JUDGMENT B.P. Jeevan Reddy, CJ. - A common question arises in this batch of writ petitions filed by Ghaziabad Development Authority questioning the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer (Irrigation), Gaziabad under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act 2. For the sake of convenience ; we may refer to the facts in W. P. No. 17729 of 1989. On 9-2-1962, a notification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, proposing to acquire a large extent of land for the purpose of the petitioner. An extent of 386 acres of land in village Jatwara Kalan of Pargana Lorn was sought to be acquired. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on 24-4-196. An award was passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 1-2-1964. The land acquired was categorised into more than one category, adopting, what is called, the belting method, and different amount of compensation was awarded for each of the categories. Suffice it to say that compensation awarded was around Re. 1/- per square yard. Some of the land-holders obtained a reference under Section 18 of the Act. The contesting respondents (Land-holders) in these writ petitions, however, did not obtain any such reference. 1 he reference, actually made under Section 18 was numbered as L.A.R. No. 91 of 1979 on the file of the Additional District Judge. Ghaziabad. The said reference was decided on 23-5-1987 where under the compensation was enhanced to Rs. 7/- per square yard. Within three months or this award, the contesting respondents herein (Land-holders) filed applications before the Special Land Acquisition Officer under Section 28-A, claiming compensation at the same rate as was awarded in L.A.R. No. 91 of 1979. These applications have been disposed of on 6-9.1988, enhancing the compensation to Rs. 4/- per square yard. We are told that the land holders, being not satisfied with the amount so awarded, asked for an obtained reference under Section 18 to the Civil Court. It is also brought to our notice that against the award of the Civil Court in L.A.R. No 91 of 1979, the State has preferred appeals, which are now stated to be pending in this Court. 3. It is also brought to our notice that against the award of the Civil Court in L.A.R. No 91 of 1979, the State has preferred appeals, which are now stated to be pending in this Court. 3. The first and the main point urged in this batch of writ petitions is this : Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act has no application and cannot be invoked in cases where the award of the Special Land Acquisition Officer was made prior to the introduction of Section 28-A In other words, Section 28-A is not retrospective in operation. Only in cases where the award of the Land Acquisition Officer is made after the introduction of Section 28-A can that provision be involved. 'the provisions contained in Section 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (Act No. 68 of 1984) is relied upon in support of this proposition. 4. Section 28-A is one of the provisions introduced by the Amendment Act No. 68 of 1984. It reads thus : "28-A, Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. (1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basic of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court : Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. (3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Section 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18." An analysis of sub-section (1) shows that it provides for a situation where : (a) the Court awards compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 in respect of a land ; (b) Persons interested in other land covered by the same notification under Section 4 (1) and who aggrieved by the award of the Collector may apply to the Collector within three months of the date of the award of the Court requesting that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court ; (c) This tight is available notwithstanding the fact they had not made an application to the Collector mid-r Section 18 within the time prescribed thereunder. The proviso to sub-section (l) of Section 28-A prescribes the manner in which the period of three months shall be computed. Sub-section (2) then days that on receipt of such an application, the Collector shall conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and then make an award determining the amount of compensation. Sub-section (3) makes the provisions contained in Sections 18 to 28 applicable to the award so made by the Collector. 5. It is evident that this is a beneficial provision, conceived in the interest of uniformity and actuated by a concern for the poor, illiterate and unwary. The objects and reasons, appended to the Bill, which became the Amendment Act, itself discloses the object underlying the said provision. 5. It is evident that this is a beneficial provision, conceived in the interest of uniformity and actuated by a concern for the poor, illiterate and unwary. The objects and reasons, appended to the Bill, which became the Amendment Act, itself discloses the object underlying the said provision. Paragraph (ix) of the objects and reasons reads thus ; "Considering that the right of reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act is not usually taken advantage of by inarticulate and poor people arid is usually exercised only by the comparatively affluent land-owners and that this causes considerable inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land to different interested parties, it is proposed to provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered under the same notification to seek-re-determination of compensation, once any one of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference court under Section 18 of the Act." 6. Mr. Ravi Kant, learned counsel for the writ petitioner, submits that Section 28 is only prospective in operation. There is nothing in the language of Section 28-A, counsel contends, which indicates any intention on the part of the Parliament to give retrospective operation to the said provision The said provision, it is contended, creates a substantive right, which has serious repercussion on the acquiring authority (State) or the beneficiary as the case may be, and. therefore, should not be given retrospective effect. He submits that where the Parliament intended to give retrospective effect to any of the provisions introduced by the Amendment Act No. 68 of 1984, it has said so specifically in Section 30 of the Amendment Act and Section 28-A is not one of such provisions to which retrospective effort is given. This Council, contends, is a sure indication of the intention of the Parliament. 7. For a proper appreciation of the latter part of the contention, it would be appropriate to set out Section 30 of the Amendment Act It reads thus: "30. This Council, contends, is a sure indication of the intention of the Parliament. 7. For a proper appreciation of the latter part of the contention, it would be appropriate to set out Section 30 of the Amendment Act It reads thus: "30. Transitional provisions : l) The provisions of sub-section (I-A) of Section 23 of the Principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the Principal Act pending on 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People), in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date ; (b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the Principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act. (2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the Principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the Principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment; Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act. (3) The provisions of Section 34 of the Principal Act, as amended by Section 20 of this Act, shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, (a) every ease in which possession of any land acquired under the Principal Act had been in ken before the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People, and the amount of compensation for such acquisition had not been paid or deposited under Section 31 of the Principal Act until such date, with effect on and from that day ; and (b) every case in which such possession has been taken on or after that date but before the commencement of this Act without the amount of compensation having been paid or deposited under the said Section 31, with effect on and from the date of taking such possession." 8. We find it difficult to accept the petitioner's submission. The right conferred by Section 28-A arises only where the Court allows an amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section II. Such an award may be by a Court on reference under Section 18 or may also be by an appellate Court made in an appeal against the award in a reference under Section 18. 1 he application under Section 28-A is to be made within three months of such an award by the Court, We, therefore, see no reason to hold that Section 28-A applies only to cases where the award under Section 11 (i.e. by the Land Acquisition Officer) is made after the introduction of Section 28-A. There are no words in Section 28-A. which lead or induce us to take this view. As would be evident, what is relevant for the purposes of Section 28-A, is the date of the award of the Court, and not the date of the award of the Land Acquisition Officer (Collector). It should also be seen that Section 28-A is a beneficial provision, conceived in in the interest of illiterate and ignorant land-holders : it is a salutary provision designed to put such illiterate and uninformed land-holders in the same position as the literate and conscious land-holders covered by the same notification. It conceptualises the rule of equal treatment. It should also be seen that Section 28-A is a beneficial provision, conceived in in the interest of illiterate and ignorant land-holders : it is a salutary provision designed to put such illiterate and uninformed land-holders in the same position as the literate and conscious land-holders covered by the same notification. It conceptualises the rule of equal treatment. We see no reason to cut down the ambit of this provision by placing a restriction of the kind proposed by the petitioner. We may emphasise that in this case, the award of the Court on a reference under Section 18 has been made long after comb g into force of Section 28-A. It is equally beyond dispute that the applications under Section 28-A were made by the contesting respondents-(land-holder') within the period of three months prescribed by sub-section (1) of Section 28-A. We are unable to appreciate the argument advanced by the counsel for the petitioner that this provision casts a severe burden upon the acquiring authority/beneficiary and therefore, should not be given retrospective operation. It must be remembered that under the Act, land of a person is acquired compulsorily. He is entitled to due compensation for his land, as provided by the Act. The policy underlying the Section is that mere ignorance of rights or inability to avail of the remedies provided by the Act within the time prescribed should not be made a ground for denying due compensation to persons interested. Where a higher compensation is awarded by the Court in respect of a land covered by the same notification, a person interested in other land covered by the same notification is given the right to apply to the Land Acquisition Officer for re-determination of the compensation payable for his land on the basis of the award made by the Court, and this right is expressly given notwithstanding the fact that the person had not applied for reference under Section 18 either to before. We are also not impressed by the argument based upon Section 30 of the Amendment Act. It is true that Section 30 specifies that some of the provisions introduced by the Amendment Act No. 68 of 1984 shall have retrospective effect, but this has no relevance to the question at issue. We are not giving retrospective operation to Section 28-A. We are merely construing it as it stands. It is true that Section 30 specifies that some of the provisions introduced by the Amendment Act No. 68 of 1984 shall have retrospective effect, but this has no relevance to the question at issue. We are not giving retrospective operation to Section 28-A. We are merely construing it as it stands. According to us, as it pointed out hereinbefore, the right to apply thereunder arises only with the making of an award by the Court awarding higher compensation than what was awarded by the Collector under Section 11 and so long as such award by the Court is made after the introduction of Section 28-A the right to apply thereunder is available to the concerned interested persons. We may reiterated that the right to apply under Section 28- A arises only on the making of an award by the Court and has to be exercised within three months therefrom, it has no real relevance to the date of the award made by the Collector under Section 11. Truly speaking the very argument of the retrospective operation in such a situation is out of place. Accordingly, we must hold that applications filed by the contesting respondents (land-holders) under Section 28-A were maintainable in law. 9. Ravi Kant raised a further contention, namely, that while sub-section (2) obligates the Collector to conduct on inquiry after receiving an application under sub-section (1), but no such inquiry was made by the Collector. For the reason, the award made is unsustainable in law. We are, however, not inclined to entertain this submission in these writ petitions. It is held in Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 1164 that "apart from fraud, corruption or collusion, the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act may not be questioned in any proceeding either by the Government or by the company or local authority at whose instance the acquisition is made." It was held that since the state itself is not entitled to question the award, the beneficiary, who really claims through the Government, cannot stand on a higher footing. We may point out that the present contention does not relate to the very foundation of the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Officer like the first contention of the petitioner. We may point out that the present contention does not relate to the very foundation of the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Officer like the first contention of the petitioner. We have dealt with the first contention of the petitioner on merits for the simple reason that it touches the very foundation of the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Officer. The failure or omission to make an inquiry, is provided by sub-section (2) of Section 28-A, even if assumed to be true for the sake of argument, does not touch the very foundation of the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Officer, but is in the nature of a procedural error, which may, of course, vitiate the award. But Since the beneficiary is not entitled to question the award by way of a writ petition or by way of a writ petition or by way of a reference, we cannot allow it to raise it in these writ petitions. 10. For the above reasons; the writ petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no, order as to costs.