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Allahabad High Court · body

1991 DIGILAW 996 (ALL)

Ferooz Jehan v. Transport Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow

1991-08-02

D.S.SINHA, S.K.DHAON

body1991
JUDGMENT S. K. Dhaon, J. 1. In this petition there are 19 petitioners, some of them have applied for the grant of a temporary permit each to the Regional Transport Authority, Moradabad and some of them have made similar applications to the Regional Transport Authority Kathgodam. Their grievance is that their applications are not being disposed of either by the two aforementioned Regional Transport Authorities or their respective Secretaries exercising delegated powers on the ground that the petitioners have not furnished two sureties so as to ensure the payment of the passenger tax if and when the same is due. The insistence upon the performance of such a condition by the petitioner is under challenge in this petition. 2. The allegation is that the two Transport Authorities and their Secretaries are imposing the aforesaid condition at the direction of the Transport Commissioner of Uttar Pradesh. It is urged that the Transport Commissioner had no jurisdiction to issue such a direction. It is also urged that, in any case, the Transport Authorities or their Secretaries cannot act upon the directive of the Transport Commissioner while exercising quasi-judicial powers for the purposes of granting temporary permits. Sub-section (1) of Section 87 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act no. 59 of 1988) (hereinafter referred to as the New Act) empowers a Regional Transport Authority and a State Transport Authority to grant temporary permits in four specified conditions. The provision also empowers the said authorities to "attach to any such permit such conditions as it may think fit". Sub-section (1) of Section 87 of the New Act corresponds to Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Old Act)- The draftsman in Section 87 has not specified the conditions which can be attached to a temporar y permit. So was the position in Section 62 of the Old Act. 3. Sub-section (2) of Section 72 of the New Act inter alia, provides that the Regiona' Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a stage carriage permit, may attach to the permit any or more of the conditions enumerated therein from (i) to (xxiv). (xxiv) reads "Any other condition which may be prescribed" SUB-section (2) of Section 72 corresponds to sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Old Act. (xxiv) reads "Any other condition which may be prescribed" SUB-section (2) of Section 72 corresponds to sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Old Act. Under the Old Act Rule 51-H had been made sub-rule (3) of the said rule is relevant and is extracted : "51-H. Permit Conditions of-The Regional Transport may to any permit granted or countersigned by it, attach : (3) the condition that in the case of a stage carriage or a contract carriage, the vehicle shall not at any time be usedi n any public place unless the tax due under the Uttar Pradesh Motor Gadi (Yatri Kar) Adhiniyam, 1962'has been paid in the prescribed manner by the holder of the permit." 4. Sections 72 and 87 fall in Chapter V of the New Act. Section 96 of the New Act provides that the statement may make rules for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter V. The corresponding section under the Old Act is Section 68. So far, it appears, no Rules have been framed by the State Government under Section 96 of the New Act. Therefore, the rules framed under Section 68 of the Old Act will continue to operate. (Section 24 of the General Clauses Act). The offending condition will surely facilitate the working of Rule 51- H (3) aforequoted as framed under the Old Act. The offending condition is really ancilliary to the said rule. 5. Section 84 of the New Act posits certain conditions which may be described as general conditions attached to all permits. The corresponding provision in the old act is sub-section (3) of Section ?9, Sub-section (2) of Section 72 and Section 84 do not exhaust all the possible conditions of a stage carriage permit. These conditions do not mandate that only the conditions mentioned in them can be regarded as conditions being included in a stage carriage permit and these conditions being regarded as conditions of permit. We have already indicated that the offending condition has a rational relationship or nexus with the conditions as contained in Rule 5-H (3). Therefore, it cannot be possibly urged that the offending condition is not germane to the provisions of the Act and the Rules. We have to bear in mind that the dominant purpose of the acts is the benefit of the public and not the permit holders. 6. Therefore, it cannot be possibly urged that the offending condition is not germane to the provisions of the Act and the Rules. We have to bear in mind that the dominant purpose of the acts is the benefit of the public and not the permit holders. 6. Section 87 of the New Act lays down the power of Regional or State Transport Authority to grant a temporary stage carriage permit with conditions annexed thereto. The conditions upon which the discretion to grant or not to grant a permit may be exercised are enumerated in (a) to (d). Till the stage when the Transport Authority decides to grant or not to grant a permit, it exercises a quasi-judicial power. However, when the stage of attaching conditions after the decision to grant a permit arrives, the quasi- judicial stage is left behind. At that stage, the decision to grant the permit is already there and only a condition or conditions have to be attached to the permit. The annexation of a condition is a part of purely executive duty of the Transport Authority concerned. Therefore, there is no scope for argument that the Transport Commissioner, while recommending the imposition of the offending condition, interfered with the quasi-judicial functions of the Transport Authority concerned. A body required to exercise independent discretion cannot act under the dictates of a superior authority or an outside authority or surrender its own decision to a policy persued by such an authority. However, it would not be debarred from considering the existence of such a policy or direction as a fact relevant to the exercise of its independent discretion. We, therefore, direct the two Transport Authorities and their Secretaries that, in case they decide to grant temporary permits to the petitioners, they shall exercise independent discretion while imposing the offending condition. 7. With these directions, this petition is disposed of finally. Petition dismissed.