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1991 DIGILAW 98 (GAU)

Biraj Chandra Mazumdar @ Biraj Mazumdar v. State of Assam and Ors.

1991-05-15

B.P.SARAF

body1991
This is an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of charge framed against the petitioner by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Hajo under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. The material facts are as follows : The petitioner was a Senior Inspector of Co-operative Societies, Gauhati and at the relevant time posted at Hajo as Secretary of a Co-operative Society, namely, No. 1, Ramdia Gaon Panchayat Samabay Samity. Simultaneously, the petitioner was also holding charge of another Co-operative Society, namely, No.2, Ramdia Gion Panchayat Samabay Samity which is situated at a distance of over 8 miles from the first society. The two proforma respondents Narayan Chandra Talukdar and Siba Nath Deka were Chairman and Manager of No. l Ramdia Gaon Panchayat Samabay Samity. This was in the year 1974. In course of audit of the accounts of the said society, some discrepancy to the tune of Rs.10,470.31 was noticed by the audit party and observation was made that the money was recoverable from the proforma respondents 2 and 3. On the basis of the said report, a complaint was lodged with the police and the Manager of the society Siba Nath Deka was arrested in that connection. He claimed that the said amount had been deposited with petitioner. In support of this claim two receipts allegedly issued by the petitioner on 20.8.74 and 28.8.74 were produced by him. 2. To verify the genuineness, the said two receipts were sent by the police to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The investigation was started by the police in 1974 and it continued for long six years. It was only on 15.5.1981 that the police filed a charge sheet in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gauhati naming the petitioner and the two proforma respondents as accused. In the charge sheet there was a reference to the certain documents which were numbered as M.R. No. 15/75. These documents were not in the case record. The petitioner wanted to inspect the same. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, therefore, directed the prosecution to produce the same. 3. Years rolled, repeated orders were passed by the Court directing the prosecution to produce those documents but there was no compliance. Those documents were not produced. These documents were, in fact, the receipts allegedly issued by the petitioner on the basis of which the petitioner was sought to be involved. 3. Years rolled, repeated orders were passed by the Court directing the prosecution to produce those documents but there was no compliance. Those documents were not produced. These documents were, in fact, the receipts allegedly issued by the petitioner on the basis of which the petitioner was sought to be involved. In the meantime, the case got trans­ferred to the file of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Hajo. He took up the case for consideration on 29.4.89 for framing the charge. In his order he discussed how the prosecution, despite repeated reminders from the Court for years together, failed to produce the relevant documents It was ultimately without those documents that the case was considered for framing charge. The learned Magistrate observed that M. R. Case No. 65/75 contained the admitted documents of the accused Siba Nath Deka, proforma respondent No.3 herein. On the basis of this observation, the Court arrived at a finding that there was a prima-facie case against the three accused persons under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. B. K. Deka submits that from a careful consideration of the order of the Court it is evident that there is no material to justify framing of the charge against the petitioner. There is no discussion in the order as 10 how there could be a prima-facie case against him under section 409 o: the IPC in the absence of the receipts in question which the prosecution failed to produce. The counsel, therefore, submits that the charge, so far as it relates to the petitioner, is liable to be quashed on that count. Counsel further submits that there is inordinate delay of 15 years in this case. The prosecution took long 6/7 years even to submit a charge sheet and after submitting the same, failed to produce the relevant documents despite repeated orders of the Court which resulted in a further delay of long 8 years to frame the charge. This has resulted in gross abuse of the process of the Court. The petitioner has been kept under suspension for long 15 years and thereafter also charge his been framed against him without any material. This has resulted in gross abuse of the process of the Court. The petitioner has been kept under suspension for long 15 years and thereafter also charge his been framed against him without any material. It is pointed out that in a case like this where the prosecution is unable to produce the material documents even for the purpose of enabling the Court to frame charge after long 15 years, the chances of trial itself, not to speak of fair trial, are absolutely bleak. He, therefore, prays for quashing of the charge. 5. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. I have also heard the learned Public Prosecutor, Mr.B. Banerjee. On consideration of the extra ordinary facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly, the undue long time taken by the prosecu­tion in filing the charge sheet and its failure to produce the documents called for by the Court and the long lapse of 15 years since the date of alleged occurrence, I am of the opinion that it will cause injustice to the petitioner if he is now asked to face trial for the alleged charge of criminal breach of trust by public savant under section 40.) IPC after long lapse of 17 years of the alleged occurrence at such a belated stage. 6. This aspect of the law came to be considered by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. In Machander vs. The State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 792 it was observed (at page 794): "We are not prepared to keep persons who are on trial for their lives under indefinite suspense because trial judges omit to do their duty. Justice is not one-sided. It has many facets and we have to draw a nice balance between conflicting rights and duties. While it is incumbent on us to see that the guilty do not escape it is even more necessary to see that persons accused of crime are not indefinitely harassed. They must be given a fair and impartial trial and while every reasonable latitude must be given to those concerned with the detections of crime and entrusted with the administration of justice, limits must be placed on the lengths to which they may go." 7. They must be given a fair and impartial trial and while every reasonable latitude must be given to those concerned with the detections of crime and entrusted with the administration of justice, limits must be placed on the lengths to which they may go." 7. Reference also may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Chajoo Ram vs. Radhey Shyam, AIR 1971 SC 1367 where the Supreme Court observed that lapse of a long time is also a relevant factor for considering the question of expediency of initiating prosecution. The delay in that case was of ten years. It was held that such long delay also militates against expediency of prosecution, 8. These decisions were referred to in State of U.P. vs. Kapil Deo Shukla, AIR 1973 SC 494 . It was a case where the High Court had quashed the pending proceedings against the accused person on the ground that it would be an abuse of the process of the Court if the trial protracted for about 20 years to be allowed to go on, On appeal, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the order of the High Court on the ground that the circumstances were likely to prevent the trial being altogether fair. It was observed at page 498 : "It is a matter of some regret that on such a view, the respondent against whom serious charges of a public nature stand, should not be proceeded with. But as against that there is equally the fact that long lapse of time and the impossibility of supplying him copies of police statements and other relevant documents is likely to end in the trial not being fair and just. In these circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that it is neither expedient nor in the larger interest of justice that the trial with all the aforesaid possible deficiencies should be allowed to proceed...". 9. These decisions squarely apply to the facts of the case in hand Here also long 17 years have passed and the trial has yet to start. Besides, the allegations also do rot justify framing of charge against the petitioner under section 409 IPC. In that view of the matter, I do not find any justification to allow the trial to continue. Besides, the allegations also do rot justify framing of charge against the petitioner under section 409 IPC. In that view of the matter, I do not find any justification to allow the trial to continue. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, it is a fit case for quashing of the charge, which I hereby do. 10. Mr. A. Sharif, learned counsel appearing for the two other accused in the same case, who are proforma respondents in this petition, submits that in view of the extra-ordinary nature of this case and the facts and circumstances already stated by this Court and the long lapse of 17 years even in framing the charge, it would not be proper, in the interest of justice, to allow the prosecution to continue against the other two accused persons. The counsel further submits that so far as the accused Narayan Chandra Talukdar is concerned, there is no material whatsoever in the charge sheet to justify framing of charge against him. So far as Siba Nath Deka is concerned, in the absence of the documents which the prosecution failed to produce, it will be difficult for the Court to consider his defence. The chances of completion of the trial in their cases also, according to the learned counsel, are very bleak not to speak of their conviction. 11. I have considered the aforesaid submissions. Besides merits, the question of long delay is undoubtedly one of the most important factors to be considered in this case. Admittedly long 17 years have passed and that too because of the remissness on the part the prosecuting agency. The trial has not even started. The Court has somehow framed charges. That proceeding was also stayed by this Court on the prayer of the petitioner in the present petition. In my opinion, it will neither be expedient nor in the ends of justice to allow the prosecution to continue after such long delay. Looking at the conduct of the prosecuting agency it is evident that the trial which has yet to start may 'take still many more years. Evidence is not available even now. It is difficult to understand what will happen when the proper stage comes for producing the same. Allowing the trial to continue will amount to keeping the accused persons under indefinite suspense for no fault of theirs. 12. Evidence is not available even now. It is difficult to understand what will happen when the proper stage comes for producing the same. Allowing the trial to continue will amount to keeping the accused persons under indefinite suspense for no fault of theirs. 12. In consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that no fruitful purpose will be served after such a long delay of 17 years to allow the trial to commence in this case against the other two accused. In that view of the matter, I also quash the charge against the two other accused, namely, Narayan Chandra Talukdar and Siba Nath Deka ia this case. The proceedings against them also shall stand closed. They shall stand discharged.