JUDGMENT S.H.A. Raza, J. 1. The substantial question of law involved in this second appeal is only this much, as to whether in order to prove joint sahan rights over the land in dispute, it was necessary for the plaintiffappellant to allege and prove that he was the owner or joint owner of the land in dispute with the defendantsrespondents; if not, whether the finding of the lower appellate court to that effect that the plaintiffappellant was not the holder of the joint rights in the land in dispute and that the land in dispute is the exclusive sahan of the defendantsrespondents, is correct or not. 2. The plaintiffappellant has filed a suit for joint possession, demolition of the wall alleged to have b en constructed by the defendantsrespondents and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering into his joint possession over the land in question. 3. The trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiffappellant. The first appellate court reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed with costs. 4. Aggrieved against the said order the plaintiffappellant filed this second appeal. 5. The learned District Judge has given a finding to the effect that the plaintiff neither in the plaint nor in evidence stated as to how he came to joint possession of the land in dispute. It cannot be, therefore, said that it was the case of the plaintiff that the disputed land was ancestral. It was also not alleged that the disputed land was taken by both the parties or their predecessorintitle from the Zamindar so that it could be said that they were Joint owners. He further opined that in order to claim joint ownership rights, the plaintiff ought to have prayed that he had been using the disputed land as his sahan far more than twelve years because he had not set up any title to the disputed sahan and had claimed joint ownership rights on the basis of user alone. 6. He further opined that in order to claim joint ownership rights, the plaintiff ought to have prayed that he had been using the disputed land as his sahan far more than twelve years because he had not set up any title to the disputed sahan and had claimed joint ownership rights on the basis of user alone. 6. D.W. 1 Sita Ram in his crossexamination gave out that the plaintiff and his father used to sit over the dispute kind occasionally, and the lower appellate court in this regard opined I do not think any right could be acquired by this occasional user and that nobody objects if a neighbour comes and sits over the land lying in front of the house. 7. On the basis of the evidence on record the learned District Judge further give a finding to the effect that in front of the door of his house the plaintiff had open land and thereafter he had made two thatches on the northern and southern sides of his house. He had been tethering his cattle under these thatches as the Commissioner found at least one long cattle trough under one of the thatch. The report of the Commissioner would further indicate that the plaintiff had constructed a new room towards the southern side of his house. The position of this room would indicate that he has been trying to grab the nearby land and, therefore, it was not improbable that in order to take possession over the disputed land he filed this suit. Later on, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that mere user might create temper m rights but the ownership rights. Occasional user would not create ownership rights. It seems that the learned District Judge had no idea about the settled law in Oudh that if a person had used a piece of land whether adjoining his house or not as Sahan Darwaza, he could not be ousted from it by any person. 8. In Mahadeo Prasad and another v. Madho and others, AIR 1947(34) Oudh 131 Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kidwai, J., as he then was, indidated as It is now settled Jaw in Oudh that if a tenant has used a piece of land, whether adjoining his house or not, as sahan darwaza,, he cannot be ousted from it by the landlord. 8. In Mahadeo Prasad and another v. Madho and others, AIR 1947(34) Oudh 131 Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kidwai, J., as he then was, indidated as It is now settled Jaw in Oudh that if a tenant has used a piece of land, whether adjoining his house or not, as sahan darwaza,, he cannot be ousted from it by the landlord. This has been laid down hi the following cases: 3 O.W.N. 475; 13 O.W.N. 937; 1936 O.W.N. 536, 1937 O.W.N. 764 and 1938 O.W.N. 285. If the landlord cannot oust a tenant from his sahan darwaza by recourse to the Courts of law, he certainty cannot take forcible possession of such land or oust a riyaya by subterfuge or through the agency of another riyaya. In the present case, the land having been found to be sahan darwaza, the plaintiffs were entitled to continue in possession of it without any infringement of their rights by anybody. It has been argued for the respondents that the word sahan darwaza has been nowhere defined and that it mean only that portion of land lying before a riyaya's house which is required by that riyaya for his use. I cannot agree that this is a correct definition of sahan darwaza. A sahan darwaza is that portion of the parti land which a riyaya in a village is in possession of for more convenient enjoyment of his housed this may be greatly in excess of what is absolutely necessary or be acquired for enjoyment of his house. It may happen that one riyaya has no sahan darwaza at all while another has a very large piece of land in his possession. The whole question turns upon what has been in possession and enjoyment of the tenant for 12 years. In the present case, it was found by the trial court that the whole of this plot of land including the area in dispute had been in the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs for more that 12 years. They were, therefore, entitled to continue in possession of it and were entitled to repel all invasion of their right to possession. That finding was not challenged in the lower appellate court and the lower appellate court has affirmed it. They were, therefore, entitled to continue in possession of it and were entitled to repel all invasion of their right to possession. That finding was not challenged in the lower appellate court and the lower appellate court has affirmed it. There can, therefore, be no longer any question that the land on which the constructions have been made is a part of the sahan darwaza of the plaintiffs. Every person who has a right is entitled to have that right protected by the Courts end I can find no warrant for the opinion of the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff's ought not to complain to the encroachment, much less can they maintain their suit for possession of the site. The case in AIR 1935 All123 is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. There it was held by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court that if some persons were in possessions of a piece of land which they were using as their court yard (sahan darwaza) and on which they tied their cattle, they could protect their possession and bring a suit against anyone who had taken wrongful possession of any portion of that land merely on the basis of their possessory title., even though they were only licensees. 9. Chief Justice Hon'ble Ghulam Hasan, as he then was, in the case of Chandrika Prasad and another v. Mohd. Amir Ahmad Khan AIR (35) 1948Oudh28 held,: In appeal it has been contended before me that the wall was necessary for the better enjoyment of the sahan darwaza in that it secured privacy to the inmates of the house as against Bisheshwar's house. The map shows that there is a thatched chabutra to the north of the defendant's house and in front of this is the sahan darwaza. From the point at which the chabutra ends the wall from south to north is 31 feet 5 inches long, 1 foot 2 inches wide and 5 feet high. On the west of this wall is a drain running across the wall. The distance between Bisheshwar's house and this wall at the southern point is reduced to 4 feet and 3 inches while at the northern point it is 7 feet 5 inches. This has probably given cause for dissatisfaction to Bisheshwar who, according to the defendant is the cause for the institution of the present suit. The distance between Bisheshwar's house and this wall at the southern point is reduced to 4 feet and 3 inches while at the northern point it is 7 feet 5 inches. This has probably given cause for dissatisfaction to Bisheshwar who, according to the defendant is the cause for the institution of the present suit. This may or may not be so, but the fact remains that the construction of the wail has left a large portion for use as sahan darwaza to the defendants and comparatively very little to Bisheshwar. The fact that the defendants wanted to secure privacy for this courtyard is no ground for holding that they could raise the wall without the permission of the zamindar. In 3 O.W.N . 475 Gokaran Nath Misra, J. held that where a tenant has been in possession of land lying in front of his house as his sahan darwaza for over 30 years, this long enjoyment gives him a right to retain the land in his possession for being, enjoyed as such and the proprietor is to be deemed in proprietary possession bat not entitled to eject the tenant by taking actual possession, though the tenant has no right to put up any structure thereon without the express permission, of the landlord. 10. In the case of Mumtaz Ali v. Mohd. Sharif Khan (AIR 1973 Allahabad 98) Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hari Swarup, as he then was, held as under: Easement has been defined in Section 4 of the Easements Act as: An easement is a right which the owner or occupier of certain land possess, as such, for the beneficial enjoyment of that Sand, to do and continue to do something, or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done, in or upon or in respect of, certain other land not his own. The right which the plaintiff claimed on the land in dispute was being exercised by the plaintiff and before him by his ancestors in their capacity as residents of the adjoining house. The right which the plaintiff claimed on the land in dispute was being exercised by the plaintiff and before him by his ancestors in their capacity as residents of the adjoining house. In the case of ReEllenbrough Park Re Davies (deceased) Powell v. Maddison, (1955) 2 All ER 38 right to use the land as a pleasure ground was held to be an easementary right Dankwerts, J. dealing with the contention that: The easement must be calculated to benefit the dominant tenement as a tenement, and not merely to confer a personal advantage on the owner of it. Observed: This I find somewhat difficult to apply for it seems to me that the benefits received from a right of way is necessarily a benefit to the owner or occupier of the tenement rather than to the tenement itself, though a right of support might be said to benefit the tenement as such............ I find it difficult to see what are the objections to a right to use neighbouring land for the purpose of enjoying air and exercise and similar amenities. Further it is evident that the attachment of such amenities for the ownership of a particular house may add considerably to the value and the enjoyment of the house. .........In my view..... ...the right to use a pleasure ground is a right known to the law and an easement. 11. Section 4 of the Easements Act places no restrictions on the nature of user of the servant heritage by the owner or occupier of the dominant heritage. Aright of easement need not, therefore, necessarily be a right yielding direct benefit to the dominant tenement itself, but may consist of a right which may yield direct benefit of the owner or occupier of the property and only consequentially and indirectly be for the more beneficial utilisation of the dominant tenement. , If the inhabitants, for a more beneficial living and enjoyment of the house, use the adjoining land for sitting and sleeping purposes, the user cannot but be deemed to be for the benefit of the occupants and consequentially for the beneficial enjoyment of the house itself because if the user is an amenity for the residents of the house it is bound to add to the value and enjoyment of the house. Applying the test which Dankwerts, J. applied, the use of the land for purposes of sitting and sleeping by the plaintiff, in the present case, will amount to a right of easement entitled to be protected by law. 12. In the aforesaid case the plaintiff claimed that he had an easementary right over the land and the same were likely to be interfered with if the injunction was not granted. Right which he claimed consisted of rights of passage and for the purposes of sitting and sleeping. The contention was that the plaintiff had no such right and they had the right to make constructions. The trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal the appellate court reversed the decree and refused the injunction prayed for. Aggrieved by the said decree defendant filed a second appeal which by means of the aforesaid order was dismissed. 13. In the present suit, right which the plaintiff claimed consisted of the right of flow of water from his house to land in question and the right to use land as Sahan for purposes of sitting and sleeping, tethering of the catties and passage for himself and household. He has raised grievance that due to the construction of the wall by the defendant who claimed that the land is for his exclusive use only, the passage of the house has been interfered with and prayed that the said wall be demolished. 14. The plaintiff appellant in support of his claim over the land relied upon the admission of D.W. 1 who in cross examination admitted that his relationship with the father of Ishwar Deen (plaintiff) existed as that they belonged to the same village. On the disputed land Ishwar Deen and his father often used to sit over. He also often used to sit over the land. He had removed three pegs which belonged to Ishwar Deen which were used for tying up the cows. Before that Ishwar Din used to tie up animals over the land. Thus from the evidence on record it was proved that since quite a long time the plaintiff and his father had been using the land in question for tying up their catties and for sitting and sleeping purposes. 15. The learned District Judge committed manifest error of law by giving a finding to the effect that mere user may create easementary rights and not ownership rights. 15. The learned District Judge committed manifest error of law by giving a finding to the effect that mere user may create easementary rights and not ownership rights. Occasional and miscellaneous user of land would not create any ownership right. He also held that in villages people do not object to such user by the persons who have no claim to the open place of land, It seems that the learned District Judge was not aware about the law regarding 'Sahan darwaza'. It was not at all necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he was the owner or joint owner of the land in dispute with the defendant in the instant case. It was sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that the land in question has been used by him, his family members and predecessors in interest as Sahan Darwaza and for other purpose for more than twelve years. 16. From the evidence on record as well as the finding recorded by both the Courts it has been proved that the plaintiff has been using the same jointly with defendants. Although both the plaintiff as well as the defendants have a right to use the land as sahan darwaza, but they have no right, either to obstruct the passage or make any constructions over the sahan. It is one thing for a person to remain in enjoyment of the land as an open space but it is quite different to put up structure over it or to close it by a wall. From the evidence on record it has been proved that a wall was constructed by the defendants which has narrowed down the passage of the plaintiff from his house to go outside from the Sahan Darwaza. The right of user would not give a right to person to put up a structure upon sahan darwaza, hence the learned trial court was perfectly justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 17. In view of what has been stated hereinabove I allow this appeal and reverse the decree of the lower appellate Court. The decree of the trial court is restored. The plaintiff will get costs throughout. (Appeal allowed)