JUDGMENT R. R. K. Trivedi, J. 1. This petition has been filed questioning the legality of the order dated 3-8-81 (Annexure V to the writ petition) under which a penalty of Rs. 50,000/- has been imposed upon M/s. Tin Can Manufactures, Chaman Ganj, Kanpur under section 112 of Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petition has been filed by Mohammad Khalil, partner of the aforesaid firm. 2. Facts in brief, giving rise to the aforesaid petition are that on 17-3-1975 Customs Officer of Kanpur searched the business premises of M/s. Tin Can Munufacturers on the basis of intelligence gathered by them and under the authority of a search warrant issued by the competent authority. This search resulted in recovery of tin plates of foreign origin weighing 6350 kgs. The tin plates so recovered before the markings showing that they were "U S.A. made". The total value of the plates according to the Customs authorites was Rs. 24,400/-. As the petitioner could not produce any evidence in support of lawful acquisition, possession and import into India of the aforesaid tin plates, the authorities under reasonable belief that the possession has been acquired in contravention of section 3 (1) of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1947 read with clause (3) of Import Control order No. 17/55 and section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962, seized the tin plates for action under section 110 (1) of the Act. Section 110 (2) of the Act requires that in case no notice in respect of the goods seized is given under clause (a) of section 124 of the Act within six months of seizure of the goods, the goods shall be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized. Proviso to section 110 (2) provides for extension of the aforesaid period of six months by Collector or Coustoms on sufficient cause being shown. Collector Customs by order dated 12-9-75 extended the period upto 10-11-1975. This order was communicated to petitioner. A copy of the order dated 12-9-1975 has been filed as Annexure 1-A to the writ petition. Petitioner was then served a show cause notice on 7-11-1975 asking him as to why the goods seized should not be confiscated under section 111 of the Act and a penalty be imposed under section 112. 3. Petitioner filed Civil Misc. A copy of the order dated 12-9-1975 has been filed as Annexure 1-A to the writ petition. Petitioner was then served a show cause notice on 7-11-1975 asking him as to why the goods seized should not be confiscated under section 111 of the Act and a penalty be imposed under section 112. 3. Petitioner filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 116 of 1976 and Writ Petition No. 284 of 1976 in this court. Both the writ petitions were heard and allowed by a Division Bench of this court vide order dated 6-1-1978. This court quashed the order dated 12-9-1975 by which the period of six months was extended upto 10-11-1975 and directed the respondents to return the seized goods. The order of Division Bench is annexure II to the writ petition. The order dated 12-9-1975 passed by the Collector of Customs was quashed on the ground that petitioner was not given opportunity of hearing before granting extension. This order could not be sustained in law. As the extension was illegal, the tin plates seized on 17-3-1975 were directed to be returned. Consequently, the tin plates were returned to petitioner which is not disputed. However, petitioner vide order dated 17-4-1980 was informed that his case shall be decided by the Deputy Collector, Central Excise, Kanpur. He was also called upon to adduce evidence in his defence in reply to the show cause notice dated 7-11-1975. Petitioner submitted his reply dated 17-7-1980. A copy of the reply has been filed as Annexure IV to the writ petition. However, the Deputy Collector by order dated 3-8-1981 imposed a penalty of Rs. 50,000/- and rejected the defence set up by petitioner. It is this order which has been impugned in the present writ petition. 4. We have heard Shri R. N. Bhalla, learned counsel for petitioner, and learned Senior Standing Counsel for Union of India Shri V. K. Singh Shri Bhalla has challenged the impugned order on the ground that in view of the order dated 6-1-1978 passed by this court no proceedings could be initiated against petitioner as the order passed by the Collector Customs dated 12-9-1975 was quashed and the tin plates seized were returned to petitioner. According to Shri Bhalla the order is binding on the respondents and as the goods seized were returned, no proceedings for confiscation in pursuance of the notice dated 7-11-1975 could be continued nor a penalty could be imposed. Shri Bhalla has placed reliance on the Division Bench view taken by Andhra Pradesh High Court in case "The appellate Collector of Customs and Central excise, Madras v. T. N. Khamibati, 1977 CrLJ 1331, and has submitted that as the notice was given during the extended period and not within the original period of six months contemplated under section 110 (2) of the Act, which was found illegal by this court, no further proceedings could be taken against petitioner and the impugned order dated 3-8-1981 is liable to be quashed. Learned Senior Standing Counsel, on the other hand has submitted that under section 110 (2) of the Act even if the goods seized are returned, the action taking by the authorities could not be affected and the impugned order has been rightly passed. 5. From the facts narrated above and the submissions made by the counsel, it is clear that the sole question for determination is as to whether further action by the Customs authorities could be continued on the basis of the notice dated 7-11-1975 which was given during the extended period. A perusal of section 110 will show that it only protects the interest of petitioner so far seizure of the goods is concerned. Under this section petitioner gets a right of return of goods to him in case notice under section 124 (a) is not given within a period of six months and the period of six months was not extended by Collector of Customs in accordance with law. But, in no way it affects the other provisions, namely under section 111 and 112 of the act which provide for confiscation and imposition of penalty. Section 124 only casts an obligation on the Department to give a notice to the owner of the goods before passing of the order of confiscation or imposition of penalty. It does not provide for any other limitation against the authorities nor prescribes any time limit for giving show cause notice. Section 124 only casts an obligation on the Department to give a notice to the owner of the goods before passing of the order of confiscation or imposition of penalty. It does not provide for any other limitation against the authorities nor prescribes any time limit for giving show cause notice. The learned Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court have taken the view that as the extension of period without affording an opportunity was illegal, the notice under section 124 of the Act given to petitioner and the subsequent confiscation and penalty proceedings are also invalid. In this judgment a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this court in case Mohammad Hanif v. Collector, AIR 1973 Alld. 433, has also been noticed by which the entire proceedings and the orders passed were quashed on the ground that the period was extended by Collector of Customs without affording opportunity to the person concerned. The learned Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court has also sought support from case Assistant Collector Customs v. Charandas Malhotra, AIR 1972 SC 689 . 6. A different view has been taken by a Division Bench of Madras High Court, In case Collector of Customs and Central Excise v. Amrutha- lakshmi, AIR 1975 Mad; 43. The learned judges of the Madras High Court have taken the view that if the notice is not given within the period of six months or if the notice is not given during the extended period, or if the notice is otherwise invalid, the Department cannot retain the goods. But that does not take away the power of the department to proceed on with confiscation and penalty provided under section 124 or to launch a prosecution in a criminal court. Section 110 is restricted to the seizure and detention of the goods for period specified and has nothing to do with the power conferred on the authority under section 124 or other provisions of the Act. Identical view has been taken by Punjab and Haryana High Court in case reported in AIR 1975 P. and H- 130 and 1975-16 Gujrat Law reports 119. We have given our sincere consideration to both the views and in our opinion the view taken by Madras High Court in case reported in 1975 Mad 43 states the correct position of law. We have given our sincere consideration to both the views and in our opinion the view taken by Madras High Court in case reported in 1975 Mad 43 states the correct position of law. We express our respectful disagreement with the view taken by the learned Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The scheme and the object behind section 110 of the Act appears to provide protection to the owner of the goods not to suffer unduly on account of the delayed action of the authorities under the Customs Act, 1962. This protection extended by legislature is to avoid any damage, injury or hardship to such person. There could be number of other possibilities for the restoration of the goods to the person from which in was seized having regard to the nature of the goods and the condition prevailing in the market and the urgent requirement of the goods to meet some urgency in relation to some genuine need and in such case the delay in restoration of the goods could cause material damage, injury or hardship. It is this harassment or prejudice which has been sought to be avoided by providing a period of limitation of six months under section 110 (2) of the Act for serving notice in case the authorities want to retain the goods. The period could be extended for another six months on sufficient cause being shown which has to be tested objectively after giving an opportunity of hearing to the owner of the goods. But all this protection is against retention of the goods seized. There is nothing in the act on which basis it could be argued that return of the goods under section 110 (2) for not serving notice within six months could affect the action by authorities under sections 111 and 112 of the Act after giving notice as contemplated under section 124 of the Act. 7. In our opinion, for proceedings for confiscation under section 111 and for imposition of penalty under section 112 of the Act the actual possession of the goods seized initially, is not necessary. 7. In our opinion, for proceedings for confiscation under section 111 and for imposition of penalty under section 112 of the Act the actual possession of the goods seized initially, is not necessary. The view taken by us finds supports from the proviso to section 110 (1) of the Act which provides that where it is not particable to seize any such goods, the proper officer may serve on the owner of the goods an order that he shall not remove, part with or otherwise deal with the goods except with the previous permission of such officer. There could be other like circumstances where the department may not be in actual possession but action for violation of the Act could be taken, e.g. when property is custodia legis. Thus the contention of the learned counsel for petitioner that possession of the goods seized with the department was necessary for action cannot be accepted. Keeping in view the seriousness and magnitude of the injury to the public interest in such cases of the illict importation of goods and having regard to the consideration of the damage to the economic policy underlying the formulation of import and export planning, it seems necessary to reconcile the need to afford an opportunity to the person affected only to the extent of retention of the goods. But, the public interest demands that a person who has possessed or acquired the goods in contravention of law should be dealt with in accordance with the law irrespective of the return of the goods. We also find support from the view expressed by Honourable Supreme Court in case I. J. Rao, Assistant Collector of Customs v. Vibhuti Bhushan, (1989) 3 SCC 202 . The facts of the case before Honourable Supreme Court were that notice was not given within period of six months and the period was extended without hearing owner of the goods and the notice of show cause was served during the extended period. The proceedings on the basis of the notice were challenged in the High Court of Calcutta. The learned Single Judge took the view that as the period was extended without affording opportunity, the order was illegal and so also the show cause notice served and as such the entire proceedings were quashed. The appellate Bench of Calcutta High Court allowed the appeal in part. The learned Single Judge took the view that as the period was extended without affording opportunity, the order was illegal and so also the show cause notice served and as such the entire proceedings were quashed. The appellate Bench of Calcutta High Court allowed the appeal in part. The order of extension was quashed and Customs authorities were directed to restore possession of the goods seized. However, the Customs authorities were permitted to initiate and complete such other proceedings against the owner of the goods as were open to them in law. The Honourable Supreme Court agreed with the view taken by the Division Bench with certain modification. The view taken by Honourable Supreme Court can be gainfully reproduced here : "........It cannot be disputed that section 110 sub-section (2) contemplates either notice (within six months from the date of seizure) to the person from whose possession the goods have been seized in order to determine whether the goods should be confiscated or the restoration or the goods to such person on the expiry of that period. If the notice is not issued in the confiscation proceedings within six months from the date of seizure the person from whose possession the goods have been seized becomes immediately entitled to the return of the goods. It is that right to immediate restoration of the goods upon, the expiry of six months from the date of seizure that is defeated by the extension of time under the proviso to section 110 (2). When we speak of the right of the person being prejudiced or placed in jeopardy we necessarily envisage some damage or injury or hardship to that right and it becomes necessary to inquire into the nature of such damage or injury or hardship for any case to be set up by such person must indicate the damage or injury or hardship apprehended by such person. IN the present case, one possibility is that the person from whose possession the goods have been seized may want to establish the need for immediate possession, having regard to the nature of the goods and critical conditions then prevailing in the market or that the goods are such as are required to meet an emergency in relation to a vocational or private need, and that any delay in restoration would cause material damage or injury or hardship either by reason of some circumstance special to the person or of market conditions or of any particular quality of requirement for the preservation of the goods. But it will not be open to him to question where the stage of the investigation, and the need for further investigation, call for an extension of time, It is impossible to conceive that a person from whose possession the goods have been seized with a view to confiscation should be entitled to know and to monitor, how the investigation against him is proceeding, the material collected against him at that stage, and what is the utility of perusing the investigation further. These are matters of a confidential nature, knowledge of which such person is entitled to only upon the investigation being completed and a decision being taken to issue notice to show cause why the goods should not be confiscated. There can be no right in any person to be informed midway, during an investigation of the material collected in the case against him. Consequently, while notice may be necessary to such person to show why time should not be extended he is not entitled to information as to the investigation which is in process. IN such circumstances, the right of a person, from whose possession the goods have been seized, to notice of the proposed extension must be conceded, but the opportunity open to him on such notice cannot extend to information concerning the nature and course of the investigation. IN that sense, the opportunity which the law can contemplate upon notice to him of the application for extension must be limited by the pragmatic necessities of the case...." 8. IN that sense, the opportunity which the law can contemplate upon notice to him of the application for extension must be limited by the pragmatic necessities of the case...." 8. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the Division Bench judgment dated 6-1-1978 of this court was not open to the authorities to initiate any proceeding against the petitioner can also not be accepted A perusal of the judgment shows that this court only quashed the order dated 12-9-75 by which the period was extended by Collector of Customs without affording opportunity of hearing to petitioner and the authorities were directed to return seized goods to petitioner. However, nothing has been said against validity of the notice. Thus, notice served on the petitioner on 7-11-1975 remained unaffected by the judgment dated 6-1-1978. The customs authorities were thus fully justified to initiate and complete proceedings on the basis of the notice dated 7-11-1975. The order dated 3-8-1981 passed by Additional Collector is thus perfectly legal and valid and does not suffer from any error of law. The impugned order has not been challenged before us on any other ground. For the reasons stated above, in our opinion, the writ petition has no force and is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed and the stay order, if any, is discharged. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.