Judgment :- Venkataswami, J.: The plaintiff in O.S.No.50 of 1982, on the file of the court of Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, has preferred this appeal. 2. Pending disposal of the appeal, the appellant/ plaintiff died and the second respondent (son of the deceased appellant) in the appeal has filed C.M.P.No. 10153 of 1991, claiming be the sole legal representative of the deceased appellant, and praying for transposing as the second appellant in the above appeal. After hearing learned counsel on both have ordered that petition. However, for the sake of convenience, the appellant hereafter referred to as the plaintiff and the contesting first respondent as first defendant. 3. Before going into the facts, it will be useful to narrate the relationship between parties. One Ranganathan was the son of the plaintiff (husband of the first defendant). the death of Ranganathan, the cause of action for the suit has arisen. The second (now the second appellant in this appeal) is the brother of the deceased Ranganathan. third defendant is the brother-in-law of the deceased Ranganathan. The 4th defendant tenant in respect of the second schedule property. The fifth defendant is a co house benefit society. The sixth defendant is a chit fund. 4. The plaintiff, claiming to be a Class I heir along with the first defendant, claimed is entitled to a share in the properties, both movable and immovable, left by the Ranganathan, along with the first defendant. There are eight schedules in the plaint. first defendant has mentioned in her additional written statement that the plaintiff the amount due under the insurance policy, and that was to be subjected to partition she (first defendant) must be given a half share. In addition to that, she has also pointed that one Vicky motorcycle has been retained by the plaintiff, that it must be valued must be given a half share in that. Further in the additional written statement, defendant has pointed out that a fixed deposit amount in the name of deceased Ranganatan in the Central Bank of India was also available for division. 5. Before the court below, the plaintiff examined herself as P.W.1, and the first examined herself as D.W.I. On the side of the plaintiff, Exs. A-1 to A-4 were marked, the side of the defendants, Exs.B-1 to B-5 were marked. Third party documents marked as Exs.X-1 to X-15. 6. 5. Before the court below, the plaintiff examined herself as P.W.1, and the first examined herself as D.W.I. On the side of the plaintiff, Exs. A-1 to A-4 were marked, the side of the defendants, Exs.B-1 to B-5 were marked. Third party documents marked as Exs.X-1 to X-15. 6. On the basis of the pleadings, evidence and the arguments, the, trial court decree declaring one-fourth share in plaint schedules 1 and 3 in favour of the plaintiff half share in the 7th schedule as well as in the L.I.C. premium and in the fixed pointed out in the additional written statement. In respect of other items, the dismissed. 7. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the present appeal was filed by the plaintiff the second appellant is now continuing the appeal. 8. Mr.E.Padmanabhan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, while narrating facts, though commented about the dismissal of the suit in respect of all items Schedules 1, 3, 7 and two items mentioned in the additional written statement, concentrated and attacked the decree only in respect of Schedules 2 and 4. In other words, we are upon to decide the correctness of the judgment and decree of the court below in respect Schedules 2 and 4. In these circumstances, we do not consider it necessary to elaborately the pleadings and the issue framed thereunder. 9. The second schedule relates to a house bearing Door No.1-C, Lakshmipuram, Bahadhur Nagar, Uppilipalayam village, within Singanallur Municipal limits, and fully described in the schedule. The fourth schedule relates to a sum of Rs.27,910-24 p. representing provident fund and group insurance and gratuity taken by the first defendant from Messrs.SITRA. 10. The main ground on which the claim of the plaintiff was negatived in respect of covered under Schedules 2 and 4 was that the deceased Ranganathan nominated the defendant to receive the benefits and, therefore, to that extent, the plaintiff must be to have been disinherited in respect of those items. The correctness of that conclusion challenged before us. 11. In support of his contention that notwithstanding the nomination in favour of the defendant, learned counsel submits that the plaintiff is also entitled as Class I heir to the benefits along with the first defendant as the nomination or the statutes under such nominations were made do not alter the general law of succession. 12. 11. In support of his contention that notwithstanding the nomination in favour of the defendant, learned counsel submits that the plaintiff is also entitled as Class I heir to the benefits along with the first defendant as the nomination or the statutes under such nominations were made do not alter the general law of succession. 12. So far as the house property covered by the second Schedule is concerned, Mr.E.Padmanabhan, learned counsel invited our attention to paragraph 11 of the statement of the first defendant, to claim exclusive title in her favour, and submitted such a claim cannot be sustained in law in view of the ratio laid down by the Supreme in Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi,A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 346. Paragraph 11 of the written statement reads as follows: "The deceased Ranganathan in his application dated 1.12.1973 to the 5th defendant, The Dhanalakshmipuram Rural Co-operative House Benefit Society Limited Reg. No.K.1584 had clearly mentioned that the property should go to this defendant after his life time. Society only accepts membership and such membership is transferable only with permission of the society. A member can nominate any person to succeed to his interest. the death of a member the interest of the deceased member under the society shall be with in accordance with Sec.24 of Act.53 of 1961. Every member of the society nominate any person to succeed to his share of interest in the society in the event death and such nomination shall be given effect to by the committee in the event death. The nomination in this case has been done specifically in accordance with the law as per the procedure described under the said Act. The nomination has also been registered under the rules of the society. The society shall transfer the interest of the deceased the bye-laws of the society. While so, the said nomination has to be treated as a will rights of this defendant have to be worked out accordingly. The plaintiff is not entitled claim any share in schedule 2 of the property. Moreover, a suit in respect of this property barred by Act 53 of 1961. This Hon’ble Court, has, therefore, no jurisdiction to try the claim for mesne profit is neither just nor proper. The plaintiff is not entitled claim any share in schedule 2 of the property. Moreover, a suit in respect of this property barred by Act 53 of 1961. This Hon’ble Court, has, therefore, no jurisdiction to try the claim for mesne profit is neither just nor proper. The plaintiff who claims to occupation of a portion is certainly not entitled to claim mesne profits especially after filed a speculative suit under Sec37(2) of the Court-Fees Act. The suit, is therefore, liable be dismissed. 13. As regards the moneys representing provident fund, group Insurance and gratuity, described in schedule 4 of the plaint, the argument of the learned counsel for the was that applying the same ratio of the Supreme Court in Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, 1984 S.C. 346, the mother is entitled to share the moneys along with the first notwithstanding the nomination in favour of the first defendant. In addition to the of the Supreme Court as mentioned above, Mr.E.Padmanabhan also placed reliance Division Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Shaik Dawood v. Mohamooda Begum, A.l.R. 1985 A.P. 321, and another judgment of this Court in Meenambal Sornathammal, (1990)1 L. W. 302. He also submitted that the Division Bench judgment the Calcutta High Court in Usha v. Smriti, A.I.R. 1988 Cal. 115, does not lay correct law. Learned counsel also relied on a decision of this Court in Krishnamoorthy Anandalakshmi, (1980)2 M.L.J. 321. 14. Mr.K.Govindarajan, learned counsel appearing for the first defendant (1st herein), contending contra, submitted that the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court case reported in Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, A.l.R. 1984S.C. 346, will have no either to the second schedule house property or to Schedule 4 moneys. According counsel, the nomination prevails and disinherits the plaintiff from claiming any share in the properties described in these Schedules. In any event, according learned counsel, in the light of specific provisions in the Employees Provident Funds the Employees Provident Funds Scheme, in particular paragraphs 61 and 70 of the there is no difficulty to come to a conclusion that there is an express provision providing line of succession to the estate of the deceased different from the Hindu Succession therefore, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court will have no application. In support his submission, he placed reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of the Calcutta High reported in Usha v. Smriti, A.I.R. 1988 Cal. 125, another judgment of the Punjab Haryana High Court in Saroj v. Murti Devi, A.I.R. 1991 P. and H. 183 and yet judgment in Malathi v. Dharma Rao, A.I.R. 1968 Orissa 8. 15. Let us now consider the rival submissions. 16. Before proceeding further, it will be useful to set out the relevant provisions, appreciating the contentions as well as the ratios laid down in the various judgments the learned counsel on both sides. 17. Sec.24 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 reads as follows: "24(1). Subject to the provisions of Sec.34, on the death of a member of a registered society, the society shall transfer the share or interest of the deceased member in the to the person nominated in accordance with the rules, or, if no person has been nominated, to such person as may appear to the committee to be the heir or representative of the deceased member; Provided that such nominee, heir or legal representative, as the case may be, being for admission, is admitted as a member of the society; Provided further that nothing in this sub-section shall prevent a minor or a person unsound mind from acquitting by inheritance or otherwise the share or interest of deceased member in the capital of the society. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec.(1) and subject in such conditions as may be specified in the rules, a registered society may of its own motion and shall, if so required by any such nominee, heir, or legal representative, as the same may be, pay to him value of the share or interest of the deceased member in the capital ascertained accordance with the rules. (3) A registered society may pay all other moneys due to the deceased member from society to such nominee, heir or legal representative, as the case may be. (4) All transfers and payments made by a registered society in accordance with provisions of this section shall be valid and effectual against any demand made upon society by any other person." 18. As the Supreme Court considered the question under the Insurance Act, the relevant section, namely, Sec.39 of the Insurance Act is set out below: "39. (4) All transfers and payments made by a registered society in accordance with provisions of this section shall be valid and effectual against any demand made upon society by any other person." 18. As the Supreme Court considered the question under the Insurance Act, the relevant section, namely, Sec.39 of the Insurance Act is set out below: "39. Nomination by policy-holder: (1) The holder of a policy of life insurance on his own may, when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment, nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid the event of his death: Provided that where any nominee is a minor; it shall be lawful for the policy appoint in the prescribed manner any person to receive the money secured by the policy the event of his death during the minority of the nominee. (2) Any such nomination in order to be effectual shall unless it is incorporated in the text the policy itself, be made by an endorsement on the policy communicated to the insurer and registered by him in the records relating to the policy and any such nomination may at any time before the policy matures for payment be cancelled or changed by an endorsement, a further endorsement or a will, as the case may be, but unless notice in writing of any such cancellation or change has been delivered to the insurer, the insurer shall not be liable any payment under the policy made bona fide by him to a nominee mentioned in the text the policy or registered in records of the insurer. (3) The insurer shall furnish to the policyholder a written acknowledgment of having registered a nomination or a cancellation or change thereof, and may charge a fee exceeding one rupee for registering such cancellation or change. (4) A transfer or assignment of a policy made in accordance with Sec.38 shall automatically cancel a nomination; Provided that the assignment of a policy to the insurer who bears the risk on the policy time of assignment, in consideration of a loan granted by that insurer on the security policy within its surrender value, or its reassignment on repayment on the loan shall cancel a nomination, but shall affect the rights of the nominee only to the extent insurer’s interest in the policy. (5) Where the policy matures for payment during the lifetime of the person whose insured or where the nominee or, if there are more nominees than one, all the nominees before the policy natures for payment, the amount secured by the policy shall be payable the policy-holder or his heirs or legal representatives or the holder of a succession certificate, as the case may be. (6) where the nominee or if there are more nominees than one, a nominee or nominees survive the person whose life is insured, the amount secured by the policy shall be to such survivor or survivors. (7) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any policy of life insurance to which of the Married Women’s Property Act, 1874 applies or has at any time applied: Provided where a nomination made whether before or after the commencement of the Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1946, in favour of the person who has insured his life or of his wife children or any of them is expressed, whether, or not on the face of the policy, as made under this section, the said Sec.6 shall be deemed not to apply or not to have to the policy.” 19. As we are concerned with the provisions of the Employees Provident Funds Act Scheme framed thereunder, the relevant provisions of the said Act and Scheme are below: “5. Employee’s Provident Fund Schemes: (1) The Central Provident may, by notification the Official Gazette, frame a Scheme to be called the Employees ’ Provident Fund Scheme the establishment of Provident Funds under this Act for employees or for any employees and specify the establishments or class of establishments to which the Scheme shall apply and there shall be establishment, as soon as may be after the framing the Scheme, a Fund in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Scheme. (1-A) omitted. (1-B) subject to the provisions of this Act, a scheme framed under sub-sec(1) may for all or any of the matters specified in Schedule II.” Item 10 of Schedule II, which is relevant for our purpose, reads as follows: ” The nomination of a person to receive the amount standing to the credit of a member his death and the cancellation or variation of such nomination. “ Paragraphs 33, 61 and 70 of the Employees Provident Funds Scheme read as follows: ” 33. “ Paragraphs 33, 61 and 70 of the Employees Provident Funds Scheme read as follows: ” 33. Declaration by persons already employed at the time of the institution of the Every person who is required or entitled to become a member of the Fund shall be forthwith by his employer to furnish and shall, on such demand, furnish to him, communication to the Commissioner, particulars concerning himself, and his required for the Declaration Form in Form 2. Such employer shall enter the particulars Declaration Form and obtain the signature or thumb-impression of the person concerned. 61. Nomination: (1) Each member shall make in his declaration in Form 2, a nomination conferring the right to receive the amount that may stand to his credit in the fund in event of his death before the amount standing to his credit has become payable, or where the amount has become payable before payment has been made. (2) A member may in his nomination distribute the amount that may stand to his credit the Fund amongst his nominees at his own discretion. (3) If a member has a family at the time of making a nomination, the nomination shall favour of one or more persons belonging to his family. Any nomination made by member in favour of a person not belonging to his family shall be invalid. (4) If at the time of making a nomination the member has no family, the nomination may in favour of any person or persons but if the member subsequently acquires a family, nomination shall forthwith be deemed to be invalid and the member shall make a fresh nomination in favour of one or more persons belonging to his family. (4-A) Where the nomination is wholly or partly in favour of a minor, the member may, the purposes of this Scheme, appoint a major person of his family, as defined in clause of paragraph 2, to be the guardian of the minor nominee in the event of the member predeceasing the nominee and the guardian so appointed; Provided that where there major person in the family, the member may, at his discretion, appoint any other person be a guardian of the minor nominee. (5) A nomination made under sub-paragraph (1) may at any time be modified by a after giving a written notice of his intention of doing so in Form 8 annexed thereto nominee predeceases the member, the interest of the nominee shall revert to the member who may make a fresh nomination in respect of such interest. (6) A nomination or its modification shall take effect to the extent that it is valid on the on which it is received by the Commissioner. 70. Accumulations of a deceased member to whom payable: On the death of a member before the amount standing to his credit has become payable or where the amount become payable before payment has been made- (i) if a nomination made by the member in accordance with paragraph 61 subsists, amount standing to his credit in the Fund or that part thereof to which the nomination relates, shall become payable to his nominee or nominees in accordance with nomination; or (ii) if nomination subsists or if the nomination relates only to a part of the amount standing to his credit in the Fund, the whole amount or the part thereof to which the nomination not relate, as the case may be, shall become payable to the members of his family in shares; Provided that no share shall be payable to- (a) sons who have attained majority; (b) sons of a deceased son who have attained majority; (c) married daughters whose husbands are alive; (d) married daughters of a deceased son whose husbands are alive; If there is any member of the family other than those specified in clauses (a), (b), (c) (d); Provided further that the widow or widows, and the child or children of a deceased shall receive between them in equal parts only the share which that son would have received if he had survived the member and has not attained the age of majority at the time member’s death. (iii) In any case, to which the provisions of clauses (i) and (ii) do not apply the whole amount shall be payable to the person legally entitled to it. Explanation: For the purpose of this paragraph a member’s posthumous child, if born shall be treated in the same way as a surviving child born before the mother’s death. 20. (iii) In any case, to which the provisions of clauses (i) and (ii) do not apply the whole amount shall be payable to the person legally entitled to it. Explanation: For the purpose of this paragraph a member’s posthumous child, if born shall be treated in the same way as a surviving child born before the mother’s death. 20. The first defendant claimed exclusive right to the second schedule house property basis of the statement by the deceased in the loan application, which, according to her, nomination in her favour. The plaintiff disputes there is any such nomination. We already pointed out that the trial court proceeded as if there was a valid nomination in of the first defendant in so far as the second schedule property is concerned. We do not that the lower court is correct in proceeding on the basis that there was a nomination favour of the first defendant in respect of the second schedule property. Assuming that is a nomination, let us see that is the position-in law. The question is, whether nomination enables the first defendant to take the second schedule house property absolutely or the plaintiff, as Class 1 heir, is entitled to claim a share therein. In this context, the ratios laid down by this Court and the Supreme Court, on the scope of nomination useful to answer the point. 21. Sathiadev, J., as he then was, in Krishnamoorthy v. Tmt.Anandalakshmi, (1980)2 321, while considering a case arising out of Life Insurance Corporation’s Provident observed as follows: "Most of the decisions above referred to arise under the Provident Fund Act and even subsequent to amendments it has been held that the nominee does not acquire absolute interest in the funds. 21. Sathiadev, J., as he then was, in Krishnamoorthy v. Tmt.Anandalakshmi, (1980)2 321, while considering a case arising out of Life Insurance Corporation’s Provident observed as follows: "Most of the decisions above referred to arise under the Provident Fund Act and even subsequent to amendments it has been held that the nominee does not acquire absolute interest in the funds. The provision for nomination is made for the benefit of discharging liability of the custodian of the fund, which aspect I have dealt with at length in the part of this judgment, and unless a specific provision is made in the relevant Act or even in the nomination a direction of bequeathing the amount is given to the effect that except the nominee, none of the legal heirs would acquire rights and such direction is not varied later on, the right of a nominee cannot anything more than being the sole person entitled to draw out the amount and he would doing so in the capacity of a trustee of the funds answer-able to the claims of the lawful heirs of the deceased member. The use of the word ‘nomination’ which means only appointments to receive the amount, cannot be construed as to confer any absolute right in the funds the exclusion of the rights of the lawful heirs, because even a stranger may be nominated whom the nominator may have trust. If the intendment is to make the nominee as absolute owner there can be no difficulty in incorporating the necessary recitals to the effect that he has got, on the date of nomination, his legal heirs and inspite of it, he bequeaths amount only to the nominee to lake the funds to the exclusion of the other heirs. When such an unequivocal expression is not present in a nomination, it would not be proper to hold such a nomination would result in absolute conferment of rights on the nominee to take amount for himself." 22. While concurring with the above observations, Srinivasan, J. in the decision reported Meenambal v. Sornathammal, (1990)1 L.W. 302 , further observed as follows: "I am entirely in agreement with those observations of the learned Judge. In fact, principle laid down by the learned Judge has been accepted by the Supreme Court in a case which arose under the Insurance Act in Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 346. In fact, principle laid down by the learned Judge has been accepted by the Supreme Court in a case which arose under the Insurance Act in Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 346. While dealing with a nomination made under Sec.39 of the Insurance Act, the Supreme Court held that the nomination does not have the effect of conferring on the nomine any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. It is down that the amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them. Incidentally, the Supreme Court approved of distinction made by Ismail, J. in M.B.Mundkur v. Life Insurance Corporation, nomination under Sec.39 and a nomination under Sec.44 of the Insurance Act. In fact, Supreme Court has quoted a passage from the decision of Ismail, J., with approval. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court holding that a nomination does not give any right to nominee, to the beneficial interest in the amount paid to the nominee, it is not necessary discuss that aspect of the matter any further. The effect of nomination has been conclusively decided by the judgment of the Supreme Court." 23. In the decision reported in Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 346, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "We are of the view that the language of Sec.39 of the Act is not capable of altering course of succession under law...............The High Court equated a nominee to the heirs legatees of the assured and proceeded to hold that the nominee succeeded to the estate all ‘ plus and minus points’. We find it difficult to treat a nominee as being equivalent to a or legatee having regard to the clear provisions of Sec.38 of the Act......The nomination indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them." 24. Let us first take the issue relating to the second schedule house property. The amount, however, can claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them." 24. Let us first take the issue relating to the second schedule house property. The document on which heavy reliance was placed on behalf of the first defendant which found favour with the trial court is Ex.B-1. Ex.B-1 is a copy of loan application dated 1.12.1973. Under Ex.B-1., it is claimed that the deceased Ranganathan applied to the 5th respondent society for a loan of Rs.10,000 for constructing a house. Actually, the signature of deceased Ranganathan does not find a place anywhere in the copy marked as Ex.B seen from Ex.B-1. that the site was purchased for a sum of Rs.2,000 under a registered document dated 29.1.1972 and the deceased was the sole owner and the loan applied for constructing a new house. In one of the columns in the application which requires information regarding the ownership of the property and the future right, the deceased has stated that the property that time belonged 10 him, and in future to his wife. In Tamil, the exact words are: Based on this alone and invoking Sec.24 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies contention was advanced before the trial court to the effect the above answer amounts ‘will’ bequeathing schedule 2 house property in favour of the first defendant. This argument was accepted by the court below and the plaintiffs suit was dismissed in respect of this First of all, it is not clear whether there is any nomination apart from the above statement the loan application. The conclusion of the trial court that the above extracted statement the deceased will amount to a ‘will’ is totally unsustainable as the requirements of a are not only not present, but also the necessary proof for establishing that, is totally Presumably, to get over this, the counsel for the first defendant must have invoked of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. We have already set out Sec.24 of the and a fair reading of the same definitely will not lead to a construction of that section altered the course of succession under personal law. Nomination, if any, under Sec.24 said Act was to protect the interests of the Society against payments and transfers in of the nomination is clear from sub-sec.(4) of Sec.24 of the said Act. Nomination, if any, under Sec.24 said Act was to protect the interests of the Society against payments and transfers in of the nomination is clear from sub-sec.(4) of Sec.24 of the said Act. Likewise, sub of Sec.24 also indicates that Sec.24 was not intended to alter the course of succession personal law. 25. In the aforesaid circumstances and also bearing in mind the principles of various set out above, if we approach the question, we do not find any difficulty in coming conclusion that the nomination, if any, by the deceased Ranganathan in respect second schedule house property in favour of the first defendant will not amount testament excluding the mother from claiming a share in the property. Therefore, that the court below was not right in dismissing the suit in respect of the second schedule house property. Consequently, we hold that the plaintiff is entitled to a half share second schedule house property. 26. The only other question that remains to be considered is, with reference to the Fund and Group Insurance amounts as described in the Fourth Schedule. As it is, there two conflicting views of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Calcutta High Court. 27. In Shaik Basheed v. Mahmooda Begum, A.I.R. 1986 A.P. 321, a Division Bench Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken a definite stand that the ratio laid down Supreme Court in Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, A.l.R. 1984 S.C. 346, squarely applies “”Provident Fund amounts. On the other hand, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Usha v. Smriti, A.I.R. 1988 Cal. 115, has taken a view that a nominee under the Fund Act is completely different from his counterpart under the Insurance Act therefore, a nominee alone is exclusively entitled to the amount to the exclusion heirs. 28. We have already extracted the relevant passage from the Supreme Court judgment Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 346. One more passage which is also may now be noted. It occurs in paragraph 12 of the judgment. The relevant portion follows: “ We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Sec.39 Act and hold that a mere nomination made under Sec.39 of the Act does not have the of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under insurance policy on the death of the assured. The relevant portion follows: “ We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Sec.39 Act and hold that a mere nomination made under Sec.39 of the Act does not have the of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be assured accordance with the law of succession governing them.” 29. Inasmuch as the counsel appearing for the plaintiff (appellant) and the first defendant placed heavy reliance to substantiate their respective stand on the Division Bench judgments of Andhra Pradesh High Court and Calcutta High Court respectively, let us look into decisions and find out the reasons which impelled the learned Judges to take their respective views which are diametrically opposite. Let us first take the Division Bench judgment Andhra Pradesh High Court Shaik Basheed v. Mahmoodo Begum, A.I.R. 1985 A.P. 321, which is earlier in point of time. learned Judges have given the reasons in paragraph 12 of the judgment which follows: "The more important question is, whether succession to this asset, stands to be governed the Mohammedan Law of Inheritance, whether there was a nomination or no nomination. The answer depends on the real intendment of the special provisions made in the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952 or the Employees Provident Fund Scheme, 1952; and the to be given to the word ‘ payable ’ which occurs balances, in the Provident Fund, represent the majority of cases, the life savings of an employee. If there is a valid nomination, becomes payable in equal shares, amongst the various members, who fall in the ‘family’ as defined in the Scheme. Does the nominee in the one case of the member family in the other case acquire an exclusive right to appropriate the amount paid to an asset belonging to him? In our view, the word ‘payable’ cannot be interpreted that the payee gets an absolute right over such amounts to the exclusion of the other to the estate of the deceased. To illustrate, ‘A’ nominated his second wife and then he left a provident fund asset of Rs.1lakh and some children by his two wives. In our view, the word ‘payable’ cannot be interpreted that the payee gets an absolute right over such amounts to the exclusion of the other to the estate of the deceased. To illustrate, ‘A’ nominated his second wife and then he left a provident fund asset of Rs.1lakh and some children by his two wives. Surely wife cannot claim to be entitled to the entire amount to the exclusion of A’s children. same principles ought to govern amounts paid to persons in a case of ‘no nomination persons cannot be put on a higher footing than a ‘nominee’. We are of the definite view in respect of provident fund amounts, the same principles as were laid down by the Supreme Court in Sarbati’s Devi’s case, A.I.R. 1984S.C. 346, should be applied." Thereafter, after pointing out the amendment made to the Provident Fund Act, 1925 year 1946 by deleting the word ‘absolutely’ occurring in Sec.5, and after noticing conflicting decisions of other High Courts, ultimately, the learned Judges summed up views as follows: "To sum up, our conclusions are: (1) The nominee of a provident fund has only the exclusive right to receive the fund. rights are the same as that of a nominee under Sec.39 of the Insurance Act. (2) The provident fund remains the property of the deceased subscriber and is available distribution amongst his heirs in accordance with their personal law. The Supreme decision in Sarbati’s Devi’s case, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 346, governs nominations made, respect of provident funds as well." 30. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court did not agree with the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In Usha v. Smriti, A.I.R. 1988 Cal. 115, the learned Judges were of the view nomination under the Provident Fund Act differed substantially from a nomination under Insurance Act. To sustain this view, reliance was placed on Sec. 10(2) of the Employee Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. In Usha v. Smriti, A.I.R. 1988 Cal. 115, the learned Judges were of the view nomination under the Provident Fund Act differed substantially from a nomination under Insurance Act. To sustain this view, reliance was placed on Sec. 10(2) of the Employee Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. Sec.10(2) of the said Act reads follows: "Any amount standing to the credit of a member in the fund or of an exempted employee a provident fund at the time of his death and payable to his nominee under the scheme the rules of the provident fund shall subject to any deduction authorised by the said or rules, vest in the nominee and shall be free from any debt or other liability incurred the deceased or the nominee before the death of the member or of the exempted employee." We find the views of the learned Judges in paragraphs 13 to 16 of the judgment which as follows: "Having given our anxious consideration to the various provisions of the provident fund and the Scheme we are of the opinion that the status of a nominee under the Provident Fund. Act is completely different from his counterpart under the Insurance Act. The and striking difference about the status of the nominee under the two Acts is discernible from Sec.10(2) of the Provident Fund Act quoted earlier which expressly provides that the amount standing to the credit of a member of the Fund at the time of his shall vest in the nominee and it shall be free from any debt or liability incurred deceased or the nominee before the death of the member. From Sec.10(2) it is abundantly clear that immediately upon the death of the member the Provident Fund money becomes part of the asset of the nominee whereas under the Insurance Act after the death assured the money continues to be his asset; and the money which was standing to the credit of the member becomes free even from the debt of liability incurred the nominee before the death of the member. Only because the money vested thereby became the property of the nominee after the death of the member such a provision was required to be incorporated as, otherwise to be attached for debts or liabilities by him prior to the death of the member. Only because the money vested thereby became the property of the nominee after the death of the member such a provision was required to be incorporated as, otherwise to be attached for debts or liabilities by him prior to the death of the member. That the nominee under the Provident Fund unlike the nominee under the Insurance Act, gets a right to the money also has been clear by the provisions of paras 61 and 70 of the Scheme quoted earlier. It is of course true that para 70 is prefixed with the heading "accumulation of a deceased member to whom payable" (emphasis supplied) and relying upon the same in the Pradesh High Court Shaik Basheed v. Mahmooda Begum, A.I.R. 1985 A.P. 321, principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, 1984 S.C. 346, would be equally applicable under the Provident Fund Act but we regret inability to agree with the views so expressed for reasons as follows: Headings or prefixed to a section cannot restrict the meaning of the section itself if its language and as our discussion will presently show, the language of para 70 is manifest. But however we proceed to analyse para 70 let us examine para 61 of the Scheme. Under para if a member, who had no family of his own, makes an outsider his nominee, nomination will automatically fail if he substantially acquires a family and he will make a fresh nomination in favour of one or more persons belonging to his family. It pertinent to point out that under Sec.39 of the Insurance Act there is no such mandate; under Sec.38 thereof a life insurance policy cannot be assigned or transferred. Para envisages that a member may in his nomination distribute (emphasis supplied), the that may stand to his credit in the funds amongst his nominees in his own discretion sub-para (5) there of says that if one of the nominees predeceases the member the (emphasis supplied) of that nominee shall revert to the member who may make nomination in respect of such interest. The word "distribute" means divide, apportion, dispense and therefore when the member has been empowered "to distribute the amongst his nominees at his discretion" it certainly means that thereby he would be the amount to them. The word "distribute" means divide, apportion, dispense and therefore when the member has been empowered "to distribute the amongst his nominees at his discretion" it certainly means that thereby he would be the amount to them. A concept of distribution as envisaged in para 61(2) of the cannot by any stretch of imagination mean that the member was distributing the receive the money amongst his nominees. That by such distribution the nominee ownership to the money has again been made explicitly clear by the word "interest" appearing in sub-para (5). The word interest" obviously means the right to the money accrued in favour of the nominee consequent upon its distribution by the member. course true that the member may modify his nomination a nominee’s interest but ultimately the nominee, whoever he may he, acquires an interest in the money. Coming now to para 70 of the scheme we get that sub-para (ii) thereof expressly says the money shall become payable to the members of the family, in cases provided therein, "equal shares" and proviso thereto expressly lays down that no share shall be payable sons of the deceased members who have attained majority or daughters who have husbands living. The major sons and married daughters whose husbands are alive have expressly excluded from receiving any share obviously because they are expected capable of maintaining themselves. If really para 70 only referred to right of the nominees mentioned therein to receive the money, and not to have any beneficial interest money, there was no necessity of expressly providing therein that it should not be the persons who are capable of maintaining themselves nor it would have provided that money would be payable in equal shares. In other words, if really the para intended to that the nominees were to receive the money only and not to have any beneficial therein the minors would not have been preferred to collect the same instead of majors would be in a better position to receive the money and to pay the same to the beneficiaries. In other words, if really the para intended to that the nominees were to receive the money only and not to have any beneficial therein the minors would not have been preferred to collect the same instead of majors would be in a better position to receive the money and to pay the same to the beneficiaries. On the contrary, para 70 has taken care of the minor heirs of the deceased member providing that the money would be paid to and received by them so that being unable to maintain themselves, they can gainfully utilise the money para 70(iii) provides that in case the provisions of the paragraph arc not applicable the amount shall be paid to persons legally entitled (emphasis supplied) to it. Entitlement property obviously means a right to the property and consequently the fact that the money would be payable to such person means that he will be entitled to appropriate the money. For the foregoing discussions we therefore find no hesitation in concluding that the nominee under the Provident Fund Act, unlike the nominee under the Insurance Act, has not only right to receive the money but also a beneficial interest therein. The contention of Mr.Roy Chowdhury that under item 10 of Schedule II of the Provident fund Act, the Central Government could not make any provision for bestowal of any right to the money under Scheme cannot be entertained having regard to the fact that the said item speaks nomination of a person to receive the amount; and the word “receive” does not militate against the concept of acceptance of money as owner in respect thereof. “[paragraphs 16] 31. After carefully going through these two Division Bench judgments, and also judgments of Sathiadev, J. (as he then was) and Srinivasan, J. (referred to above), in light of the views expressed by the Supreme Court in Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, A.I.R. S.C. 346, with due respect, we are unable to agree with the views expressed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Usha v. Smriti, A.I.R. 1988 Cal. 115. Our reasons these: “Sec.5 of the Employees’ Provident Fund Act enables the Central Government to frame Scheme. Sec.5(1-B) of the said Act specifically states that a scheme framed under sub (1) of Sec.5 may provide for all or any of the matters specified in Schedule II. 115. Our reasons these: “Sec.5 of the Employees’ Provident Fund Act enables the Central Government to frame Scheme. Sec.5(1-B) of the said Act specifically states that a scheme framed under sub (1) of Sec.5 may provide for all or any of the matters specified in Schedule II. Coming Schedule II, item 10 which alone is necessary for our purpose, reads as follows: “The nomination of a person to receive the amount standing to the credit of a member his death and the cancellation or variation of such nomination.” (Emphasis supplied) It is to be noted that Schedule II is part of the main Act. Therefore, when the substantive legislation enables the Central Government to frame a Scheme in respect of matters nomination, it must conform to Item 10 of Schedule II of the Act. If there is any conflict between the Scheme and the Act, the Scheme must be read subject to the main provisions. Thus, on a reading of paragraphs 61 and 70 of the Scheme, (already extracted), we feel though it is possible to read paragraphs 61 and 70 and also Form-2, on which reliance placed by the learned counsel for the first defendant, to mean that they provide a different line of succession, such meaning cannot be given if due regard is given to the provision, namely, item 10 of Schedule II under which alone the Central Government framed the Scheme regarding nomination of person to receive the amount. Unless the main section clearly unequivocally prescribes a different line of succession, it cannot be presumed that different line of succession is prescribed by reading paragraphs 61 and 70 of the Scheme alone. No doubt, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court (referred to supra) has referred to Sec.10(2) of the Act which we have extracted above to support its view. Here again, we are unable to subscribe to the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court, on the scope of Sec.10(2) of the Act. There is nothing to suggest that a different mode succession is prescribed even under Sec. 10(2) of the Act. Here again, we are unable to subscribe to the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court, on the scope of Sec.10(2) of the Act. There is nothing to suggest that a different mode succession is prescribed even under Sec. 10(2) of the Act. On the other hand, we are inclined to think that Sec. 10(2) of the Act was intended to save the provident fund money from the clutches of debtors of the nominee so as to enable him to distribute it to the heirs of the deceased, who are entitled to the money under the personal law. 32. In this context, it is relevant to recall to our mind the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 346, about the scope of nomination. The Supreme Court has categorically held that the nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount. The same view was expressed by Sathiadev, J. (as then was) even before the judgment of the Supreme Court, and also by Srinivasan, J. after the judgment of the Supreme Court. Therefore, we are inclined to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court for additional reason given by based on Sec.5(l-B) of the Act read with item 10 of Schedule II. In other words, we read down paragraphs 61 and 70 of the Scheme to be in conformity with item 10 of Schedule II, with Sec.5 of the Act, and by so reading, the nominee gets only a right to receive amount to distribute the same to the heirs of the deceased, in accordance with the succession governing them. In the view we have expressed above the plaintiff is entitled half share in schedule 4 monies as well. To that extent, the plaintiff is entitled to a Consequently, the judgment and decree of the trial court have to be modified. 33. In the result, the appeal is allowed only in respect of schedule 2 house property schedule 4 moneys declaring plaintiffs half share in these two schedules. However, there be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.