Judgment Binodanand Singh, J. 1. This application u/s. 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") is for cancellation of bail of the opposite party No.1 Rabindra Mahto and for getting him arrested and committing him to custody after quashing the order dated 29-5- 1990, passed by the Sessions Judge, Nalanda at Biharsharif, in Bail Petition No. 560 of 1990, by which accused opposite party No.1 Rabindra Mahto was granted bail. 2. The relevant facts are that Sarmera P.S. Case No. 27/90 dated 27-2-1990 under sections 302/34 of the Indian penal Code and 27 of the Arms Act was instituted on the basis of a written report of the petitioner addressed to the officer-in-charge of Sarmera police station filed on 27 -2-1990 at 6.30 p.m. alleging therein that he, along with Arjun Singh, Brijnandan Singh, Chhotan Singh and Vijay Kumar, was standing 6n Sarmera-Copalbad Road, near Mirnagar Village, i.e. village of opposite party No.1, on the aforesaid date in the evening. On that date the selection for Bihar Legislative Assembly was being held. At about 4 p.m. accused Alakhdeo Mahto, covillager of accused opposite party No.1 was seen standing near a maize field with Rifle and opposite party No. 1 was also standing there, being armed with gun. At that time, Nandu Singh (deceased) was going to his village Mirnagar with a bundle of Khesari crop on his head. Further allegation in the written report was that on the order of co-accused Alakhdeo Mahto, opposite party No.1 Rabindra Mahto fired with his gun on Naridu Singh, as a result of which he received injuries, fell down in the field of Gaffur Mian and instantaneously died. The Investigating Officer in course of investigation examined the eye-\ll~nesses, namely, Arjun Singh, BrijnandliJ1. :;{ngh, Chhotan Singh and others. He exam tied other witnesses as well. The post-mortem examination was held over the dead body of the deceased Nandu Singh. The case was also supervised by the Doctor. S.P. Charge-sheet appears to have been submitted in the case, but the present stage of the case is not known. 3. :;{ngh, Chhotan Singh and others. He exam tied other witnesses as well. The post-mortem examination was held over the dead body of the deceased Nandu Singh. The case was also supervised by the Doctor. S.P. Charge-sheet appears to have been submitted in the case, but the present stage of the case is not known. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has sought the order dated 29-5-1990, passed by the Sessions Judge, Nalanda at Biharsharif, granting bail to opposite party No. 1 to be quashed and cancellation of bail of opposite party NO.1 on the ground that the learned Sessions Judge has passed the order granting bail to the opposite party No.1 on improper as well as wrong consideration. The main grievance of the petitioners counsel is that the learned Sessions Judge has failed to consider the statement of the eye-witnesses, namely, Arjun Singh, Brijnandan Singh, Chhotan Singh and Vijay Kumar. All the eye-witnesses have fully supported the prosecution version stating that it was the shot fired by opposite party No. 1, which hit the deceased Nandu Singh, resulting in his death and thus the learned Sessions Judge has misdirected himself in disposing of the bail application, filed by the accused opposite party No.1. The learned sessions. Judge has also failed to take into consideration the objective findings of the Investigating Officer as well as the opinion of the doctor, who held post-mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased, which fully supported the prosecution case. Further grievance has been made by the petitioners counsel that when the Sessions Judge had rejected the application for bail of accused Alakhdeo Mahto, who is alleged to have ordered for killing the deceased it was not proper for him to release the main assailant, i.e. opposite party No.1 on bail. 4. From the perusal of the order of the Sessions Judge granting bail to opposite party No. 1 and from the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party No.1 and the State, the aforesaid submissions of the petitioners counsel do not stand controverted. There is consistent statement of the eye-witnesses in the case diary that it was opposite party No.1 who shot at the deceased killing him. There is consistent statement of the eye-witnesses in the case diary that it was opposite party No.1 who shot at the deceased killing him. The Sessions Judge has made reference to the statement of some of the witnesses as mentioned in his order, namely, the Patrolling Magistrate and other persons according to whom there was firing from three sides and they have said that they heard about the killing of Nandu Singh, but they did not disclose the name of the assailant. One of the consideration before the Sessions Judge for granting bail to opposite party No.1 was also that since the order given, i.e. Alakhdeo Mahto had been granted bail by the High Court, he thought it proper to grant bail to opposite party No.1. Here also the Sessions Judge appears to have misguided himself, since the case pf the order given cannot be equated with the case of the main assailant. Therefore, it is obvious on merits, the opposite party No.1 did not deserve bail by the Sessions Judge. 5. In this connection the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on the case of State of Maharashtra V/s. Anand Chintaman Dighe, wherein it has been held that while granting bail the court is duty bound to look into the materials collected in course of investigation and pass order without being influenced by the status and personality of the accused concerned, failing which order granting bail has been held to be bad and fit to be cancelled. Of course on facts, the case in hand is different from the reported case, since, in the reported case the order granting bail was influenced by the status and personality of the accused, which is not the case here. However, the fact remains that according to the aforesaid decision the gravity of the offence and materials available in support of the prosecution case cannot be ignored, while disposing of an application for bail filed on behalf of an accused in custody. On this consideration the impugned order is fit to be set aside, but the Other aspect of the matter also cannot be lost sight of. Opposite party No. 1 was granted bail by the Sessions Judge, Nalanda as far as back on 29-6-1990, i.e. long time back. 6. On this consideration the impugned order is fit to be set aside, but the Other aspect of the matter also cannot be lost sight of. Opposite party No. 1 was granted bail by the Sessions Judge, Nalanda as far as back on 29-6-1990, i.e. long time back. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the opposite party No.1 has cited the case of Bhogirath Singh V/s. The State of Gujarat, wherein it has been held that the High Court can cancel the bail only when there are very cogent and overwhelming circumstances for cancellation of bail. Power to grant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. The only material consideration are whether the accused will be readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tempering with evidence. Thus once bail has been granted to an accused it can be cancelled only in the circumstances mentioned above. 7. In the instant case a very half hearted averment has been made in paragraph 9 of the cancellation application that opposite party No. 1 after the grant of bail has come out from jail and threatening the informant-petitioner and other witnesses that they will have to face the consequences in case they will depose against them. This averment, however, appears to have been abandoned in view of the fact that no argument has been advanced in this regard. Besides do not find any material on the record in support of the above assertion. Thus there is no material to indicate that the accused has in any matter abused the privilege of bail extended to him in the circumstances, once he has been extended the privilege of bail, it cannot be withdrawn without any specific overt-act on the part of the petitioner which is lacking in this case. 8. On the above consideration this application is dismissed. However, it is directed that in case no commitment order has yet been passed, it must be passed within three months from the date of receipt of this order and the trial must be concluded within a year from the date of commitment.