JUDGMENT 1. - V.S. Jaiman, appellant, has been convicted & sentenced as under by the Special Judge, CBI cases Rajasthan, Jaipur, vide judgment dated July 19, 1983, against which, this criminal appeal has been filed - U/s 409, IPC - Two year's R.I. with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- (in default, six month's further R.I.) U/s 5(1)(c) read with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. - One year's R.I. with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- (in default, three months further R.I.) Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.Two first information reports (RC Nos. 421 (Ex. P. 176, dated 17.5.77) and No 30 (Ex. P. 175, dated 11.6.77) were chalked out at Delhi Special Police Establishment Jaipur Branch, upon information received from a reliable source, with the assertions that during his posting from February 11, 1972 upto May 24, 1974, as Agriculture Assistant in Central Bank of India, Bhilwara Branch, Shri V.S. Jaiman (appellant) collected amounts from the following borrowers against the loans which the Bank had advanced to them either for construction of wells or purchase of sheeps etc, - (under F.I.R. (RC) No. 30 1. Onkar of Bahia Kalan Rs. 500/- 21.1.74 2. Mangu of Rupahya Rs. 150/ 18.5.74 3. Barda of Ratanpura Rs. 400/- 25.2.74 4. Laxman of Sabalpura Rs. 200/- (under F.I.R. (RC) No. 21) 1. Sorma Chamar Rs. 300/- 8.5.74 2. Surja Bhil Rs. 300/- - do - 3. Onkar Bhil Rs. 300/- - do - 4. Laxman Bhil Rs. 300/- - do - 5. Geesa Bhil Rs. 300/- - do - 6. Nanda Bhil Rs. 300/- - do - 7. Nanda Kajod Bhil Rs. 300/- - do - 8. Narain Bhil Rs. 300/- - do - 9. Babu Bhil Rs. 300/- - do - 2. It had also been averred in the F.I.Rs. that V.S. Jaiman passed receipts to the borrowers for the amounts so collected. As per F.I.R. No. 30 (RC) the appellant did not deposit Rs. 1260/- whereas according to F.I.R. No. (RC) 21, he deposited Rs. 200/- instead of collected amount Rs. 300/-, only in each of the accounts of the borrowers. Thus, the allegation is that by not depositing Rs. 150/-(in FIR No. 30) and Rs. As per F.I.R. No. 30 (RC) the appellant did not deposit Rs. 1260/- whereas according to F.I.R. No. (RC) 21, he deposited Rs. 200/- instead of collected amount Rs. 300/-, only in each of the accounts of the borrowers. Thus, the allegation is that by not depositing Rs. 150/-(in FIR No. 30) and Rs. 900/- (in F.I.R. No. 21) in the Bank alongwith the pay-in-slips as instalments paid by the borrowers, named above, the appellant dishonestly & fraudulently misappropriated or converted the said amount collected from the borrowers to his own use. 3. The CBI police investigated the matter and after usual investigation, filed a charge-sheet against the appellant for offences punishable under Section 409, IPC, besides Section 5(2) read with S. 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1917, (for short, the Act), on 17.8.78. On 8.1.79, the trial Court framed charges against the appellant for the said offences to which he denied and pleaded trial. The prosecution examined as many as 33 witnesses. The appellant was examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C. 4. After hearing both the parties, the trial Court convicted & sentenced the appellant as stated in first para of this judgment. Hence this appeal.According to the prosecution version, the charge of misappropriation has been levelled against the appellant on two sorts of payments. Under first sort the appellant received on 8.5.1974 Rs. 300/- each from nine borrowers, namely, Sheoram (PW5), Surja (PW1), Onkar (PW4), Laxman (PW3 , Gheesa (PW2), Nanda (PW7), Nanda Kajod (PW6), Narain (PW9), and Babu (PW8) against instalment of repayment of loans advanced to them by the Bank, but he deposited only Rs. 200/- each in each of the afore named borrowers whereas he had to deposit Rs. 300/- each in the loan account of each of the said borrowers against repayment of loan amount as instalment, and thereby, in all Rs. 900/- is alleged to have been misappropriated. Pertinently to mention here that all the afore named borrowers appeared in the witness box but turned hostile by stating before the trial Court that each of them made payment of Rs. 200/- each to the appellant who gave its receipt but immediately thereafter each of them took back a sum of Rs. 100/- each from the appellant as each of them has to make certain purchases, with their assurances to redeem the said amount of Rs. 200/- each to the appellant who gave its receipt but immediately thereafter each of them took back a sum of Rs. 100/- each from the appellant as each of them has to make certain purchases, with their assurances to redeem the said amount of Rs. 100/- to the appellant within next 2-3 days. In this view of the clarificatory admissions wrung out from the evidence of the afore-named nine borrowers (PW1 to PW9) who turned hostile, it is manifestly clear that each of them made payment of amount only to the tune of Rs. 200/- to the appellant towards the instalment of repayment of loan amount because, each of them after giving Rs. 300/- to the appellant had taken back an amount of Rs. 100/- from the appellant soon after they made payment of Rs. 300/- to the appellant so as to deposit in their loan accounts, and it is not the prosecution case herein that Rs. 200/- has not been deposited in the loan accounts of each of the afore-named borrowers towards their repayment of loan amount in instalments, rather the said amount of Rs. 200/- had been deposited by the appellant with the bank in their respective loan accounts. All the witnesses-borrowers admitted that the appellant returned back Rs. 100/- to each of them believing that the said amount would be re-deemed back to him by each of them so as to further deposit in their loan accounts. These borrowers (witnesses staled that the receipt of Rs. 300/- was given to them when each of them had redeemed the payment of loan instalment. That pay-in-slips through which the appellant had allegedly deposited Rs. 200/- in each of the borrowers account are Ex. Ps. 66 to 74. Only seven receipts (Ex. Ps. 40 to 46) alleged to have been given to the borrowers have been produced whereas the receipts alleged to have been given to two of the borrowers, namely, Babu (PW8) and Narain (PW9) have not been produced. That apart, an amount of Rs. 100/- has also been deposited in loan account of each of the afore-named nine borrowers through Ex P. 22 to P33 during the period when the appellant was not posted at Bhilwara and was already transferred from there. The trial Court found the appellant guilty only on the basis of the receipts (Fx. That apart, an amount of Rs. 100/- has also been deposited in loan account of each of the afore-named nine borrowers through Ex P. 22 to P33 during the period when the appellant was not posted at Bhilwara and was already transferred from there. The trial Court found the appellant guilty only on the basis of the receipts (Fx. P. 40 to P. 46) issued allegedly by the appellant in favour of the witnesses-borrowers. 5. Under second part of the charge, the allegation is that various amounts to the tune of Rs. 200/-, Rs. 150/-, Rs. 500/-, Rs. 400/-, Rs. 200/- & Rs. 200/- were received by the appellant from Gopi Harlal (PW17), Mangu Chamar (PW18), Onkar Chamar (PW20), Barda Bhil (PW21), Laxman Chamar (FW23), & Krishna (PW25) respectively on 25.2.74. 18.5.74, 21.1.74, 25.2.74, 18.1.74 and the date (not stated) respectively. The appellant is also alleged to have passed on receipts/counter-foils to the afore-named borrowers against their payment of the aforestated amounts and these receipts are exhibited as Ex Ps. 53 to 57, receipt allegedly given to Gopi as it was not available. The charge is that the appellant by not depositing the said amounts with the Bank, dishonestly misappropriated the same.I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the judgment under appeal together with the relevant record. 6. According to the counsel for the appellant, no case had been proved against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt because, all the borrowers who appeared in the witness box did not support the prosecution version rather they all were declared hostile, inasmuch as the appellant has probablised his defence.Before entering into the merits of the case at hand I would like to have brief resume on the principles of law on the point as to whether the conviction is possible in a case where the theory of defence put by the accused is plausible & probable. 7. 7. In this regard, suffice is to take aid from the observations made by their Lordships of the Apex Court in Sri Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa (AIR 1977 SC p. 170 = 1976 (4) SCC p. 233) wherein it has been held that although the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the charge against the accused, yet where the entrustment is proved or admitted it will be difficult for the prosecution to prove the actual mode or manner of misappropriate and in such a case the prosecution would have to rely largely on the truth or the falsity of the explanation given by the accused. And, while dealing with the question as to what is the standard by which the truth or falsity of the version given by the defence is to be judged, their Lordships expounded three cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence namely : (1) that the onus lies affirmatively on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and it cannot derive any benefit from weakness or falsity of the defence version while proving its case; (2) that in a criminal trial the accused must be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty; and (3) that the onus of prosecution never shifts. Rightly held, the Evidence Act does not contemplate that the accused should prove his case with the same strictness and rigour as the prosecution is required to prove a criminal charge and keeping in view the cardinal principles referred to above, it is sufficient if the accused is able to prove his case by the standard of preponderance of probabilities as envisaged by Section 5 of the Evidence Act as a result of which he succeeds not because he proves his case to the hilt but because probability of the version given by him throws doubt on the prosecution case and therefore, the prosecution cannot be said to have established the charge beyond reasonable doubt. 8. 8. In this view of the matter, while dealing with facts and circumstances identical alike the case at hand, it had been held, once the accused gives a reasonable and probable explanation, it is for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the explanation is absolutely false because, in a criminal trial, it is not at all obligatory on the accused to produce evidence in support of his defence and for the purpose of proving his version he (accused) can rely on the admissions made by the prosecution witnesses or on the documents filed by the prosecution. In these circumstances, the court is required to probe and consider the materials relied upon by the defence instead of raising an adverse inference against the accused, for not producing evidence in support of his defence because the prosecution cannot derive any strength or support from the weakness of the defence case. And, if it fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the entire edifice of the prosecution would crumble down. 9. Now I proceed to resolve the controversy herein. Regarding the alleged misappropriation of Rs. 900/-(Rs. 100/- each from the borrowers) under F.I.R. (RC No. 21), the prosecution has produced seven receipts (each of Rs. 300/-) alleged to have been given by the appellant to the borrowers, under Ex. Ps. 40 to 46, and two alleged receipts in respect of the borrowers, namely, Babu (PW8) and Narain (PW9), being not available, were not produced. The pay-in-slips through which the appellant is allegedly deposited Rs. 200/- with the Bank in each of the borrower's account, are Ex. Ps. 66 to 74. The remaining amount of Rs. 100/- has admittedly been deposited with the Bank in each of borrowers account under Ex. P. 22 to P. 33 vide pay in-slips (Ex. P. 21 to P 30) on or about 28.4.1976, during which, the appellant was never posted at Bhilwara, rather he stood transferred from there. The fact of transfer and place of posting of the appellant at Bhilwara on or about 28.4.1976 has not been denied by the prosecution, nor, the prosecution disputed that under pay-in-slips (Ex. P. 22 to P. 30) the said amount of Rs. 100/- had not been deposited by the borrowers with the Bank, through one, Kana. The prosecution has failed to prove that these amounts under receipts-cum-pay-in-slips (Ex. P. 22 to P. 30) the said amount of Rs. 100/- had not been deposited by the borrowers with the Bank, through one, Kana. The prosecution has failed to prove that these amounts under receipts-cum-pay-in-slips (Ex. P. 22 to P. 30) were got deposited either by the appellant or at his instance or in his own handwriting. Moreover, a look at (Ex. P. 31 to P. 39) pertaining the sheets of the ledger foil of each of the borrowers account (Soram, Surja, Onkar, Laxman Bhil, Gheesa, Nanda, Nanda Bhil, Narayan & Balus) makes it abundantly clear that in addition to deposit Rs. 200/- in respect of which there is no prosecution allegation of misappropriation, an entry of deposit of an amount of Rs. 100/- in each of the borrowers account also finds place, of the date 17th June, 1974, making it clear that the said amount of Rs. 100/- was deposited in their account, just after the undisputed deposit of Rs. 200/-. 10. As regards second part of the charge of misappropriation. the prosecution case is that after taking an amount of Rs. 200/-. Rs. 150/-, Rs. 500/-, Rs. 400/-, Rs. 200/- & Rs. 200/- from Gopi Harlal, Mangu Chamar. Onkar Chamar, Barda Bhil, Laxman Cnamar & Krishna respectively, the appellant is alleged to have passed on its receipts vide Ex. Ps. 53 to 57 to the borrowers and did not deposit the same with the Bank rather misappropriated the same. On the other hand, the trial Court, itself, held that the said amount had been deposited subsequently as per the following chart:- Name of borrowers The amount in dispute allegedly taken by accused The amount allegedly deposited by the accused on 1 2 3 Mangu Chamar Rs. 150/- (Ex. P. 55) 18-5-74 Rs. 150/- (Ex. P. 152) on 3-5-76 Krishan Rs. 200/-(Ex P. 53) 18-1-74 Rs. 200/- (Ex. P. 170) on 3-5-76 Onkar Chamar Rs. 500/- (Ex. P. 54) 21-1-74 Rs. 500/- (Ex. P. 153) on 3-5-76 Barda Bhil Rs. 400/-(Ex. P. 56) 25-2-74 Rs. 400/- as per L/f entry of 19-1-76 (Ex. P. 50) Laxman Rs. 200/- (Ex. P. 57) Rs. 200/- (Ex. P. 77) 28 4-76 Gopi Rs. 200/- (Receipt not received) Rs. 250/- (Ex. P. 79) 28-4-76. 11. However, the appellant has denied to have deposit the aforesaid amounts in the accounts of the above named six borrowers. The F.I.Rs. 400/- as per L/f entry of 19-1-76 (Ex. P. 50) Laxman Rs. 200/- (Ex. P. 57) Rs. 200/- (Ex. P. 77) 28 4-76 Gopi Rs. 200/- (Receipt not received) Rs. 250/- (Ex. P. 79) 28-4-76. 11. However, the appellant has denied to have deposit the aforesaid amounts in the accounts of the above named six borrowers. The F.I.Rs. had been lodged and the investigation commenced much long after the deposit of the aforesaid amount in dispute subsequently. During the investigation and before lodging of the F.I.Rs. the said amounts as has been proved by the prosecution, itself, on record, were already found having been deposited in respective accounts of the aforesaid six of the borrowers. Moreover, the prosecution by producing counter-foils of pay in-slips and the sheets of the respective accounts of the borrowers, pertaining to the deposit though made subsequently but before lodging in the F.I.Rs. and the commencement of the investigation by the Police (CBI), and by proving these documents on record which were not in the hand-writing of the appellant, has established on record that the amount in dispute which is alleged to have been misappropriated by the appellant has already been found duly deposited in the accounts of the borrowers though may be some of them by the borrowers, themselves, or by their persons in relations or through some employees of the Bank, itself. None of the Bank employees or officers who appeared in the witness box, deposed that on the dates on which the amount in dispute is alleged to have been deposited subsequently as has been held by the trial Court, itself in the respective accounts of the borrowers that too before lodging of the F.I.Rs. and the commencement of the police investigation about the alleged misappropriation and embezzlement, they had seen the appellant in the Bank either alongwith the borrowers or their persons in relations so as to have come there to deposit the said amounts. Similarly, none of the borrowers deposed in their statements that the amounts found to have been deposited in their respective accounts subsequently which had been admitted with and by the Bank to have been deposited in the respective accounts, were taken to have been deposited by the respective borrowers and their accounts showed being lessened by those respective amounts duly deposited by the borrowers. Had these amounts not been deposited by the respective borrowers or had these amounts deemed to have been deposited by the persons other than the respective borrowers, they would not have been shown duly deposited in their accounts. The prosecution case is that during the inquiry the appellant had managed to get the amounts in dispute deposited with the Bank. Surprisingly enough, the inquiry and investigation commenced after the F.I.Rs. were lodged which were made on or about January and June, 1977 whereas the prosecution has established that the amounts in dispute were already deposited in the month of April, 1976. Moreover, the prosecution has not produced any record or document or evidence to show that any inquiry had already been initiated against the appellant before the lodging of the F.I.Rs. and the commencement of the police investigation. Had there been any inquiry against the appellant in April, 1976, then it is surprised how the appellant could have made known of the said inquiry by the Bank officer when such matters of inquiry, if any, conducted could have atleast been strictly confidential and the appellant could not have been known about such an inquiry by the Bank officers and there was rare chances for the appellant (who admittedly was posted long and far away from Bhilwara on account of his transfer from there) to have come to know about such confidential inquiry. Thus it is proper to say that the appellant got the amounts in dispute deposited with the Bank as soon as he came to know about such an inquiry by the Bank Officers. Had there been such an inquiry, by the Bank officer, then why the Bank authority allowed to get the said amounts in dispute deposited with the Bank towards it for which the allegation was that it had been embezzled by the appellant. The borrowers have also not deposed that the amounts allegedly deposited subsequently in the month of April, 1976 or so were in respect of their instalments of April, 1976 or so. The borrowers have also not deposed that the amounts allegedly deposited subsequently in the month of April, 1976 or so were in respect of their instalments of April, 1976 or so. But on other hand, the prosecution evidence makes it clear that the said amount allegedly deposited subsequently in the month of April, 1976 or so, were treated to have been in respect of the respective borrowers, nor the Bank officers stated that the amounts shown to have been deposited subsequently in the month of April, 1976 or so (which were subsequently stated by the borrowers in, their statements in whole hog to support the allegation of embezzlement against the appellant, having been not deposited by them or their persons in relations,) were got deposited either towards some instalments of the year 1976 or its any of the months, or towards some other counts. That apart, it is not their prosecution evidence that the said amounts being allegedly not deposited by the respective borrowers, stood transferred to some accounts other than that of the borrowers. On the other hand, the Bank deemed those amounts in dispute allegedly deposited subsequently in the month of April, 1976 or so, holding it to be of the respective borrowers which they have allegedly given to the appellant in the year 1974. Ex. P. 152, P. 170 P. 153, P. 50, P. 77. P. 79 have not been proved by the prosecution to have been written by the appellant, himself or his personnel. Mere evidence of an expert of hand writing that too is not pointer to the guilt, cannot be based the conviction against the appellant. 12. As already pointed out above, nine of borrowers under first part of the charge of embezzlement, have turned hostile and that apart, they have sworn in their affidavits duly verified by the Magistrate during investigation. These affidavits have been got exhibited by the prosecution. Although the prosecution had challenged those affidavits by stating they had been taken from the witnesses by deceitful means or coercion, but, the prosecution has never tried to produce the concerned Magistrate who had verified the affidavits of the witnesses so as to establish their plea of taking the affidavits, by coercion, nor examined the person who had identified the deponents of the affidavits. Non-production of these persons, (Magistrate and the identifier) makes the prosecution case as to the plea of coercion in taking affidavits as doubtful. 13. As already wrung out from the cardinal principles of been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to above, where the entrustment is admitted, it will be difficult for the prosecution to prove the actual mode or manner of misappropriation and in such a case the prosecution would have to rely largely on the truth or the falsity of the explanation given by the accused. As regards entrustment of the amounts by the nine borrowers under first part of the charge of embezzlement, the explanation of the accused in his statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C. is that after giving the amount by the borrowers, each of them had taken back an amount of Rs. 100/- from him immediately. This version stands proved by the affidavits of each of the borrowers. This makes it clear that initially there was an entrustment of Rs. 200/- only from each of the borrowers (nine, named above), and not of Rs. 300/-. Thus, the explanation given by the appellant is not false rather it is worthy of truth. In this regard, the prosecution failed to falsity the explanation given by the accused beyond doubt. Contrarily, the appellant has given a reasonable and probable explanation by producing affidavits though he was not required to prove it because in order to prove his version or explanation he can rely on the admissions made by the prosecution witnesses or on the documents filed by the prosecution, in which in the case at hand, the appellant absolutely succeed. No adverse inference against the appellant can be derived, nor the prosecution can derive any strength or support from the weakness, if any, though herein it is not, of the defence case. The trial Court has ignored the above significant aspect of the case and erred in drawing adverse inference against the appellant. Verily the prosecution has completely failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and in this view of the matter, the entire edifice of the prosecution stands crumbled down. 14. For being liable under Section 409 IPC, it is essential to commit a criminal breach of trust. Verily the prosecution has completely failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and in this view of the matter, the entire edifice of the prosecution stands crumbled down. 14. For being liable under Section 409 IPC, it is essential to commit a criminal breach of trust. `Criminal breach of trust' is defined in section 405, IPC and an essential ingredient of this office is that the accused being in any manner entrusted with property or with dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust. In view of the above definition, now it is to be seen as to whether the prosecution has brought on record any evidence establishing the dishonest intention of the appellant in doing the acts defined in Section 405, I.P.C. Having perused the record, I find that there is no such evidence having been produced by the prosecution and it is apparent that the prosecution has not even attempted to prove such dishonest intention. Verily, the whole exercise done by the prosecution was to prove that the amounts in question were received by the appellant, and the same were deposited after a lapse of time and in support of it, it produced some documents. Further exercise was made by the prosecution to prove that the documents through which the amounts in question were got deposited subsequently before lodging the F.I.Rs., were prepared either by the appellant or at his instance through the borrowers, themselves, or their persons in relations. At no stage, the prosecution attempted to prove that the appellant had benefited in any manner with his alleged unusual act in question. Further, no attempt was made also to show that the version of the facts given in the shape of his explanation about receipt of the amounts in question by the appellant was false. At no stage, the prosecution attempted to prove that the appellant had benefited in any manner with his alleged unusual act in question. Further, no attempt was made also to show that the version of the facts given in the shape of his explanation about receipt of the amounts in question by the appellant was false. On the contrary, as already held above, the appellant has been successful in establishing his defence plea as reasonable & plausible either by producing the affidavit sworn in by the prosecution witnesses, or by their admission made in the statements of the prosecution witnesses though they turned hostile to the prosecution case, itself. Thus, there is no evident to establish that the appellant dishonestly misappropriated or converted the amounts in question to his own use or dishonestly used or disposed of it. Rather the prosecution has come with a case later on after initiation of criminal proceedings upon the impugned F.I.Rs. that the amounts in question were got deposited after a lapse of time during inqury in the month of May or April, 1976. Such a theory put by the prosecution, has been held to be improbable and false in the foregoing paras of this judgment, because no material or evidence has been led by the prosecution to show that any inquiry was conducted before lodging of the F.I.R. None of the prosecution witnesses borrowers requested the Bank that the amounts in question so deposited subsequently (as has been alleged by the prosecution lateron) were not paid by them so the same may not be accounted for their loan account whereas the Bank as well as the borrowers treated the amounts in question as of loan which were allegedly deposited subsequently, after a lapse of time, being made by the borrowers who accepted the accounts maintained by the Bank including the entries in question despite the fact that the appellant denied the said amounts to have been deposited by him or at his instance in his explanation. It is quite possible that when the Bank officers went to the borrowers so as to remind them to repay the loan amounts, they took plea of payments in order to get rid of further enquiries from them by the Bank, to the appellant. It is quite possible that when the Bank officers went to the borrowers so as to remind them to repay the loan amounts, they took plea of payments in order to get rid of further enquiries from them by the Bank, to the appellant. Probably, as soon as they came to know of further enquiries, and further proceedings against their loan accounts on account of the delayed repayment of loan instalments, they got the amounts in question of instalments of loan deposited immediately in the month of May, 1976 or April, 1976 or so, otherwise they would not subsequently have changed their earliest version given to the police by hostality to the appellant by way of presenting affidavits and by way of depositing the amounts in question subsequently, before lodging of the F.I.Rs., which have been proved on record being not done by the appellant. Rather the deposits have been proved being made by the borrowers or their persons in relations. The prosecution has to go further and show that the appellant dishonestly misappropriated or converted the amounts in question to his own use or dishonestly used or disposed of it. That, I am afraid, the prosecution has not been able to do in the present case. 15. That apart, it was for the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the alleged offence punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act. In view of the clear defence taken by the appellant that to collect the amount of instalments for repayment of loan amount was not within his competence being an Agriculture Assistant, obviously it was for the prosecution to prove that under a particular circular issued by the Bank or the Banking regulations, it was the responsibility of the appellant to collect the amounts towards repayment of loan instalments and/or he was authorised to collect the said amounts from the borrowers, and, that, in exercise of his authority to collect the amounts, as a public servant, he misused or abused his position or authority deliberately and dishonestly in violation of any law on account of whom another (borrowers) wilfully suffered. The prosecution, herein, has not produced any conclusive evidence or material to prove that the appellant had dishonestly misused or abused his position in misappropriation of the amounts. 16. The prosecution, herein, has not produced any conclusive evidence or material to prove that the appellant had dishonestly misused or abused his position in misappropriation of the amounts. 16. In fact, the prosecution having failed not only to prove the main ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 409, IPC, but also failed to prove the ingredients of any offence under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. A careful analysis of the evidence and the circumstances would therefore, show that the approach of the lower trial court was clearly wrong and that the inferences drawn by the trial court were not at all warranted by the circumstances and facts proved in the case. 17. In this view of the matter, the appeal is allowed, judgment of the lower trial court is set aside and conviction & sentence imposed on the appellant under both the counts of the Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act are hereby quashed, and he is acquitted of the charges framed against him. He is on bail and need not surrender. His bail bonds stand discharged. The record be sent back. *******