JUDGMENT - PATEL H.D., J.:—By this petition M/s. Khandelwal Tubes, which is a division of M/s. Khandelwal Ferro Alloys Limited, seeks to impugn the letters of demand dated 21-2-1980 (Annexure-A) and dated 3-3-1980 (Annexure-B) as well as the orders dated 11-8-1983 and 4-4-1984 passed respectively by the respondent No. 2 Panchayat Samiti, Parseoni, and the respondent No. 3 Standing Committee, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur. By the letters of demand, which are impugned in this petition, the respondent No. 1 levied octroi tax on mild steel strips also called skelp at the time of importing such goods within the territory of octroi limits under Schedule framed under Rule 22 of the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Taxes and Fees Rules, 1960. 2. The facts in brief are that the petitioner manufactures steel tubes in their plant at Kanhan within the jurisdiction of the Village Panchayat, Kanhan- Pipri. The tubes are rolled out of mild steel strips/skelp and then galvanised if so required by the customers or as per the demand in market. The tubes are also then despatched to the various sales outlets outside the territorial limits of the Gram Panchayat, Kanhan-Pipri. The raw material required for manufacturing tubes is the mild steel strips/ skelp which are available in huge rolls and are purchased by the petitioner directly from the plants who manufacture them through the Steel Authority of India. One such consignment of mild steel strips/ skelp consisting of 18 railway receipts was received, at its railway siding at Kanhan Railway Station in the month of January, 1980. According to the petitioner, no octroi was payable by them on the aforesaid consignment. However, a letter dated 21-2-1980 was received by the petitioner from the respondent No. 1 Gram Panchayat demanding the octroi on the consignment without specifying the amount or even the time within which the payment was to be made. Subsequent to this letter, another demand letter dated 3-3-1980 soon followed, wherein the demand for payment of octroi was reiterated calling upon the petitioner to pay the amount within 24 hours, but again without specifying the amount. Subsequent to this letter, another demand letter dated 3-3-1980 soon followed, wherein the demand for payment of octroi was reiterated calling upon the petitioner to pay the amount within 24 hours, but again without specifying the amount. Since the petitioner felt that the demand for octroi tax was contrary to the provisions of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Taxes and Fees Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”) an appeal came to be preferred to the respondent No. 2 Panchayat Samiti under sub-section (5) of section 124 of the Act impugning the demand letters. By a cryptic order dated 31-8-1983 the appeal came to be rejected. According to the order, the items on which the respondent No.1 Village Panchayat demanded the tax were said to be covered by item 19 being goods manufactured from steel. The petitioner had no option, but to file a second appeal before the third respondent Standing Committee of Zilla Parishad, Nagpur. The said respondent in its meeting, held on 4-4-1984 passed a resolution dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner. This order of dismissal was communicated to the petitioner by the Chief Executive Officer of Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, by his letter dated 30-4-1984. It appears that the third respondent solely relied on the legal advice obtained from their Counsel in coming to the conclusion that the steel strips/ skelp were covered under the term “Hardware” under Item 19 of Schedule I of the Rules. The two letters by which the respondent No. 1 sought to impose the octroi as well as the orders passed by the second and third respondents confirming the imposition and collection of octroi are impugned in this petition. 3. There is no manner of doubt that the respondents levied octroi on steel strips/skelp as an item of “Hardware” covered under Item 19 in Schedule of the Rules, which reads as “Cutlery and Hardware”. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the respondents have completely misconstrued Item 19 in Schedule I of the Rules inasmuch as steel strips/skelp purchased by them as raw material for manufacturing steel tubes could never be classified as “hardware” as contemplated by the item. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the respondents have completely misconstrued Item 19 in Schedule I of the Rules inasmuch as steel strips/skelp purchased by them as raw material for manufacturing steel tubes could never be classified as “hardware” as contemplated by the item. It was also urged that the respondents should have interpreted the expression “Cutlery and hardware” as is normally understood by the people dealing in that trade or business, without isolating one from the other. The only question which falls for consideration is, whether the steel strips/skelp were at all taxable as covered under Item 19 in Schedule of the Rules and if not, whether recovery of octroi tax made on these goods is illegal? 4. It is well settled by now that where a definition of the word is not given in a fiscal statute, it must be construed in its popular sense if it is a word regularly used in trade or commerce. Popular sense would mean that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. This is clear from the two decisions of the Supreme Court in (Commissioner of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh v. M/s. Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad)1, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 168 and (Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India)2, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 597. 5. In order to determine whether steel strips/skelp would be covered by the expression “Cutlery and hardware” it would be appropriate first to deal with various citations relied upon on behalf of the petitioner to contend that the articles imported by the petitioner are not covered by the expression. To begin with reliance was placed upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in (Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. Aftab Hussain Imdad Hussain)3, 1970(25) S.T.C. 471 . The question which fell for consideration was, whether steel trunks could be described as “hardware” within the meaning of expression “mill-stores and hardware” mentioned in Item 7 of the relevant notification. The Court expressed the view that it could not. In coming to this conclusion the Court relied on materials indicating how the expression' 'hardware” was understood in the commercial world. It observed that every article made of iron or of other base metal could not be regarded as an article of “hardware”. The Court expressed the view that it could not. In coming to this conclusion the Court relied on materials indicating how the expression' 'hardware” was understood in the commercial world. It observed that every article made of iron or of other base metal could not be regarded as an article of “hardware”. In popular sense the expression would comprise small articles of base metal such as iron, copper, aluminium and their alloys like brass etc. The trade journals and catalogues of hardware items on which the parties in that case had relied, indicated that “hardware and mill-stores” were allied trades, that mill-stores comprised of items like small tool and spare-parts of machinery and that the hardware trade itself ordinarily refers to small items of base metal, particularly building materials like nuts, bolts, hinges, rivets, latches, curtain railings, window grills etc. 6. In another case of (Fine Trading Corporation v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh)4, 1970(25) S.T.C 474 the question which arose was whether kitchen-knives and penknives could be described as “hardware”; In holding that it could not the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that one cannot overlook that the entry which fell for interpretation does not refer to “hardware” alone. It relates to “mill-stores and hardware”. It also observed that a distinct category is contemplated by the expression. It further opined that the various items mentioned in the entry must be understood in the sense implied from the membership of that category. “mill-stores and hardware” have been deliberately set down as comprising between themselves a single category and, therefore, while determining what “hardware” as used in the entry means it must be read as a single entry to ascertain as to what was intended to be covered within that category. To put it differently the word “hardware” takes its colour from the word “mill-stores” restricts its meaning because of the accompanying words. It is also observed in that case that if the word “hardware” was intended to comprehend wider meaning, it would have shown as a separate entry and not be put in the same entry as “mill-stores”. 7. To put it differently the word “hardware” takes its colour from the word “mill-stores” restricts its meaning because of the accompanying words. It is also observed in that case that if the word “hardware” was intended to comprehend wider meaning, it would have shown as a separate entry and not be put in the same entry as “mill-stores”. 7. In (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Ram Niwas Puskar Datta)5, 1971 (28) S.T.C. 736 the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court held that the weights and measures made of iron have nothing in common with “mill-stores” and, therefore, it does not fall within the expression “mill-stores and hardware”. It was observed that what is comprehended within the expression “mill-stores and hardware” are all those articles which, whether described as “mill stores or hardware” have something in common with each other. The Full Bench endorsed the principle which has been laid down in the cases referred to above. 8. Several more cases were cited on behalf of the petitioner, but it is not necessary to refer them because each and every case had followed the aforesaid three cases before concluding whether the particular item was covered by “hardware” within the meaning of “mill-stores and hardware”. 9. We may at this juncture usefully refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in (Nagar Mahapalika, Bareilly v. State of Uttar Pradesh others)6, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 850 wherein it was held that normal meaning of the expression “Foreign imported liquor of all kinds of wine made in India” would not fit in the description of the “rectified spirit”. It also observed that ordinary people would not consider rectified spirit to be “foreign imported liquor or all kinds of wines made in India”. It, therefore, concluded that considering the nature of goods, namely, rectified spirit “brought into the territory it could not be considered as liquor or wine. Octroi was hence held to be impossible at the rate of 5 paise per litre under Item 7, which read as “methylated denatured and rectified spirit” and not Re. 1/- per litre which is the rate specified for “foreign imported liquor and all kinds of wines made in India”. 10. Octroi was hence held to be impossible at the rate of 5 paise per litre under Item 7, which read as “methylated denatured and rectified spirit” and not Re. 1/- per litre which is the rate specified for “foreign imported liquor and all kinds of wines made in India”. 10. The principle which emerges from the aforesaid case laws is that where a definition of the word or expression used in a fiscal statute is not given, it must be construed in its popular sense, if such word or expression is regularly used in the trade or commerce. The popular sense would mean that sense as understood by common people connected with the subject-matter. The other principle as laid down is that when entry refers to different but allied trades, one of them should not be isolated from the other and the entry must be given its popular meaning. The entry in such cases has to be read as a whole belonging to one category. As for instance, the expression “mill-stores and hardware” referred to commodities of allied trades, that while “mill-stores” consists of items like small tools and spare-parts of machinery, “hardware” referred ordinarily to items made of base metal consisting of nuts, bolts, hinges, rivets, latches etc. 11. Based on the aforesaid principles, we now proceed to consider whether steel strips/skelp which is available in the form of huge rolls would be a “hardware” within the meaning of the expression” cutlery and hardware”. Only those items of “hardware” which are allied to “cutlery” would be covered by the expression. It is, therefore, necessary to find out the different items which the term “cutlery” would cover. Even “cutlery” is not defined in the Act or the Rules. The dictionary meaning of the term “cutlery” has been stated to mean the various types of knives and cutting instrument used for domestic or manufacturing purposes and includes butchers' and cooks' knives as well as carving forks. By no stretch of imagination it could be held that steel strips/skelp would be an article of “hardware” when used in the expression along with “cutlery”. It cannot be said that the steel strips/skelp belong to the same category as the articles of “cutlery”. They have nothing in common with each other. By no stretch of imagination it could be held that steel strips/skelp would be an article of “hardware” when used in the expression along with “cutlery”. It cannot be said that the steel strips/skelp belong to the same category as the articles of “cutlery”. They have nothing in common with each other. “Hardware when used with the term” “cutlery” may include items like pots, pans and domestic appliances of that sort and simple articles made of metal and nothing more. It cannot include rolls of steel strips/skelp as is sought to be done by the respondent No. 1. With this finding, we have no hesitation to hold that the steel strips/skelp is not an taxable item for octroi under Item 19 in Schedule I of the Rules. Consequently the recovery made by the respondent No. 1 in terms of the demand letters dated 21-2-1980— (Annexure-A) and dated 3-3-1980 (Annexure-B) is clearly illegal. 12. In, the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned demand letters dated, 21-2-1980 and 3-3-1980 issued by the respondent No. 1 Gram Panchayat, Kanhan-Pipri as well as the orders passed by the respondent No. 2 Panchayat Samiti, Parseoni and the respondent No. 3 Standing Committee, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, respectively in appeal and in second appeal, are quashed and set aside. The respondent No. 1 Gram Panchayat is also directed to refund the amount illegally recovered from the petitioner within a period of 2 months from the date of this order. Rule is made absolute in above terms. The respondent No. 1 shall pay the costs of the petitioner and also bare their own. Rule made absolute accordingly. -----