G. T. NANANVATI, J. ( 1 ) ON being moved by the Baroda rayon Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the applicant"), by an application under Section 69 (1) of the gujartat Sales-tax Act, 1969, the Tribunal has raised and referred the following question of law to this Court for its decision:"whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the reliance placed by the applicant upon the decision of this Tribunal in the case of messrs Prabhat Solvent Extraction industries Pvt. Ltd. in second Appeal No. 323 of 1974 as decided on January 30, 1975, for not filing the said Second Appeal no. 15 of 1975 before this Tribunal within the prescribed period of limitation, could not and did not constitute "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay in terms of Section 71 of the Gujarat Sales-tax act, 1969, and in not condoning the delay when the said second appeal was filed by the applicant after the Gujarat High court had reversed the said decision of the Tribunal ?" ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this reference may be shortly stated. The applicant is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling artificial silk yarn and reselling chemicals. It is a dealer registered under the Act. During the year from January 1, 1971 to December 31, 1971, the applicant had purchased certain raw materials or consumable stores locally from registered dealers on payment of tax, and had used them in the manufacture of artificial silk yarn sold during that year. The applicant had sold the manufactured artificial silk yarn locally or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and had also consigned some of the manufactured goods for sale outside the State of Gujarat. ( 3 ) THE applicant claimed set off in respect of the tax paid on the purchases of raw materials or consumable stores in terms of Rule 42 of the Gujarat Sales - tax Rules, 1970. ( 3 ) THE applicant claimed set off in respect of the tax paid on the purchases of raw materials or consumable stores in terms of Rule 42 of the Gujarat Sales - tax Rules, 1970. The Sales-tax Officer found that the amount of 3% of the sales price of the consigned goods manufactured exceeded the amount of tax which the applicant had claimed by way of set off on the amount of tax paid on the purchases of raw materials or consumable stores which were used in the manufacture of finished goods which were either sold locally or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Therefore, he disallowed the applicants claim of set off under Rule 42 of the rules. ( 4 ) THE applicant then preferred an appeal before the Assistant commissioner. That appeal was partly allowed. But so far as the claim for set off under Rule 43 was concerned, he agreed with the Sales-tax Officer and dismissed the appeal on the point. This appeal was decided on 2-4-75. The applicant did not file any appeal before the Tribunal in Prabhat Solvent extraction Industries wherein it was held that in view of the proviso to Rule 42, a deduction to the extent of 3% of the sale price of the manufactured goods sold on consignment basis is required to be made from the total amount of set off admissible to the dealer, and if the total of set off admissible is less than the amount of deduction required to be effected, then the dealer is not entitled to set off under Rule 42. On a reference being made in that case, this Court took a contrary view and held that the deduction to be effected under the proviso to Rule 42 of the Rules must be confined to the drawback, set off and refund, as the case may be, to be granted in respect of tax paid on purchases of goods used in the manufacture of goods sold on consignment basis outside the State but within India. On coming to know about this decision on 11-7-1979, the applicant, within four days thereafter, filed an appeal before the Tribunal against the order of the Assistant Commissioner. It was on 15-7-79. As the applicant had filed the appeal beyond the prescribed period of limitation, it had also applied for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. On coming to know about this decision on 11-7-1979, the applicant, within four days thereafter, filed an appeal before the Tribunal against the order of the Assistant Commissioner. It was on 15-7-79. As the applicant had filed the appeal beyond the prescribed period of limitation, it had also applied for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. ( 5 ) THE Tribunal held that the decision of the Tribunal in Prabhat Solvent extraction Industries could not be regarded as sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal against the order of the Assistant Commissioner within time. It, therefore, rejected the applicants prayer for condonation of delay and dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation. ( 6 ) THE applicant then applied to the tribunal for referring to this Court the question, which we have quoted above. The Tribunal agreed with the applicant that a question of law does arise and, therefore, has referred the above stated question for decision of this Court. ( 7 ) WHAT is urged by the learned advocate appearing for the applicant is that the Tribunal committed an error in holding that non-filing of appeal within lime by the applicant in view of the decision of the Tribunal in Prabhat solvent Extraction Industries case could not and did not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. He submitted that if an assessee bona fide believed that in view of the decision of the Tribunal on the same point, though in a different case, it would be futile to file an appeal to the Tribunal and, therefore, does not file an appeal but files the same subsequently on coming to know about the change in the position of law, as a result of the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court, then his prayer for condonation of delay for that reason should be regarded as a competent plea. He submitted that as the decision of the tribunal is binding on all the subordinate authorities, the applicant, as a reasonable person, thought it fit to accept the said decision and not to take further action. Under the circumstances, it can reasonably be said that because of the decision of the Tribunal, it was prevented from filing the appeal earlier. He submitted that as the decision of the tribunal is binding on all the subordinate authorities, the applicant, as a reasonable person, thought it fit to accept the said decision and not to take further action. Under the circumstances, it can reasonably be said that because of the decision of the Tribunal, it was prevented from filing the appeal earlier. He also submitted that in matters of condonation of delay a liberal approach is required to be adopted by Courts, particularly when in a fiscal statute like the present Act, delay on the part of the assessee is not likely to cause any prejudice to the State. In this case, the assessee did make a claim for set off before the Sales-tax officer, as no set off was granted, he preferred an appeal to the Assistant commissioner. While the appeal was pending before the Assistant commissioner, this Court gave its decision in the case of Prabhat- Solvent extraction Industries Ltd. v. Slate of gujarat (1982) 49 STC 322. But it appears that the applicant came to know about it after the said appeal was decided on 20-4-75. Therefore, the question which arises for consideration is whether the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing an appeal. This is not a case where the Court is called upon to decide whether the applicant was negligent or not in pursuing its remedy and, therefore, the decision of this Court in Asian Steal and Metals (P) Ltd. v. Part maganlal Hiralal (1977) 18 Guj. L. R. 605 relied upon by the applicant is not of any help to it. While deciding whether a litigant was negligent or not in pursuing his remedy, no doubt, a liberal approach should be adopted by the Courts. But here the question is different, viz. whether an adverse decision in a different matter can be regarded as a sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal to the Tribunal. In the first place, what we have to decide is whether such a plea can be regarded as a competent plea. ( 8 ) IN support of his contention, Learned advocate for the applicant has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay (1965) 16 STC 613. In the first place, what we have to decide is whether such a plea can be regarded as a competent plea. ( 8 ) IN support of his contention, Learned advocate for the applicant has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay (1965) 16 STC 613. In that case, the supreme Court held that the mistake which was responsible for the recovery of tax illegally levied was discovered late, such a plea would be perfectly competent for applying for condonation of delay under Section 22b of the Bombay Sales- tax Act, 1946. That was a case where tax was paid under a mistake of law, and the assessment which was challenged in that case was held to be bad as contravening the provision of Article 286 of the Constitution. The assessment and collection of tax was regarded as without jurisdiction and, therefore, not an assessment made under the Act. It was in this facts and circumstances that the supreme Court, after considering which remedies were open to the assessee in such a case, observed that the assessee could have either appealed or applied for revision and prayed for condonation of delay on the ground that the mistake which was responsible for recovery of the tax was discovered late, because such a plea would have been perfectly competent under Section 22b. This observation cannot be read out of context and from the said observation we cannot jump to the conclusion that in all cases where it is found that either the tax was paid illegally, or that no appeal or revision was filed against the assessment order and, if an appeal or revision is filed after the expiry of the period of limitation, and an application for condonation of delay is made, then the ground that the mistake which was responsible for the payment of tax for not filing an appeal or revision within the prescribed period of limitation was discovered late, must be regarded as a competent plea. ( 9 ) THE learned Advocate also relied upon the decision of this Court in karamchand Premchand Pvt. Ltd. v. GIT. Gujarat (1975) 101 ITR 45. In that case, the assessee had not claimed deduction which he was entitled to under the Indian Income-tax Act because of the settled legal position that the expenditure incurred on account of stamp duty, registration charges, etc. Gujarat (1975) 101 ITR 45. In that case, the assessee had not claimed deduction which he was entitled to under the Indian Income-tax Act because of the settled legal position that the expenditure incurred on account of stamp duty, registration charges, etc. in connection with the issue of debentures was capital expenditure and not deductible from gross income. The view taken by the bombay High Court and other High courts in this behalf was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court which held that such expenditure must be treated as revenue expenditure and, therefore, deduction thereof should be given from the gross income earned by the assessee. This Court observed that the assessee had not claimed deduction and kept the question alive, obviously, because the real legal position appeared to be settled and there was no point in pursuing the question any further. It was in this stale of facts held that the assessees application made to the commissioner ought not to have been dismissed on the ground of limitation as the assessee had been able to show sufficient cause for not filing the same within the prescribed lime. This Court, thus, accepled the conlenlion of the assessee to have applied to the commissioner in view of the settled legal posilion. As poinled out by this Court in that case, the posilion of law was sellled by the High Court of Bombay and other high Courts and the same view had prevailed at least from the year 1921. This view was taken as settled by all concerned and it was under these circumstances that the assessee, during its assessment for the years 1961-62, 1962-63 and 1963-64 had not claimed deduclion of the expenditure made by it, nor was the matter carried further either in appeal or revision. Since this settled posilion was reversed by the Supreme Court in 1966, this Courl held that in view of the change in the position of law, it was open to the assessee to apply to the Commissioner under Section 33a of the Indian income-tax Act. This Court further held that it was the pronouncement of the supreme Court which made the whole difference in the situation and which gave cause for moving the Commissioner, and the petitioners inaction prior to the decision of the Supreme Court was sufficienlly explained. This Court further held that it was the pronouncement of the supreme Court which made the whole difference in the situation and which gave cause for moving the Commissioner, and the petitioners inaction prior to the decision of the Supreme Court was sufficienlly explained. Even this decision cannot help the applicanl because the assessee in that case had not claimed deduclion and had not taken any action in view of the posilion of law which was settled since 1921 as a result of the decision of the Bombay Court and other high Courts. As the Supreme Court reversed that view, it was held that that decision gave the assessee a cause for approaching the higher authority against the relevant assessment order. This view was taken because the deduction was not claimed and no action was taken because of the mutual mistake of law. Both the assessee and the department had proceeded on the basis that such a deduction was not allocable. As we have pointed out above, the question which is involved in this case is quite different. The decision which was regarded as sufficient cause for not filing an appeal to the Tribunal was the decision of the tribunal and not of the High Court and that too a recent one. It also cannot be staled that the Tribunal had settled the law on the point though it had decided the point of law inasmuch as it had interpreted the proviso to Rule 42 in a different manner. ( 10 ) ONE more decision was relied upon by the learned Advocate for the applicant and that is of an Andhra Pradesh High court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Venkataramana Chuduva and Muremura merchant (1986), 159 ITR 59. That was a case arising under the Andhra Predesh general Sales-tax Act, 1957. ( 10 ) ONE more decision was relied upon by the learned Advocate for the applicant and that is of an Andhra Pradesh High court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Venkataramana Chuduva and Muremura merchant (1986), 159 ITR 59. That was a case arising under the Andhra Predesh general Sales-tax Act, 1957. The Andhra pradesh High Court, after stating that where the question has been put in issue and has been gone into and decided by the appropriate authority, it cannot be said that the tax was paid under a mutual mistake and, in such a case, a suit or writ will not be maintainable, and the only course open would be to file an appeal or apply for revision, while asking for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal or revision, as the case may be, held that a subsequent decision of the high Court or the Supreme Court, which changes the position, the interpretation or the understanding of law, constitutes sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal or revision, as the case may be, where it is established that on the date of receipt of the impugned order, the filing of an appeal or revision would be an empty formality, having regard to the position of law then obtaining. The learned Advocate for the applicant heavily relied upon this observation and submitted that in this case also it would have been futile on the part of the assessee to prefer an appeal to the Tribunal as the Tribunal had already interpreted the proviso to Rule 42 one way and, even if the assessee had filed an appeal. It would have been dismissed and no useful purpose could have been achieved. What is required to be noted is that in that case also the assessee had not filed an appeal because of the judgment of the High Court which was subsequently reversed by the Supreme court. It would have been dismissed and no useful purpose could have been achieved. What is required to be noted is that in that case also the assessee had not filed an appeal because of the judgment of the High Court which was subsequently reversed by the Supreme court. Another thing which is required to be noted is that in four cases, out of six with which the Andhra Pradesh high Court was concerned, it held that the subsequent decision of the Supreme court did not amount to a sufficient cause for not filing appeals within times as the judgment of the High Court was pronounced long after the period of limitation had expired in those cases and, therefore, it was not possible to say that the assessee had decided not to file appeals and in that sense were prevented from filing appeals because of the judgment of the High Court. We are, therefore, of the view that this decision cannot be of any help to the applicant. ( 11 ) THIS Court, after examining the scheme of the Bombay Sales-tax Act, 1959 and also the Central Sales-tax Act in State of Gujarat v. Suhrid Geigy Ltd, Sales-lax reference No. 2/74 decided on June 28, 1974, observed that it is obvious that while exercising the advisory jurisdiction under section 61, the High Court finally settles any doubtful question of law by setting all doubt at rest in the mailers of sales-tax. Therefore, the law which is thus settled even in the advisory jurisdiction would be the final pronouncement of law, subject to the decision of the Supreme Court in sales-tax matters so far as the State is concerned. This view was taken by this court considering the position, power and jurisdiction of the High Court and the scheme of the Bombay Sales-tax Act. The scheme of the Gujarat Sales-tax Act is not different from that of the Bombay sales-tax Act as regards the question with which we are concerned and, therefore, the observation made in the said judgment would clearly apply to the cases arising under the Gujarat Sales-tax Act. In our opinion, the Tribunal has rightly pointed out that when a Tribunal decides any question and interprets a provision of law, while doing so, it cannot be said to be laying down any law for the State or settling the law for the State. In our opinion, the Tribunal has rightly pointed out that when a Tribunal decides any question and interprets a provision of law, while doing so, it cannot be said to be laying down any law for the State or settling the law for the State. It is no doubt true, as contended by the learned advocate for the applicant, that whatever tribunal decides is binding on the subordinate authorities including the commissioner, but that is because the tribunal is a superior authority in the hierarchy of administration. Merely for that reason, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be said to have the effect of deciding or settling law for the State. In our opinion, the Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that the assessee had failed to make out sufficient case for not preferring an appeal to the Tribunal within the prescribed time. ( 12 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the Department. There shall be no order as to costs in this reference. By order of the Court. Question answered accordingly. .