Judgment :- The above writ appeals have been filed against the common order dated 26.8.1987 of the learned single Judge made in a batch of writ petitions disposed of together regard to the fact that they involve a common question as to whether "wet grinder" manufactured and sold is eligible to excise duty under Excise Tariff Item 33-C of the Excise Tariff in the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. Having regard the nature of the issue involved before us, they are dealt with in common by us. 2. The basic and relevant facts necessary for our purpose are beyond controversy. respondents herein who were the writ petitioners manufacture and sell what is commercially known and called as "wet grinders". The goods sold are complete units after assembling the respective factory of the manufacturers and that the invoices are raised separately motor portion and for grinder portion and that what is manufactured is really the grinder portion and the electric motors purchased from outside from its manufacturers are attached and fixed with the grinder. The grinders as such have no electrical connection for operation by receiving electrical energy. But on the other hand the motor is placed along with provided with pulleys for relating the grinder by means of V-belts. Thus so far as manufacturers in question are concerned, what they really do is they manufacture grinder and purchase the electric motors separately from another manufacturer and virtually fits up the electric motor to the steel frame of the wet grinder in the space allotted for same and connects the wheel base of the grinder with that of the motor by using a V 3. Excise Tariff Item 33-C which was introduced by the Finance Act No.14 of 1969 effect from 1.3.1969 reads as follows: When the authorities of the Department called upon the various manufacturers grinders to take out a licence under the Central Excises and Salt Act,ihey protested made representations through the manufacturer-Association to which they were informed the authorities that domestic grinders will not fall within the scope of Excise Tariff Item Notwithstanding this stand taken at one stage, the Department officials at a later point time sought to make out domestic grinders will fall within the scope of Tariff Item through the issue of trade notices. It appears that when again representations were made the manufacturers as well as traders, the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Board of Excise and Customs, New Delhi, by their circular dated 12.6.1975 made it that wet grinders by the external motor system would fall outside the scope of Item 33 the Central Excise Tariff. Notwithstanding this, again another circular trade notice challenged in the writ petitions in question came to be issued declaring that wet grinders marketed without any electric motor will fall under Tariff Item 68 and if the same is marketed electric motor they will fall under Tariff Item 33-C. It is in those circumstances, the writ petitions came to be filed before this court. 4. Before the learned single Judge, what was urged on behalf of the various writ petitioners was that the wet grinders in question manufactured and sold by them will not fall under 33-C of the Central Excise Tariff, inasmuch as they did not have inbuilt motors for operations of the system itself and the grinders are operated by V-belt mechanism and through external motors. It was also contended before the learned single Judge that identical issue the Gujarat High Court in the decisions reported in Bala-krishna Rechhodlal Shah and others v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Ahmedabad and others, 1979 377, and Shri Punit Ghar Ganti v. Union of India and another, 1981 E.L.T. 121, held that grinders will not fall under Item 33-C and the Central Excise law being a Central enactment must be enforced uniformly throughout the country and the contrary view or stand taken the Central Excise Authorities in Tamil Nadu cannot be countenanced. Reliance was placed on the fact that the Special Leave Petition filed by the Department against judgment of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court was rejected in limine Supreme Court of India and leave to appeal was refused. Reliance was placed on the fact that the Special Leave Petition filed by the Department against judgment of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court was rejected in limine Supreme Court of India and leave to appeal was refused. It was further contended that the conclusion reached by the Collector of Central Excise in a conference was accepted Central Board of Excise and Customs and the Central Government issued appropriate instructions that the manufacture and sale of wet grinders will not fall under Item 33 Central Excise Tariff, it was not open to the Department to go back on the same or vary conclusions except for sufficient and cogent reasons based on fresh facts such as subsequent judicial pronouncements and that the authorities cannot depart from their earlier stand and when they like. 5. On behalf of the appellants, a preliminary objection was raised before the learned Judge contending that the writ petitions are premature and not maintainable against trade notices and that as the matter involved questions of fact which cannot be satisfactorily decided in a writ proceedings, the question must be left to be decided by appropriate authorities functioning under the Act. It was also contended on their behalf that wet are commonly known and used only as electrical appliances and not otherwise and that the writ petitioners completed the process by fitting the electric motor with the wet grinder, manufacturing process takes place as a result of which, according to the Department, commercially new product emerges rendering the manufacturers thereby liable to respect of wet grinders manufactured and sold by them under Item 33-C of the Excise Tariff. 6. After considering the respective submissions of the learned counsel on either side with relevant materials produced, the learned single Judge came to the conclusion that grinders in question fall outside the scope of Item 33-C of the Central Excise Tariff. The raised questioning the maintainability was also rejected. The learned Judge further following the decision of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in J.K.Synthetics Ltd. another v. Union of India and others, 1981 E.L.T. 328, that the reasons assigned Department do not satisfy the criteria laid down by the Delhi High Court justifying the of view. The raised questioning the maintainability was also rejected. The learned Judge further following the decision of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in J.K.Synthetics Ltd. another v. Union of India and others, 1981 E.L.T. 328, that the reasons assigned Department do not satisfy the criteria laid down by the Delhi High Court justifying the of view. On the said view, the learned Judge declared that there is no need or necessity formally quash the impugned trade notices inasmuch as the declaration made by him binding on the assessing authorities. Only in so far as W.P.No.596 of 1981 is concerned against which W.A.No.847 of 1988 has filed before us, the adjudication order which was the subject matter of challenge was aside. In respect of other writ petitions, they were dismissed on the simple ground that formal rule absolute need be issued to quash the trade notices for the reason referred above. Aggrieved, the Department has filed the above appeals. 7. Mr.K.Jayachandran, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants reiterated the submissions made before the learned single and contended that the wet grinder manufactured and sold by the respondents is a domestic electrical appliance falling within item 33-C of the Central Excise Tariff and that the learned Judge erred in placing reliance upon the decisions of the Gujarat High Court and the expressed in some of the earlier circulars. According to the learned counsel, it may correct to consider that only grinders having inbuilt motors will fall under the Tariff Item question and the grinders operated by motors with V-belt mechanism will not fall thereunder. 8. Mr.A.S.Kailasam and Mr.S.Balasubramanian, learned counsel appearing on behalf respondents reiterated before us the reasoning of the learned single Judge based upon decisions of the Gujarat High Court and contended that the order of the learned Judge not call for any interference in our hands. 9. We have been taken at length by the learned counsel appearing on either side through two decisions of the Gujarat High Court referred to supra and we are of the view that exception could be taken to either the correctness of the ratio laid down therein conclusions of the learned single Judge to apply the said ratio to the case on hand in of the manufacturers. The learned single Judge extensively quoted the ratio of the decision the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court which makes it unnecessary for us to refer them in detail once again in this judgment. Suffice it to refer to the fact that the very High Court in Shri Punit Ghar Ganti v. Union of India and another, 1981 E.L.T. 121, the earlier Division Bench Judgment and pointed out that it is the electric element or or rotor or starter which gives the specific character to the goods of the description electric appliance and unless electric part is fitted into it by which the said appliance the rest of the assemblage would be only a domestic appliance which could not fall within specific tariff Item of electrical appliances, but would be any other kind of power domestic grinder. 10. It is a well-known principle of construction in interpreting the tariff item or taxable that scientific, technical or dictionary meaning should not be mechanically adopted and words used therein have to be construed in their own context and in the sense as understood by the people usually conversant and dealing in such goods. Having regard tariff Item under consideration before us, it required to be considered as to what electrical appliance. In a decision reported in State of Gujarat v. Sukan Industries, S.T.C. 344, another Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court which spoke through P.D.Desai as he then was, had an occasion to construe entry 92 of Schedule II-Part Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 which used the term "domestic Electrical appliance" learned Judges held, while applying the ratio of the earlier Division Bench Judgment in 1979 E.L.T. 377, that "domestic appliance" in order that it can be properly "domestic electrical appliance ’ must have as its in-built device an electrical contrivance would make it a complete unit fit to render the designed service and that a appliance which is merely an assemblage of various component parts minus that contrivance which gives to it the electric motive power would not be a domestic electric properly so-called. 11. 11. In Deputy Commissioner v. Equipment Agencies, (1981)47 S. T.C. 68, a Division of the Kerala High Court had an occasion to consider the scope of the expression goods ’ in entry 26 of the First Schedule to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 and held therein that going by its ordinary connotation as also its meaning as understood commercial parlance it will take within its scope only appliances which are exclusively dependent upon the sue of electrical energy for their working, and which cannot be any use except in relation to the utilisation of electrical energy. It was also considered necessary that intrinsically the goods in question must be susceptible of being classified electrical goods in the sense that they by their very nature answer the said description. In coming to such a conclusion and holding that pumpsets, grinders, compressors, lathes etc. sold by the assessee therein cannot be said to be either which intrinsically fit in with the description of electrical goods or that they can be put only by use of electrical energy, the Division Bench placed reliance upon, among things, the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in William Jacks and Company Ltd v. State of Madras, (1960)11 S.T.C.340. 12. Again, a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to construe the very expression while interpreting entry 41 of the Schedule, at the relevant time of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Act, 1959 and it was held therein that unless "intrinsically the goods are electrical goods, the mere fact that an article cannot be used without electricity cannot be considered to be a decisive test. The said Division Bench referred to and relied upon the two Division Bench judgments of this Court. Of the two decisions, one was the case in Jacks and Company Ltd v. State of Madras, (1960)11 S.T.C. 340 , wherein it. was held lathe, even though driven by an electrical energy, will not come within the scope expression "electrical goods." 13. In the light of the various pronouncements referred to supra, we are of the view order to bring an article or commodity within the meaning of Tariff Item 33-C and within meaning of the expression "domestic electrical appliance" it is necessary that electrical appliances should be in built in the commodity concerned. In the light of the various pronouncements referred to supra, we are of the view order to bring an article or commodity within the meaning of Tariff Item 33-C and within meaning of the expression "domestic electrical appliance" it is necessary that electrical appliances should be in built in the commodity concerned. An electrical appliance is same as electrically operated machinery and all electrically operated machineries cannot said to answer the description of electrical appliances. The presence of an electric motor an apparatus or machinery notwithstanding that electric motor formed a distinct, severable and separate unit, cannot have the effect of rendering the machinery or apparatus electrical appliance merely because the said motor also was fixed as a distinct component wet grinder, connected by a V-belt. 14. We are of the view that having regard to the fact that indisputably the manufacturer wet grinder and the trader have purchased electric motors from third parties and thereafter fitted the latter into the steel frame of the wet grinder and connected the motor with grinder by V-belt, the article in question cannot be treated to be an electrical appliance is an essential pre-requisite to make it fall within Item 33-C of the Central Excise addition to the same being a domestic appliance. Though excise duty is levied incidence of manufacture or production and removal of the goods for consumption, no need so far as the case on hand is concerned to detain ourselves to dwell in detail aspect as to the nature of the process involved in fitting the electric motor to the steel of the wet grinder in the space allotted for the same, inasmuch as prima facie we that by mere process of assembling the electric motor in the already existing grinder commercially new product as such emerges by any manufacturing process. That apart, are also concerned more about the identity of the commodity and as to whether it the description of domestic electrical appliance which we have answered in the negative already. 15. For all the above reasons, we are not persuaded in any manner to come to a conclusion than the one arrived at by the learned single Judge and we find no justification take a view contra. The plea of the appellants, therefore, merits only rejection at our. 16. 15. For all the above reasons, we are not persuaded in any manner to come to a conclusion than the one arrived at by the learned single Judge and we find no justification take a view contra. The plea of the appellants, therefore, merits only rejection at our. 16. The plea raised on behalf of the appellants regarding the maintainability of the petitions has been highly repelled by the learned single Judge and we are not convinced the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants on this aspect either. light of our conclusions as above, we consider it unnecessary to go into the question on the legality or otherwise of the competency of the authorities to change their view whether there are sufficient grounds for such a change in the circumstances of the case. writ appeals therefore, fail and shall stand dismissed; but in the circumstances, there no order as to costs. V.K. - — Appeal dismissed.