JUDGMENT:- Bhuvaneshwar Prasad, J. This is an appeal under section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (in short the 'Act'). It is directed against the order dated 10. 4. 1987 passed by the learned District Judge-cum-Motor Vehicles Accident Claim Tribunal. Dhanbad, in Title Suit (M. V.) No. 62 of 1986, by which the learned court below had refused to condone the delay of three months and eight days in filing an application under section 110 A of the Act. 2. It appears that at about 10 A. M. on 11. 2. 1985 while Suresh Pandit aged about 30 years, the husband of Appellant No. I. Most. Rukamani Devi was coming along the road the truck bearing B. R M. 4781 belonging to the respondent dashed against him near Kothari Market, Garga Bridge, Chas as a result of which he died at the spot. The Chas Police Station Case No 24 of 1985 under sections 279, 337 and 304 A of the Indian Penal Code was also instituted by the police in connection with this incident. It was contended in the claim case that the deceased was an employee of B. S. L. under Steel Authority of India Limited, Bokaro Steel City in the district of Dhanbad and he was drawing the salary of Rs. 681/-. The owner of the Motor Vehicle (Respondent) assured Appellant No. 1 that he will settle the matter and will give compensation to her. However, on 29.10.1986 the respondent refused to settle the matter. 3. Appellant No. 1 remained mentally perplexed due to sudden and tragic death of her husband and could not file the-claim in time. The claim case was, however, filed after a delay of three months and eight days. This delay was caused on account of the fact that appellant no. 1 was mentally shocked and perplexed on account of the death of her husband and also on account of the fact that the respondent had delayed the filing of the claim case on the pretext of conciliation and settlement. Accordingly the claim case under section 110A of the Act, was filed along with the condonation petition (Annexure -1) stating these facts before the learned Claims Tribunal. However, the learned Claims Tribunal by the impugned order, was pleased to reject the petition for condonation of delay and dismissed the suit in limine. 4. Accordingly the claim case under section 110A of the Act, was filed along with the condonation petition (Annexure -1) stating these facts before the learned Claims Tribunal. However, the learned Claims Tribunal by the impugned order, was pleased to reject the petition for condonation of delay and dismissed the suit in limine. 4. In this appeal the appellants have contended that the learned court below had gravely erred in dismissing the claim case in limine, on the ground of delay of three months and eight days without considering petition (Annexure-'1'). The delay of three months and eight days has' been properly explained in the condonation petition. The payment of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, on account of the death caused by the accident emanates from the welfare legislation and is to be construed liberally in condoning the delay. On these grounds, it was contended that the impugned order be set aside and the case be remanded back to the learned court below for adjudication. 5. Before proceeding to deal with the merits of this application, I will firstly refer to the order dated 8. 3. 1988 passed by this Court in the present appeal. From this order it would appear that there has been a delay of fourteen days in filing this appeal for which the petition for condoning the delay under proviso to Section 110D of the Act, was filed. By the order dated 8. 3. 1988 this petition for condonation of delay was ordered to be placed for hearing along with the appeal filed under section 110D of the Act. Hence the parties were heard on this petition also. 6. Before proceeding to Consider the - respective submissions of the Parties with respect to condonation of, delay it will be useful to quote Section 110D of the Act, which runs as follows : "110D, Appeals.-(1) Subject to the provisions of sub• section (2), any person aggrieved "by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court; Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than two thousand rupees." 7. In this condonation petition it has been contended that the appeal should have been filed within ninety days as provided under section 110D of the Act. There is, however, a delay of twelve days in filing this appeal (excluding the time in obtaining the certified copy of the order). On the death of her husband there being no adult male member in the family; appellant No.1 Could not file this appeal in time. It was further contended that appellant No. 1 is a poor lady and the other three appellants are her minor children. She is passing her days very miserably and as such she could not come to Ranchi to file her appeal within time because of poverty. On these grounds, it was prayed that the delay of twelves days be condoned. 8. I have heard the parties on this petition. It appears that except for appellant No. 1, the rest of the appellants are minors. The deceased was the husband of appellant No.1 and the father of the minor appellants. Under these circumstances, I feel inclined to allow this petition filed under proviso to Section 110D (1) of the Act, and condone the delay in filing of the present appeal. The dalay is accordingly condoned and the appeal is admitted. 9. At the time of hearing of this appeal it has seriously been argued on behalf of the respondent that this appeal is not maintainable and, therefore, it should be rejected on this ground. 10 view of this submission the important question that arises for consideration would be whether this appeal is maintainable or not. Before taking for consideration this fact I will like to quote the impugned order in extenso. It runs as follows: "Perused office report. From the office report it appears that the case is barreo1 by limitation by a period of three months eight days. To condone this delay a petition has been filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is a claim case under the Motor Vehicles Act, wherein itself there is a provision for condonation of delay under Section 1l0A (3). To condone this delay a petition has been filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is a claim case under the Motor Vehicles Act, wherein itself there is a provision for condonation of delay under Section 1l0A (3). The only ground for condonation of the delay is that due to the death of her husband, claimant No.1 remaind mentally up set. I find that this is not a good, Sufficient or sound ground for condoning the delay. There is long delay i8 filing this claim case. I am not at all satisfied with the ground taken by the petitioner claimants. The petition for condonation of delay is thus rejected. The plaint is time barred so it is dismissed in limine". 10. Shri P K. Mukherjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has seriously contended before me that the impugned order by which the learned Claims Tribunal had refused to condone the delay is not an award and, therefore, no appeal under section 110D of the Act, will lie. It was his submission that in order to constitute an award the requirements of Section 110 B should be fulfilled section 110 B runs as follows: "110B. Award of the Claims Tribunal.-on respect of an application for compensation made under section 110A, the Claims Tribunal shall after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard hold an inquiry into the claim or as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of section 109 B may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver (If the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, a8 the case may be". (Proviso omitted) 11. The important question that arises in this connection is what is the meaning of expression “Award", It is interesting to note that the word "A ward" has nowhere been defined in this Act. It is only in Section 110B of the Act, that the expression "Award" has been used to state about the award of the Claims Tribunal. The important question that arises in this connection is what is the meaning of expression “Award", It is interesting to note that the word "A ward" has nowhere been defined in this Act. It is only in Section 110B of the Act, that the expression "Award" has been used to state about the award of the Claims Tribunal. The determination of this question is important since under Section 110D only a person aggrieved by an award of the Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court. (12) The ordinary meaning of the word 'award' is : a decision. Chambers' Twentieth Century Dictionary assigns to that word the following: "v. t. to adjudge; to determine; to grant-n. judgment: final decision, esp. of arbitrators; that which is awarded: a price." The Concise Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of that word as a 'judicial decision; payment, penalty, assigned by this'. And, attribution of such a connotation to the word 'award' is not only not unknown in legal parlance but is familiar. For example in the - Arbitration law the arbitrator's decision is invariably referred to as an ‘award' Even where the arbitrator completely negatives a claim advanced by one of the parties to the arbitration and refuses to grant any relief to him, his decision is an 'award' capable of being filed in court and compelled to be filed in court. (l3) In the aforesaid background it has to be determined whether the impugned order will amount to be an 'award' or not. It is Dot an award within tile meaning of section 110B of the Act, no appeal against it can be filed under Section 110D of the Act. If. on the other hand, it is an award the appeal will be maintainable, In this connection, 1 will firstly like to refer to a single Bench decision in the case of G. Gopalaswami Vs. Navalgaria (A.I.R. 1967 Madras 403). In this case also an appeal was filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal dismissing an application for excusing the delay in filing the main application for compensation under section 110-A (3) of the Act. There also a preliminary objection was taken as to the maintainability of appeal. The learned Court, however observed as follows: "A preliminary objection was taken to the maintainability of the appeal. There also a preliminary objection was taken as to the maintainability of appeal. The learned Court, however observed as follows: "A preliminary objection was taken to the maintainability of the appeal. It was submitted that under section 110D and appeal is provided to a person aggrieved by an a ward of a Claims Tribunal. It was contended that the order of the Claims Tribunal refusing to entertain the application which was filed 60 days after the date of the accident is not an award. I am unable to accept this contention, for the order of the Tribunal refusing to entertain an application puts an end to the claim and decides the application once for all against the claimant. A reading of Section 110-D does not warrant the restricted meaning that an appeal is available only against the order granting or refusing the award. The meaning of the word "award" is "to adjudge grant ... ...... judicial decision". The word award issued to include a decision by the Claims Tribunal in dealing with an application for compensation arising out of an accident. To construe the word a ward to include only the determination or refusal to grant any compensation may be giving a very restricted meaning. When the Tribunal decides to entertain an application after the expiry of the sixty days or refuses to entertain an application, the decision is judicial in character and is an award. Section 110D provides right of appeal to any person aggrieved by an award of the Claims Tribunal, and if the order refusing to excuse the delay is an award, there can be no difficulty in holding that appeal lies against such order under section 110-D." 14. Also the learned counsel for the appellants, shri S.N. Singh, has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of Komal Charan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R. 1971 Allahabad 503). In this case also it appears that a preliminary issue was framed before the Claims Tribunal on the question of limitation. This issue was decided against the appellant. It was held that the order dismissing an application under section 110A as time barred by refusing to condone the delay effectively terminates the proceedings and disposes of that application. It will thus have the effect of disallowing the compensation claimed by the appellant and is, therefore, an award appealable under section 110D. This issue was decided against the appellant. It was held that the order dismissing an application under section 110A as time barred by refusing to condone the delay effectively terminates the proceedings and disposes of that application. It will thus have the effect of disallowing the compensation claimed by the appellant and is, therefore, an award appealable under section 110D. Paragraph 7 of this decision runs as follows: "The termination may come a bout as a result of findings on all issues including preliminary issues. It can equally happen on a finding on a preliminary issue like limitation. The Tribunal may find that the application for compensation is barred by time and that there is no sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The resulting order would effectively terminate the proceedings and dispose of the application for compensation. Such an order will be an "award" appealable under section 110•D." 15. In paragraph 8 of this judgment a case has been taken into consideration in which oven when the claim under section 110A of the Act, was filed in time but was dismissed on merit, no amount was determined as compensation. Therefore, it was held that even when section 110B speaks of making an award determining the amount of compensation. ill a situation as above, when BO amount of compensation can be detemined such a decision nonetheless would be an award. 16. In this connection, shri S. N. Singh, the learned counsel for the appellants, has also placed reliance on the case of Janaki Pillai Ponnamma Pillai Vs. K. Azhakiya Nambi (A. I. R. 1981 Kerala 196) (F. B.). In paragraph 7 of this decision it was held that the decision dismissing the main application as time barred after refusing to condone the delay in filing the same is appealable award. It cannot be said that the Claims Tribunal, having dismissed the condonation of application, had not 'entertained' the main application as envisaged by section 110A(3) and that, therefore, its decision was not an award. It was further held that the word 'entertained' in Section 110 A (3) means to' 'adjudicate upon' or 'to proceed to consider on merits'. It cannot be said that the Claims Tribunal, having dismissed the condonation of application, had not 'entertained' the main application as envisaged by section 110A(3) and that, therefore, its decision was not an award. It was further held that the word 'entertained' in Section 110 A (3) means to' 'adjudicate upon' or 'to proceed to consider on merits'. Where in an inquiry which the Claims Tribunal has to hold' on receipt of an application' as envisaged by section 110B the Claims Tribunal finds that the application is time barred and that there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay the inquiry stopped at that stage resulting in the dismissal of the application. In other words, without considering the merits of the claim, the Claims Tribunal makes a decision that the applicant is not entitled to any compensation. Under these circumstances, the Full Bench has held that this will be an award within the meaning of Section 1110•B and, therefore, appealable under section 110D. 17. However, it appears that there has been some amendment in section 110B by Act, 47 of 1982 which came into force with effect from 1.10.1982. According to this amendment in place of the following, namely, "hold an inquiry into the claim and may make an award" which expression was there from before. By this amendment the following namely-"hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of Section 109B may make an award" was substituted. 18. It appears that the present case relates to a period subsequent to this amendment which came into force on 1.10.1982. This will however, not make any difference since even before this amendment the expression "'to hold" an inquiry into the claim and may make an award" was already there• Hence the decision referred to above will fully apply to the facts of the present case also. 19. The condonation petition filed be fore the learned Claims Tribunal is Annexure-'1' to this petition. In this petition for condonation of delay neither Section 5 of the Limitation Act, nor sub-section (3) of Section 110A has been referred to. Moreover, the condonation of delay has been prayed on two grounds, namely, (1) that appellant no. 19. The condonation petition filed be fore the learned Claims Tribunal is Annexure-'1' to this petition. In this petition for condonation of delay neither Section 5 of the Limitation Act, nor sub-section (3) of Section 110A has been referred to. Moreover, the condonation of delay has been prayed on two grounds, namely, (1) that appellant no. 1 remained mentally perplexed due to sudden and tragic death of her husband, and (ii) sufficient time was consumed by the opposite party on the pretext of conciliation to settle the matter. From the impugned order it, however, appears that the learned Claims Tribunal thought that this was a petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act, and not under section 110A(3) of the Act. It is not clear from where the learned Claims Tribunal came to any such conclusion. This simply goes to show that the learned District Judge as the Presiding Officer of the Claims Tribunal bas not even cared to look into the petition dated 29.10.1986 (Annexure-'1') before passing the impugned order. Similarly, he bas wrongly stated in it that the only ground for condonation of delay is that claimant no. 1 remained mentally up set due to the death of her husband. He has not even made a mention of the second ground taken in this petition that sufficient time was consumed by the opposite party on the pretext of conciliation to settle the matter. This shows that the impugned order has been passed in a casual and negligent manner and I am surprised to note that a Senior Officer like a District Judge can go to the extent of passing any such perfunctory order. 20. From discussions made above it becomes perfectly clear to me that the impugned order is an award within the meaning of Section 110B of the Act, is, therefore, appealable under section 110D of the Act. Hence this appeal is maintainable. I further find that manifestly the impugned order suffers from patently wrong statements made in it and on this ground alone it is liable to be set aside 21. Hence this appeal is maintainable. I further find that manifestly the impugned order suffers from patently wrong statements made in it and on this ground alone it is liable to be set aside 21. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.4.1987 is set aside the case (Title suit (M. V.) No. 62/86) is restored to the file and is remanded back to the learned District Judge-cum- Motor Vehicles Claims Tribunal, Dhanbad for proceeding in accordance with law after passing necessary orders on the petition for the condonation of delay as filed by the applicant (contained in Annexure-'1'). There after the Tribunal is directed to dispose of the claim of the present appellants in accordance with law after giving notice to both the parties. Appeal allowed.