MEHTA, J. — In both these revision petitions, which are directed against the order dated 20.9.89 by which the learned Civil Judge has rejected the applications filed by the petitioners under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C., following questions have been referred by a learned Single Judge for decision by a Division Bench. (1) Whether a subordinate Court should not record reasons for refusing documentary evidence sought to be adduced under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. even though good cause has been shown for such late production and the document is material one? (2) Whether no revision petition would lie against the order by which the subordinate court has refused to accept documentary evidence under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. notwithstanding the fact that good cause has been shown for late production and the document is of vital material importance? (2). In order to answer the questions referred to the Division Bench, it will be proper to briefly narrate the facts, which are common to both the revision petitions. (3). On 29.8.1984, the non-petitioner filed a suit for pre-emption of the disputed property and a portion of Haveli, two storied described in paras 1 and 2 of the plaint against the petitioners with the averments that the petitioner No.l and the non- petitioners are brothers and the non-petitioner has got half share in the disputed Haveli as per the registered family settlement dated 26.9.1981 which is comprised of joint chowk-pol and as such the petitioner has got a right of pre-emption in the disputed property. It was further averred in the plaint that petitioner No. 1 has sold a portion of the disputed property to the petitioner No. 2 vide registered sale deed dated 24.7.84 for a consideration of Rs. 10,000/- without giving any notice to him and therefore prayed for a decree of right of pre-emption in lieu of Rs. 10,000/- and for possession accordingly. (4). Petitioners filed their separate written statements on 25.2.1985 and 25.1.1985 respectively and denied the averments of the plaint in toto. In para No. 10 and 14, it was specifically contended by the petitioners that petitioner No. 1 had dire necessity of money and is a near relative of the petitioner No. 2 being brother-in-law of petitioner No. 2. Petitioner No. 1 and the non-petitioner came to Bhagwati Lal and asked about the necessity of Rs. 20,000/-. In para No. 10 and 14, it was specifically contended by the petitioners that petitioner No. 1 had dire necessity of money and is a near relative of the petitioner No. 2 being brother-in-law of petitioner No. 2. Petitioner No. 1 and the non-petitioner came to Bhagwati Lal and asked about the necessity of Rs. 20,000/-. Since the matter related in between the near relatives, therefore, it was agreed between the petitioners. It was agreed that petitioner No. 1 will execute a registered sale deed in the name of the petitioner No. 2 and in case the money is returned back with interest, the petitioner No. 2 will re-register and get it resold in favour of petitioner No. 1. (5). According to the petitioner, Bhagwati Lal gave Rs. 20,000/- to the Petitioner No. 1 and got executed a registered sale deed for a consideration of Rs. 10,000/-in his name for the upper storey and for the same consideration of lower storey in the name of his son Navratan. An agreement was also executed by petitioner No. 1 in favour of Bhagwatilal to the effect that the petitioner No. 1 will return the aforesaid amount with interest within a month then he will get executed a registered sale deed in favour of petitioner No. 1. The petitioner No. 1 returned the aforesaid amount of Rs. 20,000/- to Bhagwatilal with interest, who in turn executed a registered sale deed in favour of petitioner No.l. (6). Learned trial court framed issues. Before the evidence of the plaintiff started, the petitioner No. 1 moved an application on 24.7.89 under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. read with Section 151 C.P.C. for taking in evidence two documents i.e. an agreement dated 25.7.84 executed between Bharosilal and Bhagwatilal and the registered sale deed dated 4.9.89 in suit No. 10/89. In his application, the petitioner No.l has stated that the documents sought to be produced in evidence are necessary for the proper decision of the suit. It was submitted that the documents are genuine. They were not in power and possession of the petitioner at the time of framing of issues and therefore, they could not be produced. The documents werein possession of the wife of petitioner No. 1 who had kept them in her maternal home which were mixed with some other articles and could not be traced out earlier. They were not in power and possession of the petitioner at the time of framing of issues and therefore, they could not be produced. The documents werein possession of the wife of petitioner No. 1 who had kept them in her maternal home which were mixed with some other articles and could not be traced out earlier. When the petitioner went to attend a marriage and stayed at their maternal house, the documents were searched and traced and, therefore, they were being produced with the application. It was also stated that the petitioners evidence had not yet started and, therefore no prejudice will be caused to the plaintiff-non-petitioners. A reply to the application was filed by the non-petitioner and after hearing the parties, the learned trial court dismissed the applications filed by petitioners No. 1. (7). In order to answer the two questions referred by the learned Single Judge, we may notice the provisions of Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. and Section 115 C.P.C. "O.XIII, r. 2 C.P.C. Effect of non-production of documents: — (1) No documentary evidence in the possession or power of any party which should have been but has not been produced in accordance with the requirements of r. 1 shall be received at any subsequent stage of the proceedings unless good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the court for the non-production thereof; and the court receiving any such evidence shall record the reasons for so doing. (2) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to the documents:- (a) Produced for the cross-examination of witnesses of the other party, or (b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory." "S. 115. Revision : (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears : — (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it think fit. Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where - (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding. or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. (2) The High Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any court subordinate thereto. Explanation: — In this section, the expression any case decided includes only an order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings." (8). A perusal of order 13 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure shows that it does not provide for any particular form in which the order of the court is to be passed. The object of Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. is merely to prevent late production of documents, so that it may not cause injustice to either of the parties. The provision however cloths the court with discretion to allow production of documents, if it is satisfied that good cause has been shows to its satisfaction. This provision can be read as divided into two parts. The first part contains a prohibitive clause that no documentary evidence in possession or power of any party which should have been produced in accordance with the requirement of Order 13 R. 2 C.P.C. but has not been so produced, shall be received at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. In the second part, a discretion has been conferred on the court to permit production of such documents at a stage later than one envisaged by Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. if good cause has been shown to the satisfaction of the court, for non-production of such documents. There is a further rider in the second part and this rider is that the court receiving such evidence shall record reasons for doing so. The provision can be read in yet another manner. There is a further rider in the second part and this rider is that the court receiving such evidence shall record reasons for doing so. The provision can be read in yet another manner. Ordinarily, the court shall not receive documentary evidence in possession or power of any party at a stage subsequent to the stages as specified in Order 13 Rule 1 C.P.C., if such document has not been produced earlier, and unless the court is satisfied that there was good cause for non-production of such documentary evidence. If the court allows the production of documentary evidence at a stage subsequent to the one specified in Order 13 Rule 1, it shall record reasons for doing so. The provision clearly confers a discretion on the competent court to receive documentary evidence at a later stage of the proceedings, if it is satisfied that there existo good cause, but the exercise of the discretion must be evidenced in the reasons which the court is required to record in support of its order. The discretion which vests in the court as per the plain language of Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. is only hedged with one condition that the court must feel satisfied about the existence of a good cause. The party which wants to produce documentary evidence at a stage subsequent to the stage specified in Order 13 Rule 1 must satisfy the court that there exists a good cause for non-production of the documents and the court must indicate in its order the reasons by which it has felt satisfied that good cause has been shown for non-production of documents at the earlier stage. It is very much clear from the language of the rule itself that the court before which an application is made under Order 13 Rule 2 must apply its mind to the reasons or cause given by the applicant for failure to produce documents in accordance with Order 13 Rule 1. If the court is satisfied that good cause exists, it can allow production of documents and in doing so. it must record reasons. Once good cause has been shown to the satisfaction of the court, it cannot arbitrarily refuse to receive such documentary evidence. If it declines to receive documentary evidence, then too, it is required to record reasons. If the court is satisfied that good cause exists, it can allow production of documents and in doing so. it must record reasons. Once good cause has been shown to the satisfaction of the court, it cannot arbitrarily refuse to receive such documentary evidence. If it declines to receive documentary evidence, then too, it is required to record reasons. That is very much implicit in the scheme of Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C.If good cause is shown by a party for its failure to produce the documents in accordance with the requirement of Order 13 Rule 1 the court cannot without giving reasons decline to receive documents. The satisfaction of the court about the existence or non-existence of good cause has to be indicated in the order itself. The order passed under Order 13 Rule 2 can be challenged in different ways. As will be shown hereinafter, in our opinion, a revision petition is maintainable under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an order passed under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. That apart such an order can be challenged even in appeal filed under Section % C.P.C. against the final judgment and decree which may be passed by the court. If the order is passed without reasons the court will be left to probe in dark or to make a fishing and rowing enquiry about the reasons which led to the passing of the order by the court for its refusal to receive documentary evidence despite the fact that good cause is shown. (9). On the basis of development, which has taken place during last 3 decades, it is now one of the settled principle that even quasi-judicial orders must be reasoned order unless requirement of recording of reasons is dispensed with by specific Legislative enactment. Such exclusion can also be inferred by necessary implication by virtue of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. In Simens Engineering and Manufacturing Company Ltd. vs. Union of India (1) the Court was dealing with an appeal against the order of Central Government on revisional application under a Sea Customs Act, 1878. Such exclusion can also be inferred by necessary implication by virtue of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. In Simens Engineering and Manufacturing Company Ltd. vs. Union of India (1) the Court was dealing with an appeal against the order of Central Government on revisional application under a Sea Customs Act, 1878. In that case, the Supreme Court has laid down the following principle of law: — "It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of administrative law, they may, have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order, is like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law." (10). In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. Vs. Union of India (2), Subbarao, J. in his dissenting judgment observed: — "In the context of a welfare State, administrative tribunals have come to stay. Indeed, they arc the necessary concomitants of a welfare State. But arbitrariness in their functioning destroys the concept of a welfare State itself. Self discipline and supervision exclude or at any rate minimize arbitrariness. The least a tribunal can do is to disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure guarantees consideration. The condition to give reasons introduce clarity and excludes or at any rate minimizes arbitrariness; it gives satisfaction to the party against which the order is made; and it also enables an appellate or supervisory court to keep the tribunals within bounds. The least a tribunal can do is to disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure guarantees consideration. The condition to give reasons introduce clarity and excludes or at any rate minimizes arbitrariness; it gives satisfaction to the party against which the order is made; and it also enables an appellate or supervisory court to keep the tribunals within bounds. A reasoned order is desirable condition of judicial disposal." "If tribunals can make orders without giving reasons, the said power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest officers may turn out to be a potent weapon for abuses of power. But, if reasons for an order are given, it will be an effective restraint on such abuse, as the order, if it discloses extraneous or irrelevant considerations will be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction. A speaking order will at its best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard." "There is an essential distinction between a court and an administrative tribunal. A Judge is trained to look at things objectively, uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency; but an executive officer generally looks at things from the stand-point of policy and expediency. The habit of mind of an executive officer so formed cannot be expected to change from function to function or from act to act. So it is essential that some restrictions shall be imposed on tribunals in the matter of passing orders affecting the rights of parties; and the least they should do is to give reasons for their order. Even in the case of appellate courts invariably reasons are given, except when they dismiss an appeal or revision in limine and that is because the appellate or revisional court agrees with the reasoned judgment of the subordinate court or there are legally permissible grounds to interfere with it. But the same reasoning cannot apply to an appellate tribunal, for as often as not the order of the first tribunal is laconic and does not give any reason." (11). But the same reasoning cannot apply to an appellate tribunal, for as often as not the order of the first tribunal is laconic and does not give any reason." (11). In the latest decision of the Supreme Court in S.N. Mukharjee vs. Union of India (3), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has after considering the American as well as English law, observed : — "The object underlying the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fair play in action". The requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves his object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision making. Keeping in view the expanding horizen of the principle of natural justice, therefore, it must be held that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory-frame work whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme of the provision of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case." (12). If that is the requirement of passing of speaking orders/reasoned orders by the administrative authorities and quasi-judicial authorities, there can be no doubt that while passing orders under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil Court must record reasons. Recording of reasons is an essence of the rule of law, which constitutes the foundation of all proceedings. (13). In Smt. Swaranlata Vs. Recording of reasons is an essence of the rule of law, which constitutes the foundation of all proceedings. (13). In Smt. Swaranlata Vs. Harendra Kumar (4), their Lordships had made very aluminating observations regarding the procedure to be followed by the courts under the Code of Civil Procedure in cases of civil disputes. It will be appropriate to quote them: — "Trial of a civil dispute in Court is intended to achieve according to the law and the procedure of the Court, a judicial determination between the contesting parties of the matter in controversy. A judicial determination of a disputed claim where substantial question of law or fact arise is satisfactorily reached, only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that suggest themselves to the Judge; a mere order deciding the matter in dispute not supported by reason is no judgment at all. Recording of reasons is intended to ensure that the decision is not the result of whim or fancy, but of a judicial approach to the matter in contest; it is also intended to ensure adjudication of the matter according to law and the procedure established by law. A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the grounds on which the Court has decided against him, and more so, when the judgment is subject to appeal. The appellate court will then have adequate material on which it may determine whether the facts are properly ascertained, the law has been correctly applied and the resultant decision is just." (14). The appellate court will then have adequate material on which it may determine whether the facts are properly ascertained, the law has been correctly applied and the resultant decision is just." (14). In Radhey Shyam vs. Lalli (5), this court has observed as under:- "It must be impressed upon the trial court that due weight should be given while writing an order, to the respective contentions of both the parties and proper reasons should be assigned for the conclusions arrived at by that court so that appellate or revisional court may be able to appreciate as to what ground prevailed with the trial court while passing such an order.As the trial court has to exercise its judicial discretion while proceeding to allow or to disallow an application for setting aside ex-parte decree, the trial court is expected to record its finding clearly as also the reasons upon which such finding is based." These authorities clearly bring out the principle of law that the conclusions of the court must be supported by reasons duly recorded and this requirement transcended all technical rules of procedure. The Trial Court must give due weight to the respective contentions of the parties and should assign proper reasons for its decision so that the appellate court or the revisional court maybe able to appreciate grounds or reasons which prevailed with the trial court while passing the order. We are also of the considered opinion that while passing an order under Order 13 Rule 2 accepting application for producing documentary evidence, the court is under an obligation to record reasons by virtue of the express provision contained in Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. At the same time, requirement of recording of reasons for refusing to accept such documentary evidence is implicit in the scheme of Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. (15). The second question which has been referred for answer is as to "whether no revision petition would lie against an order by which the subordinate court has refused to accept evidence under O. 13, R. 2 C.P.C. notwithstanding the fact that good cause has been shown for late production and the document is of vital importance. (16). The question of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Sec. 115 CDC. has been examined in various decisions of this court. (16). The question of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Sec. 115 CDC. has been examined in various decisions of this court. In Harak Chand vs. State of Rajasthan (6), a Full Bench of this court held that whether particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question of law, which the High Court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question; it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. That was a judgment given prior to the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure by Amending Act of 1976. The amended provisions were examined by a learned Single Judge in Radhey Shyam vs. Nathu Ram(7), and also in Ram Chand vs. Laxmi Kumar (8).In the first case, the learned Judge took the view that for invoking revisional jurisdiction, not only the conditions laid down in Sec. 115 (1) (a), (b) or (c) are to be fulfilled but also either of the conditions in Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso are to be satisfied and the restrictions under Sec. 115 (2) is also to be met. Proviso added to this Section by the Amendment Act of 1976 Act only further restricts the scope of revision. The learned Judge further held that whether a good cause has been shown under O. 13 ,R. 2 warranting admission of a document after framing of issues, is a question on which the court may express opinion rightly or wrongly and while doing so it may commit an error of law by wrong interpretation of law on the scope of 0.13 R. 2. CDC. or may commit a mistake in holding that there is no good cause when one is provided, but that would not result in bringing the case under Sec. 18 (1) (a), (b) or (c). Thus , against rejection of an application under O. 13 R. 2 CDC. no revision can lie. In the second case, the learned Judge took the view that the petitioner who comes to the High Court for invoking jurisdiction under Section 115 CDC. should by cogent reasons and material on record, make out a clear case of failure of justice or irreparable injury. no revision can lie. In the second case, the learned Judge took the view that the petitioner who comes to the High Court for invoking jurisdiction under Section 115 CDC. should by cogent reasons and material on record, make out a clear case of failure of justice or irreparable injury. In case where all that has been shown is that there was an error of jurisdiction only, a legal inference of irreparable injury or failure of justice cannot be made as a presumption of law. Petitioner who comes to the court is required to further show some thing more for invoking the jurisdiction of the court for proving that there has been failure of justice or irreparable injury. (17). The matter was then considered by another learned Single Judge in Ghever Chand vs. Jag Singh (9). In that case the learned Judge analysed the provisions of Section 115 CDC. and after considering several decisions of this court, Supreme Court and the other High Court observed : — "Even when interlocutory order does not adjudicate or determine any right or obligations of the parties in controversy in the suit, still, such an interlocutory order may occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury and as such, it can be said that such an order is revisable. The expression "any case which has been decided" includes "any order made." It is true that the expression "any order made" includes within its embrace all sorts of orders. Such a wide connotation of course, cannot be given to the expression "any order". An order, which may ultimately affect the decision of the suit or which may ultimately affect the right of the party, though it is not adjudicating the right, may, in my opinion, be covered under the expression "any order". Take for example, partys evidence is closed without any rhyme or reason. Assistance of issue of process has been illegally refused. It may be stated that no right in controversy has been adjudged, but, as such order ultimately affects the right of the party or affects the decision of the suit and so in my opinion, would be covered under the expression "any order". (18). The judgment of the court in Ram Chand vs. Laxmi Kumar (supra) became subject matter of consideration in a reference made to a Division Bench in Yakub Ali vs. F. Haji Tajkhanji Ibrahimji (10). (18). The judgment of the court in Ram Chand vs. Laxmi Kumar (supra) became subject matter of consideration in a reference made to a Division Bench in Yakub Ali vs. F. Haji Tajkhanji Ibrahimji (10). The Division Bench in that case over-ruled the decision in Ram Chands case and observed : — "We have carefully considered Narainlas case(supra) and Ramchands case (1) in the light of ss. 105 and 115, proviso (b) C.P.C. It was clearly laid down in S.S. Khannas case that where the decision itself is not appealable to the High Court directly exercise of the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court would not be deemed excluded. Apart from that the object behind s. 115 CDC. is to provide means to an aggrieved party to obtain correction or rectification of non-appealable order though this power has to be exercised on the fulfilment of all the conditions laid down in it. If the interpretation which has been taken in Narainlals case (supra) and Ramchands case is accepted, that will, in our opinion, frustrate the very purpose and object of s. 115 CDC. Apart from this, it should also not be lost sight of that, amongst others, the explanation to s. 115 unambiguously lays down that in Section 115, expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made in the course of a suit or any other proceeding. This explanation is more than clear that case decided means even a part of case and as such on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in proviso (b), interference can be made with the order refusing to record evidence. It follows from what has been discussed above that if any jurisdictional error has been committed by the subordinate court in the course of a suit or other proceedings, it can be corrected in revision provided that order has occasioned failure of justice or caused irreparable injury to the party against whom the order has been made. The mere fact that such an order can be challenged by setting forth an objection in memo of appeal against the decree under s. 105 CDC. would not be sufficient for not invoking the revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 CDC. The mere fact that such an order can be challenged by setting forth an objection in memo of appeal against the decree under s. 105 CDC. would not be sufficient for not invoking the revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 CDC. on the ground that as that order can be challenged by setting forth as a ground of objection in the memo of appeal against the decree in an appeal, it cannot be said to occasion failure of justice or not to have caused irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. On the basis of S.S. Khannas case and Baldevdass case and the Explanation to s. 115 C.P.C. we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the interlocutory order relating to jurisdictional error, if it falls within the expression "any case which has been decided" can be challenged in revision provided the aggrieved party satisfies the High Court that order has resulted in failure of justice or has caused irreparable injury to him. The contrary view taken in Narainlals case (supra) and Ramchands case is over-ruled." (19). In Harbilash vs. Kalyan Prasad (11) a learned Single Judge again examined the scope of Section 115 CDC. and then observed : — "In view of the aforesaid decisions of this court there remains no room for controversy that the High Court is empowered to rectify an order of subordinate court at any stage of the suit or other proceedings and that the revision is no bar merely because the correctness of such order can be challenged under Sec. 105 C.P.C. It would also be clear that by adding explanation to Sec. 115 C.P.C. the scope and ambit of a revision before the High Court have been widened and any limitation put on the expression any case which has been decided in Sec. 115 C.P.C. in some of the cases would no longer be held good view in the light of the amendment of the said section. It is further clear that even when an interlocutory order may not adjudicate or determine any rights or obligation of the parties to the suit, but in case such an order may occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable loss the order would become revisable." (20). It is further clear that even when an interlocutory order may not adjudicate or determine any rights or obligation of the parties to the suit, but in case such an order may occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable loss the order would become revisable." (20). Learned Judge took the view that the scope of Section 115 has been widened and any limitation put on the expression "any case which has been decided" in Section 115 C.P.C. in some of the cases would no longer be held good in the light of the Amendment of the said Section. In Municipal Council, Bharatpur vs. Gokulchand (12), a Single Bench of this court took the view that Amendment Act of 1976 has increased the scope of Section 115 C.P.C. It was further held that revision against the order of trial court rejecting an application of the defendant under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. for taking documents on record is maintainable. In Ramjilal vs. Durgalal (13), a learned Single Judge entertained the revision petition against the order passed by the Trial Court rejecting application of the defendant filed under Order 13 Rule 2 for bringing on record some documents, which were letters of the Devsthan Commissioner and the certified copy of the judgment passed by it. (21). In Nand Kishore vs. Budh Ram (14) this court allowed the revision petition filed against the order passed by the trial court allowing an application filed under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C.. The reason for acceptance of the revision petition was that the trial court was entitled to admit documents if good cause was shown, but if the party has not disclosed as to how and when the documents were discovered by it, and no sufficient reason has been given for non-production of the documents at the earlier stage, the court was entitled to see the documentary evidence. (22). In Mool Chand Sharma Vs. Hari Shanker Sharma (15), a learned Single Judge allowed the revision petition filed against the order passed under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. permitting production of the documents at a late stage. The court took the view that no good cause has been shown for late production of the documents. (23). In Ganesh Ram Vs. In Mool Chand Sharma Vs. Hari Shanker Sharma (15), a learned Single Judge allowed the revision petition filed against the order passed under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. permitting production of the documents at a late stage. The court took the view that no good cause has been shown for late production of the documents. (23). In Ganesh Ram Vs. Paras Finance Company and another (16), a learned Single Judge of this Court took the view that where the trial court had, by untenable interpretation of Sec. 30 (2) of the Registration Act, erred in believing a document to be properly registered, it must be deemed to have acted with illegality or with material irregularity and the revision petition against such order is maintainable. The matter has been examined in yet another decision by a learned Single Judge in Jagdish Cotton Textile Mills Ltd, Vs. Union of India (17) and after referring to various cases, the learned Judge held that a revision petition against an order passed under O. 13 R. 2 C.P.C. is not maintainable. (24). We may now analyse Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Section provides that the High Court can call for the record of any case, which has been decided by the Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto and if such subordinate court appears to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested in it or to have acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. In such a case the High Court can make an order as it thinks fit. Thus the High Court can entertain revision petition in a case where it appears to the court that the subordinate court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested in it or to have acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. A further rider has been provided in the Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 115 C.PC. A further rider has been provided in the Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 115 C.PC. The rider is that the High Court shall, under this section, vary or reverse .any order made or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding except where an order if it had been made in favour of a party applying for revision would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding or an order if allowed to stand would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. Thus these conditions are required to be fulfilled before the interference in revision petition can be made by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 115 (1) C.P.C. There is a further provision in Section 115, which provides that the High Court shall not under Sec. 115 vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any court subordinate to it. An explanation has also been added to Section 115 on the recommendations of the joint Committee of Law Commission. There was conflict of opinion amongst various High Courts about the interpretation of the phrase "case decided." The Joint Committee recommended that the expression ?" case decided" should be clarified so as to include the interlocutory order. Apparently the explanation has been added after taking into consideration the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M/s S.S. Khanna vs. Brg. F.J. Dhillon (18) and Baldevdas vs. Filmisthan Distribution (19). The explanation now makes it clear that the expression "case decided" includes any order made or any order deciding any issue in the course of the suit or other proceedings. Clearly by addition of this explanation, the scope of the expression "case decided" has been widened. Nevertheless, before an order made by a subordinate court is revised by the High Court, the Conditions Specified in Section 115 (1) C.P.C. as well as those specified in the Proviso to sub-section (1) will have to be fulfilled. Clearly by addition of this explanation, the scope of the expression "case decided" has been widened. Nevertheless, before an order made by a subordinate court is revised by the High Court, the Conditions Specified in Section 115 (1) C.P.C. as well as those specified in the Proviso to sub-section (1) will have to be fulfilled. The view that the explanation added to Section 115 by 1976 Amending Act has widened the scope and ambit of Section 115 finding support from the decision of Orissa High Court in Tata Iron and Steel Company vs. Rajrishi Experts (20) and in our opinion the judgment of justice M.C. Jain (as he then was) in Ghever Chands case (supra) lays down correct principle of law. (25). On a consideration of the various authorities, we are of the view that illegal assumption of jurisdiction not vested in the court of failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in it usually relate to initial stage or a case, but acting illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction comes after the court has validly and lawfully assumed jurisdiction. If in exercise of a jurisdiction vested in it the court acts with illegality or with material irregularity i.e. where there is a exercise of jurisdiction, which the court possesses but the exercise has been in a manner which is illegal or materially irregular, then Clause (c) of Section 115 (1) would be attracted. It must always be remembered that the powers which have been conferred on the revisional court by virtue of Section 115 are intended with a view to subserve the ends of justice and not to defeat them. Now if, under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. a party applies for producing documentary evidence and offers sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the court and still without assigning any reason, the court refuses to exercise its discretion in favour of the party making an application, it is certainly a case where the order of the court suffers from material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in it. A revision petition against such an order will clearly be maintainable. A revision petition against such an order will clearly be maintainable. Similarly if in a case, without the existence of sufficient cause, the court allows an application filed under Order 13 Rule 2, it will have to be held that the court has committed material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction of entertaining application under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. In that event also a revision petition will be maintainable. Of Course, it will be for the High Court to consider as to whether failure of justice has been occasioned on account of passing of that order and then only the court will be entitled to pass order accepting the revision petition. In our considered opinion, the view taken by this court in Radhey Shyams case (supra)as well as in Jagjeet Cotton Mills case (supra) do not lay down correct proposition of law. In fact in Jagjeet Cotton Mills case, the learned Judge himself observed that in all 4 cases the trial courts have given reasons in their orders for not receiving the documents and none of the documents is going to affect the ultimate decision of the cases in which they have been filed. Learned Single Judge in Municipal Council Bharatpur Vs. Gokul Chand and Ramjilal vs. Durgalal (supra) allowed the revision petitions treating them to be maintainable and held that the trial court had erred in not receiving the documents. Similarly in Nand Kishores case (supra) and Mool Chand Sharmas case (supra) the two learned Judges entertained the revision petitions and allowed them against the orders passed under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. by which applications for production of documentary evidence were allowed by the trial court. Both the learned Judges proceeded on the premise that the revision petitions were maintainable against the orders passed by the trial court under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. (26). Both the learned Judges proceeded on the premise that the revision petitions were maintainable against the orders passed by the trial court under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. (26). Thus, we answer the two questions in the following manner: — (1) A subordinate court must record reasons for refusing to receive documentary evidence sought to be adduced under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. where good cause has been shown for late production of the document and the document is material one; (2) We answer the second question in affirmative and hold that revision would lie against an order by which the Subordinate court has refused to accept documentary evidence under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C. These two cases may now be placed before the learned Single Judge for decision in accordance with law.