Judgment :- The prayer in the writ petition is for the issue of a writ of mandamus, directing respondent to restore the petitioner, the possession of the V.O.C. park canteen, drive restaurant, Coimbatore by renewing the lease in favour of the petitioner in respect said premises for the period from 1.4.1988. 2. The petitioner took part in auction of a land and building comprises in V.O.C. compound, Coimbatore, from the respondent/Municipality when the leasehold interest was auctioned He was panted lease for three years to run a in the premises. It seems the petitioner was paying Rs.375 per month rent from 1981, was enhanced to Rs.1,163 from 1984, on the respondent becoming a City Corporation. In March 1987, the respondent asked the petitioner to vacate the within 24 hours on the ground that they proposed to suction the leasehold interest petitioner filed a suit in O.S.No.842 of 1987on the file of the District Munsif Coimbatore, for declaring that the action of the respondent is illegal and for a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with her possession and enjoyment the property unless evicted under due process of law. She also obtained interim injunction and continued to be in possession. On 14.3.1988 the respondent sent a the petitioner, stating that her claim for renewal of the lease will be considered withdrew the suit and sought for renewal of issue for three years from 1.4.1988 as but the respondent did not pass any order. It is stated that the petitioner withdrew on 29.1.1990, and the memo filed was to the effect that the suit may be dismissed settled out of court and that the petitioner/plaintiff reserved her rights to file a fresh future developments warranted such a course. The respondent sent a letter on asking the petitioner to pay Rs.30,230 being the difference of the enhanced rent from 86 to 1988-89. The respondent had increased the rent by 30% from 1985-86. When petitioner sought for time to make payment, the respondent insisted that the application would be considered only if the entire amount was paid, and hence it was full. It is stated that the petitioner spent considerable sums over the property meanwhile doing renovation work, believing the representations of the respondent lease would be renewed. When petitioner sought for time to make payment, the respondent insisted that the application would be considered only if the entire amount was paid, and hence it was full. It is stated that the petitioner spent considerable sums over the property meanwhile doing renovation work, believing the representations of the respondent lease would be renewed. When the renovation work at a cost of over Rs.2 lakhs was over, the respondent broke open the lock put by the petitioner and over-locked the on 19.9.1990, and sent a letter to the petitioner that they had taken possession. petitioner approached the Special Officer of the respondent and also made representations for renewal. Though action appears to have been initiated for granting renewal, no orders have been passed till the filing of the writ petition. circumstances, the petitioner has come forward with the above prayer. 3. Notice of motion has been ordered by me on 83.1991. Mr. P.M. Bhaskaran, learned appears for the respondent and files counter. 4. Mr. R. Krishnamurthy, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner, contends the action of the respondent in not renewing the lease from 1988 to 1991 is erroneous law. He points out that when the petitioner was under the bona fide impression lease would be renewed in her favour, and on account of the promise, she had the civil suit, paid the entire sum demanded and also renovated the premises heavy expenditure, she was dispossessed in a very high-handed manner. He contends that having asked the petitioner to pay enhanced rental and assured renewal would be granted in her favour, it was not proper on the part of the respondent dispossess the petitioner without following a procedure known to law. Learned senior points out, in law, the petitioner is entitled to continue in possession till she is evicted a valid procedure known to law and the action of the respondent in keeping her out premises, inspite of the fact that Her movable properties continued to remain premises, is quite unreasonable. He further contends that a resolution was proposed renew the lease at a rent of Rs.1,966 per month, but the meeting was adjourned would show that the respondent was actually interested in renewing the lease in favour the petitioner. 5. He further contends that a resolution was proposed renew the lease at a rent of Rs.1,966 per month, but the meeting was adjourned would show that the respondent was actually interested in renewing the lease in favour the petitioner. 5. Mr.P.M.Bhaskaran, learned counsel for respondent/Corporation, contends that once period of licence was over, the petitioner was asked to vacate the premises and she failed to do so, the premises was taken possession on 19.9.1990. He points out that petitioner did not pay the arrears of Rs.30,230 inspite of notice dated 8.6.1990 27.6.1990, and hence possession was taken on 19.9.1990. He admits that arrears subsequently paid in December, 1990. He contends that on 13.12.1991, the Corporation passed a resolution that the building should be leased out in public auction or should given to other Institutions with service motive. Learned counsel would say that it is false say that the respondent/ Corporation gave any hope that the lease/licence would be renewed in favour of the petitioner. However, learned counsel was unable to say under what authority of law, the building was taken possession of by the respondent. 6. I have considered the rival submissions and have gone through the entire files before me by the respondent’s counsel. Here is a case where the petitioner, whether lessee or licensee, who was in occupation of the respondent’s building, was dispossessed without following any provision of law. She entered the premises under a valid licence and when she was asked to vacate, she filed a suit and obtained interim injunction. Corporation increased the rental and she was asked to pay arrears of Rs.30,220. When sought for time, the respondent insisted for payment as a condition for considering application for renewal. Earlier, she withdrew the suit at the instance of the respondent promise. However, the respondent did not adhere to the terms of the compromise possession of the building in a high-handed manner. Contrary to the compromise endorsement made by the petitioner, the respondent took possession on 19.9.1990 the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation, a procedure has to be followed eviction. It is not in dispute that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Public Premises (Eviction Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1975, or any other Act has not been followed for evicting petitioner. I do not see anything from the file to show that any procedure has been before possession was taken. It is not in dispute that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Public Premises (Eviction Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1975, or any other Act has not been followed for evicting petitioner. I do not see anything from the file to show that any procedure has been before possession was taken. A public authority like the respondent ought not resorted to such steps. What is the proper order passed in such circumstances, has considered by Mishra, J., in Meera Nireshwalia v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 1990 313. At page 321, the learned Judge has elaborately discussed this aspect and has as follows: “A writ court’s jurisdiction in these matters is more ex debito justitiae than as a rule Courts as sentinels of the people ’ s rights, cannot close their eyes to matters which not fall within the realm of law, or in cases where law is thrown to winds and those expected to obey, observe, and follow law, decide to violate it. ” After referring to various decisions on the subject, the learned Judge proceeded to as follows: “Even without recourse to the provisions like Art.226 of the Constitution of India, Courts India never allowed a straight case where it was, found that somebody was dispossessed property illegally without following the prescribed procedure of law and ordered restoration of possession. As to what a Court of law in such a situation can do, is spelt a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Indrasan Rai v. Enayat Khan, A.I.R 1952 317. When it was noticed that in the garb of making prohibitory orders under Sec.144, a person in possession of property was removed and another was put in possession, Court found that the law never envisaged any such power much less any such power magistrate or the police. The Court examined various authorities on the subject and observations in this regard in some of the earlier judgments of the Court including v. Kedar Nath, I.L.R. 2 Pat.10, Cairns, L.C. in Rodger v. Comptoir D ’ Escompte De (1871) L.R. 3 P.C. 466 and Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad, (1945)581 W. 57: A.I.R. 1945 P.C. Dipendra Nath Bakwit v. State of Bihar, A.I.R 1962 Pat. 101, Cairns, L.C. in Rodger Comptoir D ’ Escompte De Paris, (1871) L.R. 3 P.C. 488, the Division Bench of the court One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of court does injury to any of the suitors, and when the expression ‘ the act of the court ’ is used, does mean merely the act of the primary court, or of any intermediate court of Appeal but of the court as a whole, from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the up to the highest court which finally disposes of the case. ” And thus held, that it was in which the Court must direct for restoration of possession. The said law has held the uninterruptedly and it is not necessary to multiply this principle with additional judgments. Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Dipendra Nath Bakwit v. State of Bihar, A.I.R 1962 101 (F.B.), however, examined the scope of a writ of mandamus which has since been determined by the authorities of the Supreme Court and quoted with approval a from Farrison Extraordinary Legal Remedies, page 329, dealing with the remedy mandamus for compelling surrender of the properties of a Private Corporation incumbent officer to his successor in office. The quotation runs: “ Mandamus is generally recognised as the only speedy and adequate remedy to surrender of the insignia, records funds and other property of a private corporation incumbent officer who refused to deliver them to his successors in office, when it that he does not hold them under any colour of right to the office. The right incidental right to compel surrender of the corporate office to the lawful successor. The same principles that govern the right in the case of public officers are applicable to officers of corporations. While mandamus is not the proper remedy to try title of office, an incumbent holding under no colour of right cannot defeat his successor’s right to mandamus the question of the validity of the latter ’ s title and thus deprive him of the right to possession of the corporate property belonging to the office, on the theory that mandamus proper remedy to try title. As in the case of public officers, respondent, being without colour of right, has no title to try. As in the case of public officers, respondent, being without colour of right, has no title to try. A prima facie right, a right de facto, and not de jure, that is necessary to such cases, or all that is involved. This Court may determine deciding actual title. Actual title is only incidentally involved, if at all. The right to possession of the corporate property is incidental to the right to the office, not actual title, and petitioner shows a prima facie right thereto, the court merely rests on such prima facie for the time being, without adjudicating the actual title, which is left to a pro-ceeding warranto. Nor is it any defence to say that the property is not in the possession of the when it has been voluntarily turned over to some stranger, as it is the duty of the officer have it in his custody, and if not, to regain it. In Sohan Lal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 529, the Supreme Court made observations, which, in my opinion, are relevant for understanding the scope of a mandamus. In a situation like this, one Jagan Nath had been evicted from a premises contravention of the law. His eviction was, therefore, illegal. The Supreme Court found his eviction was illegal and therefore, a writ of mandamus could issue to or an order nature of mandamus could be made against the Union of India to restore possession property to Jagan Nath from which he had been evicted. The property, however, was the hands of the Union of India; instead, it had passed on to a private individual. Whether mandamus could issue in such a situation or not was the issue before the Supreme The Supreme Court observed, “there is no evidence and no finding of the High Court that appellant was in collusion with the Union of India or that he had knowledge that the eviction of Jagan Nath was illegal. Normally, a writ of mandamus does not issue to or an order nature of mandamus is not made against a private individual. Such an order is made a person directing him to do some particular thing, specified in the order, which appertains to his office and is in the nature of a public duty (Halsbury’s Law of England, Vol.II, Simonds Edition, p.84). Such an order is made a person directing him to do some particular thing, specified in the order, which appertains to his office and is in the nature of a public duty (Halsbury’s Law of England, Vol.II, Simonds Edition, p.84). If it had been proved that the Union of India and the appellant colluded and the transaction between them was merely colourable, entered into with a to deprive Jagan Nath of his rights, jurisdiction to issue a Writ to or make an order nature of mandamus against the appellant might be said to exist in a court. observations thus make it amply clear that if the petitioner’s dispossession of the house a result of collusion of something colourable entered into with a view to deprive possession of the properly between the respondent-officials and respondents 8 and 9, Court, therefore, shall have jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus.” 7. On the facts and circumstances of this case, I have no hesitation to hold that Corporation has exceeded its jurisdiction in taking possession of the premises forcibly the petitioner contrary to the promise made without following any procedure known and the principle enunciated by Mishra, J. squarely applies. In these circumstances, a mandamus is issued to the respondent/Corporation to hand over back the premises petitioner on or before 14.1.1992. The writ petition is allowed. Since I feel that this is case where the Corporation has exceeded its jurisdiction and has thrown the rule of winds, a cost of Rs.2,000 is awarded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.