S. D. AGARWALA, J. ( 1 ) THE question that arises for consideration in the present petition filed under Article 226 of the constitution of India is as to whether application moved by the petitioner under Section 33-C (2)of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is maintainable or not. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to the petition are as follows: the petitioner was an employee in Government Press, Allahabad. He was appointed on the post of Sweeper in Printing and Stationery, Allahabad on 19. 12,1948. He was compulsorily retired from service on 4. 9. 1975 in public interest on the recommendation of the Screening Committee constituted on 13. 8. 1975 after considering his entries of the character roll. By an order dated 22. 11. 1978 the petitioner was re-employed in service with the condition that he will not be entitled for the wages from the date he was compulsorily retired till the date of re-employment but he will continue to work till the date of superannuation. The petitioner was retired from service on 30. 11. 1980. Just before retirement of the petitioner, the petitioner made an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court, Allahabad claiming a sum of Rs. 12,615. 70 p. as wages for the period from 4. 9. 1975 to November, 1978 which was denied to him in the order dated 22. 11. 1978 by which he was re-appointed. The labour Court, Allahabad by its order dated 16. 3. 1981 dismissed the application. It is this order dated 16. 3. 1981 which has been challenged in the present writ petition. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Labour Court has acted illegally in exercise of his jurisdiction in rejecting the application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act. His contention is that the application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act was maintainable and the labour Court should have, directed the payment of salary to him which he had claimed. ( 4 ) FROM the facts on record it is clear that the petitioner has been compulsorily retired on 4. 9. 1975. He was re-employed by an order dated 22. 11. 1978 with the specific condition that he will not be paid his salary from the date of his compulsory retirement till the date he takes over charge after re-employment. The earlier order dated 4. 9. 1975. He was re-employed by an order dated 22. 11. 1978 with the specific condition that he will not be paid his salary from the date of his compulsory retirement till the date he takes over charge after re-employment. The earlier order dated 4. 9. 1975 by which the petitioner was compulsorily retired was not cancelled. The petitioner took re-employment on the specific condition that he will not claim salary for the period from 4. 9,1975 till the date of his re-employment. It is, therefore, clear that there was no existing right of the petitioner to claim salary from 4. 9. 1975 to November, 1977 as is clear from the order dated 22. 11. 1978. ( 5 ) SECTION 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as follows: " (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months: "provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit. ( 6 ) THIS Sub-section (2) of Section 33-C of the Act applies only to a case where the workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. There has to be an existing right to receive money or any benefit. If there is no existing right to receive money or benefit then the provisions of Sub-section (2) of this Section will not apply. In the instant case in the order of re-employment specific condition of re-employment was that the petitioner will not be paid salary from the date of his retirement till he takes over charge after re- employment. The re-employment was subject to this specific condition. In the instant case in the order of re-employment specific condition of re-employment was that the petitioner will not be paid salary from the date of his retirement till he takes over charge after re- employment. The re-employment was subject to this specific condition. In the circumstances the petitioner does not have a right either to receive any money or any benefit under the re-employment order. The claim for salary now made for the period from the date of compulsory retirement till the date of re-employment, consequently, cannot be a subject matter of an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act. The only remedy available to the petitioner at all, however, can be a reference of dispute under Section 10 of the Act. ( 7 ) PETITIONER has relied upon three cases of the Honble Supreme Court in support of his submission that his application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act is maintainable. The first case relied upon by the learned counsel is a decision in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajgopalan : 1963-2 LLJ 89. Learned Counsel has specifically relied on paragraphs 15 and 16 of this decision. In this case Supreme Court after analysing the words used in Section 33-C (2) of the act laid down that on a fair and reasonable construction of Sub-section (2) it is clear that if a workmans right to receive the benefit is disputed that may have to be determined by the Labour court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money, the Labour Court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive the benefit. If the said right is not disputed nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money, but if the said right is disputed the Labour court must deal with the question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making the necessary computation can arise. This interpretation was given by the Supreme Court in relation of an existing individual right as has been clarified in para 15 of the said decision. This interpretation was given by the Supreme Court in relation of an existing individual right as has been clarified in para 15 of the said decision. The principle of interpretation of Section 33-C (2)would only be applicable to the case where there is an existing individual right. Where the right itself is non-existent the question of applicability of Section 33-C (2) does not arise. In the instant case already held above, the order by which the petitioner was re-employed, it was clearly stated that he will not be entitled to salary from the date of compulsory retirement till the date of re-employment. In the circumstances, petitioner did not have any existing right, and as such the question of computation of such right does not arise. ( 8 ) THE next case relied upon by the learned counsel is a decision in Shri Ambica Mills Co. v. S. B. Bhatt : 1961-I LLJ 1. In this case Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act came up for interpretation before the Honble Supreme Court. The Honble Supreme Court laid down that in dealing with the claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages the authority inevitably would have to consider questions incidental to the said matters. In determining the scope of these incidental questions care must be taken to see that under the guise of deciding incidental matter the limited jurisdiction is not unreasonably or unduly extended. Care must also be taken to see that the scope of these incidental questions are not unduly limited so as to affect or impair the limited jurisdiction conferred on the authority. Thereafter the honble Supreme Court has held that if a contract of employment is admitted and there is a dispute about the construction of its terms that obviously falls within Section 15 of the Act. The decision in this case, in my opinion, does not apply to the facts of the present case. Here the claim is in regard to the payment of salary for a period which was specifically denied to the petitioner in the contract of re-employment. There is no question of interpretation of the terms of the contract of employment. The decision in this case, in my opinion, does not apply to the facts of the present case. Here the claim is in regard to the payment of salary for a period which was specifically denied to the petitioner in the contract of re-employment. There is no question of interpretation of the terms of the contract of employment. What the petitioner is claiming is a benefit which does not arise out of the contract at all but the real contention is that the order by which the petitioner was re-employed in an erroneous order and as such in spite of the order he is entitled to wages for the period from the date of his compulsory retirement till the date of re-employment. This, in my opinion, cannot be claimed within the purview of Section 33-C (2) of the Act. The case of Shri ambica Mills Co. v. S. B. Bhatt (supra), in my opinion, does not advance the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner. ( 9 ) THE last case relied upon by the learned counsel is a decision of East India Coal Co. v. Rameshwar 1967 (15) FLR 457 (SC ). Here the question was as to whether certain sets of employees were entitled to bonus or not under the scheme as they were performing domestic and personal work. The question was whether the workman comes within the terms of the scheme laid down by the Company. The scheme was admitted. The question only was as to whether certain employees were entitled to bonus in the scheme or not. This case also in my opinion does not help the petitioner. As already observed above, there is no right of the petitioner for the claim made by him. In fact, in the order of re-employment he was denied that right and he accepted re-employment on the condition laid down by the Government by which he was re-employed. ( 10 ) IN view of the above, in my opinion, the contention raised by the petitioner does not have substance. The application made by the petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of the Act is not maintainable and the view taken by the Labour Court, Allahabad, does not suffer from any legal infirmity. The petition is accordingly, dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. .