Research › Browse › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

1991 DIGILAW 949 (RAJ)

Abdul Gaffar v. Shahid Hussain

1991-12-05

D.L.MEHTA, M.R.CALLA, N.C.SHARMA

body1991
M.R. CALLA, J. - The applicants filed a suit seeking a decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants or their agents from making any construction over the Sheikh Bao Grave yard belonging to the applicants with the further prayer that the defendants be restrained from demolishing the graves of the ancestors of the applicants and from illegal and unauthorised interference with the use of the said grave-yard and that the illegal construction over the said grave yard be demolished and the original position be restored. The defendants filed the written statement and denied the averments made in the plaint; but the case set up by defendants was that the applicants plaintiffs had no graveyard of their own and there was no grave-yard nor there was any boundary. The applicants-plaintiffs filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC seeking amendment of the plaint. The Munsiff Magistrate, Ajmer City (West) in this Civil Suit No. 230/1985, Abdul Gaffar vs. Shahid Hussain & Ors. rejected the application under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC through which the amendment was sought. Against the order dated 25.11.1987 passed by the Munsiff Magistrate, Ajmer City (West), the applicants preferred a revision petition under See 115, CPC, which was registered as S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 910/1987. This revision petition was decided on 21.03.1990 and, taking note of the fact that in the main proceedings in the civil suit issues were yet to be framed, the order dated 25.11.1987 was set aside, the revision petition was accepted and the applicants-plaintiff were permitted to amend the suit. It was also ordered by the Single Bench of this Court in the order dated 21.03.1990, while deciding the revision petition, that the applicant-plaintiffs may file (he amended plaint as per the amendment application within a month and pay a sum of Rs. 500/- to the defendant within one month and, in case of failure to do so it will be presumed that the applicants-plaintiffs were not interested in amending the plaint and the application seeking amendment shall automatically stand rejected. The revision petition was decided accordingly. 2. 500/- to the defendant within one month and, in case of failure to do so it will be presumed that the applicants-plaintiffs were not interested in amending the plaint and the application seeking amendment shall automatically stand rejected. The revision petition was decided accordingly. 2. The order dated 21.03.1990 is reproduced as under : ^^fnukWd 21-3-90 ekuuh; U;k;kf/kifr Jh fnudj yky esgrk Jh vkj-,e-yks<+k] vf/koDrk izkFkhZ vizkFkhZ izfroknhx.k dh vksj ls dksbZ mifLFkr ughaA izkFkhZ oknh ds vf/koDrk dks lquk x;k ,oa vf/kuLFk U;k;ky; ds vknsk fnukad25-11-1987 dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA bl U;k;ky; us fnukad 16-12-1987 dks ;g vknsk fn;k Fkk fd xzg.kkFkZ LVst ij gh eqdnesa dk vfHkfu.kZ; dj fn;k tk;sxkA vf/koDrk izkFkhZ dk ;g dFku gS fd vHkh fookn fcUnq ugha cus gSA bu ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa U;k;fgr esa ;g mfpr gS fd fnukad 25-11-87 dk vknsk fujLr fd;k tkosa ,oa izkFkhZ dks okn i= dks lakksf/kr djus dh vuqefr dnh tkosaA vr% fuxjkuh Lohdkj dh tkrh gSA oknh vius okn i= esa lakks/ku i= ds vuqlkj ,d ekg esa dj ,d ekg esa izLrqr djsaA oknh izfroknhx.k dks 500@& :i;s lakks/ku dk vnk djsaA oknh izkFkhZ 500@& :i;s ,d ekg dj nsos vU;Fkk ;g eku fy;k tkosxk fd og lakks/ku ugha djuk pkgrk gS vkSj lakks/ku Lor% fujLr ekuk tkosxkA bl izdkj ;g fuxjkuh fuf.kZr dh tkrh gSA g- fnudj yky esgrk (3). According to this order dated 21.03.1990 the amended plaint was to be filed by 20.04.1990 and a sum of Rs. 500/- was also required to be paid to the defendants by 20.04.1990. However, the amended plaint was filed on 28.05.1990." Counsel for the defendants accepted the copy of the amended plaint and cost. The trial Court, however held that the application for amendment of the plaint stood rejected in terms of this Courts order dated 21.03.1990 because the applicants-plaintiffs had failed to file the amended plaint & to pay a sum of Rs. 500/- as cost within one month from the date of the peremptory order. The trial Court recorded the order dated 5.11.1990, that the amended plaint cannot be taken on record. 500/- as cost within one month from the date of the peremptory order. The trial Court recorded the order dated 5.11.1990, that the amended plaint cannot be taken on record. The applicant again approached this Court by filing a miscellaneous application under Section 151, CPC in S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 910/1987, seeking an amendment of the order dated 21sl March, 1990, stating therein that they had received no any information from their counsel about the order dated 21.03.1990 & that they had come to know of it on 14.05.1990 only through their counsel in the trial Court and thereafter they approached the counsel who had appeared in the revision petition on their behalf in this Court, but were told that the information had been sent and, in case the same has not been received by the applicants, he cannot be blamed. It has been further stated in this Misc. Application filed on 16.11.1990 before this Court that the applicants-plaintiffs are undeducted and poor and, had they come to know of the order passed by this Court they would have certainly complied with the same within time & that they came to know of it only through their counsel in the trial Court on the basis of the copy of this Courts order which was sent to the trial Court by the Registry of the High Court. It has also been submitted by the plaintiffs applicants that non-compliance of the order was not deliberate or wilful and they have been made to suffer without there being any fault on their part. On these facts, it was prayed that the order dated 21.03.1990 be ordered to be modified & the time for filing the amended plaint and the payment of the cost be extended. When this application dated 16th Nov., 1990 came up before the Court on 10.09.1991, after hearing the counsel for both the sides and after considering the law laid down by this Court in Smt. Chhagani vs. Tara Kumari (1), and Gobardhan Singh vs. Barsati (2) one of us (Honble Mehta, J.) who had heard the matter as Single Judge agreeing with the view taken by the All, High Court, referred this matter to the Larger Bench. Making a reference to the Larger Bench on 10.09.1991, the following question was formulated :- "Whether Sec. 148 read with sec. Making a reference to the Larger Bench on 10.09.1991, the following question was formulated :- "Whether Sec. 148 read with sec. 151 CPC empowers the Court to extend the time after the expiry of the period originally fixed irrespective of the fact that the application for extension of time has been moved after the expiry of the period fixed under the order?" The order dated 10.09.1991 is reproduced as under:— "Honble D.L. Mehta, J. Mr. S.K. Keshote for the petitioner Mr. K.C. Sharma for the non-petitioner. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the non-petitioner invited my attention to the judgement of this Court in the case of Smt. Chhagani vs. Tara Kumari 22 IIR (1972) Raj. page 1295. This Court held that time granted under a peremptory order should also be extended provided the application for extension of time was made before the expiry of the period fixed under the peremptory order meaning thereby that the Court has limited power of extending the period under section 148 CPC only in cases where the application has been filed within the period specified in the pre-emptory order. In this judgment, the provision of Section 148 CPC has been considered. Mr. Keshote cited before me the case of Gobardhan Singh V. Barsati (AIR 1972 All. page 246). In this case, the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has taken the view that Section 148 empowers the Court to extend the lime even after the expiry of period originally fixed irrespective of the fact that whether application for extension is made before or after the expiry of the period. Mr. Keshote has also cited some other cases. I agree with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court and I consider it proper to refer this matter to the larger bench to reconsider the decision given in the case of Ml. Chhagani (supra). Honble Chief Justice may be requested to constitute the larger bench for consideration of the judgment on the following point :- "Whether Sec. 148 read with Section 151, CPC empowers the Court to extend the time after the expiry of the period originally fixed irrespective of the fact that the application for extension of time has been moved after the expiry of the period fixed under the order? Registrar is directed to place the file before the Honble Chief Justice for constituting the Bench. Registrar is directed to place the file before the Honble Chief Justice for constituting the Bench. The proceedings in the trial Court shall remain stayed for a period of three months. It is expected that the Honble Chief Justice will constitute the Bench within this period and matter be placed before the Bench so constituted for further orders. Sd/- D.L. Mehta J" 4. Thus the limited question before us which has been referred to this Larger Bench is as to whether the Court is empowered under Sec. 14S read with Sec. 151 CPC to extend the time granted under a peremptory order even if the application for extension of time is filed after the expiry of the time originally granted by the Court. 5. Shri S.K. Keshote appearing for the applicants-plaintiffs has submitted that ordinarily the Court may not extend the time granted under a peremptory order in case the application seeking extension of time is filed after the expiry of the period granted by the Court on a peremptory order but it cannot be a rule of thumb. His submission is that in a given case when it is made to appear before the Court that for reasons beyond the control and comprehension of a party, the application seeking extension of lime could not be filed prior to expiry of the period granted in the peremptory order if the Court feels persuaded that the party was really not at all at fault, it cannot be countenanced as a proposition of law that the Court has no powers to extend the lime if the application for extension is made after the expiry of the time originally fixed by the Court. According to Shri S.K. Keshorte, such power to grant extension of time even after the expiry of the period originally fixed by the Court is discernible from the provision of Sec. 148 read with Sec. 151, CPC Shri S.K. Keshote has submitted that the proposition which has been laid down in Ml. According to Shri S.K. Keshorte, such power to grant extension of time even after the expiry of the period originally fixed by the Court is discernible from the provision of Sec. 148 read with Sec. 151, CPC Shri S.K. Keshote has submitted that the proposition which has been laid down in Ml. Chhagani vs. Tara Kumari (supra) does not lay down the correct law on the point and he has relied on the following authorities :- Mahant Ram Das vs. Ganga Das (3) Gobardhan Singh vs. Barsati (supra) Persiasami vs. Illupur Panchayat Board (4) Shankar vs. Parwatibi (5) Budhulal vs. Chhotelal (6) Akbar Ali vs. Abdul Wahab (7) Indian Statistical Institute vs. (Associated Builders (8) Chinnamarkathian vs. Ayyavoo (9) and Johri Singh V. Sukh Pal Singh (10) 6. As against this, Shri Jain appearing on behalf of the respondents has placed reliance on Ml. Chhaganis. Tara Kumari (supra) and Mohan Prakash vs. Gulab Chand (11). It has been argued by Shri Jain that once the period granted under the peremptory order is extended, no application seeking extension of time made after the expiry of the period originally fixed by the Court, can be entertained; and in case such an application is made even after expiry of period of peremptory order and if the time is extended even at this stage, there will be no sanctiy of the per-emptory order passed by Court and the whole stand defeated and frustrated. 7. If an order passed before hand and it has to become effective on doing or not doing any act within the stipulated time, the order is known as Peremptory order. The word " Premptory" according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, New 7lh Edition, at page 761, Col. 2 means as under :- "1. (Law) final, not open to appeal or challenge (peremptor), challenge prisoners objection to proposed juror by right without need to give reason 2. (of statement or command) admitting no denial or refusal; (of person etc.) dogmatic, imperious, dictatorial." The word "peremptory" as such will certain suffixes has been given the following meaning in Websters Third New International Dictionary, Vol. II, page 1677, Col. : — Peremptory final decisive, to take away entirely, destroy, kill, I. Putting an end to for precluding a right of action debate or delay, admitting no contradiction, absolutely find. II, page 1677, Col. : — Peremptory final decisive, to take away entirely, destroy, kill, I. Putting an end to for precluding a right of action debate or delay, admitting no contradiction, absolutely find. 2 A. expressive of urgency or command imperative, 3-a (i) marked by self assurance, confident, positive 4. of an arrogant or imperious nature, houghty, dictatorial (ordered around in the most terms). Peremptory : a case, circumstance, document, or command that cannot be ignored; Peremptory Challenge : a challenge (as if a juror) made as of right without assigning any cause. Peremptory exception or peremptory plea : A legal exception or plea attacking the cause of action of defence or its merits. Peremptory instruction : An instruction charging a jury that if they agree to the truth of certain staled facts they must find for a designated party. Peremptory mandamus : A final and absolute mandamus to enforce the courts judgment." The word "Peremptory norms of Jus congens" has been given the following meaning in Vidhi Shabdawali (Legal Glossary), l988 issued by the Ministry of Justice and Legal Deaprtment at page 244, Col. I : ^^vo; ikyuh;] fo/kku ds vfuok;Z izfreku According to Strouds Judicial Dictionary Vol. IV, the word "peremptory" at page 1982, means as under : — (1) "Peremptory" signifies a final and determinate act. without hope of renewing or altering (Cowel). (2) A peremptory challenge of a juror is "used only in matters criminal, and alleged without other cause than barely the prisoners fancy" (Cowel, Challenge); but the Crown has also in some cases the right of peremptory challenge, sec here on Arch. Cr. 32nd ed.) 174. (3) " A peremptory DAY is when business is to be spoke to at a precise day; but if it cannot be spoken to then, the court, at the prayer of the party concerned, will give a farther day without prejudice to him" (Jacob). (4) " A peremptory mandamus requires the thing to be done absolutely, and to it nothing but a certificate of perfect obedience can be proper return, see here on Short and Mellors Crown Officer Practice (2nd ed.) 240." (5) "A peremptory order for time to plead means that the order is final unless varied by a subsequent order on special circumstances being shown for a further extension (Falck Vs. Axtheim 24 ABD 176)." In Judicial Dictionary by K.J. Aiyar, 8lh ED. Axtheim 24 ABD 176)." In Judicial Dictionary by K.J. Aiyar, 8lh ED. Page 712, the word "peremptory" has been given the following meaning :- "Peremptory : Final and determinate." "Peremptory adjournment : An Adjournment to a day when the business shall be taken up and proceeded with the court." "Peremptory challenge" An arbitrary species of challenge to a specified number of jurors by the accused or prisoner without any reason being stated. This is privilege accorded both to the Sovereign and to the prisoner, when jurors are chosen before the commencement of a trial by jury." "Peremptory paper. A portion of the cause list in which mention will be made of all motions to be disposed of before any other business." "Peremptory undertaking : An undertaking to proceed with the cause upon payment of costs; or to bring an action at the next adjourned or specified date upon payment of the costs. Ordinarily, adjournments are granted to a parly upon an undertaking to pay the other party its costs; the case, in the next adjourned date, will not be taken up, or, the case will be decided against the party who moved for the adjournment, if the costs ordered be not paid. The payment of the costs is a condition precedent for the right of hearing to the parly who applied for the adjournment." P. Ramatha Aiyars The Law Laxicon, Reprint Edition, l987, at page 964, Col. 2, deals with the word "peremptory" as under :- "Peremptory joined with a substantive, as action or exception signifies a final and determinate act, without hope of renewing or altering (Tomilins Law Dic.). Imperative, absolute, not admitting of question delay, or reconsideration; positive, final, decisive, not admitting of any alternative, self determined, arbitrary. Any statement of declaration is peremptory which is meant to be final and determinate, and is therefore couched in absolute or positive language. There is no hope of further amendment or indulgence. Peremptory challenge. Peremptory challenges are those which are made to the jury without assigning any reason, and which the courts are bound to respect. Peremptory challenge of a jurors used only Juror (?) matters criminal, and alleged without other cause than barely the prisoners fancy (Cowel). There is no hope of further amendment or indulgence. Peremptory challenge. Peremptory challenges are those which are made to the jury without assigning any reason, and which the courts are bound to respect. Peremptory challenge of a jurors used only Juror (?) matters criminal, and alleged without other cause than barely the prisoners fancy (Cowel). Peremptory date, is when business is to be spoken to at a precise day, but if it cannot be spoken to them, the Court, at the prayer of the party concerned, may give farther day without prejudice to him (Jaco). Peremptory mandamus, peremptory writ.of manadamus is an extraor dinary remedy to coerce the performance of a pre-existing duty or a clean and specific legal right. A peremptory order for time to plead, means, that the order is final unless varied by a subsequent order on special circumstances being shown for a further extension. (Falck v. Axtheli 24 QBC 176;59) LJOB 161)." 8. It is, therefore, clear that when a peremptory order is passed by the Court, the Court passes a coercive order for the performance of a pre-existing duty in the nature of command for the obedience within a given time, failure of which is to entail a penal consquence. It is clear that even if a peremptory order is final, it is sounless varied by a subsequent order on special circumstance being shown but for a further extension. The peremptory order is, therefore, capable of being varid in case special circumstances become the crux of the matter. In a gvin case,even if the special are shown for further extension. Thus it cannot be said once a peremptory order is passed it is untouchable and, once it is held that the time under an order can be further extended on special circumstances being shown such circumstances become the crux of the matter. In a given case, even if the special circumstances are shown after the expiry of the period fixed by the court for the purpose of exiention as well as to explain as to why an application seeking extension could not be made prior to the expiry of time, the time may be extended by the Court. 9. In a given case, even if the special circumstances are shown after the expiry of the period fixed by the court for the purpose of exiention as well as to explain as to why an application seeking extension could not be made prior to the expiry of time, the time may be extended by the Court. 9. Usually, this type of orders are passed by the Court to gel the compliance in lime bound manner and therefore, the whole purpose is that the lime schedule fixed by the Court should be adhered to and the order is faithfully and punctually complied with. In such cases, if any application is moved before the expiry of the lime fixed by the Court seeking extension of time, there cannot be any difficulty in extending the time. However the question posed in the reference under consideration is as to whether the courts can extend the lime even in such cases where the application seeking extension has been made after the expiry of the period fixed by the court. While considering this question, we have to keep in view that such cases may also be there where it was physically practically impossible for a particular party to apply for extention of time within the time fixed by the court, it may be beyond the control and comprehension of a party to make such an application within time prescribed by the court. There may be cases in which a party may be helpless and stands prevented by a reasonable, sufficient and just cause from making such an application within the time fixed by the court and there may be cases in which the court may find that in the facts of a given case, it would lead to a gross injustice if the application seeking extension of time made after the expiry of period fixed by the court, is not allowed. The question that arises for our consideration is whether in such cases also the courts should he rendered powerless and helpless spectator when even if the Court is convinced that the parly could not have approached the courts for extension of lime within the time fixed by the court and yet should withhold the order granting extension of time merely because the application seeking extension of time has been made after the expiry of the period fixed by the court. 10. 10. It is, of course, true that in Chhagani & Anr. Vs. Smt. Tara Kumari &. Anr. (supra) a division bench of this Court had taken the view that according to the provision of Sec. 148, CPC, lime granted under a peremptory order could be extended if the application in that behalf was made before the expiry of that time and in the facts of that case, a peremptory order was passed on 19.07.71 requiring compliance to pay the court-fee within a period of six weeks, failing which the appeal was to stand dismissed. The court fee had been paid on August 20,1971 and, yet an order was made on 23.08.1971 dismissing the appeal on the ground that the court-fee had not been paid and when an application was moved to set aside the order dated Aug. 23, 1971, saying that the court-fee had been paid on Aug. 20,1971, the application was dismissed. But in the facts of this case, it would appear that no application had been filed seeking extension of time after the expiry of six weaks. The application which was moved and which was rejected by the court was an application to set aside the order dated 23.08.1971 by which the appeal had been dismissed as a result of the peremptory order. Therefore, we find that though as a proposition of law, the Division Bench laid down the principle that the time granted under a peremptory order can be extended if an application in that behalf is made before the expiry of that time. But it has not been held in this case as a positive principle that extension of time cannot be granted in case the application seeking extension is filed after the expiry of the period granted under the peremptory order because, in fact, there was no application seeking extension of time, but the arguments was that the peremptory order stood complied with on 20.08.1971 by paying court-fee and therefore, the order dated 23.08.1971 should be set aside, and what was argued before the court was that the court had the jurisdiction to set aside the order passed on Aug. 23,1971 despite the fact that no application for extension of time was made before the expiry of six weeks time from July 5, 1971 allowed under the order dated July 9,1971. 23,1971 despite the fact that no application for extension of time was made before the expiry of six weeks time from July 5, 1971 allowed under the order dated July 9,1971. It was in this context that the court laid down that the time granted under a peremptory order could be extended provided an application for extension of time was made before the expiry of the period fixed under the peremptory order. 11. In Mohan Prakash v. Gulab Chand (supra), it was argued that the Court had the power under Sec. 148, CPC to restore the case even though there have been non compliance of the peremptory order and para 3 of the judgment in Gobardhan Singh vs. Barsati (supra) (FB) was referred. In this case the peremptory order was passed on 2()lh December, 1979 granting three weeks time to file fresh notices failing which the revision petition was to stand dismissed automatically. The petitioner should have filed fresh notice by 20th Jan., 1980 but the petitioner failed to do so as a result of which the revision petition stood dismissed. The dismissal was discovered on 20th Feb., 1980 and thereafter an application under Sec. 151, CPC which was filed was an application for restoration and for seeking extension of time. The Single Bench of this Court observed as under :- "In case, there is any difficulty in complicance of a peremptory order, a party should seek an extension of time before the period allowed expires. In a given case, even after passing of the peremptory order and its non-conpliance if there is an important intervening reason, like serious illness or such major inevitable natural events above human control, then certainly this Court can invoke Sec. 148 CPC." 12. It has been further held in para 6 that unfortunately for the petitioner, no such cause has been shown in this case. The mere reason of an inadvertance cannot be treated as sufficient for extending time in the case of peremptory order, otherwise, peremptory orders would lose their desired effect. All that was said about Allahabad Case was that it had its peculiar features and cannot provide any guidance or assistance in this case to this Court. Thus, it cannot be said that in this case there was any application for extension of time &. All that was said about Allahabad Case was that it had its peculiar features and cannot provide any guidance or assistance in this case to this Court. Thus, it cannot be said that in this case there was any application for extension of time &. it was laid down in any positive terms that in case an application is moved seeking extension of lime after the expiry of the period granted by the court under the peremptory order, the Court has no power to extend the time. 13. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Gobardhan V. Barsati (supra) after considering Mahant Ram Das vs. Ganga Das (supra) & commenting upon the decision in the case of Mohan Lal v. Ladli Prasad (12), Usha Sales (P) Ltd. v. Narain Singh, (13), and Tarapada Sarker v. Nepal Gazi (14) observed and held as under : — "The cases interpret the Supreme Court decision as laying down that the power to extend time under sections 148,149 or 151 CPC can only be exercised upon an application made before the expiry of the time and not upon an application made after the expiry of the time. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided these cases, we think that this is not a correct reading of the decision of the Supreme Court. It appears to us that their attention was not drawn to the passage in the judgment of the Supreme Court quoted above in which it has been clearly stated that even on the application filed under Sec. 151 CPC which were filed after the expiry of the period fixed the High Court had ample power under Sections 148 and 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure to extend the time. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bokaro and Famgur Ltd. V. State of Bihar AIR 1965 Cal. 3 (18 has correctly interpreted the Supreme Court decision thus : "Where an order is made for payment of the deficit court fees accompanied by the further order that if the deficit court-fee be not paid, within the time allowed the suit or appeal would stand dismissed. In such a case if sufficient cause in explanation of the default, be made out. Courts may allow extension of time even after the period originally fixed has expired. In such a case if sufficient cause in explanation of the default, be made out. Courts may allow extension of time even after the period originally fixed has expired. In our opinion, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in AIR 1936 All 477 (supra) is no longer good law. Even in cases where an order is made by the Court for doing a thing within a particular time and the order further provides that the application, suit or appeal shall stand dismissed if the thing is not done within the time fixed, the Court has jurisdiction, if sufficient cause is made out to extend the time even when the application for extention of time is made after the expiry of the time fixed. It is not the application for grant of further time, whether made before or after the expiry of the time granted, which confers jurisdiction on the Court. The Court possesses the jurisdiction under Sec. 148 CPC to enlarge the time and the application merely invokes that jurisdiction." 14. In Persiasami v. Illupur Panchayat Board (supra), it was held that the Court can extend time even after the expiry of period originally fixed, taking note of the events and circumstances which came about within the earlier fixed time. While taking this view, the case of Mahant Ram Das v. Ganga Das (supra) has been followed. In Shankar vs. Parwatibai (supra), the application for extension of time made after the expiry of the time granted or fixed by the Court was held not to be incompetent. In para 16 of this judgment, while referring to Mahant Ram Das V. Ganga Das (supra), it was held that the decision in L.P. Jain V. Nandkumar (15), is no longer good law. In Budhulal vs. Chhotelal (FB) (supra), a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the Court had the power to extend time even after the expiry of the period originally fixed if the circumstances shown before it justify such an order to further extend the time. It was held that the language of section 148, CPC is wide enough to vest the Court with undoubted jurisdiction to enlarge the time, from time-to time, and this jurisdiction extends even to a case where the period fixed has already expired. It was held that the language of section 148, CPC is wide enough to vest the Court with undoubted jurisdiction to enlarge the time, from time-to time, and this jurisdiction extends even to a case where the period fixed has already expired. In Akbar Ali v. Abdul Wahab (J&K) (supra), while referring to Gobardhan v. Barsati (FB) (supra) it was observed in para 7, as under :— "7. Contrary view has, however, been expressed in AIR 1972 All 216 (FB) in which their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court observed that even in cases where an order is made by the court for doing a thing within a particular time and the order further provides that the application, suit or appeal shall stand dismissed, if the thing is not done within the time fixed, the court has jurisdiction if sufficient cause is made out to extend time, even when the application for extension of lime is made after the expiry of time fixed. It is immaterial whether the application is made before or after the expiry of time granted which confers jurisdiction on the Court. The Court possesses the jurisdiction under section 148, as also under section 151, CPC." 15. After referring to Mahant Ram Das v. Ganga Das (supra) and certain other decisions, the observations of the Supreme Court were quoted as under:— "How undesirable it is to fix time peremptorily for a future happening which leaves the court powerless to deal with events that might arise in between it is not necessary to decide in this appeal. These orders turn out often enough to be inexpedient. Such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed." "But we are of opinion that in this case the court could have exercised its power first July 13, 1954, when the petition filed within time was before it and again under the exercise of its inherent powers, when the two petitions under sections 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure were filed. If the High Court had felt disposed-to take action on any of these occasions, Sections 148 and 149 would have clothed them with ample power to do justice to a litigant for whom it entertained considerable sympathy, but to whose aid it erroneously fell unable to come. In our opinion, the High Court was in error on both the occasions. Time should have been extended on July 13, 1954, if sufficient cause was made out and again, when the petitions were for the exercise of the inherent powers." In Indian Statistical Institute vs. M/s Associate Builders (supra), it was observed in para 13 as under : — "Equally when the petition is not properly stamped the Court has ample powers to extend the lime for affixing proper court-lee. Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers ample power on the High Court to exercise its powers in order to do justice to a litigant where the failure is not due to any fault of the litigant Mahant Ram Das vs. Ganga Das ( 1961 3 SCR 763 ). In Chinnamarkathian v. Ayyavoo (supra), it was observed in para 14 as under : — "It is well acepted principle statutorily recognised in section 148 of CPC that where a period is fixed or granted by the Court for doing any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, the Court may in its discretion from lime to time enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may expire. If a Court in exercise of the jurisdiction can grant time to do a thing in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary curtailing, denying or withholding such jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to grant time would inher in its ambit the jurisdiction to extend time initially fixed by it. Passing a composite order would be acting in disregard of the jurisdiction in that while granting time simultaneously the court denies to itself the jurisdiction to extend lime. The principle of equity is that when some circumstances are to be taken into account for fixing a length of lime within which a certain action is to be taken, the Court retains to itself the jurisdiction to re-examine the alteration or modification of circumstances which may necessitate extension of time. The principle of equity is that when some circumstances are to be taken into account for fixing a length of lime within which a certain action is to be taken, the Court retains to itself the jurisdiction to re-examine the alteration or modification of circumstances which may necessitate extension of time. If the Court by its own act denies itself the jurisdiction to do so it would be denying to itself the jurisdiction which in the absence of a negative provision, it undoubtedly enjoys. Conditional orders, were held by this Court to be in terroriam, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay, but they do not completely estop a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed." 16. The Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Gobardhan Singh v. Barsati (FB) (supra) had been quoted with approval in para 21 of the Supreme Court decision in Johri Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh (supra) , as under :- "21. Consequently, the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Senior Subordinate Judge only (i) if the said Judge had no jurisdiction to make the order it has made, and (ii) had acted in breach of any provision of law or committed any error of procedure which was material and may have affected the ultimate decision. If neither of these conditions was met the High Court had no power to interfere, however, profoundly it may have differed from the conclusion of the senior subordinate Judge on questions of fact or law. Coming to the question as to made by him it may be pointed out that S. 148, CPC as seen above, conferred same jurisdiction in him in this regard. Apart from the cases cited above in support of the proposition we may refer to a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court succinctly laving down the law on the point in Gobardhan Singh v. Barsati, l972 All. J. 169 : ( AIR 1972 All. 246 ). Apart from the cases cited above in support of the proposition we may refer to a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court succinctly laving down the law on the point in Gobardhan Singh v. Barsati, l972 All. J. 169 : ( AIR 1972 All. 246 ). Relying on a decision of this Court in Mahant Ram Das v. Ganga Das (1961)3 SCR 763 : ( AIR 1961 SC 882 ) it was held (para 7 at p. 24) of A1R):- "Even in cases where an order is made by the Court for doing a thing within a particular lime and the order further provides that the application, suit or appeal shall stand dismissed if the thing is not done within the time fixed, the Court has jurisdiction, if sufficient cause is made out, to extend the time even when the application lor extension of time is made after the expiry of the time fixed. It is not the application for grant of further time,whclher made before or after the expiry of the time granted. which confers jurisdiction on the Court. The Court possesses the jurisdiction under S. 148 CPC to enlarge the lime and the application merely invokes that jurisdiction." 17. Thus, we find that a peremptory order even if made in a case fixing a period for the compliance, can be interfered with for the purpose of extending the lime even if an application is made seeking extension of lime after the expiry of time fixed under the peremptory order if a proper case for that purpose is made out before the Court. The correct import of Supreme Court decisions referred to above and the judicial consensus of various High Courts viz. Allahadad, Madars, Bombay. Madhya Pradesh. Jammu & Kashmir High Courts is that even after psssing the peremptory order, the Courts is not powerless to extend the time for the compliance of the order even if an application is made seeking extension of time after the expiry of the period originally fixed under the peremptory order. Allahadad, Madars, Bombay. Madhya Pradesh. Jammu & Kashmir High Courts is that even after psssing the peremptory order, the Courts is not powerless to extend the time for the compliance of the order even if an application is made seeking extension of time after the expiry of the period originally fixed under the peremptory order. In our considered opinion, it is not the cored import either of Smt. Chhagani Vvs. Tara Kumari (supra) or Mohan Prakash v. Gulab Chand (supra) that the time cannot be extended if he application seeking extension of time is made after the expiry of the time fixed under the peremptory order and, we hold that under Sec. 148 read with Sec.151 CPC, the Court has ample power to extend the lime after the expiry of the period originally fixed irrespective of the fact that the application for extention of time has been moved after the expiry of the period fixed under the order. 18. The reference made to the Larger Bench is answered accordingly. Let the case be placed before the concerned Bench.