JUDGMENT MISHRA, J. - The assessee/appellants herein, who are building demolishing contractors as dealers in teakwood, iron and other building materials, reported a total and taxable turnover of Rs. 4,60,924.13 and nil respectively for the year 1974-75 under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The assessing officer noticed certain defects and hence determined the total and taxable turnover at Rs. 4,60,924.13 and Rs. 3,97,272.07 respectively by his order dated February 23, 1976. The assessee preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (C.T.) II, Madras and disputed several items including the item, viz., assessment made on the second sales turnover of iron and steel scrap bought locally and sold as such. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner deleted the turnover of Rs. 1,05,632 from the taxable turnover on that account exercising power however under section 34 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. The Joint Commissioner (Commercial Taxes), Chepauk, Madras has held that the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue and that the assessing officer had rightly taxed the said amount. The assessee has come up in appeal before us. The assessee's case is that although buildings being immovable properties do not come within the definition of "goods" in the case of sale of the building to him, it was in fact the sale of the goods attached to the building and therefore the sale of the scraps thereof was a second sale entitled to exemption. In a recent judgment of this Court in R. M. Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu [1986] 62 STC 432, it has been held that the contracts for demolition of superstructures and clearance of debris could not be split up as sale of timber, as a sale of old iron scrap and as a sale of bricks, etc. That was a case wherein the Life Insurance Corporation of India sold certain old structures to the assessee therein after demolition, for debris to be removed. The assessee after demolishing the superstructures, sold the old iron and timber materials. The court held that the assessee's liability to pay tax on the sale of old iron scrap materials could not be legally questioned. The Bench which decided the said case, failed to take notice of an earlier judgment of this Court in the case of State of Madras v. Raman & Co. [1974] 33 STC 1. The court held that the assessee's liability to pay tax on the sale of old iron scrap materials could not be legally questioned. The Bench which decided the said case, failed to take notice of an earlier judgment of this Court in the case of State of Madras v. Raman & Co. [1974] 33 STC 1. That was a case in which the assessee, who was a dealer in scrap iron, purchased condemned railway coaches sold in auction by the Railway department and also components of Nissen huts sold by the Director of Supplies and Disposals. The assessee later dismantled the condemned railway coaches as also the Nissen huts and sold the resultant timber and iron materials in bulk. The court in that case found that the intention of the sellers and buyers in the circumstances of the first sale of the components of Nissen huts and condemned articles could be taken to be to sell or buy condemned articles only for the purpose of acquiring the property in the old materials contained in those condemned articles and therefore what the assessee purchased in the auction was scrap and when he sold the scrap later he was only a second seller. The court indicated that the only question which could be asked in such cases is, whether the purchaser of such condemned articles could have entertained any idea of putting those articles to any further use. If he could not use them except for dismantling and selling the resultant scrap, the intention of the sellers and buyers in such cases could easily be taken to be to sell or buy condemned coaches and condemned Nissen huts only for the purpose of acquiring the property in the old materials contained in those condemned articles. The Joint Commissioner however who decided the instant case was conscious of the judgment of this Court in [1974] 33 STC 1 (State of Madras v. Raman & Co.). He has however commented, "I have given careful consideration to the contention urged by the learned authorised representative. One vital point of difference should be noted in the application of the judgment reported in [1974] 33 STC 1 (Mad.) (State of Madras v. Raman & Co.) to this case. That case dealt with condemned railway coaches which are movable property and hence 'goods'. One vital point of difference should be noted in the application of the judgment reported in [1974] 33 STC 1 (Mad.) (State of Madras v. Raman & Co.) to this case. That case dealt with condemned railway coaches which are movable property and hence 'goods'. But in this case what was purchased by the dealers were only buildings, which are immovable property and hence not 'goods'. Whatever might have been the intention of the parties the fact remains that in this case what was purchased by the petitioners was only immovable property which is not liable to tax at the hands of the sellers because immovable property is not 'goods' as defined under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. Sales tax is exigible only on sales or purchases of goods as defined in the said Act. It consequently follows that when the dealers demolished the building and sold the resultant materials they became the first sellers of those materials as movable property. ....." The Joint Commissioner evidently failed to appreciate the ratio of the judgment in the case of State of Madras v. Raman & Co. [1974] 33 STC 1 (Mad). The sale whether of movable or immovable property is a sale that there is no tax on the sale of a particular type of property because the property sold is not "goods" as defined under the Act will not change the character of the second sale of the components of that property for the purpose of tax. It shall be a second sale in the sense that if the sale of the components alone had been contemplated, the components when removed from their attachment were goods as indicated in the judgment of this Court in the case of State of Madras v. Raman & Co. [1974] 33 STC 1. In R. M. Basha's case [1986] 62 STC 432 (Mad.) also, the court has posed the question whether there had been two sales involved in the assessee's purchasing the superstructures from the Life Insurance Corporation of India and selling the old iron scrap materials and timber materials, and whether there being an earlier sale by the Life Insurance Corporation of India, the second sale of the components thereof were liable to tax or not. The court found that this contention was not acceptable because, "The agreement between the assessee and the Life Insurance Corporation of India is for the demolition of the superstructures and for clearance of the debris for a stated consideration. Therefore, there is no sale of old iron materials as such by the Life Insurance Corporation of India to the assessee, so that the assessee's sale of old iron scrap materials can be termed as 'second sales'. No doubt, it is true, that the authorities below have proceeded on the basis that there is a sale by the Life Insurance Corporation of India, of the old iron scrap materials, but since the Life Insurance Corporation of India is not a dealer, its sale cannot be taken to be the first taxable sale inside the State. But, on the materials, the authorities below are not right in proceeding on the basis that there has been a sale of old iron scrap materials from the Life Insurance Corporation of India, to the assessee." Unfortunately, the Joint Commissioner has not posed this question and answered. Our attention has been drawn to documents on the record showing that the auction was for demolition and removal of the building materials as per condition of sale. If that be so, there can be some sense in the assessee's contention that he had purchased the materials in the building and not any immovable property. It is not known whether the first seller, that is to say, the owner of the buildings was liable to tax in the event of his selling the components of the buildings or not. It is not known whether the first seller, that is to say, the owner of the buildings was liable to tax in the event of his selling the components of the buildings or not. In R.V.S. Textiles v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (T.C. No. 605 of 1981 - order dated January 21, 1991 ([1999] 116 STC 366 (Mad.) supra)), this Court has said, "Coming to the main contention, we cannot but take notice of the scheme of the Act under which the assessment order has been made, subjected to two appeals, one before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under section 31 of the Act in the case of an order passed by the appropriate authority under section 4-A, section 12, section 12-A, section 14, section 15, sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 16, section 18, sub-section (2) of section 22, section 23 or section 27, other than an order passed by an Assistant Commissioner (Assessment) and before the Deputy Commissioner in the case of an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Assessment) as in section 31-A and before the Appellate Tribunal under section 36 of the Act. Besides the appeals, certain special power has been given to the Deputy Commissioner akin to the power of revision under section 32 of the Act and a provision has been made for revision by the Deputy Commissioner in certain cases in section 33 of the Act. Similarly, some special powers are vested in the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes by section 34 of the Act and he has been given the power of revision in certain cases. The power under section 34 of the Act which has been exercised by the Board in the instant case (which has now been made the power of Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes by Act 22 of 1982) was spelt out in the following words : .........." After so referring to section 34, the court has said, "This indicates that the power was conferred on the Board of Revenue (now it is conferred upon the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes) to call for and examine on its own motion an order passed by one of the authorities referred to therein and after making such enquiries or causing such enquiries to be made to pass such order thereon as it thought fit. But this power was/is not intended to be exercised in a routine or casual manner but only on special occasions. Otherwise, there would/shall always be a chance of the suo motu power of revision being used to defeat the course of proceedings in appeal and in revision." In Avon Plastics v. State of Tamil Nadu [1982] 49 STC 268, this Court has said : "Unless it is found in any particular case that this discretion was wrongly exercised, it would not be proper for the Board to interfere with the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Such interference is likely to simplify the appellate power." In T.C. No. 605 of 1981 (R.V.S. Textiles v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes) [1999] 116 STC 366 supra this Court added, "That indicates that the suo motu revisional power should be used sparingly and only when it is found that without such interference interest of Revenue will suffer." There is no such finding recorded by the Joint Commissioner in the instant case. Proceeding however to examine whether in a case in which it is found that the interests of Revenue was likely to suffer, what may be the procedure that would be followed in exercise of suo motu revisional power, in Dunlop India Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (T.C. Nos. 622, 623 and 681 of 1981) (order dated January 30, 1991 ([1999] 116 STC 371 supra)), a Bench of this Court said, "In the instant case however we find ourselves faced with a case where the appellate order is interfered with, without any opportunity afforded to the assessee to demonstrate that the assessment order was vitiated. Conceding that on the facts of the instant case there were good reasons for the Joint Commissioner to exercise his power of revision and to reverse the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, it is necessary to decide how while disposing of a suo motu revision the Joint Commissioner should act. Should he just set aside the appellate order without affording opportunity to the assessee, if there is any defect in the appellate order and some serious infirmities are also there in the original assessment order to demonstrate before the Joint Commissioner that there may be infirmities in the appellate order rendering the appellate order bad, yet the assessment order also was/is not sustainable. We are of the opinion that unless it is acknowledged as a part of the role of the revisional authority to afford opportunity to the assessee to raise his objections/contentions to show that the assessment order is bad, there shall be a complete denial of a forum of appeal or revision to the assessee to question the validity of the assessment order on facts and in law. Unless such an opportunity is afforded to the assessee, it would be unjust and unfair, to deny to the assessee such opportunity before the revisional authority, in the absence of a hearing on merits would be a case in which the assessing authority's order shall be final and conclusive." In the instant case, since the assessee was contending that he had purchased the components and not the building, it was necessary for the Joint Commissioner to examine whether there was any truth in what he alleged. If he succeeded in showing that he had purchased the components only and not the building as such, he could legitimately claim exemption as the sale of components by him constituted a second sale. Since no such opportunity was given to the assessee by the Joint Commissioner, we are of the opinion that the Joint Commissioner's order is vitiated and is accordingly fit to be quashed. The same is accordingly quashed. The case however has to be remitted back to the Joint Commissioner to afford to the assessee an opportunity of being heard on the question whether the intention in the first sale was to transfer the property right in the components of the building or irrespective of the components in the building itself. If it is found that the first sale was of the components only, the rule of law as stated in the judgment of this Court [1974] 33 STC 1 (State of Madras v. Raman & Co.) shall apply. Otherwise it will be a case covered by the law stated by this Court in the case reported in [1986] 62 STC 432 (Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu). In the result, this appeal is allowed. The order of the Joint Commissioner in Ref. No. M2/355/80 dated February 19, 1981, is quashed. The case is remitted to the Joint Commissioner for a fresh hearing in the light of the observations made above. No costs. Appeal allowed.