JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—Petitioners by filing this petition under section 482 read with section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have prayed for setting-aside an order passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (If), Shimla in a complaint filed by respondent No 1 against respondents No. 3 to 5 directing the petitioners to be summoned and tried alongwith the other accused, 2. The facts in brief giving rise to the filing of the present petition are that on 29-12-1988 respondent No I filed a complaint in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla against respondents 3 to 4 complaining that he had been defamed by them by making false statements/imputations by drafting a resolution against him on 10-6-1987 and thereafter circulating it to the higher authorities in the government as well as to the Ministers on 12-6-1987 and in June, 1988 of which he acquired knowledge only in the month of December, 1988. The complaint was assigned by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Shimla to the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class (II), Shimla, who called upon the complainant to produce evidence in support of the complaint. On 21st of July, 1989 complainant examined himself and two other witnesses and closed his preliminary evidence on 30th of August, 1989 The trial Magistrate on the basis of evidence on record, came to the conclusion that there was sufficient grounds for proceeding against the three accused namely respondents No, 3 to 5 and accordingly he made an order summoning them to face trial After the accused had been duly served on 24th of April, 1990, an order was made, calling upon the complainant to produce pre-charge evidence on 4th of June, 1990. On the adjourned date two witnesses were present who were not examined by the complainant on the ground that in the facts and the circumstances, it was for the accused to have rebutted the averments made in the complaint On the same day an application was moved by the three accused praying for being discharged, as there was no prima facie case made out against them The case was taken up on 7th of August, 1990 when this application moved by three accused was rejected, and case was fixed for 8th October, 1990 for recording pre-charge evidence, after the complainants contention bad been negatived that it was for the accused to have rebutted the allegations made in the complaint. 3. 3. Feeling aggrieved the accused took up the matter in revision and the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Shimla on 5th of April, 1991 dismissed the revision and upheld the order of summoning the three accused. This order was further challenged by the three accused by filing Criminal Revision No. 31 of 1991 in this Court, which was dismissed on 6th of May, 1991. 4. On 8th of October, 1990 for which date complainant had been called upon to produce pre-charge evidence, the same was not produced, however, an application was moved by the complainant praying to summon 17 other persons as accused. Copy of this application was supplied to the Counsel for the three accused who had till then been summoned and after hearing arguments on 10th of July, 1991, this application was allowed on 12th of July, 1991 and the trial Magistrate has made an order of summoning those 17 other persons as accused, 15 out of them have challenged this order by filing this petition, the other two are respondents No. 6 and 7. It may at this stage be also noticed that petitioners No, 1, 4 and 11 who have now been summoned by the trial Magistrate as accused, in pursuance to the impugned order, are already named by the complainant as his witnesses in the case In the original complaint, 5. After the petition had been admitted, the record of proceedings was called in this court. I have beard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record minutely. 6. At the very outset preliminary objection has been raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the complainant that impugned order being interlocutory one cannot be interfered by this Court even in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction and in support of the same, reliance has been placed by him in V. C Shukla v. State through C B. I., AIR 1980 SC 962. On merits, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has challenged the impugned order by urging that the impugned order having been passed by the trial Magistrate without application of mind by overlooking the provisions of section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 hereinafter to be referred as the ‘Code’ and without satisfying himself about the existence of evidence worth the name on record to enable him to exercise jurisdiction in summoning the other persons to face trial alongwith the original accused. It has further been contended that assuming that impugned order is an interlocutory one, this Court under its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code can redress the grievance of the petitioner. The act of complainant in moving the application praying for summoning the petitioners was nothing but abuse of the process of the court. After considering the submissions made on behalf of the learned Counsel for the parties, I feel that there is much substance in what is stated by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 7. The only evidence which was adduced on the record on 21st of July, 1989 was in support of the complainant making out grievances that on 10th of June, 1987 a resolution had been drafted by the three accused which they circulated on i2th of June, 1987 and on June 9, 1988 which amounted to defaming him by making false statements and imputations. There is nothing in the statement of these three witnesses or in the alleged resolution dated 10th of June, 1987 which might connect the petitioners with the commission of the alleged offence. It was on 8-10-1990 that the application dated 9th of August, 1990 was moved which is at pages 133-34 of the record, in which the complainant for the first time alleged that the three accused by moving an application on 4th of June, 1990 has taken up a plea that they while passing the resolution were not alone but many others had joined them. It is further averred in the application that now the complainant has been able to get hold of the names of the persons supporting the three accused and a copy of resolution had come to his hand which is dated 7-6-1990, from which complicity of 17 persons can be made out in commission of the crime against him. It is further averred in the application that now the complainant has been able to get hold of the names of the persons supporting the three accused and a copy of resolution had come to his hand which is dated 7-6-1990, from which complicity of 17 persons can be made out in commission of the crime against him. Alongwith this application, the complainant attached list of 17 persons under his signature and attached thereto a photostat copy of minutes of proceedings of Executive members of the office of Divisional Commissioner employees. Mandi alleged to have been held on 18th of June, 1989. The photostat copy of the resolution would show that there are as many as 8 persons signatories to these minutes Neither this application dated 9th August, 1990 filed on 8th of October, 1990 is supported by an affidavit, nor copy of the minutes dated 18-6-1989 is authenticated one These were not proved on record but were merely produced. The trial Magistrate merely acted on the bare allegations of complainant without recording any further evidence in the case. 8. The only provisions which can be found in the Code which might enable and authorise a court to proceed against person other than the accused, appearing to be guilty of offence is section 319. It provides that in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person, not being the accused, has committed any offence, for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed, 9. An order under section 319 of the ‘Code’ for proceeding against a person other than the accused persons, in view of the clear provisions contained therein can be made only if it appears from the evidence that such person has committed any offence. In the absence of any evidence or j material, powers contained in section 319 cannot be exercised. The word evidence’ which finds mention in section 319 means evidence on record. Mere producing photostat copy of some minutes of a meeting which has not been authenticated at all, cannot be said to be a piece of evidence. It would become a piece of evidence only when it is proved on record in accordance with the provisions contained in the Evidence Act. Mere producing photostat copy of some minutes of a meeting which has not been authenticated at all, cannot be said to be a piece of evidence. It would become a piece of evidence only when it is proved on record in accordance with the provisions contained in the Evidence Act. Even the application, as pointed out is not supported by an affidavit. The Magistrate appears to have acted merely on the ipse dixit of the complainant and proceed in hot-haste to pass the impugned order summoning persons. Even from the contents of the application, it can be seen that there is no connection of the averments made therein with the resolution alleged to have been passed on 10-6-1987 which is the subject-matter of the original complaint. 10. The only question which now remains to be considered is the preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. In V. C. Shuklas’ case supra, the order of framing of the charges were held to be purely an interlocutory order as it does not terminate the proceedings but the trial goes on until it culminates in acquittal or conviction The argument of the learned Counsel for the complainant is that there is a clear bar in sub-section (2) of section 397 that the powers of the revision conferred by sub-section (i) in section 397 shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. The petitioners have no doubt prayed for quashing of the order in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction by this Court, but have also prayed that if powers of revision cannot be exercised, the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code be exercised to quash the order. The Supreme Court in Raj Kapoor and others v. State (Delhi Administration) and others, AIR 1980 SC 258, by placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47, held that there is no bar on the exercise of inherent powers where abuse of the process of the court or other extraordinary situation excites the courts jurisdiction It further held that inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 of the Code does not stand repelled when the revisional power under section 397 overlapse. While giving a word of caution the Supreme Court approved the ratio in Madhu Limayes case supra by observing that High Court must exercise the inherent powers very sparingly, the limitation is self-restraint and nothing more The policy of the law is clear the t interlocutory orders, pure and simple should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay, but nothing prevents the court from quashing an order when it brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the court or when it finds that the same deserve to be quashed for the purpose of securing the ends of justice. 11. In view of the aforementioned discussion and as has been found above, the trial Magistrate completely overlooked the provisions of section 319 of the Code’ and proceeded to pass the order in a mechanical manner, merely on the application of the complainant, without there being any material on record and on the basis of such allegations which cannot be said to have any connection whatsoever with the alleged resolution dated 10-6-1987, which is the subject-matter of the original complaint 12. Learned Counsel for the complainant further urged that the order passed on 12th July, 1991 summoning the petitioner is not liable to be interfered with as challenge made by the three original accused against the order of summoning them to face trial had failed when their revision petition was dismissed by this Court This submission made by the learned Counsel for complainant deserves out-right rejection Petitioners were not party to the proceedings, when the three accused had challenged the order passed against them. The subject-matter of dispute in the revision filed by the three accused in this court was totally different than the one which is presently involved in the instant petition. 13. Accordingly, I feel inclined to accept the petition which is hereby accepted. The impugned order dated 12th July, 1991 passed by the trial Court is quashed and set-aside The records of the case will be sent back to the trial Magistrate with the directions to proceed in accordance with law against the three accused persons, Trial Courts order quashed.