Judgment :- Even though the prayer in these Original Petitions related only to the action taken by the Management against the petitioners in suspending them from service pending disciplinary action, the petitioners have made several averments relating to the merit of the case, which are of course denied by counter affidavits. In view of the fact that I am concerned in these two cases only with the validity of the suspension pending enquiry, and the correctness of the procedure adopted in this regard, I am not examining the merit of the case against the petitioners which is the subject matter of enquiry. 2. Petitioner in O.P. 10481 of 1990 is an Assistant Executive Engineer, and the petitioner in O.P. 10757 of 1990 is a Works Manager of the respondent Company. The Company is admittedly an authority under Art.12 of the Constitution of India. Ext. PH dated 10-3-1982 is the appointment order of the petitioner in O.P. 10481 of 1990, and it is not disputed that similar appointment order has been issued to the petitioner in O.P. 10757 of 1990 also. Clause 9 of the appointment order says that during the tenure of service, the petitioner will be governed by the standing orders and other rules and regulations of the Company which are in force and which may come into force from time to time and which are applicable to the employees of the category to which he belongs. The same provision is applicable to the petitioner in O.P. 10757 of 1990 as well. The standing orders and the rules and regulations of the Company relating to the service conditions applicable to the petitioners are contained in Ext.P9. Clause 12 of Ext.P9 details the acts or omissions on the part of an employee which will amount to misconduct. Clause 13 details the punishment to be given if any employee is found to be guilty of misconduct, depending on the gravity of the misconduct. Clause 15 provides the procedure to be adopted for imposing punishment for a misconduct. 3. I feel that this case has to be decided on the basis of the interpretation of clause 15 of Ext.P9 which reads as follows: "A Charge Sheet will be given to the employee concerned and he will be asked to give his explanation. Clause 15 provides the procedure to be adopted for imposing punishment for a misconduct. 3. I feel that this case has to be decided on the basis of the interpretation of clause 15 of Ext.P9 which reads as follows: "A Charge Sheet will be given to the employee concerned and he will be asked to give his explanation. On receipt of the explanation, in case the alleged misconduct prima facie appears to be of a serious nature, the Management may place the employee under suspension pending enquiry. In other cases, the Management will decide whether a formal enquiry should be conducted, and if the decision is for an enquiry, an enquiry shall be ordered to be conducted. The Management will, on receipt of the finding of the enquiry authority or in cases where no enquiry is ordered may, on receipt of the explanation, issue notice to show cause why a specific punishment should not be meted out to him. On receipt of his reply or in the absence of one, on the expiry of the date by which the reply is called for, the Management will pass suitable orders. This procedure will be applicable only in cases where punishments are either reduction in rank, removal or dismissal. In other cases, the Management shall pass such orders as may be appropriate on receipt of the employee's explanation." Earlier portion of Ext.P9 clearly says that the rules contained in Ext.P9 shall apply to all employees of the Company who are classified by the Management as Managerial personnel and such other employees as are not workmen as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 as amended from time to time. Petitioners in these two writ petitions are admittedly persons classified as Managerial personnel. 4. In the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General relating to the period 1988-89, certain irregularities in which the petitioners and the then Managing Director of the Company were involved, were brought to the notice of the Government. The Commissioner and Secretary to Government, by letter dated 14-11-1990, after referring to the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, and the involvement of the petitioners, took the view that disciplinary action has to be initiated against the petitioners for the irregularities detected by the Comptroller and Auditor General. By that communication which is produced by the 1st respondent as Ext. By that communication which is produced by the 1st respondent as Ext. Rl(b), the Managing Director of the Company was directed to initiate detailed disciplinary proceedings against the two officers, and if necessary, to keep them under suspension pending investigation into the matter. Acting upon the said communication from the Government, the Managing Director of the Company issued Ext. PS suspension order to the petitioner in O.P. 10481 of 1990, and Ext.P15 order of suspension to the petitioner in O.P. 10757 of 1990, both dated 15-11-1990. Ext. PS order reads as under: "The Government have examined the Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General 1988-89 forwarded by the Accountant General regarding the irregularities in the Kerala State Wood Industries Limited involving Sri N. Lakshmanan Nambiar, Assistant Executive Engineer of the Company. The Government have directed the Managing Director in their D.O. Letter NO.21258/B3/89/F&WLF dated 14-11-1990 to initiate disciplinary proceedings against Sri N. Lakshmanan Nambiar. Under instruction from the Government, Sri N. Lakshmanan Nambiar, Assistant Executive Engineer is placed under suspension with effect from the forenoon of this day, the 15th November, 1990. Further course of action will be intimated separately." Ext.P15 is also similarly worded. It will be seen that the impugned orders are passed on the basis of the directions contained in the Government's letter aforementioned. 5, Even though several contentions have been raised regarding the merit of the case against the petitioners, the only point to be examined in these proceedings is whether Exts.P S and P15 orders are liable to be quashed. 6. There cannot be any dispute that the Management can keep an employee under suspension pending disciplinary enquiry, and the question whether subsistence allowance should be given should depend upon the regulations governing the contract. It is contended that there is an inherent right for the Management to suspend any employee, in the sense that he can be forbidden from entering into the Company and doing the job. On behalf of the petitioner it is submitted that the relationship between the petitioners and their employer is governed by the rules contained in Ext.P9. Under Ext.P9, disciplinary action against an employee can be taken only following the procedure mentioned in clause 15 of Ext.P9. That means, a charge sheet will have to be issued to the employee concerned and he will have to be asked to give his explanation. Under Ext.P9, disciplinary action against an employee can be taken only following the procedure mentioned in clause 15 of Ext.P9. That means, a charge sheet will have to be issued to the employee concerned and he will have to be asked to give his explanation. On receipt of the explanation, in case the alleged misconduct prima facie appears to be of a serious nature, the Management may place the employee under suspension pending enquiry. When this has been specifically laid down, the Management cannot fall back on any inherent right they have, to keep the petitioner under suspension. For this proposition, counsel .for the petitioner referred to several decisions. They are, Mis. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Meerut (AIR 1984 SC 505), A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corpn. of India Ltd. (AIR 1984 SC 1361), Rasiklal v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AIR 1985 SC 540), and Union of India v. Arun Kumar Roy (AIR 1986 SC 737). It is submitted that if there are rules framed regulating the service conditions of the employees, the Management has to follow the procedure mentioned in the rules/regulations, and the Management cannot fall back on an alleged power. Therefore, it is submitted, Exts.P S and P15 in the respective Original Petitions will have to be quashed on this short ground. 7. The decision in Glaxo Laboratories' case (supra) referred to by the petitioner is for the proposition that the Management has no right to enumerate misconduct other than what has been stated in the Standing orders, where the Standing Orders of an establishment provides that certain acts or omissions would constitute misconduct. In the said decision the Supreme Court held as follows: "Some misconduct neither defined nor enumerated and which may be believed by the employer to be misconduct ex post facto would not expose the workman to a penalty. It cannot be left to the vagaries of the management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant Standing Order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant Standing Order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty." To the same effect is the decision reported in AL Kalra's case referred to above. These and the other decisions cited on behalf of the petitioners only highlights the well settled position that if there are Standing Orders, then the procedure laid down therein will have to be complied with. 8. Counsel on behalf of the Company urged before me that Clause 15 of Ext.P19 itself states that the procedure mentioned therein will be applicable only in cases where the proposed punishments are either reduction in rank, or removal or dismissal. In other cases, the Management is empowered to pass appropriate orders on receipt of the employee's explanation. On the basis of this, it is submitted that the procedure mentioned clause 15 of Ext.P9 need be followed only if the Management is contemplating action against the employee for dismissal or removal from service or reduction in rank. In other cases, suspension pending enquiry can be ordered even without issuing show cause notice and getting reply thereto. Therefore, it is submitted that suspension pending enquiry passed by the Management in this case, viz. Exts.P S and P15 respectively, are perfectly in order. It is also submitted that there is a provision in the Articles of Association of the Company that the Government can issue directions to the Company, and the Company is bound to obey such directions. In this case, the Management was directed to keep the petitioners under suspension, and therefore, according to counsel, Exts.P5 and P15 can be justified under that provision. The next contention of counsel for the respondent Company is that there are three kinds of suspension from service, viz. 1) suspension as a punishment, 2) suspension pending enquiry, and 3) suspension simpliciter. Suspension simpliciter, it is submitted, is an inherent power vested in the Management. Counsel for the respondent Company referred to the decisions reported in B.R. Patel v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1968 SC 800), Govinda Menon v. State of Kerala (1963 KLT 1162), V.P. Gindroniya v. State of M.P. (AIR 1970 SC 1494), and Government of India v. TarakNath (AIR 1971 SC 823). He also referred to B.R. Ghaiye's 'Law and Procedure of Departmental Enquiries in Private and Public Sectors' (Third Edition), page 470, and sought to justify the action taken by the Management. 9. It is an established position that the Management can always keep an employee under suspension pending enquiry. He also referred to B.R. Ghaiye's 'Law and Procedure of Departmental Enquiries in Private and Public Sectors' (Third Edition), page 470, and sought to justify the action taken by the Management. 9. It is an established position that the Management can always keep an employee under suspension pending enquiry. But it has to be done in accordance with the procedure laid down by the rules governing the service conditions of the employees. Suspension means temporary deprivation of one's office or position, and when a servant is under suspension, he does not perform the normal duties. The suspended employee does not cease to be an employee of the authority who suspended him. Such a suspension should be secured by an order on the part of the authority empowered to suspend the person according to law, to debar the employee temporarily from attending the office and performing his functions. B.R. Ghaiye, in 'Law and Procedure of Departmental Enquiries in Private and Public Sectors' (third edition) page 470, summarises the law as under: "Suspension order is generally issued when the disciplinary proceedings against a particular employee are contemplated or have started or charge-sheet is given. Sometimes this is regulated by the service rules. When the rules provide that a servant against whom an enquiry is contemplated or proceedings have started, may be placed under suspension pending enquiry, then, he can be suspended even when an enquiry is contemplated and has not actually been initiated." But suspension has to be done in accordance with the procedure laid down by the rules governing the service conditions of the employees. The direction of the Government is only to take disciplinary action according to law. If the Standing Orders or the rules governing the employment requires a charge sheet to be given calling for explanation of the employee before an employee is kept under suspension, that procedure has to be adopted. Of course, it is not to be understood that in all cases where disciplinary action is to be taken, a show cause notice or charge sheet has to be issued calling for explanation as a condition precedent of keeping a person under suspension pending enquiry. But when the rules and regulations specifically require such a course to be adopted, any action in deviation from that rule cannot be justified. But when the rules and regulations specifically require such a course to be adopted, any action in deviation from that rule cannot be justified. In V.P. Gindroniya's case (supra), the legal position has been summarised by the Supreme Court as under: "The general principle is that an employer can suspend an employee of his pending an enquiry into his misconduct and the only question that can arise in such a suspension will relate to the payment of his wages during the period of such suspension. It is now well settled that the power to suspend, in the sense of a right to forbid an employee to work, is not an implied term in an ordinary contract between master and servant, and that such a power can only be the creature either of a statute governing the contract, or of an express term in the contract itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such a power either as an express term in the contract or in the rules framed under some statute would mean that an employer would have no power to suspend an employee of his and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work, he will have to pay the employee's wages during the period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the order of suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. It is equally well settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed against the employee while an enquiry is pending into his conduct even though there is no such term in the contract of employment or in the rules, but in such a case the employee would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of suspension if there is no statute or rule under which. it could be withheld. The distinction between suspending the contract of a service of a servant and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting is important. The suspension in the latter case is always an implied term in every contract of service. it could be withheld. The distinction between suspending the contract of a service of a servant and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting is important. The suspension in the latter case is always an implied term in every contract of service. When an employee is suspended in this sense, it means that the employer merely issues a direction to him that he should not do the service required of him during a particular period. In other words the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey." The third kind of suspension referred to above, it is submitted by counsel for the respondent Company, can be ordered against an employee by the Management at any time. In short, it is submitted that de hors the rules, the Management can always keep an employee under suspension in the sense that he need not report for work. But the aforesaid decision will not be an authority for that proposition, as the Supreme Court emphasised the fact that the 3rd kind of suspension referred to above can be exercised only when there is no rule governing contractual relationship. Otherwise, it will amount to conferment of arbitrary power to the Management to ignore the rules. This position will be clear from the recent approach made by the Supreme Court relating to right to work under public sector undertakings, in the decision reported in Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (AIR 1991 SC 101). the Supreme Court observed as under: "The employment under the public undertakings is a public employment and a public property. It is not only the undertakings but also the society which has a stake in their proper and efficient working. Both discipline and devotion are necessary for efficiency. To ensure both, the service conditions of those who work for them must be encouraging, certain and secured, and not vague and whimsical. With capricious service conditions, both discipline and devotion are endangered, and efficiency is impaired. The right to life includes right to livelihood. The right to livelihood therefore cannot hang on the fancies of individuals in authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can its survival be at their mercy. With capricious service conditions, both discipline and devotion are endangered, and efficiency is impaired. The right to life includes right to livelihood. The right to livelihood therefore cannot hang on the fancies of individuals in authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can its survival be at their mercy. Income is the foundation of many fundamental rights and when work is the sole source of income, the right to work becomes as much fundamental. Fundamental rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of undefined premises and uncertain application. That will be a mockery of them. Both the society and the individual employees, therefore, have an anxious interest in service conditions being well-defined and explicit to the extent possible. The arbitrary rules, such as the one under discussion, which are also sometime described as Henry VIII Rules, can have no place in any service conditions." (page 173). Hence, when it is stated in the rules and regulations that before a person is kept under suspension, a show cause notice has to be issued and his explanation is to be called for, it has to be observed that such a procedure is in line with the latest decision of the Supreme Court. 10. The decisions cited by counsel for the respondent Company will not be an authority for the proposition that when a procedure for suspension enquiry is laid down in the service conditions, the Management has the discretion to depart from the said procedure and suspend the employee pending enquiry, without following the procedure. The decision reported in B.R. Patel v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1968 SC 800) only states the general principle that the employer can suspend an employee pending enquiry into his misconduct. But the same will not be an authority for the proposition that if the contract of employment provides as to how the suspension pending enquiry can be ordered, the said procedure can be overlooked arbitrarily by the Management. The other decisions referred to by the respondent Company also only elaborate the nature of suspension pending enquiry and the right of the Management to keep the employee under suspension as well as the necessity or justification for the same. The other decisions referred to by the respondent Company also only elaborate the nature of suspension pending enquiry and the right of the Management to keep the employee under suspension as well as the necessity or justification for the same. But those decisions do not touch upon the question whether if there is a definite rule binding on the Management and the employees as to how an employee can be placed under suspension and also regarding the procedure to be followed before keeping an employee under suspension, the same can be overlooked or ignored, falling upon the inherent power. I am of the opinion that such an inherent power does not exist, to ignore the provisions of the binding, terms of the contract of employment. 11. The interpretation canvassed before me by the respondent Company to the latter part of clause 15, viz. that issue of show cause notice calling for explanation need be done only in cases where the Management proposes a punishment of reduction in rank or removal or dismissal from service, and in other cases, suspension pending enquiry can be ordered without issuing show cause notice, does not appeal to me. Clause 15 details the procedure for punishment. Charge sheet has to be issued to the employee and he should be asked to give his explanation. On receipt of the explanation, if the misconduct alleged is prima facie of a serious nature, the Management can place the employee under suspension. In other cases, the Management need not suspend the employee pending enquiry, but decide whether an enquiry should be conducted, and if the decision is for an enquiry, an enquiry shall be ordered to be conducted. The Management, on receipt of the finding of the enquiry authority, or in cases where no enquiry is ordered, on receipt of the explanation, will have to issue show cause notice as to why a specific punishment should not be imposed. When the latter part of Clause 15 says that this procedure need be complied with only in cases where punishment of reduction in rank or removal or dismissal is proposed, it only means that an elaborate enquiry need be conducted only if the Management proposes a major penalty as aforementioned. In other cases, appropriate orders can be passed after receipt of the explanation. When clause 15 of Ext. In other cases, appropriate orders can be passed after receipt of the explanation. When clause 15 of Ext. P9 says that suspension pending enquiry can be passed only after receipt of the explanation of the employee, the latter part of that clause shall not be an authority for the proposition that even without calling for an explanation, suspension pending enquiry can be ordered. 12. In this case, there is a clause empowering the Management to keep an employee under suspension, when disciplinary proceedings are contemplated, only after issuing a charge sheet and asking for explanation of the employee. In so far as this procedure has not been followed in this case, I feel that Exts. P8 and P15 in the respective Original Petitions cannot be sustained. I, therefore, quash Exts. P8 and P15 orders in O.P. Nos. 10481 of 1990 and 10757 of 1990 respectively. But, I make it clear that nothing contained in this judgment will prevent the management from taking disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners, if found necessary, including keeping the employees under suspension, after complying with the rules and regulations regulating the service conditions of the employees of the respondent Company. The Original Petitions are allowed as above.