Judgment :- Abdul Hadi, J.: The appellant in these two civil miscellaneous appeals is the Superintending Engineer, National Highways, Tirunelveli. C.M.ANo.261 of 1985 arises out of the O.P.No.89 of 1981 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur filed by the appellant for a decree in terms of the Award passed by the Arbitrator, who is the 2nd respondent the appeals. C.M.ANo.262 of 1985 arises out of O.P.No.108 of 1981 filed by respondent in both the appeals, to set aside the said Award in so far as it relates to 3 and 4 of the Award "A Common Judgment was passed in both the original petitions 22.10.1983. 2. The 1st respondent is the Highways contractor. As per the agreement between appellant and the 1st respondent, the appellant gave the 1st respondent contractor, work of laying approach road to the bridge in question. The said work consisted stages. One is collecting gravel on the said road side and the rate for doing the said was fixed at Rs.10.25 per cubic metre and the total gravel so collected admittedly 48,490 cubic metres. The second stage of the work is spreading the said gravel and it or compacting it on the said road @ Rs.16 per ton cubic metre. Regarding these stages of this work, dispute arose between the said parties and the dispute was referred the abovesaid Arbitrator on 14.7.1978, who has passed the Award on 29.3.1979. appellant filed the abovesaid original petition for passing a decree in terms of the said Award, while the 1st respondent-contractor filed the abovesaid O.P.No.108 of setting aside the abovesaid portions of the Award as stated above. 3. The court below made modifications with reference to paragraph 1 and paragraph the relief portion of the Award and set aside paragraph 3(iii) therein. With regard paragraph 3(iv) of the Award, the court below agreed with the Arbitrator and refused grant interest as claimed by the Contractor. Accordingly it passed the decree. (Though judgment and decree passed by the court did not expressly specify the amount from the claim petition and the counter statement we are able to gather that the decreed is the sum total of the two amounts claimed in the claim petition, viz., and Rs.18,989.86, that is, Rs.46,649.86. Accordingly it passed the decree. (Though judgment and decree passed by the court did not expressly specify the amount from the claim petition and the counter statement we are able to gather that the decreed is the sum total of the two amounts claimed in the claim petition, viz., and Rs.18,989.86, that is, Rs.46,649.86. In other words, what is mentioned in Paragraph of the decree would refer to the abovesaid Rs.27,660 and what is referred to in paragraphs (3) and (4) of the decree would together refer to the abovesaid Rs.18,989.86. Aggrieved the said decree, these appeals have been filed by the appellant. On the other hand, respondent-contractor has filed cross-objection in each of these appeals. The cross in C.M.A.No.262 of 1985 relates to cost only. The other cross-objection in C.M.A.No.261 1985 relates to interest. 4. Now, let us deal with the abovesaid appeals. In the above referred to paragraph Award, the Arbitrator came to the conclusion that the first respondent’s contention abovesaid work was completed, was not correct. Hence, the arbitrator refused to direct appellant to pay to the 1st respondent the 5% of value of work i.e., Rs.27,660 withheld the appellant Consequently, the Arbitrator concluded in paragraph 3(iii) of the Award for the balance of the work to be done, it has to be determined in advance as to how gravel is required. The Court below has modified the abovesaid conclusion in paragraph by holding that the abovesaid work had been completed. Hence, the Court below the appellant to pay the abovesaid 5% amount (which comes to Rs.27,660) to respondent. Further, consequently, it set aside the abovesaid conclusion reached paragraph 3(iii) of the Award. 5. Only with reference to the modification made to the abovesaid paragraph 1 consequent setting aside of the conclusion reached in paragraph 3(iii) of the Award, learned counsel for the appellant made his submission and not with reference to the modification made with reference to the above referred to paragraph 3(ii) of the Award. only submission, in essence is, that the court below erred in reaching the conclusion work entrusted to the 1st respondent was completed by him. So, in this appeal, called upon to decide only with reference to the abovesaid submission. Hence, we have set out the other pleadings of the parties or the other findings of the Arbitrator below in any detail. 6. So, in this appeal, called upon to decide only with reference to the abovesaid submission. Hence, we have set out the other pleadings of the parties or the other findings of the Arbitrator below in any detail. 6. The conclusion to be reached on the abovesaid submission of the learned counsel appellant, even according to him, depends solely on the interpretation to be put relevant passage in Exs.A-23 and A-24. Ex.A-23 is the letter dated 20.2.1978 written Divisional Engineer to the Superintending Engineer and Ex.A-24 is the letter 24.2.1978 written by the abovesaid Superintending Engineer to the Chief Engineer. abovesaid passage which occurs in both the said letters runs as follows: “The portion of work entrusted to the contractor has been completed. As the work entrusted to the contractor has been completed, the extension of time and long time contract may be sanctioned. ” According to the learned counsel for the appellant, this statement means that only a of the work entrusted to the 1st respondent has been completed. But, we are unable accept this interpretation. The abovesaid passage does not use the expression “but uses the expression “the portion”. That means the whole of the Work entrusted to respondent, even though it may be a portion of the entire work necessary for laying abovesaid approach road to the bridge in question. This interpretation of ours is fortified the subsequent statement in the abovesaid passage, which begins by saying “as the entrusted to the contractor has been completed”. So, it is clear that the work entrusted the 1st respondent had already been completed. If that is so, automatically, the abovesaid 5% amount has to be paid by the appellant to the 1st respondent. Consequently, there is no question of balance work to be done. Therefore, the court below is right in modified the abovesaid paragraph 1 of the Award and in having set aside paragraph 3(iii) of the Award as stated above and both the civil miscellaneous appeals are dismissed. 7. Now, coming to the above referred to cross-objections, so far as the cross relating to cost is concerned, it has to be dismissed since even before the court learned counsel for the 1st respondent admitted that it was within the discretion Arbitrator and since on the ground, the Court below also held that the decision Arbitrator regarding the cost was correct. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent not advance any argument on the question of cost. Therefore, the cross-objection C.M.ANo.262 of 1985 is liable to be dismissed. 8. So far as the cross-objection in C.M.ANo.261 of 1985 is concerned, the only by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent is that the court below should modified the relief-portion of paragraph 3(iv) of the Award by granting the interest by the 1st respondent, viz., 17% interest on the abovesaid amounts of Rs.27,660 Rs.18,989.86 withheld by the appellant, Admittedly, there was no agreement parties for the interest claimed. The court below also observes so. But, the learned for the 1st respondent-cross-objector relies on three recent decisions of Lakshmanan, M/s. Goutham Constructions & Fisheries (P) Ltd v. National Bank for Agrl. Development, (1991)1 L.W.421, P.Shanmugha Sundaram v. M/s.Bharat Corporation Ltd., (1991)1 L.W. 481 and V.V. Raghavan v. M/s Madras Refineries another, (1991)1 L.W. 536 , and claims that interest should be awarded as per judgments rendered relying on recent Supreme Court decisions. But, the above judgments of this Court by Lakshmanan, J., and the Supreme Court decisions only the legal position regarding grant of interest in arbitration proceedings, where arbitration was made after the coming into force of the Interest Act, 1978. The said into force only on 19.8.1981 pursuant to the notification issued under Sec.1(3) Act. But, in the present case, as already stated, the reference to arbitration earlier, that is, on 14.7.1978 itself. So, the said Interest Act, 1978 and the said have no application to the present case. 9. As per the law which stood prior to the com-mencement of the said Act, the position follows: (1) With reference to interest prior to the date of reference and from the date which the money became due, the Arbitrator may grant such interest, But, since there agreement between the parties regarding the same, we are not inclined to interfere with finding of the Court below in this regard. (2) Then, regarding the interest pendente lite, is, from the date of reference to arbitration till the date of award, the Supreme Court held in State of M.P. v. S. & S. Limited, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1507, that where the relating to payment of interest was also referred to arbitration, the Arbitrator could that dispute and grant such interest just as court could do under Sec.34, C.P.C. We find with reference to the above referred to sum of Rs.46,649.86 withheld by the appellant, reference was made to the Arbitrator for giving a decision regarding the same. So, we interest with reference to the abovesaid amount withheld, from the date of reference date of Award. The reasonable rate of interest which could be awarded for this period be fixed at 12% per annum. Accordingly we grant interest at the said rate for the period. 10. Further, regarding the interest from date of the Award to the date of decree also, Supreme Court has held in Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1032 the same manner. So, here also we grant interest at 12% per annum with reference abovesaid amount withheld by the appellant. 11. Regarding the interest after the date of the decree, the court below has already granted 6% interest per annum. In the circumstances, we think it would be reasonable to substitute this by 9 per cent per annum. Accordingly this cross objection has to be allowed extent mentioned in the abovesaid paragraphs 9 and 10 and this paragraph. 12. In the result, both the civil miscellaneous appeals and the cross objection C.M.ANo.262 of 1985 are dismissed. The cross-objection in C.M.A.No.261 of 1985 is in part by granting interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of reference date of decree with reference to the abovesaid amount withheld by the appellant and granting 9% p.a. interest for the period subsequent to the decree of the court below other respects, the said cross-objection is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs both in the appeals and in the cross-objections. Appeals and cross objection dismissed/other cross objection allowed in part.