JUDGMENT R.B. Mehrotra, J. - By means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the recovery of interest accrued for non-payment of excise to the tune of Rs. 47, 556.70. 2. Necessary facts for the decision of the writ petition are as under : Petitioner along with one Hira Lal was granted licence by public auction for retail sale of the country liquor in respect of some shops in the district of Lalitpur for the excise year 1977-78. According to the conditions of licence, petitioner was permitted to open his shops right from 10 a. m. to 10 p.m. However, the pendency of the licensing year, the Excise Commissioner. Uttar Pradesh, vide notification, dated 18-9-1977 curtailed the hours of sale and permitted the petitioner to sell the country liquor only from 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. The aforesaid notification was challenged by means of a writ petition before this Court in G.C. Jaiswal v. Excise Commissioner, reported in, 1978 ALJ 802 : 1978 Tax LR 1953 a Division Bench of this Court held that the said notification was prospective in nature and was not applicable to the current licensing year 1977-78. The Division Bench held that the said notification was to be made applicable for the next licensing year i.e., 1979-80 and onwards. The petitioner claimed compensation for the loss which he suffered due to illegal curtailing of selling hours of the country liquor. The said writ petition was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court, vide order, dated 1-7- 1980. While dismissing the writ petition, the Court held as under :- "In the writ, petition it has been stated that the petitioner's application for remitting the licence fee has been rejected. A copy of the application has been filed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition which indicate that it was not an application for remission of licence fee. It was an application claiming compensation. In view of decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1385 of 1978 M.L. Jaiswal v. D.M. decided on 4-2-1978, the order refusing to entertain compensation cannot be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the petitioner has any other remedy he is free to avail the same. There is no merit in this petition. Dismissed. In view of decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1385 of 1978 M.L. Jaiswal v. D.M. decided on 4-2-1978, the order refusing to entertain compensation cannot be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the petitioner has any other remedy he is free to avail the same. There is no merit in this petition. Dismissed. Sd/- H. N. Seth, Sd/- R. M. Sahai." On the basis of the observation made in the aforesaid judgment, the petitioner applied for remission of the licence fee before the District Magistrate, Lalitpur due to the aforesaid illegal curtailing of selling hours. No decision was taken on the aforesaid remission application and a recovery for an amount of Rs. 96,739.70 was issued against the petitioner for payment of balance amount of the licence fee. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid recovery certificate by means of a writ petition which was numbered as writ petition No. 278 of 1980. On 25-7-1980, a Division Bench of this Court stayed the recovery proceedings against the petitioner during the pendency of writ petition No. 278 of 1990. 3. However, during the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, U.P. Excise Act was amended by U.P. Act No. 7 of 1985 and S. 38A was added in,the said Act. S. 38A as amended by U.P. Act No. 7 of 1985 came into force on 29-3-1985. For convenient reference, S. 38A of the said Act is reproduced below : "38A. (1) Where any excise revenue has not been paid within three months from the date on which it becomes payable, interest at such rate not exceeding twenty-four per cent per annum, as may be prescribed, shall be payable from the date such excise revenue becomes payable till the date of actual payment; Provided that until a higher rate is prescribed, the rate of interest will be eighteen per cent per annum : Provided further that in respect of an excise revenue which became payable before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Excise (Amendment) Act, 1985, interest at the said rate shall be payable from the date of such commencement if the excise revenue is not paid within three months of the said date. Explanation : Nothing in this sub-section shall be construed to affect the payment of interest under an agreement from the terms of an auction or, a decree of the court, passed before the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Excise (Amendment) Act 1985 or which may be passed after the date of such commencement, in suits or proceedings filed before the said date. (2) Provisions of S. 39 shall mutatis mutandis apply to realisation of such interest as they apply to realisation of excise revenue". 4. After the enactment of the aforesaid S. 38A, the petitioner's writ petition No. 278 of 1980 was dismissed by this Court, vide judgment, dated 16-12-1986. In this judgment, this Court took the view that the petitioner is not entitled for any remission in the licence fee. The judgment has became final against the petitioner. Consequent thereto, the petitioner paid the balance amount of licence fee on following dates : 10-12-1987 ... 71,000.00 5-1-1988 ... 25, 739.00 Total 96, 739.00 5. Subsequent thereto, another recovery certificate has now been issued on 30-9-1988 for an amount of Rs. 47,556.70 asking the petitioner to pay the interest at the rate of 18% on the balance amount of excise revenue to the tune of Rs. 96,739/- which was due against the petitioner on 29-3-1985, the date on which S. 38A was brought into the statute book. The only question which requires consideration in the present writ petition is as to whether the amount of Rs. 96,739/- was `payable' on the date the U.P. Act No. 7 of 1985 came into force or it became payable for the first time when the petitioner's writ petition was dismissed on 16-12-1986 and the interest started running from the date the writ petition was dismissed. The Revenue has taken a stand in the present case that despite the interim order passed by this Court staying the recovery of Rs. 96,739/- in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 278 of 1980, the interest started accruing right from the date U.P. Act No. 7 of 1985 came into force i.e., 29-3-1985. The Revenue has taken a stand in the present case that despite the interim order passed by this Court staying the recovery of Rs. 96,739/- in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 278 of 1980, the interest started accruing right from the date U.P. Act No. 7 of 1985 came into force i.e., 29-3-1985. The petitioner on the other and has contended that since the recovery of the excise revenue was stayed by this Court, the licence fee was not `payable' due to the interim order passed by this Court and the same became payable for the first time on 16- 12-1986 when the petitioner's writ petition was dismissed and the Revenue has exceeded its authority in calculating the interest on the balance amount from 29-3-1985. 6. In Corpus Juris Secondum, Volume LXX, Page 202, the word `payable' is defined as under :- "PAYABLE An adjective of ambiguous import, standing alone the word is not confinable to one single definite meaning, nor is there such single meaning when it is used in a legal sense. It is a descriptive word, its meaning can be determined only in the light of the situation and the circumstances of its use. In the ordinary sense it excludes the notion of fulfilment, and is limited to that which has become payable, due, or owing. Payable has been defined as meaning admitting or demanding payment capable of being paid; suitable to be paid; to be paid; that may be discharged or settled by delivery of value. The word "payable" is frequently defined as meaning that which may, can, or should be paid, but when it is used in commercial transactions it means to be paid or that which is to be paid, rather than that which may be paid. It has been further defined as meaning due; matured or maturing; legally enforceable.......". 7. In the LAW LEXICON, 1987 Edition, page 956, the word `payable' is defined as under :- "Payable". The word `payable' is a descriprive word, meaning 'capable of being paid; suitable to be paid; Admitting or demanding payment; justly due; legally enforceable." 8. The learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance on the second proviso to S. 38A which has already been quoted above, and contended that the amount of Rs. The word `payable' is a descriprive word, meaning 'capable of being paid; suitable to be paid; Admitting or demanding payment; justly due; legally enforceable." 8. The learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance on the second proviso to S. 38A which has already been quoted above, and contended that the amount of Rs. 96,739/- became payable before the commencement of U.P. Excise (Amendment) Act and interest also became payable from the date of such commencement since the excise revenue was not paid within 3 months of the said date. The Contention of the Standing Counsel is that despite interim order staying the recovery of licence fee, the petitioner was under an obligation to pay the said lincence fee within three months, if the petitioner wanted to save himself from payment of the interest. 9. We have give our careful consideration to the aforesaid submissions of the learned Standing Counsel. We are unable to agree with the said submissions for two reasons : Firstly, S. 38A begins with the words "where any excise revenue has not been paid within three months from the date on which it becomes payable...... In the present context, the word "payable" should be interpreted to mean `legally enforceable'. In the present case, the excise revenue became legally enforceable for the first time on 17th of December, 1986. The excise revenue was not legally enforceable earlier since the recovery of the excise fee was stayed by the Court. The word `payable' is not capable of any other interpretation in the present context on the date the Act came into force, due to the interim order passed by this Court, the amount of licence fee or excise revenue was not legally enforceable against the petitioner as the petitioner was saved from paying it, due to the interim order passed by this Court. The licence fee became payable only after the dismissal of the writ petition and the petitioner became liable for interest from the date of the dismissal of the petitioner's writ petition. The Revenue could have charged the interest only from 17-12-1986 till the petitioner paid the licence fee. 10. Secondly, in the second proviso also, the word `payable' is to be read in the context of the words `before the commencement of the U.P. Excise Act'. On the date the U.P. Excise (Amendment) Act commenced, the excise revenue was not payable by the petitioner. 10. Secondly, in the second proviso also, the word `payable' is to be read in the context of the words `before the commencement of the U.P. Excise Act'. On the date the U.P. Excise (Amendment) Act commenced, the excise revenue was not payable by the petitioner. It was certainly payable at an anterior permit of time, but in between intervened the Court's interim order which created a situation that on the date of U.P. Act No. 7 of 1985 commenced, no excise revenue was payable by the petitioner. The second proviso in the present case will not be attracted. 11. In view of the above analysis of S. 38A of the U.P. Act No. 7 of 1985, we are of the opinion that the petitioner is liable to pay interest only from 17-12-1986 i.e., the next day after the petitioner's writ petition was dismissed till the date the petitioner paid the licence fee. The Revenue is in error in demanding the interest on excise revenue right from the date U.P. Act No. 7 of 1985 came into force. The demand of Rs. 47,556.70 is to be quashed to that extent. 12. We accordingly allow the writ petition, quash the demand of Rs. 47,556.70 towards interest from the petitioner to the extent it has demanded payment of interest anterior to 17-12-1986. The Revenue will re-calculate the interest at the rate of 18% of the balance amount of licence fee from 17-12-1986 till the petitioner paid the balance amount of licence fee and will issue a fresh recovery certificate and will recover the amount of interest accordingly. Parties will bear their own costs.