial prisoners who had been in jail for a period exceeding one half of the maximum sentence which could be awarded, if convicted, the court directed the State Government to provide lawyers to move bail applications on their behalf and the Magistrates or the sessions courts were directed to dispose of the same in accordance with the broad guidelines indicated in the judgment dated 12th February 1979. We do not find any observation of the court for release of those under-trial prisoners who were charged for offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life Besides the order for release on bail was passed in favour of those persons who were in jail for periods exceeding one-half of the maximum punishment which could be awarded to them, if convicted, for the offences with which they were charged. 9. In the case of Kadra Pahadiya, AIR 1981 SC 939 , the accused were four young boys who were in jail for more than eight years and according to the letter on the basis of which the habeas corpus petition was registered, the accused were 9 to 11 years of age when they were arrested on 26th November and 19th December, 1972. Though their cases were committed to the court of sessions on 2nd July 1974, but the trial had not made any progress. Though their cases were committed to the court of sessions on 2nd July 1974, but the trial had not made any progress. IN this case the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the Sessions Judge concerned to proceed with the trial from day to day without any interruption. However, the report does not show that any direction for releasing the accused on bail was issued. 10. In the second case of Kadra Pahadiya, AIR 1982 SC 1167 , decided by the Supreme Court on 6-5-1981, a direction was issued for speedy trial of those persons who were in jail and whose cases had been committed to the court of sessions even prior to 31st December, 1974. The Sessions trials had remained pending for 5 to 7 years after the commitment of the case of those accused who were in custody. The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not pass any order for bail with regard to those persons but made an observation that the magistrate may consider the case of those accused who were awaiting commitment since before 31st December, 1976, whether they should be released on bail in appropriate cases, obviously these persons who were awaiting commitment since December 1976 must have been in custody for more than four and a half years. A further observation was made that the magistrate will consider the question of grant of bail if the accused were eligible to be released on bail in accordance with the principles laid down in Hussainara Khatoon's case. In Mathew Areeparmtil v. State of Bihar, AIR 1984 SC 1854 , a writ petition was filed seeking release of persons who had been languishing in jails without trial for petty offences. The Hon'ble Supreme Court issued a direction to the effect that in all cases instituted against the Adivasi accused concerned, which involved sentence of 7 years or more, they will be entitled to be released on consideration of the merits by the courts concerned while other cases which did not come in the aforesaid category the accused were directed to be released on bail on executing personal bond. 11. Similarly in Nimeon Sanema v. Government of Meghalaya, AIR 1979 SC 1518 , habeas corpus petitions were' filed for release of large number of persons under alleged illegal detention under guise of judicial process. 11. Similarly in Nimeon Sanema v. Government of Meghalaya, AIR 1979 SC 1518 , habeas corpus petitions were' filed for release of large number of persons under alleged illegal detention under guise of judicial process. The Hon'ble Supreme Court directed release of the accused but made exception where accused were involved in cases under sections 302 and 395 IPC. 12. Therefore it is clear that the Supreme Court has made a distinction on the ground of seriousness of the offence and the sentence which could be awarded on conviction while directing release of under trial prisoners. In G. Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor A. P., AIR 1978 SC 429 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court after taking notice of Article 21 of the constitution laid down the following criteria for grant of bail :- "When the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment of it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should be he enlarged. The nature of the charge is the vital factor and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. Another relevant factor is as to whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the court to be freed for the time being. The legal principle and practice validate the court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore, not an exercise in irrelevance." 13. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore, not an exercise in irrelevance." 13. In State v. Jaspal Singh Gill, AIR 1984 SC 1503 , the High Court had granted bail to an accused who was facing prosecution under section 3 of the official secrets act which was punishable with an imprisonment which may extend to 14 years. On appeal riled by the State the Hon'ble Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the accused. It was held as under : "The court before granting bail in cases involving non-bailable offences particularly where the trial has not yet commenced should take into consideration various matters such as the nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, circumstances which are peruliar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial, reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or the State and similar other consideration." 14. Again in Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan, AIR 1987 SC 1613 , the Supreme Court set aside the order by which bail was granted to the accused by the High Court on the ground of delay in trial. The court observed as follows :- "......No doubt liberty of a citizen must be seriously safeguarded by court, nonetheless when a person is accused of a serious offence like murder and his successive bail applications are rejected on merit there being prima facie material, the prosecution is entitled to place correct facts before the court. Liberty is to be secured through process of law, which is administered keeping in mind the interests of the accused the near and deaf of the victim who lost his life and who feel helpless and believe that there is so justice in the world as also the collective interest of the community so that parties do not loose faith in the institution and indulge in private retribution. Learned Judge was unduly influenced by the concept of liberty, disregarding the facts of the case." Now we may consider the decisions of our own court. Learned Judge was unduly influenced by the concept of liberty, disregarding the facts of the case." Now we may consider the decisions of our own court. In Bissu v. State of U. P., 1989 LCrR 281, Hon'ble B. L. Yadav, J. allowed the second bail application of the applicant on the ground of delay in disposal of appeal. The accused was in jail since 1979. He was convicted under section 302 IPC on 4-8-1981 and bis first bail application was rejected by the High Court on 23-4-1982. The second bail application was allowed on 4-5-1989 on the ground that the appeal could not be disposed of even after eight years. In this case the accused had undergone nearly ten years and his appeal was also pending for nearly eight years in the High Court when he was granted bail, in our opinion the accused had undergone a substantial portion of the sentence awarded to him and he was rightly granted bail on the facts of his case. This case can be of no assistance to the present applicant who has been in jail only for nine months. 15. In the case of Sri Narain Rai (supra) the only reason given by Hon'ble Jafri, J. for allowing the third bail application of the applicant and for granting bail to him was that the applicant was in jail for nine months but the case had not been committed to the court of sessions. Similarly in the case of Dilip Kumar v. State (supra) bail was granted by Hon'ble Jafri, J. on the ground that the applicant was in jail for one year but in spite of several dates being fixed charges had not been framed in the sessions trial, and in the absence of speedy trial there was infringement of the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the constitution. 16. In Shamshad v. State, 1988 ACrR 206, it was held that bail should be decided on merits and in doing it the interest of the society, the State and even that of the relations of the victim should be taken into account. It was further held that there was no rule that if trial is not concluded within a year the bail must be granted. It was further held that there was no rule that if trial is not concluded within a year the bail must be granted. The Supreme Court had an occasion to again consider the effect of delay in trial in the case of Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 149 . A petition was filed for quashing of the proceedings on the ground of infringement of the right of the accused to a speedy trial which forms part of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the constitution. In this case the accused were arrested in the night of November 29/30, 1984, and the charge-sheet was submitted after more than one year, on December 14, 1985. The court ruled that the delay in the investigation of the case, on the facts of the case, could not be considered to be such which may warrant quashing of the proceedings. The following observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court will be helpful in judging whether there was really a delay :- "The question whether the right to a speedy trial which forms part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 has been infringed is ultimately a question of fairness in the administration of criminal justice even as 'acting fairly' is of the essence of the principles of natural justice and a 'fair and reasonable procedure' is what is contemplated by the expression 'procedure established by law' in Art. 21 several questions arise for consideration in this connection. Was there delay? how long was the delay ? Was the delay inevitable having regard to the nature of the case, the sparse availability of legal services and other relevant circumstances ? Was the delay unreasonable ? Was any part of the delay caused by the wilfulness or the negligence of the prosecuting agency ? Was any part of the delay caused by the tactics of the defence ? Was the delay due to causes beyond the control of the prosecuting and defending agencies ? Did the accused the ability and the opportunity to assert his right to a speedy trial ? Was there a likelihood of the accused being prejudiced in his defence ? Irrespective of any likelihood of prejudice in the conduct of his defence, was the very length of the delay sufficiently prejudicial to the accused ?......" 17. Did the accused the ability and the opportunity to assert his right to a speedy trial ? Was there a likelihood of the accused being prejudiced in his defence ? Irrespective of any likelihood of prejudice in the conduct of his defence, was the very length of the delay sufficiently prejudicial to the accused ?......" 17. The principle which can be called out from the provisions of the statute and the law laid down by the Supreme Court is that in serious offences like murder, dacoity etc. or those which are punishable with sentence of death or imprisonment of life, delay in committal or trial cannot be the sole ground for granting bail. Besides delay of nine months of one year or so is not such a delay which may entitle an accused to claim bail on the ground of violation his fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined by Article 21 of the constitution. A court hearing a bail application has to take into consideration various matters like nature and seriousness of offence, the actual role played by the applicant in the commission of crime, the nature and quality of prosecution evidence, the possibility of the accused tampering with the prosecution evidence or witnesses in the event of being released on bail, the antecedents of the applicant, i.e., whether he is habitual or has a criminological history, chances of his absconding and not being available for trial, the age of the applicant and some times even his health, the interest of the near and dear of the victim and the society at large too can not be ignored altogether. In some type of offences enumerated in Chapter VI of penal code like section 121, 122, 124 and 124A and under the official Secrets Act the interest of State will assume paramount consideration. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down exhaustively the relevant factors which the court has to consider while deciding a bail application. THE question of delay has to be taken into consideration along with other relevant material. Therefore, it will not be correct enunciation of law to hold that an accused is entitled to be released on bail on the ground of delay in trial. 18. THE question of delay has to be taken into consideration along with other relevant material. Therefore, it will not be correct enunciation of law to hold that an accused is entitled to be released on bail on the ground of delay in trial. 18. In our considered opinion Sri Narain Rai v. State, 1989 AWC 287 , Lalji Singh v. State, 1988 ACrR 434, Dilip Kumar v. State, 1990 LCrR 91, and Nathu v. State, 1987 ALJ 1211 have not been correctly decided as bail was granted on the sole ground of delay of nine months in committal of the case in Sri Narain's case and the delay of one year in conclusion of trial in Lalji's case and delay of one year and two months in framing charges in Nathu's case without taking into consideration other relevant factors enumerated above. What importance should be given to the question of delay will again depend upon many factors but primarily upon quantum and the question as to who is responsible for delay in the proceedings of the case. If the prosecuting agency itself is responsible for the delay its benefit has to be given to the accused. If the delay has occurred on account of manipulations or tactics adopted by the accused like seeking frequent adjournments, moving frivolous applications, asking for copies of non-essential documents, absence of a co-accused of a case necessitating adjournment or any other reason, it will not entitle him to claim bail on this ground as no one can take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that one accused should not suffer on account of wrong committed by another accused but in criminal case at times the accused have either shared the same common intention or the same common object at the time of commission of the crime and they are not strangers to each other. The practice of one of the accused absenting on a date fixed for getting the case adjourned is not unknown. These days delay in disposal of cases is also taking place on account of frequent strikes or closure of courts. In such a situation, the accused not being at fault, he must get the benefit of the same. Regarding quantum of delay a host of factors like number of accused involved, number of witnesses to be examined, volume or bulk of evidence to be adduced etc. In such a situation, the accused not being at fault, he must get the benefit of the same. Regarding quantum of delay a host of factors like number of accused involved, number of witnesses to be examined, volume or bulk of evidence to be adduced etc. have to be seen. The court has to examine the totality of circumstances to judge whether in a given case there has been delay in conclusion of the trial, and if so, who is responsible for the same. Lastly we feel that if a bail application is pressed on the ground of delay in commitment of the case or in conclusion of the sessions trial, it would be more appropriate to first issue a direction to the court concerned to commit the case or conclude the trial, as the case may be, within a fixed period and the order should be communicated to the presiding officer of the Court. If the desired result is not achieved the bail application may be heard on merits and in the light of the observations made above. 19. We accordingly direct the learned Magistrate to commit this case, if it has not already been committed, to the court of sessions within one month from the date of receipt a copy of this order. The office is directed to send a copy of this order to the Chief Judicial Magistrate Mirzapur, for immediate compliance. 20. The parole granted to the applicant, as extended from time to time, is further extended for a period of two months.