JUDGMENT 1. This is a defendant's second appeal in a suit for ejectment and damages etc. The appeal was dismissed by me on 29791 summarily but reasons were to follow. These are the reasons. 2. The plaintiff has purchased the shop in suit from its owner and appellant No. 2 Jamuna Shanker was a tenant in it and was running the said shop and paying rent at the rate of Rs. 400/ per month. On 31382 the licence of Jamuna Shankar, tenant came to an end for the year 198283. Devendra Singh, appellant No. 1 obtained the licence for country made liquor for 198283. Jamuna Shankar surrendered the shop on 31382 in favour of the plaintiff respondent and handed over possession to him and executed a surrender deed 31A (Ext. 4) and vacated the shop. The appellant No. 1 requested the plaintiff to grant him licence for the shop for a mouth so that he might run his shop and in the mean while he would search for some other accommodation. The plaintiff granted a licence to appellant No. 1 (vide 32A, Ext. 3) to run the shop for a month since 1482. The licence came to an end on 3482, but he did not vacate the possession. Even though the licence came to an end on 30482 but for the sake of precaution the plaintiff served a notice terminating tenancy and to vacate the possession, and filed the instant suit. 3. The defendants contested the suit denying plaint allegations and alleging that the licence to run the shop was only in the name of appellant No. 1, Devendra Singh, but appellant No. 2 Jamuna Shankar was also a colicensee and appellant No. 2 did not execute any surrender deed in favour of the plaintiff respondent on 31382 nor handed over possession to him, rather his tenancy continued. It was tried to pay rent after 30482 but the plaintiff did not accept it. In case there is any document written by the defendant appellants, that is a forgery under the pressure of police. 4. The trial court decreed the suit and lower appellate court has dismissed the defendants appeal. This appeal by the defendants has been filed to set aside the decrees of the courts below. 5. In case there is any document written by the defendant appellants, that is a forgery under the pressure of police. 4. The trial court decreed the suit and lower appellate court has dismissed the defendants appeal. This appeal by the defendants has been filed to set aside the decrees of the courts below. 5. Sri N. Lal, learned counsel for the appellants uaged that no issue about surrender by Jamuna Shankar was framed under 0.14 R 1 & 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, Code) hence no finding could have been recorded on it. The trial court decreed the suit holding that a licence under Section 2A of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, (Act No. 13 of 1972), (for short, the Act), was created in favour of appellant No. 1 and lower appellate court held that as it was a nonresidential accommodation, hence no licence could be created under Section 2A, rather it can be under the Easement Act and appellants continued as tenants even without order of allotment and lease came into existance, the courts below erred in decreeing the suit. Reliance was placed on Udho Das v. Pooran Prakash & others, ( AIR 1964 All 1 ); Nanak Ram v. Kundal Rai, ( AIR 1986 SC 1194 ); Munni Devi v. Smt. Radha Devi, ( 1989 AWC 781 ). 6. Sri Murli Dhar, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri S. A. Shah has filed caveat for the respondents and urged that as the parties know the case of other side the absence of issue was not fatal, the findings recorded that appellant No. 2 has made surrender on 31382 and handed over possession of shop to the plaintiff and that licence was granted in favour of appellant No. (Devendra Singh) only for a month (1482 to 30482) which came to an end automatically and for precautions's sake the tenancy was also terminated, that signature of the appellants on surrender deed etc. were genuine and not forged or under the pressure of local police are findings of fact based on appraisal of evidence on record, there was no lease in favour of the appellants on these findings. 7. were genuine and not forged or under the pressure of local police are findings of fact based on appraisal of evidence on record, there was no lease in favour of the appellants on these findings. 7. As regards the first point about the absence of an issue on the question of surrender of tenancy by Jamuna Shanker, appellant No. 2 in favour of plaintiff landlord, no doubt whenever a material proposition of fact or law is averred by one party and denied by the other as envisaged by Rule 1 of Order 14 of the CPC an issue may be framed on the point. These issues may be of fact or of law. The Court must in such matters read the plaint, written statement, if any, and examination, under Rule 2 Order 10 of the Code and after hearing the parties, ascertain as to on what material proposition of fact or law the parties are at variance and frame an issue on that point. In certain matters where the parties know well the case of either side and the evidence in support of their contentions, and there was no objection from the either side about the nonframing of issues, in that event even if there is absence of an issue, the same cannot be said to be fatal to the case nor it can be said that there was mistrial. In many cases some allowances have to be made for human feelings. The parties lead evidence on the Issues framed and also negative the allegations made by the other side in his pleadings. It cannot be assumed that until exactly on the issue framed the parties lead evidence, the issues alone cannot be made foundation for decision of the case. Some points or issues to be framed may not occur to the mind of the parties and consequently the issues need not be framed. In other words, where the parties had gone to the trial knowing what is the real question between them and the evidence was led and the court has also correctly drawn inference or formed an opinion on the basis of such evidence, just the absence of issue on the point cannot be said to be of any much significance. This point has been settled by a string of decisions. This point has been settled by a string of decisions. (See Kameshwaramma v.Subba Rao, 1963 SC 884; Kunju v. Philip, AIR 1964 SC 164 ; Girdhari Singh v. Gokul AIR 1976 Raj 10 ). 8. The matter can be viewed from another angle. Under Section 99 of the Code it has been provided that no decree shall be reversed merely because there has been an error, defect or irregularity in any proceeding or on account of any misjoinder or non joinder of parties of a cause of action or any other defect or irregularity in any proceeding in the suit not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. In other words, just on the basis of technicalities alone no decree can be reversed unless it has resulted in failure of justice. In view of the provisions of Section 99 of the Code it is obvious that any defect which does not affect the merit of the case of the jurisdiction of court, cannot invalidate the decision. Section 99 is with a view to promote justice. (See Virendra Singh v. Vimal Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 2169 ; Shamboo Dayal v. Chandry Kali Devi AIR 1964 All 350 ). 9. 1 am, therefore, of the view that even though no issue was framed on the question of surrender, but as this was the specific allegation in the plaint and the defendant appellant was also conscious about it and set up a theory that even though the signature of defendant was thereon the surrender deed and the licence set up by the defendant appellant No. 1 since 1482 to 30482, the signatures were obtained by fraud, coercion and under influence of the local police. In this way it cannot be said that the defendants were not aware about the plea of surrender. A finding of fact has been recorded by the court below that surrender by appellant no. 2, the first tenant, was valid and genuine and he surrendered the shop in favour of the plaintiff, the landlord. The next finding of fact is that defendant appellant No. 1 also obtained licence from the plaintiff for a period of one month since 1482 to 30482. 2, the first tenant, was valid and genuine and he surrendered the shop in favour of the plaintiff, the landlord. The next finding of fact is that defendant appellant No. 1 also obtained licence from the plaintiff for a period of one month since 1482 to 30482. The case of the appellant was that appellant No. 2 did not execute any deed of surrender nor he left possession in favour of the plaintiff respondent and similarly the appellant No. J continued as cotenant with appellant No. 2 in continuation with the original tenancy. But this fact has been disbelieved by the courts below and a finding of fact against appellant No. 2 has been recorded and it his been found after appraisal of evidence on record that no lease subsisted either in favour of appellant No. 2 who made surrender nor any lase was executed by the landlord in favour of appellant No. 1. 10. As regards the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, suffice it to say that in the Full Bench case of Udho Das v. Pooran Prakash, (Supra), was a case where the contract of tenancy was entered into by the parties, i. e. the landlord and the tenant in violation of order under Section 7 (2) of the U.P. Temporara Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1947, it was held by the Full Bench of our Court that even though lease may be in violation of provisions of the Act, but the same shall be binding on the parties and not on the District Magistrate. This case was relied upon in Munni Devi v. Radha Devi, ( 1989 AWC 781 ) and U that case also the scope of Sections 11 and 13 of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting) (Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972, (Act No. 13 of 1972) was considered and it was held that even if there may be an absolute prohibition of letting of the premises and taking it on rent under the order of allotment, but the contract of tenancy or the lease made in violation of the provisions of the Act would be valid between the parties and create a relationship of the landlord and tenant even if it might not bind the parties concerned. Reliance was placed on Nanak Ram v. Kundal Raj, ( AIR 1986 SC 1194 ). 11. Reliance was placed on Nanak Ram v. Kundal Raj, ( AIR 1986 SC 1194 ). 11. In Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of U.P. & others, ( AIR 1974 SC 1924 ), it was held that the lease made in violation of the provisions of Section 7 (2) of the Act would be valid between the parties and would create relationship of landlord and tenant between them although it might not bind the authorities concerned. Therefore the lessee who had been paying the rent to the lessors was a tenant and permission under Section 3 to file a suit for eviction was necessary. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down in the above cases, but that was a case decided on particular facts of those cases. In the present case the facts are entirely different. Appellant No. 2 made surrender on 31382 (Vide Ext. 4, 31A) about his possession in favour of plaintiff respondent landlord as his licence for country made liquor for 198182 came to an end. This has been held to be correct on the basis of evidence on record led by the parties. In case Jamuna Shankar surrendered the shop to the landlord and that has been held to be a finding of fact, then where is the question of grant of lease in his favour. Similarly appellant No. 1 has also obtained licence from the landlord for a period of one month from 1482 to 30482 and in that connection an agreement Ext. 3, 32 Al was executed. It has also been held to be correct. Even though the case of defendant was that these documents bear signature of the appellants under pressure of the local police, but that theory has been disbelieved and it has been held that appellants 1 & 2 executed the documents of surrender and licence out of their own volition and there was no pressure of local police at all. Under these circumstances, there was no question of any lease being executed in violation of any provision of either U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 or the provisions of U.P. Temporary Control of Rent & Eviction Act. Consequently I am of the view that the case cited by the learned counsel for the appellants are based on entirely different facts and their ratio cannot be borrowed here. Consequently I am of the view that the case cited by the learned counsel for the appellants are based on entirely different facts and their ratio cannot be borrowed here. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants are devoid of merits. 12. In view of the premises aforesaid, the present appeal fails and it is dismissed summarily under Order41 Rule 11 of the Code. (Appeal dismissed.)