RAY C. J. ( 1 ) THIS application is directed against the order passed by the learned Judge, Labour Court, Rajkot, on 30/01/1991, under Sec. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, inter alia, directing that Rs. 1,48,114/ - by way of pay with increment, D. A. , house rent, and bonus for the period during 19/02/1983 and 30/10/1990 should be paid to the applicant therein, namely, Shri Dharamshi F. Zala, who is the respondent in this Application. It may be noted here that the said respondent-Shri Zala was a train clerk and his service was terminated in a disciplinary proceeding. He challenged the order of termination of his service before the Central administrative Tribunal and the Central Administrative Tribunal set aside the order of termination, directing his reinstatement in service, with all back wages. As the back wages and other benefits of service pursuant to the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal have not been paid to Shri zala, he made an application under Sec. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes act before the appropriate Labour Court for quantifying the monetary compensation to be paid to him and, as aforesaid, the Labour Court, Rajkot disposed of the said application, inter alia, directing to make payment of the amount stated hereinbefore. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court in entertaining the said application under Sec. 33c (2) has been sought to be challenged in the instant application and the learned Counsel for the petitioners strenuously contended before us that since the order was passed by the Central administrative Tribunal, an application by way of contempt should have been made before that authority for executing the judgment and no application under Sec. 33c (2) could have been made before the Labour Court. Our attention has been drawn to the provisions of Sec. 20 and Sec. 27 of the administrative Tribunals Act. It appears that Sec. 27 of the Act only envisages that the order passed by the Tribunal should be enforced in the same manner in which the order passed by the other authority, from whose order challenge could be made before the Central Administrative Tribunal, could have been executed. The learned Counsel, however, has failed to show to us any provision by which any forum has been prescribed wherein the order passed by the departmental authority can be executed. The learned Counsel, however, has failed to show to us any provision by which any forum has been prescribed wherein the order passed by the departmental authority can be executed. The learned Counsel has also contended that as the decision made under Sec. 27 by the Central Administrative tribunal cannot be challenged in any Court except in the Supreme Court, such decision cannot also be executed in any other forum and execution of the order can only be made by the Central Administrative Tribunal itself. We are unable to accept such contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. The decision made by the Central Administrative Tribunal is not sought to be challenged. On the contrary, it has been accepted as final and only a prayer has been made to quantify the benefits of service flowing from the said decision in terms of money under Sec. 33c (2 ). Admittedly, the employee is a "workman" within the meaning of the industrial Disputes Act and the benefits arising out of the decision of the Tribunal can be quantified in terms of money. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it does not appear that the jurisdiction under Sec. 33c (2) is ousted by any special provision to that effect. It may be indicated here that if the legislative history of Sec. 33c (2) is traced, it will be evident that Sec. 33c (2) has been incorporated and amended subsequently in order to enable the workmen to get the money equivalent of his legitimate dues by way of wages and other benefits of service if it is possible to quantify such dues. The Supreme Court in a series of decisions has indicated that by way of execution, the Authority under sec. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act can quantity the benefits of service if such quantification is possible. We have indicated that no specific forum for executing the monetary benefits flowing from the decision of the departmental authority has been prescribed. Under Sec. 27 of the administrative Tribunals Act, the order passed by the departmental authority as referred to in Sec. 20 of the Act can be executed. We have indicated that no specific forum for executing the monetary benefits flowing from the decision of the departmental authority has been prescribed. Under Sec. 27 of the administrative Tribunals Act, the order passed by the departmental authority as referred to in Sec. 20 of the Act can be executed. It does not appear to the Court that because an application for contempt may be made before the Tribunal for violation of its order, a workman is precluded from making an application before the Labour Court for quantifying the benefits and dues of his service in terms of money when such benefits or dues are capable of being quantified and rights flowing from service have been adjudicated by a competent authority, namely, the Central Administrative tribunal. It, therefore, does not appear to us that the decision made by the Labour Court under Sec. 33c (2) is per se illegal or without jurisdiction, for which interference by this Court is called for. This application is, therefore, dismissed. .