M. R. MALLICK, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is against the judgment and decree passed by the Ld. Addl. District Judge, 3rd Court, Howrah, in Title Appeal No. 251/79 affirming those of the Ld. Subordinate Judge, 2nd Court, Howrah, in Title Suit No. 20/76. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case may briefly stayed as follows : the respondents as plaintiffs brought the above title suit under section 37 A and section 38 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act for accounts and for declaration of the amount due against the present appellant. The respondents as plaintiffs alleged in the p1aint that they took loan of Rs. 1500/- from the defendant on 16. 5. 74 and another loan of Rs. 2000/- on 12. 8. 74 keeping the property being holding No. 35, Girish Ghosh Road, Howrah, as security. To keep the transaction within the ambit of law in force two sale deeds were executed on the above two dates and on those two dates two deed of agreement for reconveyance were executed by the present appellant in favour of the present respondents. The plaintiffs claimed that they had made payment towards the said loan on different instalments. But as the defendant did not agree to execute any deed of reconveyance in favour of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have brought the present suit for a declaration as regards the amount due and for passing appropriate relief to which the plaintiffs may be entitled. ( 3 ) THE defendant contested the suit contending inter alia that the properties in suit were purchased by the defendant by the two sale deeds dated 16. 5. 75 and 12. 8. 74 for a consideration of Rs. 2,500/- and Rs. 4,700/- respectively and that the deeds of agreement for reconveyance are all void and not enforceable under the law. The defendant also denied that there was any loan transaction between the parties or that any such loan was repaid. During the pendency of the suit one of the plaintiffs, namely, plaintiff No. 1 filed a petition for compromise through another Advocate with the defendants. ( 4 ) THE Ld. trial Judge on considering the evidence on record refused the record the compromise entered into between the plaintiff No. 1 and the defendants found the transaction to be a loan in substance and declared that the total amount due including interest was Rs. ( 4 ) THE Ld. trial Judge on considering the evidence on record refused the record the compromise entered into between the plaintiff No. 1 and the defendants found the transaction to be a loan in substance and declared that the total amount due including interest was Rs. 9,700/- and directed the present appellant to execute a deed of reconveyance in favour of the respondents on receiving Rs. 9,500/ -. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved, the present appellant preferred an appeal before the Ld. District Judge, Howrah, and the Id. Addl. District Judge, Howrah, affirmed the above finding of the Id. Trial Judge but he modified the judgment and decree of the trial Judge directing the present respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 9,500/- in six equal annual instalments commencing from Asar 1387 B. S. and in default of any such instalment, the defendant was given the liberty to apply for making the decree final. ( 6 ) BEING aggrieved, the defendant has moved this Court in second appeal. ( 7 ) BEFORE us the appeal has been contested by the plaintiffs-respondents. The Id. Advocate for the appellant has urged mainly four points, namely,- (I)both the courts below committed a great illegality in refusing to record the compromise between the plaintiff no. 1 and the defendant; (ii)both the courts below committed a great illegality by not considering the appellant's documents regarding the valuation of the suit property and illegally rejecting the same as not relevant; (iii)both the courts below committed a great illegality by coming to the finding that the transaction was loan in substance ; and (iv)that the direction given by the Ld. Trial Judge for execution of the deed of reconveyance was clearly outside the purview of section 38 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act and consequently, the said direction being illegal, is liable to be deleted from the judgment and decree of the court below. ( 8 ) AS regards the first point, namely, as to whether the Ld. Judge committed any illegality in refusing to record the compromise, both the courts below came to the finding that, regard being had to the nature of the suit such a compromise by one of the plaintiffs could not be recorded and that the court has a discretion either to record a compromise or not. Judge committed any illegality in refusing to record the compromise, both the courts below came to the finding that, regard being had to the nature of the suit such a compromise by one of the plaintiffs could not be recorded and that the court has a discretion either to record a compromise or not. Both the courts below relied upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1926 Cal. 193. In that case also when some of the parties to the suit entered into a compromise by filing a compromise petition, it was held that the court could refuse to grant a decree in terms of the compromise if good causes shown for not recording the compromise. The compromise that was entered into between the plaintiff no. 1 and the defendant was completely against the reliefs sought for in the suit. Such a contradictory compromise would vitally affect the other plaintiffs who brought the suit for a declaration that the transaction in question witnessed by two deeds of sale and two agreements for reconveyance was loan in substance. In order to avoid such contradictory positions of the parties-one by judicial decision of the court of law and another by compromise by some of the parties, the courts below were, in our opinion, perfectly justified in not recording such a compromise and we do not find any illegality in such refusal. Therefore, the first contention of the appellant fails. ( 9 ) ON behalf of the appellant it is submitted that in order to show as to what proper valuation of the suit property was, the appellant produced before the Id. trial Judge a sale deed of property which was just contiguous to the property in suit It is also pointed out that the sale deed Ext. A/2 by which the plaintiffs-respondents sold 2? cottahs of land with some structures thereon to one Jasoda Passi at Rs. 4750/- was a very material document for consideration of the valuation of the property, but both the courts below rejected that as not relevant for determining the valuation and both of them have taken into consideration the other evidence produced by the plaintiffs- respondents to come to the finding that the valuation given in the two sale deeds was clearly inadequate. ( 10 ) ON considering the judgments of both the courts below, we are of the view that as to what the proper valuation of the suit property is, is nothing but a finding of fact to be arrived at on considering the evidence adduced by the parties. We are of the view that whatever was the appreciation of the oral evidence and the documents produced before the Id. Trial Judge the finding of fact arrived at by appreciation of those evidence even if such appreciation was, not proper, is not assailable in Second appeal. The Supreme Court in E. Mahaboob Saheb v. N. Sabbarayan Choudhury, AIR 1982 SC 679 has clearly observed that the concurrent finding of fact is not assailable in Second appeal. The Supreme Court has also held in K. Sabbaraju v. C. Sabbaraju, AIR 1968 SC 947 , that the High Court in Second appeal is not empowered to interfere with finding of fact on the ground of its being erroneous unless there is substantial error or defect in the procedure prescribed by law which may have produced error or defect on the decision of the case upon merits. In AIR 19801 SC 1209, the Supreme Court has observed that even if the finding are grossly perverse, that by itself does not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of clear error of law. ( 11 ) IT is true that both the courts below did not accept Ext. A/2 as a proper guide for valuation of the suit property: On the contrary, the Municipal valuation as well as the valuation arrived at by them on considering the monthly rent realised from the tenants were considered by both the courts below as a proper guide for ascertaining as to what the true valuation was of the property in suit. ( 12 ) IN our view, for ascertaining the proper valuation the Id. Judge did not commit any illegality in taking the rent realised as the basis for ascertaining the market value. Even the annual valuation given by the Municipality is also another mode of considering the valuation of the property. Therefore, the valuation made by the Id. trial Judge which was affirmed by the Id. 1st Appellate Court, is, in our opinion, not at all perverse. Therefore, only because the document Ext. Even the annual valuation given by the Municipality is also another mode of considering the valuation of the property. Therefore, the valuation made by the Id. trial Judge which was affirmed by the Id. 1st Appellate Court, is, in our opinion, not at all perverse. Therefore, only because the document Ext. A/2 was discared by the courts below, we are not of the view that the finding of fact regarding the valuation of the property has to be interfered with by this Court in Second Appeal. Therefore, this contention also fails. ( 13 ) AS regards the third contention that both the courts below came to the perverse finding that the transaction in question was loan in substance, we are firmly of the view that this is also a concurrent finding of fact based on evidence. It is now clear that for the purpose of determining as to whether a transaction is loan in substance even if the sale deed and the agreement for reconveyance are not incorporated in the same deed, section 37 A clearly states that such two deeds executed on the same date are to be treated as mortgage by conditional sale if the other elements of such mortgage are present. In order to ascertain as to whether those documents created a mortgage or an out sale, there are several decisions of our High Court. The first is ILR 1956 (1) Cal. 59. The other is AIR 1985 Cal. 59 (Sk. Abdul Yaffar v. Sudhakanta ). It has been clearly held that in order to ascertain as to whether the transaction is out and out sale or a mortgage by conditional sale, several factors have to be taken into consideration. The main factors are possession the value and the intrinsic evidence of the deeds. In Swarnalata v. Chandi Charan, AIR 1984 Cal. 130 , it has been observed that the cumulative effect of all these relevant facts will determine the real character of transaction and not one or two factors considered in isolation. ( 14 ) IN this particular case it has been clearly revealed in evidence that even after the two sale deeds were executed in favour of the appellant, the plaintiffs-respondents were residing in the properties in suit and also collecting rent from the tenants. ( 14 ) IN this particular case it has been clearly revealed in evidence that even after the two sale deeds were executed in favour of the appellant, the plaintiffs-respondents were residing in the properties in suit and also collecting rent from the tenants. Even though the appellant tried to lead evidence that he also recovered rent, both the courts below rejected those evidence as not believable. Therefore, even after the two sale deeds were executed by the respondents in favour of the appellant, the plaintiffs-respondents remained in possession of the property and also were realising rent. Moreover both the courts below on considering the rent realised from the premises as well as the annual valuation of the Howrah Municipality, came to the finding that the valuation of the property was more than that shown in the two sale deeds. In view of these circumstances, the Id. trial Judge came to the finding that the transaction was loan in substance. He, therefore, considered as to that amount was really paid by the appellant by way of loan to the respondents and came to the finding that the loan was advanced was shown as consideration money in the two Kobalas. He ascertained interest @ 6% p. a. and declared the amount due to be Rs. 9,500/ -. ( 15 ) THE ld. appellate court below affirmed the said finding of the trial court but gave a further direction to the plaintiffs-respondents to pay the lid amount by six equal annual instalments. Subject to this modification, the judgment and decree of the trial court was affirmed. ( 16 ) ALL these findings were findings of fact and, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court to which we have already made reference, we are unable to disturb any of the above findings. ( 17 ) THE last question that remains to be decided is as to whether the trial court was justified in directing the present appellant to execute a deed of reconveyance on the respondents' paying an amount of Rs. 9,500/ -. The appellate court made some modification as we have stated above. ( 17 ) THE last question that remains to be decided is as to whether the trial court was justified in directing the present appellant to execute a deed of reconveyance on the respondents' paying an amount of Rs. 9,500/ -. The appellate court made some modification as we have stated above. ( 18 ) THE appellant has urged before us that this being a suit under section 38 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act, the jurisdiction of the court was limited only to making of the declaration as regards the amount due or giving direction as to make the accounting in respect of the amount due, but the court has no jurisdiction to direct the present appellant to execute and register deed of sale on the respondent paying the above amount. There is no doubt that section 38 of the Act contemplates a borrower asking an application before the appropriate court for taking accounts and for declaring the amount due to the lender. The section is, however, silent to what obligation the lender would have to discharge after the amount which has been declared to be due, is repaid to the lender. Our attention has been clearly drawn to section 36 (4) of the Act where it has been clearly drawn that section 36 shall apply to any suit, whatever its form may be such suit is substantially one for the recovery of a loan or for the enforcement of any agreement or security in respect of a loan or for the redemption, any such security. The respondents submit that the present suit must be treated as one for redemption of the mortgage security and, in that view the ld. Judge could take the provision of section 36 into account while passing the appropriate decree. He draws our attention to the provision of section 36 in which there is a clear provision that on reopening a transaction and on giving the order to the judgment-debtor to pay the decree-holder the amount due in such number of instalments as it may think, then the court under section 36 has the jurisdiction to declare the sale to be deemed to have been set aside. It is submitted that in case of mortgage for condition sale in a suit for redemption after the amount due is paid to the lender there is also obligation of the lender to execute and register a deed of conveyance in favour of the borrower on receiving the full payment. ( 19 ) WE find that the definition of a "mortgage for conditional sale" as given in section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act stipulates one of the conditions of the mortgage by conditional sale as that on payment of the amount due on the security, the lender shall execute and register a deed of conveyance. ( 20 ) IT is well-settled that the court of law has the jurisdiction to grant a party appropriate relief even if specifically asked for. The appellant submits that it being a special suit, the court cannot go beyond the provision of section 318 of the Act. We have already indicated that while deciding a suit under section 38, the provision's of section 36 can also be taken into consideration. We are also of the view that the provision of the Transfer of Property Act can also be taken into consideration by the court of law. The Supreme Court in AIR 1952 SC 47 , has held that where the facts are set out, the suit may be framed in one way but the court may grant relief not prayed for. In that decision it was found that on the facts set out by the plaintiff it was evident that he was entitled to contribution. The method of compensation was a matter of law and it was for the court to apply the law and grant appropriate relief. Therefore, the consequential order passed by the trial court and then affirmed by the appellate court below, cannot be held to be illegal and it cannot be held that the courts below did not have any jurisdiction to pass an order directing the appellant to execute and register a deed of reconveyance on receiving the amount's declared by instalments. ( 21 ) IN the result, we are unable to find that there is any illegality in the judgments of the courts below. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal. ( 21 ) IN the result, we are unable to find that there is any illegality in the judgments of the courts below. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal. But we direct that the plaintiffs-respondents shall pay the defendant-appellant the amount declared to be due by the courts below by six equal annual instalments commencing from the month of Baisakh 1398 B. S. payable by the end of Baisakh each year and if all these instalments are paid, the appellant shall execute and register the deed of reconveyance but the respondent failing to pay the instalments in terms of this order, the two sale deed's of the suit property shall stand affirmed. No order is made as to costs in this appeal. M. N. Roy, J. I agree. Appeal dismissed