This appeal has been filed by the plaintiff whose suit for specific performance of a contract for sale was decreed by the Assistant District Judge and, on appeal by the defendants, dismissed by the first appellate Court, the Additional District Judge, Cachar, Silchar, 2. The ease of the plaintiff was that on 2.8.71 the defendant No. 1 Manindra Chandra Das entered into an agreement with him by executing a Bainapatra or Bainama (agreement for sale) to sell a plot of land with houses standing thereon for a sum of Rs. 8,000/-. He received Rs.1,825/-as earnest money and delivered possession of the land and houses to the plaintiff on that very day. Under the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff was to pay the balance amount of Rs. 6,175/- on or before 11.8.71 and the defendant No. 1 was to execute and register a sale deed in his fovour. Accordingly, with previous information to the defendant, the plaintiff went to Hailakandi on 11.8.71 with a sum of Rs. 6,175/- and stamp papers worth Rs. 200/-. He waited there for the defendant No. 1 from 10 AM to 3PM, hut the defendant did not turn up to receive the balance amount and execute the sale deed in terms of the agreement to sell. The plaintiff apprehending that the defendant had willfully abstained from coming to the Sub-registry, got one "Swarnalipi" executed in token of his presence in the Hailakandi Sub-registry with the balance money and the stamp on 11.8.78. 3. The defendant No. 1, on the otherhand, contracted to sell the very same property to defendant No. 2, Astalal Das for Rs. 9,000/- and on the next day i.e on 12,8.7t, executed aid registered a sale deel in his favour. The case of the plaintiff is that the defendant No.2 had purchased the property having full knowledge of the prior contract of sale and notice of plaintiff's possession. Under the circumstances, on 12.8.71 the plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant No. 1 in the Court of the Assistant District Judge No. 1, Silchar for specific performance of the contract for sale. 4. The defendant No. 1, Manindra Chandra Das filed a written state­ment but remained absent thereafter. He admitted the agreement for sale of the property to the plaintiff and execution of 'Bainapatra' in his favour. He, however, stated that he received Rs. 500/-as advance, not Rs. 4. The defendant No. 1, Manindra Chandra Das filed a written state­ment but remained absent thereafter. He admitted the agreement for sale of the property to the plaintiff and execution of 'Bainapatra' in his favour. He, however, stated that he received Rs. 500/-as advance, not Rs. 1.825/-as stated in the co .tract for sale. So far as the execution of the sale deed is concerned, the case of the defendant No.l was that he went to Hailakandi Sub-registry on 11.1.71 and waited there till 3PM, but as the plaintiff did not appear in terms of the agreement for sale, he left for his house at Panchgram. On his way at Badarpur he met the plaintiff going towards Hailakandi in a bus. It was also stated that the plaintiff had reported the defendant No. 1 that he could not collect money and so he did not go to Hailakandi. Thereafter, on return to his village he sold the suit land to Astalal and g we delivery of possession to him. 5. By the order of the trial Court, the purchaser Astalal Das was impleaded as defendant No. 2 in the suit. He also filed a written statement. He denied all the allegations of the plaintiff and contended that he was a bonafide purchaser for value without notice. His contention was that on 11.8.71 in the afternoon defendant No. 1 came to him at his Panchgram house and offered to sell the suit property to him. The price was settled at Rs. 9,000/- and thereafter he (defendant No. 2) went to Silchar and purchased stamps. The defendant No. 1 came to Silchar next day and executed and registered sale deed in respect of the suit property in his favour. 6. The plaintiff examined a number of witnesses to prove the execution of the agreement to sell and its contents and also delivery of possession to him by the defendant No. 1 in pursuance of the said agreement. One of the witnesses Sachindra Chandra Das (PW 1), who was the Secretary of the Gaon Panchayat of Village Panchgram, stated that he had written the agreement to sell (Ext.1) on 2.8.71 and the defendant No.l delivered posse­ssion of the suit property to the plaintiff and removed his family to his house at Sonbeel. He also stated that the property has since then been in possession of the plaintiff. He also stated that the property has since then been in possession of the plaintiff. This statement of Sachindra Chandra Das was corroborated by a number of other witnesses. Though some witnesses were examined on behalf of the defendant No. 2, defendant No. 1 Manindra Chandra Das did not examine himself to deny the execution of the agreement for sale, its contents or delivery of possession to the plaintiff. 7. The trial Court on consideration of the deposition of the witnesses and the facts and circumstances of the case came to a finding that the agreement for sale (Ext.l) was genuinely executed by the defendant No. 1 and in pursuance of the same, possession of the suit property was delivered to the plaintiff on 2.8.71. 8. While arriving at the aforesaid conclusion the trial Court also took into consideration the statement of the defendant No. 2 in his written statement to the effect that on 11.8.71 in the afternoon defendant No.l went to his Village Panchgram to meet him and proposed to sell the suit property at a price of Rs.9,000/-. The deal being settled the defendant No.2 went to Silchar to purchase the stamp papers. From these state­ments of the defendant No. 2 the trial Court inferred that the defendant No.l was not at Hailakandi from 10.30 AM to 3 PM as stated by him in his written statement. The trial Court also arrived at a finding that the defendant No. 2 had knowledge of the prior transaction of defendant No.l with the plaintiff and also of the possession of the plaintiff over the suit property. In view of these findings, the trial Court decreed the suit and directed the defendant No. 1 to execute and register a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property as per terms of the 'Bainapatra' (Ext.l) after accepting Rs.6,175/- from him. Tae plaintiff was directed to furnish the requisite stamps for the sale deed and bear the expenses of execution and registration. A period of 30 days was granted for execution and registration of the sale deed. 9. No appeal was filed by the vendor Manindra Chandra Das against the judgment and decree of the trial Court. An appeal was however, filed by the subsequent purchaser Astalal Das. A period of 30 days was granted for execution and registration of the sale deed. 9. No appeal was filed by the vendor Manindra Chandra Das against the judgment and decree of the trial Court. An appeal was however, filed by the subsequent purchaser Astalal Das. The Additional District Judge who heard the appeal observed that though the defendant No.l did not examine himself he had in his written statement disputed the amount of earnest money alleged to have been paid to him and also the delivery of possession to the plaintiff. The Additional District Judge examined the '.Bianapatra' (Ext.l) and observed that there was some inconsistency in the statement regarding possession made therein and came to the conclusion that the last sentence which deal with handing over of possession to the plaintiff had been interpolated. He also noticed some discrepancies in regard to actual taking over of the suit property by the plaintiff. He, therefore, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to prove delivery of the suit property to him. From the aforesaid circumstances, the learned Additional District Judge inferred that the defendant No.2 was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. In view of the aforesaid finding, the judgment and decree of the trial Court were set aside. The suit was dismi­ssed. The learned Additional District Judge, however, allowed the alternate prayer of the plaintiff for refund of earnest money. The learned Additional District Judge did not believe the contention of the defendant No. 1 in his written statement that he had received only Rs. 500/- as earnest money and a greater amount had been entered in the document without his knowle­dge. It was observed that the burden was on the defendant to prove his case made out in the written statement and by not examining himself and not adducing any evidence he failed to discharge this burden. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim for refund of earnest money of Rs. 1,825/-was allowed. The plaintiff had come in second appeal against the order of the learned Additional District Judge by which the judgment of the trial Court was set aside. 10. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff is that the findings of the trial Court were based on evidence on record and cogent reasons. 1,825/-was allowed. The plaintiff had come in second appeal against the order of the learned Additional District Judge by which the judgment of the trial Court was set aside. 10. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff is that the findings of the trial Court were based on evidence on record and cogent reasons. The said findings and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court were reversed by the Additional District Judge purely on conjectures and surmises and, as such, the appellate judgment should be set aside and the decree for specific performance passed by the trial Court should be restored. The learned counsel for the respondent, the subsequent purchaser of the suit property, submits that the learned appellate Court was justified in holding that the possession of the suit property was not given to the plaintiff by the vendor as stated in the 'Bianapatra' in view of the contention raised by him in the written state­ment. It is also submitted that the respondent is a bonafide purchaser for value without notice of the prior sale and> as such, the appellant-plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for specific performance. 11. The counsel for the appellant, in reply, submits that no reliance can be placed on the statements of the vendor (defendant No. 1) made in his written statement as the same were not proved by him. He did not even examine himself. No decision can be founded on the statements made in the written statement in such a case. 12. I have carefully considered the rival submissions of the counsel for the parties. Before I proceed to consider the same it may be expedient to briefly state the law on the subject. 13. A "contract for sale" has been defined in section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act in the following terms- "A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not of itself create any interest in or charge on such property." From this definition it is clear that contract for sale is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document of sale on fulfilment of the terms and conditions specified therein. It does not of itself create any interest in or charge on such property." From this definition it is clear that contract for sale is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document of sale on fulfilment of the terms and conditions specified therein. The buyer in such a case does not become the owner of such property which is the subject-matter of the contract. What the buyer gets by a contract far sale is only a right to obtain a sale deed from the seller. It" the seller refuses to comply, the buy r is entitled 10 enforce this obligation by filing a suit for specific performance. 14. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 ( the Act, hereinafter) specifies the persons against whom specific performance of a contract may be enforced. Under clause (a) of the said section, it may be enforced against either party to the contract. Under clause (b), it maybe enforced against any other claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. It is thus clear that specific performance is enforceable both against the party to the contract and the transferee. The only exception to this rule is "a transferee for value .who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract". In a case where the subsequent transferee claims to fall in the exception, the burden is on him to prove that he is a bonafide transferee without notice of the original contract. So far as the notice is concerned, it appears to be settled legal position that a constructive notice is also sufficient for the purpose of section 19 (b) of the Act. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, possession of the prior contractee may also operate as constructive notice of the original contract to the subsequent purchaser. 15. From the foregoing discussion it is clear that a specific performance of a contract for sale can be enforced both against the party to the contract as well as the subsequent transferee. 15. From the foregoing discussion it is clear that a specific performance of a contract for sale can be enforced both against the party to the contract as well as the subsequent transferee. The first thing that a plaintiff in such a suit has to prove, therefore, is that there was a valid contract for sale between him and the owner of the immovable property and that despite fulfilment of the terms and condi­tions of the said contract by the plaintiff, tae owner has failed to execute a deed of sale. In other words, the plaintiff has to prove the existence of a valid contract for sale and performance of his part of the contract. Once that is done and it is shown that despite that the other party failed to execute the contract, the Court can order specific performance of the contract and direct the owner to execute the sate deed in terms of the contract. In a case where subsequent to the contract the property has been transferred to some other person, the contract can be enforced against the transferee also unless such transferee claims to be a bonafide transferee without notice as provided in the exception to section 19 (b) of the Act. In that case the burden will be on such trans­feree to prove the same. 16. In the instant case the fact of execution of the contract for sale has not been denied by the defendant No. 1 who is the owner of the suit property. The only dispute raised by him in his written statement was in regard to the amount received as earnest money. According to him it was Rs. 50 /-, whereas according to the contract it was Rs. 1,825/-. There was no dispute about the date by which the plaintiff was to make the payment and to get the sale deed executed. The defendant, however, did not make any attempt to prove his case. The plaintiff, on the other hand, proved not only the execution of the document, but also its contends The trial Court, therefore, held the contract in question to be genuine. It further held that the possession of the suit property had also been deli­vered to the plaintiff on the date of execution of the said document as stated therein. The plaintiff, on the other hand, proved not only the execution of the document, but also its contends The trial Court, therefore, held the contract in question to be genuine. It further held that the possession of the suit property had also been deli­vered to the plaintiff on the date of execution of the said document as stated therein. The factum of delivery of possession was also corroborated by a number of witnesses who deposed before the Court. The appellate Court on the other hand, noticed some "inconsistency" in the statements in regard to possession in the contract agreement and inferred therefrom that the last sentence in the agreement dealing with the handing over of possession to the plaintiff had been interpolated. 17. I have carefully perused the contract document (Ext, 1) in the light of the evidence of the witnesses including evidence of PW 1, who had written the same. I find that there is no material and/or evidence to justify the conclusion that the said document is not genuine or that any sentence has been interpolated therein. The finding of the learned Additional District Judge to that effect, to my mind, is not tenable as it is based purely on conjectures and surmises, not on any material on record. Besides, the contract was executed by the defendant No. 1, It is 1 e who could have said whether a particular sentence was there originally or interpolated later. He did not come forward to do so. The plaintiff, on the other hand, has adduced all necessary evidence to prove that the document was genuine. The learned Additional District Judge himself considered this document from this angle while allowing the claim of the plaintiff for refund of earnest money of Rs. 1,825/-. While doing so, the learned Additional District Judge refused to believe the contention of the defendant No. 1 in his written statement that he bad received Rs.500/- as earnest money and a greater amount had been entered in the document without his knowledge. The learned Additional District Judge rightly observed in that connection that the burden was on the defendant to prove his case made out in the written statement and by not examining him­self and not adducing any evidence he failed to discharge this burden. It was in that background that the claim of the plaintiff for refund of Rs. The learned Additional District Judge rightly observed in that connection that the burden was on the defendant to prove his case made out in the written statement and by not examining him­self and not adducing any evidence he failed to discharge this burden. It was in that background that the claim of the plaintiff for refund of Rs. 1,825/-which was the earnest money shown to have been paid to the defendant No. 1 in the contract for sale was allowed. It appears that the learned Additional District Judge on the one hand rejected the case of the defendant in regard to the correctness of the contents of the contract for sale so far as it related to amount of earnest money on the ground of his failure to prove his case by adducing necessary evidence, but on the other hand refused to accept the contents of the document in regard to delivery of possession. The two approaches of the learned Additional District Judge are self-contradictory. In any opinion, the first approach taken by him is correct. The contract in question having been proved by the plaintiff to be genuine and there being no evidence to the contrary, it has to be accepted as genuine and has to be acted upon. 18. So far as the performance of his part of the contract by the plaintiff is concerned, it may be observed that there is abundance of evidence on record to show that the plaintiff, in terms of the stipulation in the contract, went with a sum of Rs. 6,175/-and the requisite stamp papers to the office of the Sub-registrar at Hailakaadi and waited there upto 3 PM. The plaintiff thus performed his part of the contract. It is the defendant who did not turn up. On the other hand, in the afternoon of the material day, he went to defendant No. 2 to offer him the said property for sale and settled a fresh sale with him and the very next day executed the sale deed in his favour. The plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to enforce specific performance of the contract against the defendant No. 1. 19. Now the merits of the case of the plaintiff for enforcement of the specific performance of the contract against the subsequent transferee may be considered. The plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to enforce specific performance of the contract against the defendant No. 1. 19. Now the merits of the case of the plaintiff for enforcement of the specific performance of the contract against the subsequent transferee may be considered. Undoubtedly the claim is enforceable against the subsequent transferee unless such transferee can prove that he falls under the exception. In the instant case, the case of the subsequent transferee is that he purchased the land without any notice of the original contract. The trial Court found 1.1at this claim was not proved and held that he had notice of the original contract. The trial Court also observed that the original contractee was in possession of the suit property and the transferee was the owner of land contiguous north of the suit land. From this fact, the Court also inferred constructive notice on the part of the transferee of the original contract. The appellate Court reversed this finding by rejecting the case of the plaintiff that he was in possession of the suit property. 20. As I have already turned down the finding of the first appellate Court in this regard on (he ground that it is based purely on conjectures and surmises, the aforesaid conclusion of the Additional District Judge also cannot stand. I am of the clear opinion that the defendant No. 2 failed to prove that he had no notice of the original contract. 21. In View of the foregoing discussion, the conclusion is inevitable that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance of the contract for sale. The judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge passed on appeal are, therefore, set aside and the judgment and decree of the Assistant District Judge are restored. 22 Now I turn to the form of the decree. The decree of the trial Court in the instant case, is in the following terms :- "... The defendant No. I Manindra Chandrs Das is hereby directed to execute and register a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit properties as per terms of the Bainapatra Ext. 1 after accepting Rs. 6,175/- from the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall furnish the requisite stamps for the sale deed and also bear the expenses of the execution and registration of the said sale deed. 1 after accepting Rs. 6,175/- from the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall furnish the requisite stamps for the sale deed and also bear the expenses of the execution and registration of the said sale deed. The defendant No.1 is granted a period of 30 (thirty) days to execute and register the sale deed.......” This decree does not appear to be in proper form. 23. The question as to the proper form of a decree in a suit for specific performance brought by the prior transferee where there is a sale of the same property in favour of a prior and subsequent transferee and the subsequent transferee has, under the conveyance outstanding in his favour, paid the purchase money to the vendor., came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Darga Prasad ts. Deep Chand, AIR 1954 SC 75 . The Supreme Court observed (at page 80):' “The practice of the courts in India has not been uniform and three distinct lines of thought emerge. We are of course confining our attention to a 'purchaser's' suit for specific performance. According to one point of the view, the proper form of decree is to declare the subsequent purchase void as against the plaintiff and direct conveyance by the vendor alone. A second considers that both vendor and vendee should join, while a third would limit execution of the conveyance to the subsequent purchaser alone." It was held (at page 81):- "In our opinion, the proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the plaintiff and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff.......we direct accordingly." 24. The Supreme Court in this case also considered the question whether the balance of the purchase money should be paid to the subsequent transferee or to the vendor. It was observed (at page 81) :- "......We do not think it would be right to Jay down that in every case the balance of the purchase money should be paid to the subsequent trans­feree up to the extent of the consideration paid by him. It was observed (at page 81) :- "......We do not think it would be right to Jay down that in every case the balance of the purchase money should be paid to the subsequent trans­feree up to the extent of the consideration paid by him. There may be equities between the vendor and the subsequent transferee which would make that improper, so unless they fight the question out as between themselves and it is decided as an issue in the case, the normal rule should be to require that the money be paid to the vendor." [Emphasis supplied] 25. This decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Soni Lalji Jetha vs. Soni Kalidas Devchand, AIR 1967 SC 978 and C. P. L. Narasimha Raju vs. the State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 1238 . 26. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, in my opinion, the proper form of decree in the present case would be as indicated by the Supreme Court in Durga Prasad (supra) to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the plaintiff and direct lie subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff. I order accordingly. The judgment and decree of the trial Court shall stand modified to this extent, 27. In the result, the appeal is allowed with cost throughout. The judg­ment and decree of the first appellate Court are set aside. The judgment and decree of the trial Court are restored subject to the modification indicated above.