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1991 DIGILAW 925 (MAD)

H. Belli v. Union of India, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi

1991-12-18

K.S.BAKTHAVATSALAM

body1991
Judgment :- 1. The prayer in the writ petition is as follows: “To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction to the 2nd and 3rd respondents from letting out the property belonging to the first respondent and classified as Class ’A’ in the G.L.A. Rules 1937 or dealing with it in any manner contrary to the Rules aforesaid.” 2. The petitioner claims to be a social worker and interested in the welfare of the society and also is attempting to enforce the laws through legal machinery. Certain lands in the cantonment area are controlled and managed by the 4th respondent. In 1986 the respondents 2 and 3 sought the land for their use after the lease period in their favour is over. It seems initially the lands were classified as agricultural lands and class ‘C’ when it was leased out to persons who belonged to lower strata of the society. In 1986 the 4th respondent handed over the lands to the respondents 2 and 3. It is alleged in the affidavit that subsequent to the surrender of the lands by the lessees the fifth respondent has been illegally permitted to raise crops and he is making merry out of the State executor and is cultivating the lands and taking the income from the lands. It is stated that the 5th respondent is owning about 80 acres and they are under cultivation and he is raising crops like carrot, cabbage, potato and garlic etc. It seems the petitioner lodged his protest to the respondents 2 and 3 and issued a number of notices to the parties concerned and no action has been taken according to the allegations made in the affidavit. It is alleged in the affidavit that the Government lands are not available to be misused and it is not prerogative of the respondents 2 and 3 to confer a privilege not available in them to the 5th respondent, that poor farmers have been removed from the lands on the ground that it is required for the exclusive use of the respondents 2 and 3. However, it is seen that the fifth respondent is cultivating the lands and it is stated that the property of the State cannot and should not be used for benefiting a few. However, it is seen that the fifth respondent is cultivating the lands and it is stated that the property of the State cannot and should not be used for benefiting a few. It is also alleged that when the lease was cancelled it was due to the security reasons and by leasing out in favour of the 5th respondent the cancellation of lease itself is under cloud of doubt, according to the petitioner. The petitioner has been making representation since 1987 since the lands have been used by the 5th respondent and it should not be done. The petitioner has been given a reply by the Lt.Col.Officiating Training, Madras, Regimental Centre, Wellington on 8.7.1971 saying that no defence land has been given on lease to any one. The defence Estate lands under the case of this Centre is being managed, according to Rules 2 and 4. When another person by name Nanjappa made a complaint he has been replied that the case has been examined and it is found that private party has been given any lease and thereafter the amount was realised by way of sale proceeds from the garden fund etc., has been deposited in the Government Treasury by the M.R.C.Wellington. This letter Nanjappa has received from the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Defence. Not satisfied with that the petitioner made a representation to Thiru Shri Sharad Pavvar through the Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha on 17.10.1991 to the Ministry of Defence, Government of India and also has written the letter to the officer Commanding Station, Madras House, Wellington. 3. I heard Mr.Raghavachari, learned counsel for the petitioner in extenso. 4. I am not convinced with the arguments of the learned counsel and the contentions raised in the affidavits from the records, the records produced before me, the petitioner seems to be raising a question of public interest according to him, which has been denied by the Department by Communications. Inspite of it, if the petitioner wants to agitate the matter once over as it is the guardian of the public property, I do not think that this Court can extend its arms under Art.226 of the Constitution of India aiding him. Inspite of it, if the petitioner wants to agitate the matter once over as it is the guardian of the public property, I do not think that this Court can extend its arms under Art.226 of the Constitution of India aiding him. As has been rightly pointed out by Khalid, J. in Shri Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal A.I.R 1987 S.G. 1109: (1987)2 S.C.C. 295 :(1987)2 S.C.J. 70: “Today public spirited litigants rush to courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name. They must inspire confidence in courts and among the public. They must be above suspicions. See the facts of this case and the result.” The learned Judge further observed thus: “My purpose in admitting these few lines of my own is to highlight the need for restraint on the part of the public interest litigants when they move courts. Public interest litigation has now come to stay. But one is led to think that it poses a threat to courts and public alike. Such cases are now filed without any rhyme or reasons It is, therefore, necessary to lay down clear guidelines and to outline the correct parameters for entertainment of such petitions. If courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of public interest litigations, the traditional litigation will suffer and the courts of law, instead of dispensing justice, will have to take upon themselves administrative and executive functions. I should not be understood to say that traditional litigation should stay put. They have to be tackled by other effective methods, like decentralising the judicial system and entrusting majority of traditions’ litigation to village courts and Lok Adalats without the usual populist stance and by a complete restructuring of the procedural law which is the villain in delaying disposal of cases: It is only when courts are apprised of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group or a class action or when basic human rights are invaded or when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the courts, especially this Court, should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its jurisdiction under all available provisions for remedying the hardships and miseries of the needy, the under dog and the neglected, I will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self imposed restraint on public interest litigants.” In my view, this is a typical case where the observations of Khalid, squarely applies. It is not as if the petitioner has not been replied by the concerned authorities. I have already stated that the Department as well as the Defence Ministry have denied the allegations of the petitioner by replying to him. In such circumstances, I do not think that this Court can interfere in this matter. The writ petition is dismissed.